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PART VIII.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

TURKISH WAR.

May 1913.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

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111	„ „ ..	369	30,	Turco-Servian campaign in Central Albania. Refers to Part VII, No. 212. Transmits report from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir	55
112	„ „ ..	371	May 1,	Castellorizo. Refers to Part VII, No. 464. Transmits despatch from Vice-Consul Sir A. Biliotti reporting further on its occupation by the Greeks	56
113	„ „ ..	372	1,	Keshan Collieries Company. Refers to Part V, No. 485. Transmits memorandum furnished by company showing how their property would be affected by new frontier line, and setting forth their position	56

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114	Sir G. Lowther ..	374	Apr. 30, 1913	Albania. Essad Pasha's message to Grand Vizier asking for instructions, and latter's reply. Reports on steps taken in connection with transmission of messages. Captain of "Zealandia" forwards Essad's message, but it was deemed better for him not to forward the reply	58
115	„ „ ..	376	May 1,	Conclusion of peace. Refers to Part VII, No. 507. Transmits copy of note presented to Ottoman Government inviting them to cease hostilities, designate plenipotentaries, and select meeting place ..	59
116	Sir E. Goschen ..	162 Confidential	2,	Evacuation of Scutari. Austrian action. Has communicated Part VII, No. 648 to Herr von Jagow. Reports conversation with him. Herr von Jagow maintained Austrian view as to urgency of compelling evacuation of Scutari. Sir E. Goschen emphasised point that the time taken to do this was less important than necessity of preserving the concert	59
117	Sir F. Bertie ..	225	2,	Crete. Indemnities for family of Moslem guard and for M. Zaimis. Advance of 4,000,000 fr. Refers to Part VII, No. 415. Transmits French reply. M. Pichon does not think it desirable to submit question of repayment of advance to the Paris Financial Commission (see Nos. 296 and 517)	60
118	„ „ .	229	4,	Financial Commission in Paris. Representation in it of Ottoman Debt Administration. Refers to Part VII, No. 489. M. Pichon agrees that such representation is undesirable	61
119	Admiralty .. .	Confidential	5.	Evacuation of Scutari. Vice-Admiral has arranged for supplies to be sent, but as such action would nullify blockade he enquires whether his Majesty's Government agree to it. He thinks removal of destitute population to San Giovanni impracticable	61
120	„ „ ..	Confidential	5.	Evacuation of Scutari. Supplies. Withdrawal of Servian troops. Movements of Montenegrin troops. Transmits copies of telegrams exchanged with Vice-Admiral and of telegram from Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean ..	62
121	Sir R. Rodd ..	95 Tel.	5,	Albania. Italian action in south. Refers to No. 102. Minister for Foreign Affairs had not decided on form of the communication which would have to be made explaining Italian action. It would have been represented as a form of co-operation with Austria, but he hoped question would not now arise (see No. 122)	63
122	„ „ ..	96 Tel.	5,	Albania. Italian action. Refers to No. 121. Minister for Foreign Affairs gave assurance that Italy coveted no territory in Albania	63
123	Sir G. Lowther ..	220 Tel.	5,	Conclusion of peace. Peace delegates. Refers to No. 89. Reports names of Turkish delegates (see No. 203) ..	63

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124	Count de Salis ..	84 Tel.	May 5, 1913	Albania. Threatening Austrian notes to Montenegro. Refers to No. 42. Montenegrin Government have promised satisfaction, and no causes of tension appear to remain	63
125	To Sir F. Elliot ..	71 Tel.	5.	Greek 2½ per cent. guaranteed loan. Refers to No. 16, and Part VII, No. 530. Sees no *prima facie* objection to release of bonds. This applies to National Bank only, and not to Ionian Bank (see No. 303) ..	64
126	To Count de Salis ..	58 Tel.	5.	Evacuation of Scutari. Attendance of vice-consul at functions. Refers to No. 82. Vice-consul should certainly not attend ..	64
127	„ „ ..	59 Tel.	5.	Evacuation of Scutari. Refers to No. 92. He should express to King Sir E. Grey's appreciation of his message. It is important that when naval officers have arranged to take over town no difficulties shall be made by Montenegrin Government (see No. 156)	64
128	„ „ ..	60 Tel.	5.	Evacuation of Scutari and procedure in regard to its evacuation. Transmits text of resolution adopted at Ambassadors' meeting of 5th May. Instructs him to join in collective representation accordingly	64
129	To Sir F. Elliot .	72 Tel.	5.	Repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania. Transmits Ambassadors' resolution to effect that Powers should ask Greek Government not to oppose passage of transports (see No. 146) .	65
130	To Sir F. Bertie ..	307	5.	Evacuation of Scutari. Partition of Albania. Future of Ægean islands. Informs of conversation with French and Russian Ambassadors touching on these points ..	65
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131	To Sir F. Cartwright	103	5.	Evacuation of Scutari. Informs of conversation with Austrian Ambassador, who related what Count Berchtold had done on receiving news	65
132	To Sir F. Cartwright	104	5.	Evacuation of Scutari. Repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania. Informs of proceedings at Ambassadors' Conference of 5th May, and of resolutions passed concerning procedure in regard to taking over town, and concerning steps to be taken at Athens in regard to repatriation of Turkish troops	66
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133	To Sir E. Goschen ..	151	5.	Evacuation of Scutari. Has informed German Ambassador of Montenegrin decision, and took opportunity of pointing out that Powers' proceedings had been based on assumption that no Power would seek to acquire territory for itself. This was said with reference to partition of Albania and question of Ægean islands ..	67
134	To Treasury ..	..	5.	Ottoman Debt revenues drawn from occupied territories. Refers to Part VII, No. 356. Sir E. Grey does not expect to receive any further observations from the Law Commissioners	67

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136	Consul Samson ..	4	Mar. 30,	Adrianople. Reports on political and military events from 3rd February to 23rd March	68
137	Sir R. Rodd ..	106	May 2,	Southern Albanian frontier. Corfu Channel. Refers to No. 67. Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Austrian Government agree in opposing Greek control, which would menace gate of Adriatic; but he thought there was room for compromise and that frontier might be extended north of River Kalamas ..	74
138	Sir G. Buchanan ..	145	2.	Evacuation of Scutari. Russian attitude in event of Austrian action. Transmits *aide-memoire* defining Russian attitude summarised in No. 52	74
139	„ „ ..	146	3.	Ottoman fiscal stamps. Transmits Russian reply to communication made in pursuance of Part VII, No. 471. Russian Government have not received Turkish circular, but share Sir E. Grey's view (see No. 369)	75
140	Sir F. Harvey to Sir L. Mallet	..	4.	Financial Commission. Question of inclusion of 3 per cent. customs surtax will present greatest difficulty. States the position, and enquires view of His Majesty's Government	76
141	M. Coromilas to Greek Legation	Confidential	5.	Repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania. Greek Government will allow free passage to transports. Draws attention to problem of maintaining order in Albania after withdrawal of troops, and suggests methods of meeting difficulty	77
142	Council of Foreign Bondholders	..	5.	Financial Commission. Representation of Administration of Ottoman Debt. Refers to Part VII, No. 418. Reminds Sir E. Grey of their request that such representation be invited (see Part IX, No. 49) ..	77
143	Admiralty..	Confidential	6.	Evacuation of Scutari. Repatriation of Turkish troops. Transmits copies of two telegrams to vice-admiral containing his instructions	78
144	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	156 Tel.	6.	Bulgarian troops. Reports their distribution	78
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146	Sir F. Elliot ..	66 Tel.	6.	Repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania. Refers to No. 129. Has informed Prime Minister of Ambassadors' resolution. Greek Government are ready to facilitate repatriation, but think some force should be left for maintenance of order (see No. 197)	79
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151	Sir G. Lowther ..	382	3,	Turkish financial position. Transmits extract showing extraordinary credits for year ending 1st March. Recalls Sir R. Crawford's statement that Turkey will require to raise £T. 25,000,000 at end of war	80
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154	M. Misu	..	6,	Kutzo-Vlachs. Roumanian Government desire insertion in peace treaty of clause granting an amnesty to Kutzo-Vlachs in the belligerents' territories (see No. 388)	82
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157	„ „ ..	86 Tel. Confidential	6,	Albania. Essad Pasha. French Minister learns that King is asking allies to give Essad some of Turkish ammunition captured in war	83
158	Sir F. Elliot ..	68 Tel. Confidential	7,	Southern Albanian frontier. Corfu Channel. Prime Minister supposes that Italian objections to Greek possession are based on fear of channel not being neutralised in practice. He enquires whether Sir E. Grey could suggest appointment of permanent commission to prevent its fortification of channel, the expenses to be charged to Greece	84
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163	„ „	107	7,	Evacuation of Scutari. Austrian Ambassador feared King Nicholas might not wish to include all fortifications and Tarabosh in surrender of town. Sir E. Grey read to him No. 156, and said he had no indication of any such difficulty ..	85
164	To Sir G. Lowther ..	135	7,	Imposition of 1 per cent. tobacco duty at Ghergheli by Servians. Transmits No. 31. Enquires whether duty was or was not collected under Turkish rule, as statements by tobacco company and by Servian Government differ (see No. 447). .	85
165	To Sir R. Rodd ..	127	7,	Organisation of Albania. Transmits draft scheme presented by Italian Ambassador	85
166	„ „ ..	128	7,	Albanian frontiers and Ægean islands. Italian Ambassador states that Austria has accepted Italian proposals for organisation of Albania. Refuses to consider compensation for Montenegro. Sir E. Grey suggests connecting question of southern frontier with that of Ægean islands. Italian Ambassador agrees, but refuses to consider cession of Rhodes to Greece, though disclaiming intention to hold it	87
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168	Sir F. Elliot ..	94	Apr. 30,	War news and minor events of March and April in Greece. Movements of Royal Family. Pro-Russian demonstrations. Search for the "Hamidieh" .. .	88
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177	Sir G. Lowther ..	221 Tel.	8.	Repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania. Refers to No. 140. Turkish Government states that transports will soon be sent for repatriation of troops	95
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179	Sir H. Bax-Ironside ..	157 Tel.	8,	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 161. Bulgarian Prime Minister acknowledges impartiality of His Majesty's Government, and realises equivocal attitude of Austria	95
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187	Sir E. Goschen ..	171	7,	Seizure of Ottoman fiscal stamps by allies. Refers to Part VII, No. 471. German Government has instructed German representatives at Sophia and Athens to make representations against action of allies. Gives reasons for this action. Hopes that His Majesty's Government will instruct representatives in same manner (see No. 253)	99
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192	„ „	89 Tel.	8.	Montenegrin Cabinet. Reports formation of new Montenegrin Cabinet under General Janko Vukotich, M. Petrie Plamenatz being Minister for Foreign Affairs (see No. 434)	102
193	Sir H. Bax-Ironside	153 Tel.	9.	Silkworms. Refers to Part VII, No. 200. Prohibition withdrawn	102
194	„ „	159 Tel.	9.	Macedonian outrages. German Minister has called attention of Bulgarian Government to matter, especially to state of districts of Ropchos and Nevrecop. This, with British representations, has made impression. Suggests that French Minister should be instructed in same sense (see No. 216)	102
195	Sir G. Lowther	224 Tel.	9.	Movements of British ships. Refers to No. 183. Suggests that it would be premature to remove battleship from Constantinople before signature of peace (see No. 526)	102
196	Sir G. Buchanan	186 Tel.	9.	Roumano-Bulgarian arbitration. Refers to No. 148. Decision signed. Minister for Foreign Affairs will inform Roumanian and Bulgarian Governments, but will not communicate text till signature of peace	103
197	Sir F. Elliot	70 Tel.	9.	Repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania. Refers to No. 146. Greek Government has informed Bulgarian Government of proposed repatriation; but latter object, and Greek Government must conform to views of their ally (see No. 353)	103
198	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside „ Sir F. Elliot	64 42	9.	Seizure of Ottoman fiscal stamps by allies. Transmits copies of despatch from Constantinople forwarding Turkish request for restitution of stamps, of circular despatch to Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Rome expressing views of His Majesty's Government on matter, and of despatch from Paris embodying views of French Government. Instructions to address note to Government in this sense (see Nos. 148 and 353)	103
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201	Sir G. Lowther	384	4.	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 115. Transmits copy of reply of Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to collective note of Powers on peace negotiations. Reply states that Turkish Government accept Powers' invitation to cease hostilities, and designates London as meeting place of peace delegates	105
202	„ „	386	4.	War news. His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana reports engagement on Cilician coast between Turkish troops and Greek cruiser	106
203	„ „	390	6.	Conclusion of peace. Confirms No 123. Turkish delegates for London Peace Conference. 1. Osman Nizami Pasha, ex-Ambassador in Berlin. 2. Batzaria Effendi, a Kutzo-Vlach, connected with the Salonica Jewish politicians, and a strong supporter of the Triple Alliance. 3. Reshid Bey, known in London in connection with Bagdad Railway negotiations	106
204	Admiralty	Confidential	10.	Evacuation of Scutari. Transmits two telegrams from Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to effect that (1) ships will shortly be sent for repatriation of Turkish troops, and (2) convention for evacuation of Scutari drawn up and signed. Its terms given	106
205	Count de Salis	90 Tel. Confidential	9.	Albania. Essad Pasha. Report, based on authority of King, that Essad has received 16,000*l.* from Servia	107
206	Sir H. Bax-Ironside	160 Tel.	9.	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 160. Bulgarian Prime Minister states that Bulgarian Government will sign treaty as soon as Enos-Midia line has been defined as they propose. They do not think treaty will cause much difficulty	107
207	„ „	161 Tel.	10.	Ottoman bonds. Refers to No. 654. British and French Ministers, after discussing matter with Prime Minister, have sent him identic note	108
208	„ „	162 Tel.	10.	Movements of Servian troops. All Servian troops have now left Bulgaria. Bulgarian delay in providing trains for them has caused much friction	108
209	Sir G. Lowther	225 Tel.	10.	Castelloriza. Consul at Smyrna telegraphs that vice-consul at Rhodes now corrects his telegram of 20th April, and states that there was no military occupation of island by Greeks (see No. 254)	108
210	Sir R. Paget	117 Tel.	10.	Albania. Telegram from Monastir states that Servians have evacuated Elbasan after establishing a mainly Albanian Administration	108

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212	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside	108 Tel.	10,	Conclusion of peace. Enos-Midia frontier. Refers to No. 129. Enquires whether Bulgarian Government addressed official note embodying desire expressed by M. Gueshof as to frontier line. If so, its terms to be telegraphed	109
213	To Sir R. Paget ..	89 Tel.	10,	Conclusion of peace. Suggested amnesty. Ambassadors' Conference passed resolution on 8th May recommending proclamation of general amnesty. Instructions to communicate resolution when colleagues have been similarly instructed	109
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214	Sir F. Cartwright ..	76 Tel.	11,	Financial Commission. Representation of Ottoman Public Debt on. Refers to No. 189. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Austrian Government recommend appointment of Sir Adam Block with advisory voice. Reasons given	109
215	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	163 Tel.	11,	Conclusion of peace. Enos-Midia frontier. Refers to No. 212. No official note, but Prime Minister handed to each foreign Minister paper giving proposed definition of line, full text of which was given in No. 129	109
216	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside	109 Tel.	11,	Macedonian outrages. Refers to No. 194. Instructions to ask French colleague to speak to Bulgarian Government ..	110
217	Sir G. Lowther ..	220 Tel.	12,	Repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania. Refers to Nos. 177 and 197. Porte has sent list of transports. 3,000 troops will be landed at Beirout, remainder at Smyrna, Constantinople, and Black Sea ports. Turks apparently unaware of Bulgarian objections. Should they be informed?	110
218	„ „ ..	230 Tel.	12,	Repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania. Refers to No. 217. Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has heard of Bulgarian objections, and suspended proposed arrangements till matter is settled ..	110
219	Sir F. Elliot .	71 Tel.	12,	Conclusion of peace. Reply of allies to communication of 1st May. They agree to cease hostilities and send delegates to London, who may claim to discuss Albanian frontier and islands till after conclusion of peace. Greek plenipotentiaries are MM. Skoulondis, Gennadius, and Streit ..	110
220	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	164 Tel.	12,	Conclusion of peace. Transmits reply of allies to communication of 1st May, as in No. 219 (see No. 435)..	111
221	„ . ..	165 Tel.	12,	Greco-Bulgarian relations. Transmits two telegrams from Cavalla reporting conflicts between Greek and Bulgarian troops ..	111

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223	To Sir F. Bertie ..	202 Tel.	12,	Repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania. Refers to No. 197. Requests that Powers should request Bulgarian Government not to raise difficulties, as the repatriation was a purely humanitarian measure, and troops would not be employed in further hostilities (see Nos. 248, 258, 264, 265, 295, 295, and 316)	111
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457	Consul-General Lamb	36 Tel.	26,	Greco-Bulgarian relations. Refers to No. 423. Fighting stopped 24th May. 200 wounded arrived in Salonica ..	273
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463	„ . .	180 Tel.	26.	Greco-Bulgarian relations. Refers to No. 430. Reports skirmishes between Greeks and Bulgarians, 23rd, 24th, and 25th May. Bulgarian Government are sending General Savanof to negotiate at Athens. Policy of Bulgarians apparently to encircle Greek forces round Saloniea to obtain free hand against Servia (see No. 512) ..	274
464	Sir G. Lowther ..,	244 Tel.	26,	Mines at Smyrna. Refers to No. 420. Grand Vizier says he has sent commission of enquiry to Smyrna. He is at a loss to explain occurrence, as he declares mines were all of modern type (see No. 513)	274
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467	To Sir F. Elliot ..	79 Tel.	26.	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 427. Urges Greece to sign treaty. Those delegates who are prepared to sign should do so at once, and others should leave London. Question of Albanian frontier and Ægean isles cannot be considered till treaty is signed. In signing treaty Greece can make reserves for herself, though of course Powers will not be bound by them (see Nos. 491 and 492, and Part IX. No. 27)	275
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471	To Sir H. Bax-Ironside	72	26.	Conclusion of peace. Reports conversation with Bulgarian Minister, who says Bulgaria cannot allow continuation of present situation. He hints that Bulgaria will sign independently of other allies	277
472	„ „	76	28.	Conclusion of peace. Greco-Bulgarian relations. Reports conversation with Dr. Danef, who complains of Greek delay in signing treaty. He is prepared to sign treaty as it stands. Sir E. Grey agrees that those delegates who are prepared to sign should sign at once. If Bulgaria signed, peace would be secured on land. Dr. Danef speaks of Greco-Bulgarian conflicts, and suspects Greeks of wishing to seize railway from Dedeagatch to prevent transport of Bulgarian troops from Chatalja	277
473	To Sir F. Cartwright „ Sir F. Bertie .. „ Sir E. Goschen .. „ Sir R. Rodd .. „ Mr. O'Beirne ..	116 332 166 143 208	26.	Ambassadors' Conference. Reports meeting of 26th May. Discussion of Greek attitude to treaty, Northern Albanian boundary, Scutari, Servian railway to Adriatic.	278
474	Sir F. Elliot ..	115	19.	Relations of allies. Athens corresponds deny existence of Greco-Servian treaty, but an understanding of some sort is certain. Both Greece and Servia afraid of Bulgarian predominance. Fighting between Greeks and Bulgarians appears to have been serious. Bulgarian Minister accuses Greeks of pouring troops into Macedonia while Bulgarian army was occupied at Chatalja, and declares Greek Government will not come to terms. M. Venizelos shows unusual exasperation against Bulgarians (see No. 534) ..	279
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490	French Embassy ..	..	27.	Commercial Court at Salonica. Note stating view of French Government that Balkan States should be requested to promise to respect decisions of Salonica Court on cases anterior to annexation. Requests views of His Majesty's Government (see Part IX, No. 87)	289
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493	„ „ ..	87A Tel. Very Conf.	28.	Ægean islands. German Minister says Italian Government have asked German Government to urge Greece to negotiate on islands with Italy direct. German Government has advised Italy to apply to His Majesty's Government	290
494	Sir H. Bax-Ironside..	183 Tel.	28.	Conclusion of peace. Refers to No. 479. Bulgarian delegates prepared to sign at once	290
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525	To Sir E. Goschen ..	209 Tel.	30.	Asia Minor. German Ambassador suspects secret agreement between England, France, and Russia to partition Asia Minor. Instructions to deny report (see Part IX, No. 107)	303
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527	.. .. ..	232 Tel.	30.	Conclusion of peace. As soon as peace treaty was signed Bulgarian delegate proposed protocol stating that peace should begin from signature of treaty. Servian and Greek delegates raised objections. Turkish delegate then asked Sir E. Grey if he should sign with Bulgarian delegate alone. Sir E. Grey said he would, in his opinion, be justified in so doing. This can be told to Ottoman Government ..	304
528	To Sir F. Cartwright ,, Sir F. Bertie .. ,, Sir E. Goschen .. ,, Sir R. Rodd ,, Mr. O'Beirne ..	118 345 171 148 312	30.	Ambassadors' Conference. At meeting of 30th May Sir E. Grey announced conclusion of peace, and suggested solution of Albanian and islands questions by compromising giving Koritza and Stilos to Albania and islands to Greece. Ambassadors agreed to report to their Governments. Other questions discussed: Montenegrin loan and organisation of Albania ..	304
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533	Sir F. Elliot ..	117	23.	Seizure of Ottoman fiscal stamps by allies. Refers to No. 198. Transmits note addressed to Greek Government by French and British Ministers requesting restoration of stamps (see Part IX, No. 50)	312
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535	Consul-General Wratislaw	14	24.	Cretan immunities. Proceeds of Cretan surtax are paid to all six Powers, and not to protecting Powers alone. Consent of Austria and Germany will therefore be necessary to secure use of surtax receipts for immunities	313
536	Sir R. Rodd ..	133 Confidential	25.	Southern Albania further. Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs has told Greek Chargé d'Affaires that Italy would support Roumanian proposal for inclusion of Koritza Vlorla in Albania. La reverse-ton with British Ambassador, Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs has always asserted that proposal came from Austria; but it is evident that Italian Government are using it for bargaining compensation of Corfu Channel and islands. They have also objected to Greece holding Argyro-castro	314
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542	..	192 Tel. Confidential	31.	Relations of allies. Refers to No. 540. If no immediate arrangement can be come to, Servian Government, with consent of Russian Government, will propose conference at St. Petersburgh on lines given in No. 496	317

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Further Correspondence respecting the Turkish War.

Part VIII.

[19993] No. 1.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 9.) *Canea, April 20, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 9 of the 18th instant, reporting that, by order of the Greek Government, M. Dragoumis has instructed the Cretan custom-house authorities to admit Greek products and manufactures (including those of districts occupied by Greek troops during the war) into this island free of duty, I have the honour to state that until further orders Greek tobacco and alcohol will continue to pay duty on importation into Crete.

I have already reported in my despatch No. 7 of the 12th instant that Cretan products are now admitted free into Greece. Here again, an exception has been made in the case of Cretan beer and malt, tobacco, alcohol, explosives, ready-made clothing, forest products, flour, and farinaceous products, which continue to pay duty according to the Greek tariff.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[19967] No. 2.

Mr. Vaughan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 46. Confidential.) *Bucharest, April 27, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Roumanian Minister of Commerce, M. Xenopol, has availed himself of the parliamentary recess to visit Italy.

The ostensible object of his visit is the study of economic questions with a view to the promotion of trade between the two countries, but I am confidentially informed that the real object is to convey the official thanks of the Roumanian Government to the Italian Government for the latter's support of Roumania's claims in the matter of Silistria. The Italian military attaché remarked to me that the visit was no doubt further prompted by a desire to make amends for Roumania's attitude during the Italo-Turkish war.

Prince Carol is leaving Bucharest to-morrow for a tour in Italy, and will be, I understand, the bearer of the chain of the order of Carol I, which the King of Roumania is conferring upon the King of Italy.

According to telegrams published in the Roumanian press, M. Xenopol has been shown marked attention by the Italian Sovereign, His Majesty having invited him and Madame Xenopol to be his guests of honour on the occasion of the launch of the "Duilio," and having conferred a high decoration upon his Excellency.

Public opinion here credits Italy with having espoused the Roumanian cause with

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greater enthusiasm than Austria, who is thought to be fearful of any action on her part likely to alienate the sympathies of Bulgaria.

I have, &c.
J. C. T. VAUGHAN.

[20378] No. 3.

Note communicated by Count Mensdorff, May 1, 1913.

LE Gouvernement austro-hongrois, tout en maintenant la proposition présentée dans la réunion du 15 mars relativement aux droits découlant des Capitulations turques dans les territoires qui seront annexés par les alliés, est prêt à ne pas insister pour qu'une stipulation à ce sujet soit insérée parmi les articles de la paix préliminaire. Cette décision a été prise par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal pour les raisons suivantes :

La paix préliminaire ne spécifie pas encore l'étendue des territoires qui seront annexés à chacun des États balkaniques, et le règlement des questions rattachées à la souveraineté territoriale dans ces portions, surtout des questions financières et des questions régies actuellement par les Capitulations, est donc réservé à une date ultérieure quand il y aura pleine clarté sur les parts de territoire allouées à chaque État balkanique.

L'Autriche-Hongrie fera alors dépendre sa reconnaissance de ces changements territoriaux d'une solution satisfaisante des questions susindiquées.

Ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie, Londres,
le 1er mai, 1913.

[20148] No. 4.

Memorandum communicated by Count Trauttmansdorff, May 1, 1913.

L'ENQUÊTE faite sur la mort du Père Palitch n'a relevé aucun fait qui pourrait motiver les plaintes des autorités et fonctionnaires monténégrins contre ce prêtre, et tout ce que ces fonctionnaires avancent sur les circonstances dans les quelles Palitch a été tué est dénué de fondement.

On a, au contraire, constaté les faits suivants : Sans prendre égard à son caractère de prêtre et sans l'avoir jugé, on fit ligoter Palitch et on l'escorta à pied comme un prisonnier ordinaire. En outre, la déposition que le Père Clément fit devant la commission comme témoin, fait sérieusement soupçonner que le Père Palitch fut mal[illegible] par ordre. En outre, comme notre protectorat religieux est encore en vigueur, on doit [illegible] qu'un dignitaire autrichien aurait dû assister à l'interrogatoire auquel le Père a été soumis par la police monténégrine.

Nous [illegible] donc justifiés à demander au Gouvernement monténégrin une satisfaction pour la mort dudit prêtre.

Quant aux conversions forcées des catholiques du district de Diakova, nous avons désiré [illegible] cette question d'accord avec le Gouvernement monténégrin et de rétablir [illegible] religieux. Le Gouvernement monténégrin a rejeté la demande du Ministre d'Autriche-Hongrie à Cettigné de n'opposer aucun obstacle aux rapports [illegible] avec leurs prêtres sous des prétextes futiles. Ces convertis forcés ont été sommés par les autorités monténégrines d'assister sans exception [illegible] service orthodoxe célébré pendant les fêtes de Pâques.

Cette attitude du Gouvernement monténégrin démontre qu'il est impossible d'obtenir de ce Gouvernement par des négociations amicales qu'il respecte les droits légitimes et empêche leur violation, comme il est d'usage entre États guidés par le sentiment de justice.

Nous nous refusons donc de laisser participer plus longtemps notre délégué dans l'enquête de Diakova, qui est rendue illusoire par l'obstruction pratiquée de la part des agents monténégrins.

Comme cette enquête ne sera pas continuée, nous sommes forcés de rechercher d'autres moyens pour sauvegarder la liberté religieuse des catholiques de Diakova.

Pour régler donc l'affaire Palitch ainsi que celle des conversions forcées, nous adressons au Gouvernement monténégrin les demandes suivantes :

1. Le Gouvernement monténégrin ayant refusé jusqu'ici—malgré des demandes réitérées—de laisser enterrer Palitch d'après le rite catholique, devra faire transporter le corps du défunt à l'église catholique du village de Zumbi (à trois heures de Diakova), où l'enterrement solennel aura lieu ; le Gouvernement monténégrin se fera représenter à cet enterrement par un fonctionnaire militaire ou civil ayant le grade de général ou de Ministre d'État.

2. Le Gouvernement monténégrin érigera sur un point de son futur territoire qui sera déterminé plus tard une croix commémorative de la mort du Père Palitch et prendra toutes les mesures nécessaires pour que la construction d'une église catholique, que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal se propose d'ériger en mémoire de ce religieux, puisse être tout de suite commencée. Le Gouvernement monténégrin se fera représenter à la consécration solennelle de la croix commémorative et de cette église par un fonctionnaire militaire ou civil ayant le grade de général ou de Ministre d'État.

3. Comme il est à craindre que les ex-catholiques convertis par force à l'orthodoxie et voulant revenir à leur ancienne religion seront menacés dans leur sûreté personnelle, le Gouvernement monténégrin leur garantit d'une manière manifeste, soit par affiches, soit par le crieur public, &c., la liberté de choisir leur domicile, c'est-à-dire le libre passage, soit sur le territoire occupé actuellement par l'armée serbe, soit sur celui de la future Albanie.

Ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie, Londres,
le 1er mai, 1913.

[20107] No. 5.

Memorandum communicated by Hakki Pasha, May 1, 1913.

LE Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique voudra bien donner son consentement :

1. A l'élévation des droits d'importation en Turquie à 15 pour cent *ad valorem*. La nouvelle augmentation de 4 pour cent ne pourra être appliquée aux marchandises anglaises que si elle est appliquée à celles de tous les autres États.

2. Au remplacement ultérieur de 15 pour cent *ad valorem* par un tarif à droits spécifiques à fixer d'un commun accord.

(Au moment de la confection de ce tarif, il sera possible d'avantager certains classes de produits et de charger certaines autres de façon à rester dans la moyenne de 15 pour cent.)

3. A l'application aux sujets britanniques de l'impôt de témottu, à la condition d'une application générale à tous les étrangers.

4. A l'abolition, en principe, des bureaux de poste étrangers.

(En attendant et pour éviter la criante injustice des revenus publics d'un État perçus pour le compte des autres, on peut suggérer l'idée de l'emploi de timbres ottomans par les bureaux étrangers.)

5. A étudier la question de la suppression des Capitulations.

(L'Angleterre, en consentant et en participant à cette étude, rendra un vrai service, pas seulement à la Turquie et à la nation ottomane, mais aussi à l'humanité. L'état actuel de la justice en Turquie, avec les lois et les tribunaux d'une douzaine d'États, équivaut à la négation de toute justice. Si tous les États ayant des droits capitulaires découlant de leurs propres traités (non par la clause de la nation la plus favorisée) nommaient une commission purement de juristes pour étudier les inconvénients du système actuel et recommander les moyens d'y obvier, on pourrait arriver, par étapes, à de grandes améliorations.)

Londres, le 1er mai, 1913.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON
ALL WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE

[20430] No. 6.

Memorandum communicated by Italian Embassy.

(Translation.)

THE Government of His Majesty the King of Italy has been informed that the Russian Government are disposed to accept the French scheme for the labours of the financial conference at Paris. Nevertheless, the Russian Government, being desirous of safeguarding the sovereign rights of the Balkan States, make certain reservations in regard to the question of the maintenance of concessions, &c., granted to third parties by the Sublime Porte; they propose that this question should not be decided by the conference of Paris, which is of a technical character and ill-suited to settle such matters of principle, but that it should rather be referred to the meeting of the Ambassadors in London or else to the Ambassadors of the same Powers at Paris.

The Italian Ambassador would be grateful if he might be furnished with the views of the British Government on this point.

May 1, 1913.

[20078] No. 7.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 1.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, May* 1, 1913.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of telegrams, dated the 30th ultimo, which have been received from the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, and the Vice-Admiral commanding Third Squadron.

I am, &c.

W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 7.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April* 30, 1913.

EXPECT all Servians will have left San Giovanni di Medua by 3rd May, and believe town will be occupied by Montenegrins. Alessio has been evacuated by Servians and occupied by force of, at least, 500 Montenegrins.

Stores left by Servians at Alessio, and, apparently also at San Giovanni di Medua, for Montenegrins.

Enclosure 2 in No. 7.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *April* 30, 1913.

REFERENCE to No. 356, three more transports reached Salonica with Servian troops.

[20114] No. 8.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, May* 1, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 158 of 30th April.

I enquired of Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who had heard nothing of Turkish battery, and does not understand why they should be taken to Durazzo. In view, however, of complete uncertainty prevailing with regard to Essad Pasha's intentions, the Austro-Hungarian Government would consider it more prudent not to comply for present with his request and will instruct their admiral accordingly.

[20113] No. 9.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 155.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, May* 1, 1913.

PEACE mediation.

My immediate preceding telegram of 29th April.

I have to-day carried out, in concert with my colleagues, instructions contained in your telegram No. 102 of 23rd April.

Prime Minister informed me that Bulgarian Government will at once proceed to arrange further suspension of hostilities. They must consult their allies as to remaining points before giving a definite reply. Allies were, however, already agreed on London as place of signature. If signature is only to be a formality he thinks that it might be done by Bulgarian Minister.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[20110] No. 10.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 168.)

(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, May* 1, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 375 of 30th April.

I communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs substance of your circular telegram of yesterday.

His Excellency expressed entire approval, and said he had himself held very similar language in speaking of Austria and Montenegro as that in which you had explained proper attitude for a strong man to adopt towards a weaker one.

He could not as yet state definitely course Russian Government might have to adopt. Emperor had enjoined on him necessity for patience. For the present, therefore, their attitude would be one of abstention, and they would wait on events. They were most anxious to avoid being dragged into a war. They were not afraid of Austria, but Germany had also to be reckoned with, and though in such case France would support Russia it was not known what England would do, and England alone of all Powers was in a position to strike a mortal [group omitted: ? blow] at Germany.

Russian Government, moreover, did not want to endanger results achieved by Balkan States, and while latter would gain strength year by year Austria would grow weaker and weaker. It was not therefore to Russia's interest to precipitate war, but he was most anxious not to let Austria know that Russia would do all she could to avert war. As soon as Austria moved, Russian Government would probably have to explain their attitude in a communiqué, of which terms would have to be carefully considered, so as to avoid appearance of weakness on one hand or of provocation on the other. Their subsequent attitude would be guided by nature of Austria's action, and by state of public opinion in Russia. Were Austrian action to be confined strictly to obtaining evacuation of Scutari, he trusted that Government would be able to control public opinion. But if it assumed larger proportions he could not answer for consequences.

Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me what we should do. I replied that I gathered our attitude would be on lines laid down in declaration made by you at meeting of Ambassadors on 28th April, and that I presumed we should continue to take part in naval demonstration.

[20111] No. 11.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 169.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, May* 1, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 371 of 30th April.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said he did not understand object of transporting Turkish battery from San Giovanni di Medua to Durazzo, and that he must make further enquiries before giving me an answer.

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[20112] No. 12.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 170.) *St. Petersburgh, May 1, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)
MINISTER for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he had telegraphed to Sophia and Belgrade, expressing the earnest preoccupation which the differences between the two Governments were causing him, and suggesting that time had come for them to submit questions in dispute to arbitration of Russia in conformity with terms of their treaty.

[20115] No. 13.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 81.) *Rome, May 1, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)
SOME of my colleagues are disposed to think that, if Austria operates alone at Scutari, Italy may endeavour to find pretext for sending force to Southern Albania. Nothing has been said to me at the Foreign Office indicating that such a plan is contemplated, but some tentative suggestions of this nature have appeared in the press.

[20095] No. 14.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 214.) *Constantinople, May 1, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.
YOUR telegram No. 201 of 29th April.
I understand Turkish Government have already, through their Ambassadors, approached Powers with a view to obtaining consent of the allies to the repatriation of Essad's and the other troops from Albania.
My colleagues are generally in favour of this, but my Russian colleague suggests that if Albania is to be independent some troops may be required to form gendarmerie.

[20096] No. 15.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 215.) *Constantinople, May 1, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.
YOUR telegram No. 195 of 23rd April: Cessation of hostilities.
Collective note handed in to-day. Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to give an affirmative reply to-morrow.

[20041] No. 16.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 62.) *Athens, May 1, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.
MY despatch No. 83 of 21st April: Greek 2½ per cent. guaranteed loan.
Following from delegate on Financial Commission:—

"Commission unanimously in favour of consenting to the release of bonds deposited by the National Bank of Greece. If no objection we shall reply in this sense on 3rd May. Governor of bank wishes to know decision before leaving for Paris on 4th May."

[20098] No. 17.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 63.) *Athens, May 1, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)
GREEK newspaper states that Italy has declared to the Powers that, if Austria takes coercive measures against Montenegro, she will occupy Santi Quaranta.

(Confidential.)
Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me he knows that an expeditionary force is ready at Taranto.
(Sent to Rome.)

[20102] No. 18.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(No. 64.) *Athens, May 1, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)
COLLECTIVE communication in the sense of your telegram No. 67 of 23rd April will be made this afternoon. Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is aware of the tenor of it, says it appears to him that, while the allies had accepted mediation, the Great Powers intend to impose intervention.

[19987] No. 19.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, May 1, 1913.*
FOLLOWING is repetition of telegram from Salonica to-day:

"Two transports with Servian troops returning from Albania arrived last night; 22,000 men are expected. Relations between the Greeks and the Servians are, however, somewhat less cordial."

[19988] No. 20.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, May 1, 1913.*
FOLLOWING is repetition of telegram No. 13 from Monastir of to-day:—

"First regiment has arrived here from Struga. One battalion of the 2nd regiment has arrived at Struga from Dibra. Second battalion of the 16th regiment has left Monastir for Perlepe."

[19931] No. 21.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 377.) *Foreign Office, May 1, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)
YOUR telegram No. 166 of 30th April.
I approve what you said. For us to take the action which Minister for Foreign Affairs urges would entail the risk of semblance of participation on our part in an Austrian action of which Russia may have to publish a communiqué saying that she disapproves. We should then have the appearance of acting against the wishes of Russia and of separating ourselves from France. Such a position in this matter would be most repugnant to His Majesty's Government and to public opinion here.

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[20160] No. 22.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 1, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 191 of to-day to Berlin.

When all your colleagues have been duly authorised you should join in the collective representation.

[20199] No. 23.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 1, 1913.*

YOU should make an effort to impress upon King Nicholas and his Government how serious the situation is. Austria is on the point of taking separate action. She may do so immediately, unless Montenegro complies with the representation of the Powers already made, which the Montenegrin Minister for Foreign Affairs most unwisely declined to treat as of extreme urgency.

I have urged that resort to force should be postponed and time given to allow Montenegrin Government to realise the situation. If Montenegro complies peaceably with the demand of the Powers to evacuate Scutari she will obtain some economic assistance, which has already been favourably considered by the Powers. If she continues to resist she will certainly be expelled from Scutari by force, she must abandon all hope of economic assistance afterwards, and the consequences will be most disastrous. This is the real alternative.

I have no assurance that Austria will not take action immediately, and I am certain that, if Montenegrin Government does not comply with the demand of the Powers in a very few days, she has nothing but the latter alternative to expect.

[20160] No. 24.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.[*]

(No. 191.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 1, 1913.*

MONTENEGRIN delegate communicated yesterday to this Office a *pro-memoriâ* requesting the opinion of His Majesty's Government as to whether, in the event of Montenegro accepting the solution of Scutari being included in Albania, the Powers would accord her some territorial compensations and some financial aid.

I communicated this *pro-memoriâ* to the Ambassadors to-day, and I made the following statement :—

"The communication volunteered spontaneously by the Montenegrin delegate is a *fait nouveau*, and seems to indicate that King Nicholas is beginning to realise how serious the situation is. In view of this, His Majesty's Government cannot say that the last resort has yet been reached, and in the circumstances an effort, even if it be the last, is worth making to avoid a resort to force. This effort might take the form of a strong representation, stating that if the Montenegrin Government evacuate Scutari, as demanded by the Powers, they will receive the financial help which has already been under the consideration of the Powers to improve the economic situation of their country. But if they do not evacuate Scutari they will certainly be expelled, by one method or another, and Montenegro must abandon the hope of subsequent help from the Powers. In that case the consequences of her attitude would be disastrous."

The Ambassadors are ascertaining the views of their several Governments as to the proposed representation to Montenegro, and are urging that if the Governments agree to its terms the collective representation should be made without delay.

(Addressed to Berlin, Paris, St. Petersburgh, Rome, and Vienna ; repeated to Cettinjé, No. 53.)

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[*] Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 193), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 380), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 161), and Sir R. Rodd (No. 166).

[20377] No. 25.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No 98.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 1, 1913.*

AFTER the *réunion* this afternoon I had some very frank, friendly, and informal talk with Count Mensdorff.

I urged upon him again the difference there might be between action taken by Austria in Albania and an Austrian invasion of Montenegro, even if we had reached the stage of the last resort, when separate action was unavoidable.

He said that he had understood this, and if only I could say that there was some form of separate action by Austria which would enable an international character to be preserved, it would be of enormous assistance.

I said that, as there had been no time to discuss the matter, I could not promise that any form of separate action by Austria would enable the concert of Europe to be maintained. It was quite certain that action involving Servia would break up the concert, and so also would anything like an invasion of Montenegro. Whether separate action by Austria in the last resort, limited to action in Albania and the expulsion of the Montenegrins from Scutari, could be agreed to without breaking up the concert, I could not say. All I could do, if the time came when there was no alternative to separate action, would be to discuss the matter with France and Russia, to ascertain if there was any form of separate action to which it was possible to get Russia to agree. The real danger in separate action, as far as we were concerned, was not that we should use threatening language ourselves—though, if the action was taken prematurely or was of an excessive character, British public opinion would not be satisfied without some statement that we regretted or deprecated it—but the danger consisted in that to which separate action might lead. It might be the spark that created a European conflagration, and if that occurred, the question of Scutari, which would be the spark, would be completely lost sight of in the other issues that would be raised. In such an event, we and other Powers should have to consider, not the merits of the question of Scutari, but what our own interests required us to do in a European crisis.

Count Mensdorff realised this, and said that it was to avoid these dangers that he was so anxious for me to find some means of giving separate action, if taken by Austria, an international character.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20463] No. 26.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.[*]

(No. 99.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 1, 1913.*

AT the *réunion* this afternoon, I stated that the British Government had approved the statement that I had made at the last *réunion* respecting their attitude, but that the words "as far as Scutari is concerned" ("en ce qui concerne la question de Scutari") should be added after the words "disinterest herself in his fate" ("se désintéressera de son sort").

Count Mensdorff then made the following verbal communication :—

"La dernière réunion n'est pas tombée d'accord sur les mesures de coercition à employer contre le Monténégro pour le cas où la démarche collective faite à Cettigné ne donnerait pas de résultat prompt et satisfaisant. Nous nous trouvons, par conséquent, vis-à-vis de la situation que j'avais annoncée dans mes communications antérieures, c'est-à-dire que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois se réserve de prendre les mesures nécessaires pour mettre à exécution les résolutions des Puissances.

"Les vues exprimées au cours de la dernière réunion par les représentants de plusieurs Puissances sur les mesures de coercition à prendre nous font espérer que d'autres Puissances ne refuseront pas de coopérer avec nous dans les opérations à terre ou dans une action navale, bien qu'une résolution n'ait pas été prise à ce sujet dans la dernière réunion.

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[*] Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 300), Sir E. Goschen (No. 149), Sir R. Rodd (No. 124), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 183).

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"L'objection formulée par M. l'Ambassadeur de France contre le désarmement de troupes ne paraît pas fondée au Comte Berchtold. Mon Gouvernement est au contraire d'avis qu'il n'y aurait pas impossible qu'un désarmement même sans combat --servirait au Roi Nicolas de motif suffisant pour justifier vis-à-vis de son peuple sa soumission à la volonté des Puissances. Il est, toutefois, évident qu'une pareille action ne saurait avoir l'effet voulu si l'on déclarait dès à présent—ainsi que M. Sazonof l'avait suggéré dans une conversation avec le Comte Thurn—de se borner à l'occupation des ports sans pousser plus loin les opérations militaires.

"Quant à l'avis de Sir Edward Grey de déclarer dès à présent au Roi Nicolas que, s'il se soumet à la volonté des Puissances, elles discuteront avec lui après l'évacuation de Scutari de ces compensations raisonnables, le Gouvernement austro-hongrois fait observer ce qui suit :

"Le Monténégro doit avant tout respecter la volonté des Puissances et évacuer Scutari sans que les Puissances lui fassent envisager des compensations. Ainsi que nous l'avons déclaré maintes fois, nous ne pourrions prendre en considération des compensations territoriales aux dépens de la frontière nord et nord-est de l'Albanie, fixée d'une manière définitive par les Puissances. Si après l'évacuation de Scutari les Puissances venaient à envisager les mesures économiques à prendre pour assurer à ce pays épuisé les moyens d'existence, nous nous réservons de prendre part à une conversation à ce sujet."

I then informed the Ambassadors that, after I had seen them separately yesterday, I had received the following communication, which M. Popovitch had made to Sir Arthur Nicolson :—

"J'ai l'ordre de mon Gouvernement de demander au Gouvernement Royal d'Angleterre si, dans le cas où le Monténégro cédant à la volonté des Grandes Puissances et faisant le sacrifice de ses ambitions les plus naturelles—en acceptant la solution Scutari à l'Albanie—les Grandes Puissances lui accorderaient une compensation territoriale digne de ses sacrifices et dont la ligne frontière passerait

, avec une aide efficace pour rétablir sa situation économique et rendre la vie plus possible à ses habitants."

I explained that this communication had been made quite spontaneously and unexpectedly. It was not the result of any suggestion by us or discussion with us. I made the following observations to the *réunion* upon it :—

The communication volunteered spontaneously by M. Popovitch was a *fait nouveau*, and seemed to indicate that King Nicholas was beginning to realise how serious the situation was. In view of this, the British Government could not say that the last resort had yet been reached, and, under the circumstances, an effort, even if it were the last, was worth making to avoid a resort to force. This effort might take the form of a strong representation stating that if the Montenegrin Government evacuated Scutari peaceably, as demanded by the Powers, the Montenegrin Government would receive financial help, which had already been under the consideration of the Powers, to improve the economic situation of Montenegro; but that, if they did not evacuate Scutari, they would certainly be expelled by one method or another; they would have to abandon the hope of help from the Powers; and the consequences would be disastrous.

The German Ambassador at once expressed an opinion favourable to my observations.

The Italian Ambassador did the same.

Finally all the Ambassadors agreed to my observations, and said that they would refer them to their Governments.

I gave all the Ambassadors copies of the communication that M. Popovitch had made. After what the Austrian Ambassador had been instructed to say about territorial compensation, it was clearly impossible for him to enter upon any discussion of this communication; but all the Ambassadors said that they would send it to their Governments.

I gave to the Ambassadors copies of the draft of a treaty embodying the points in dispute between Turkey and the allies, as approved by the Powers.

The Ambassadors all expressed approval of it, except the French Ambassador, who, while not differing from anything in the substance of it, said that his Government did not think that there was any advantage in this method of procedure, but would defer to the general opinion.

It was urged, in the interests of peace, that I should give the draft to the belligerents as quickly as possible.

I said that, as both the Turkish Ambassador and Bulgarian Minister had asked for a draft, I would give them this draft, pointing out that it contained only what the Powers had already approved, and that I assumed there was nothing in it to which any of the Governments of the Powers would object; and telling them that they might take it and make what use they pleased of it. I would point out also that it did not deal with questions between the belligerents and the Powers, which would have to be discussed with them afterwards, but only with questions between Turkey and the allies.

Lastly, the German Ambassador brought forward the wish of the Turkish Government to get leave to send to Asia Minor their troops in Albania, whom they could not feed there.

All the Ambassadors were in a position to agree to this, except the Russian Ambassador, who had no instructions.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20001] No. 27.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 127.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 1, 1913.*

THE Turkish Ambassador left with Sir A. Nicolson on the 29th April the proposals of which I herewith transmit a copy to your Excellency.

As to the second point, Sir A. Nicolson told his Highness that the matter would probably be considered at the Ambassadors' meeting on the 1st May, and if a draft treaty were drawn up which the belligerents would be ready to sign the first point would automatically be settled.

As to the third point, Sir A. Nicolson told his Highness we could not influence the press.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 27.

Note communicated by Tewfik Pasha.

RAPATRIEMENT avec armes et bagages des troupes ottomanes [illegible] et en Macédoine et en Albanie. Il suffirait de permettre que des bateaux de transport puissent librement embarquer et emmener à un port de l'Asie Mineure ces troupes d'un point du littoral que les alliés pourraient désigner.

2. Que les Puissances arrêtent la formule des bases du traité de paix définitif afin de la soumettre à la signature des belligérants. Les questions secondaires et qui s'y rattachent pourraient ensuite être discutées et résolues par la conférence des Ambassadeurs.

3. Prier le Foreign Office d'user de son influence auprès de la presse pour que les journaux s'abstiennent de mener une campagne arménophile ou autre au moment précisément où le Gouvernement s'applique sincèrement et prend les dispositions nécessaires pour la réorganisation et l'application des réformes dans l'Empire.

[19999] No. 28.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 38.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 1, 1913.*

THE Greek Minister told Sir A. Nicolson on the 29th April that the Greek Metropolitan of Durazzo had telegraphed to say that there was a great risk that the lives of Christians would be seriously in danger when the Servian troops had left, as

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the Albanian Moslems might wreak vengeance on them, and that he hoped that the Powers would take some measures to protect them and keep order generally.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20000] No. 29.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 39.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 1, 1913.

THE Greek Minister mentioned on the 29th April to Sir A. Nicolson that his impression was that his Government would prefer that the Powers should submit a draft treaty for the signature of the belligerents rather than that the negotiations between the latter should be reopened. At the same time, he intimated that he presumed that, in the questions of the islands and of the southern boundaries of Albania, Greece would be permitted to discuss those matters with the Powers.

Sir A. Nicolson said that this was a question to which he could give no reply, but he pointed out to him that as the two questions which M. Gennadius had mentioned were reserved to the Powers it was for the latter alone to decide upon them. Moreover, the points which he had raised were distinct from a draft treaty, and could be examined after the peace was signed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20347] No. 30.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 87.)
Sir, *Belgrade, April* 26, 1913.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 86 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that, in the course of the celebrations which took place in this city on the occasion of the fall of Scutari, a demonstration was made before the Russian Legation. M. de Hartwig appeared at the window and replied to the popular acclamations.

Different versions of this reply are given by the "Politica" and "Samouprava" respectively.

According to the former, M. de Hartwig said :—

"Accept my hearty gratitude for the Servian and Montenegrin victory—for the victory of the whole of Slavdom. Long live the Servian nation! Long live Slavdom!"

According to the "Samouprava," the speech took the following form :—

"I beg you to accept my deep gratitude for your expressions of sympathy towards Russia and the Czar. Accept my hearty greetings and wishes for the happiness and progress of the Servian nation and of Slavdom."

The former version of M. de Hartwig's speech, which has been circulated in the Austrian press, will be sure to cause renewed resentment in official circles in Austria.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[20211] No. 31.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 88.)
Sir, *Belgrade, April* 28, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub, reporting the action of the Servian customs authorities at Ghevgheli in claiming 1 per cent. export duty on tobacco exported, together with copy of my reply thereto.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure 1 in No. 31.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 23.)
Sir, *Uskub, April* 20, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 26 of to-day, I have the honour to report that yesterday evening the local representative of the Commercial Company of Salonica (Limited) informed me that the Servian customs authorities at Ghevgheli were claiming 1 per cent. export duty on tobacco exported by his company. This duty was never claimed by the Ottoman authorities, though I am not sure if they had the right to collect it or no.

There are some serious practical objections to the levying of this duty. The consignment of tobacco contains parcels of different qualities, would have to be unloaded for examination, and exposure to the weather, inevitable owing to the complete absence of customs sheds at Ghevgheli, would deteriorate the value of the goods. I am also told that the Servians have no appraisers capable of making a just valuation of the goods. They have proposed that the books of the firm should be produced at Ghevgheli; as the books are kept in London, and are in daily use, this is manifestly impracticable.

Serious hardship would result from the application of this duty, the tobacco in question having already been sold to foreign régies, and no export duty having been allowed for in calculating the price.

I have advised the agent to pay under protest rather than incur the greater financial loss due to the delay of the goods while the question is being threshed out, but, for reasons given above, it is most desirable that the matter should, if possible, be speedily terminated in favour of the exporters. I understand that an Austrian company here is also interested, and that the Austrian consulate has been approached on the matter.

I have made no representations to the local authorities, previous experience having shown me that it is useless to do so. I have little doubt that the difficulty is simply due to Servian ignorance of the fiscal system of the occupied territory.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 31.

Sir R. Paget to Vice-Consul Peckham.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Belgrade, April* 28, 1913.

I BEG to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 23 of the 20th instant, reporting the action of the Servian customs authorities at Ghevgheli in claiming 1 per cent. export duty on tobacco exported.

I have spoken the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs upon this subject, and am informed by him that this export duty was in fact levied by the Turkish authorities, and paid on the export of tobacco from Macedonia to Servia.

I am, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[20212] No. 32.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 89.)
Sir, *Belgrade, April* 28, 1913.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 26 of the 29th ultimo, in which was enclosed a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador covering a draft of a note prepared by the French Government protesting against the interference on the part of the Servian authorities with the administration of the Ottoman Debt, I have the honour to report that, in accordance with your instructions, I communicated the

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tenour of the draft note to the Servian Government on the 26th instant, my French, German, and Austro-Hungarian colleagues having already done so.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[20213] No. 33.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 90.)
Sir, *Belgrade, April 28, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub upon the Serbo-Bulgarian relations in the occupied territories.

The concluding paragraph of this despatch, stating that the Servians are withdrawing from Albania with a view to strengthening their position *vis-à-vis* to Bulgaria, is of interest.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 33.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 24.)
Sir, *Uskub, April 21, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 27 of the 20th instant, I have the honour to report that the Servians appear to be preparing, if need be, for a war with Bulgaria, and are concentrating their troops on the southern edge of their occupied territory. At Egri Palanka they are said to have twelve battalions. There were rumours current here of an encounter there between the troops of the two allies, but the truth appears to be that it was a partial rising of the local Exarchist peasantry. As I have already reported (my despatch No. 13, Confidential, of the 20th February), the Slav peasantry is probably well armed, and the Servians might well find a Bulgarian war complicated by band action in their sphere of occupation.

The garrisons of Kratovo and Kumanovo have also been reinforced, but I have no details.

In my despatch No. 2, Confidential, of the 23rd January I reported that the garrison of Ishtib was purely Servian. Since then, however, Bulgarian troops have been introduced, and half the town is now in Bulgarian occupation. Feeling appears to run high between the two halves of the garrison.

At Kuprulu (Veles) the Servian garrison is said to be 36,000 strong. I hear that two Bulgar bands fifteen and twenty strong have left Kuprulu.

The sympathies of the Moslem population—and there are a considerable number of Moslem villages between Ishtib and Kiuprulu—are, I believe, with the Servians, who have made some use of these people as spies on their Exarchist neighbours.

The persecution of Bulgars in Uskub is, if anything, increasing. The head of the Bulgar theological seminary has recently been beaten, and there are ugly rumours of the mysterious disappearance of various prominent Bulgars. (I am informed that when, some years ago, M. Tserovich was Prefect of Vranya, it was unsafe for Uskub Bulgars to travel between here and Nish. If this is true it lends some probability to this report.)

Serbo-Albanian relations have improved; not only has a large part of the Servian garrison been withdrawn from Albania, but the Government seems to have realised that, in view of strained relations with Bulgaria, it would be as well to avoid complications in the north. Lack of arms would, I think, prevent the Albanians making any effective diversion in case of a Serbo-Bulgarian war.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

[20214] No. 34.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 139.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, April 29, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a copy of the protocol of the seventh meeting of the conference of Ambassadeurs on the Roumano-Bulgarian mediation.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 34.

Protocol of Seventh Meeting, April 28, 1913.

AVANT de procéder à la signature de la décision élaborée par la conférence, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères dit que, se conformant à ce qui avait été arrêté à la dernière séance, il avait très confidentiellement informé les Ministres de Bulgarie et de Roumanie à Saint-Pétersbourg de la teneur du document en question. Le Ministre de Roumanie n'a fait aucune objection, tandis que celui de Bulgarie, après avoir communiqué avec son Gouvernement, était venu exprimer le désir de ce dernier de voir, pour des raisons de politique intérieure, éliminé le passage final contenant des remerciements de la part des Puissances à l'adresse du Roi Ferdinand et du Gouvernement de Sophia.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères demande, en conséquence, s'il n'y aurait pas lieu de tenir compte de ce désir.

Après un court échange d'idées à ce sujet, on convient de supprimer le dernier alinéa du texte en sixième séance et de modifier les deux alinéas précédents du même texte comme suit :—

"Avant de se séparer, la conférence a à cœur de rendre hommage aux dispositions connues de la Bulgarie à consentir des sacrifices au maintien et au resserrement de ses liens d'amitié avec la Roumanie, qui ont singulièrement facilité sa tâche.

"La conférence exprime la conviction que les arrangements conclus par elle ne sauraient manquer de produire le résultat unanimement recherché."

Les Ambassadeurs d'Autriche-Hongrie et d'Italie ayant déclaré devoir consulter leurs Gouvernements avant de signer le texte ainsi modifié, on décide de remettre la signature au vendredi, 19 avril (2 mai), à 11 heures du matin.

[20128] No. 35.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 219.)
Sir, *Paris, April 30, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to your despatch No. 264 of the 21st instant, to transmit to you herewith copy of a note from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs informing me of the view held by the French Government and of the action taken with regard to the question of the appropriation of Ottoman fiscal stamps seized by the Greek and Bulgarian authorities in the territories occupied by their troops.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 35.

M. Pichon to Sir F. Bertie.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 29 avril, 1913.*

VOTRE Excellence a bien voulu, sous la date du 23 avril, m'indiquer que le Gouvernement britannique avait reçu communication d'une note verbale circulaire adressée par la Porte en vue de demander aux Puissances que des démarches soient

faites pour provoquer la restitution de timbres fiscaux ottomans saisis par les autorités grecques et bulgares.

En me faisant connaître l'opinion de Sir Edward Grey au sujet de cette demande, vous m'exprimiez en même temps le désir d'être renseigné sur le point de vue adopté en cette circonstance par le Gouvernement de la république.

J'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que mon Département a reçu dès le 24 mars, de l'Ambassade de France à Constantinople, une copie de la note circulaire à laquelle vous faites allusion. A la suite de cette communication, et considérant que les recettes provenant des droits de timbre sont affectées au service de la Dette publique ottomane, j'ai invité les représentants du Gouvernement de la république à Sophia et à Athènes à faire des démarches afin d'éviter que ces timbres ne puissent être envoyés en Turquie d'Asie, où leur vente se ferait au détriment des intérêts de la Dette publique.

Je vous serai obligé de bien vouloir porter ces indications à la connaissance du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires Etrangères.

Agréez, &c.
(Pour le Ministre),
PALÉOLOGUE.

[20130] No. 36.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 221.)
Sir, *Paris, May 1, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 215 of the 28th ultimo, to transmit to you herewith a leading article by the editor of the "Figaro" on the subject of Montenegro and Scutari.*

M. Gaston Calmette again eulogises the Ambassadorial conference in London, and expresses the warmest appreciation of what has already been achieved by those taking part in it.

He points out that unless Austria, who is the most directly interested in the matter, obtains satisfaction there is war ahead. That Power has already given up the idea of the Sanjak and Salonica, and has yielded about the new frontiers of Servia and Bulgaria. The Slavs have, from the Austrian point of view, increased their strength enormously, and will henceforth be dangerous neighbours for the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy with its diversity of races. Albania, with Scutari as its capital, appears to Austria as the indispensable make-weight to ensure her tranquillity. It is highly advisable to give her satisfaction, otherwise events may bring about a general European conflagration.

M. Calmette then declares that it is not worth bringing about such slaughter in Europe all for the sake of Montenegro. "Nous avons," he says, "d'autres devoirs envers la patrie: réservons nos enfants pour d'autres causes." It is the duty of France to work for the cohesion of Europe, and if the international action demanded by Austria is necessary to avert the catastrophe which he foresees, it should be decided upon without a day's delay.

(Confidential.)
I am informed that M. Pichon recently approached the editor of the "Figaro" and asked him to use his influence to counteract the deplorable effect produced by the articles of M. Tardieu in the "Temps," which I have reported to you in previous despatches.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[20150] No. 37.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

L'AMBASSADEUR de Turquie présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey, et a l'honneur de porter à la haute connaissance de son Excellence que le Département des Finances bulgare vient de décreter que "tous les biens meubles et immeubles

* Not printed.

abandonnés par les propriétaires musulmans ayant pris la fuite à la suite de la guerre sont en vertu des ordres donnés par le Ministère de l'Agriculture et du Domaine de l'Etat, et conformément à l'article 43 de la loi bulgare sur l'héritage, considérés propriétés de l'Etat bulgare; que ce dernier seul pourra en disposer, et que toute transaction concernant les biens susmentionnés ne pourra être faite que par l'entremise du Département des Finances bulgare."

Cet avis du Ministère des Finances bulgare équivaut en somme à la confiscation pure et simple des biens appartenant aux musulmans établis dans les territoires actuellement occupés par les Bulgares et constitue une violation flagrante des principes du droit international moderne et des règles adoptées par le règlement annexé à la quatrième convention de La Haye de 1907.

Vouloir déroger dans ces conditions à une règle nettement établie et acceptée que la propriété privée sur terre est inviolable en cas de guerre et qu'aucune entrave ne doit être apportée aux droits de propriété, de possession ou de jouissance des sujets d'un Etat ennemi, serait créer un précédent fâcheux et compromettre gravement les droits individuels de propriété en cas de rupture de relations entre deux pays.

La question ayant donc un caractère général et intéressant tous les Etats signataires des Actes de La Haye, Tevfik Pacha, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, s'empresse de faire appel aux bons offices de Sir E. Grey et de prier son Excellence de bien vouloir entreprendre des démarches auprès du Gouvernement de Sophia en vue de le faire revenir sur une mesure aussi arbitraire et qui va ouvertement à l'encontre des principes universellement reconnus et appliqués du droit des gens.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 1er mai, 1913.

[20251] No. 38.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 2.)

Sir, *Admiralty, May 2, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated the 2nd instant, No. 336, from the Admiralty, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 38.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII."

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, May 2, 1913.*
YOUR No. 65.

Foreign Office making enquiries at Vienna and Rome, as it seems strange that Austria and Italy should wish to send supplies to Scutari while Montenegrins are in possession and continue to refuse to comply with wishes of Powers.

[20126] No. 39.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 2.)

Sir, *Admiralty, May 2, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram dated the 1st instant, No. 65, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

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Enclosure in No. 39.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

May 1, 1913.

(Telegraphic.)

AUSTRIAN and Italian Governments have instructed their senior officers to allow Italian steamer "Citta di Messina," and Austrian steamers "Metkovitch" and "Skutari," which are loaded with supplies at Cattaro, to enter Boyana and send supplies by river vessels for use of inhabitants of Scutari.

Desire immediate instructions as to whether I should agree to this.

Have withheld consent meanwhile, as it would, in my opinion, nullify blockade.

[20237] No. 40.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 65. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Athens, May* 1, 1913.

I HAD a second interview to-day with M. Coromilas, who read to me a portion of a report from Hilmi Pasha, the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna, to his Government to the effect that he had received information at the Ballplatz of a design on the part of Italy to occupy Vallona and fortify it, thus securing the mastery of the Adriatic. This design was connected with the motive of the action of Italy in the question of the islands of the Ægean, namely to obtain the supremacy of the Mediterranean.

However the despatch came into M. Coromilas's possession, it appeared to me to be genuine.

His Excellency expressed anxiety to know what position His Majesty's Government would take up towards an Italian policy of that nature.

[20190] No. 41.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 77. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, May* 1, 1913.

THE King is sending the following message to the three allied Governments:—

"In spite of the declaration of the allies reserving the right to discuss the demands of the Powers [group omitted: ? and] definite fixing of the frontiers of Albania, and in spite of the state of war existing between the allies and the Porte, the Powers demand from us the immediate evacuation of Scutari.

"Russia continues to exercise strong pressure on us, although she alludes to an [group undecypherable] danger on the side of Austria, who already addresses to us threatening notes which menace our rights of sovereignty.

"The Montenegrin Government make an urgent appeal to the allied Governments with a view to a collective representation to the Powers protesting against this act, which is in contradiction with their former declarations and with the spirit [group omitted: ? and] letter of our last reply to the mediation offer."

[20205 No. 42.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, May* 1, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

I understand that the Austrian notes specially referred to are the following:—

1. Note stating that, in view of obstruction of the authorities and withheld witnesses, the joint enquiry into incidents at Djakova must be suspended. In view, however, of the facts already brought to light, the Austrian Government require reinterment of monk with due honours; erection of commemorative cross; erection of chapel by Austria; solemn proclamation of religious liberty.

Yesterday the Montenegrin Government returned an evasive answer (please see my despatch No. 17).

2. Note requiring satisfaction for outrage attempted towards military attaché on his journey to Cattaro on 21st April.

The latter incident might easily be settled, but the Montenegrin Government have so far evaded giving a reply.

[20210] No. 43.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 79.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, May* 1, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 67 of 23rd April to Athens: Mediation.

Collective representation made to-day.

[20227] No. 44.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, May* 1, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

I hear on fairly good authority that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has discussed question of sending naval brigade to Vallona as a counterpoise to an Austrian disembarkation in Northern Albania, and that ships of war are held in readiness for such an eventuality at Taranto.

[20219] No. 45.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, May* 1, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 160 of 29th April.

Reply just received from the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs is to the effect that he is in favour of asking Balkan allies to agree to transport of Turkish troops from Albania, but in view of their special agreements with Austria-Hungary concerning Albania they have referred the question to Vienna.

I am pointing out that my question only concerned application to Turkish Government as to whether they could supply transports for the purpose.

As regards transfer of battery from San Giovanni di Medua to Durazzo he reserves answer, and does not understand object of sending them to the latter place.

[20224] No. 46.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, May* 1, 1913.

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon, and he told me that the Powers, having apparently no practical suggestion to make for compelling Montenegro to [group omitted], Austria must recover her liberty of action, and he intimated that meant that an Austrian military expedition would be sent to recover Scutari for Albania. Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me that negotiations were progressing most satisfactorily with Italy with a view to common action, not merely to parallel action, Italy in Southern Albania, Austria in Northern. He seemed to me to be practically certain that Italy would end in taking common action with Austria against Montenegro. I enquired whether he would send an ultimatum to that country before acting. He replied that the way in which operations would begin was not settled; he had to concert with Italy on this as well as on many military points.

I asked him whether he would give time to the Powers for them to make a last

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effort to persuade King Nicholas to yield. He replied that there was still time to do so, as he would precipitate nothing, and he declared that Austria would take no military action against Montenegro until the negotiations with Italy were terminated one way or the other.

I conveyed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs the views expressed in your telegram No. 169 of 30th April, and he assured me that he was determined not to lose sight of the aim of any military expedition, which would be solely to recover Scutari for Albania. However, he could not bind the hands of the military people absolutely, and he would have to leave them considerable latitude of action. For instance, should Montenegro collect troops on the flank of an Austrian force acting against Scutari, it would be impossible to order the Austrian authorities to abstain from dispersing them.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed to me the strong hope that the Powers would see their way to continue the blockade after Austria and Italy had decided to take military action on land. The presence of the fleet might accelerate the termination of military action by bringing about the yielding of King Nicholas to the will of the Powers.

On my enquiring of the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the Austrian Ambassador at London would cease to attend the Ambassadors' meetings in London, he replied that he had no intention for the present of giving him instructions to do so.

[20260] No. 47.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 72.) *Vienna, May 2, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

I HEAR from a fairly trustworthy source that at Ministerial Council held this morning under the presidency of Minister for Foreign Affairs it was decided that military operations against Montenegro shall commence on Tuesday next unless King Nicholas agrees to withdraw from Scutari.

[20261] No. 48.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 73.) *Vienna, May 2, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations :—

"No troops have yet left Trieste, but transports are being chartered, and number of emigrants have been forbidden to start, as the ships are required for troops. Minor movements of troops are reported on Bosnian railways, and goods traffic is suspended on those lines.

"Presume that if expedition starts, and if attachés are permitted to go, you will allow me to accompany force."

[20226] No. 49.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 87.) *Rome, May 2, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 1st May.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs contend that the Turkish Government have themselves proposed to repatriate troops in Albania, and that assent of the Balkan allies, especially of Greece, is necessary to ensure non-interference with transports.

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[20262] No. 50.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, May 2, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 166 of 1st May.

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs for his impressions of Montenegro's new step. He said that he had some ground for fearing it was a mere pretext to gain time, firstly, because other Austrian demands for satisfaction had encountered abrupt refusal by King Nicholas, and, secondly, because Italian Minister at Cettinjé had convinced himself that the King intended to provoke Austria to war, hoping in the long run to derive some greater advantage from eventual Austrian embarrassments. He hoped, however, it might be regarded as a first step to negotiation, and trusted Powers would so regard it. He had not yet seen Austrian Ambassador, who was always extremely uncompromising, but he was convinced that Austria had gone too far to yield as regards territorial compensations, a reconsideration of which would, moreover, create a most dangerous precedent for future resolutions of Powers. He was urging at Berlin and Vienna that a line should be adopted corresponding very nearly to that submitted by you at Ambassadors' meeting, but that, to secure Austrian adhesion, Montenegro should be told that she must in first place make the *geste* of renouncing Scutari in obedience to will of the Powers, the King being at the same time told that, once this was done, the Powers, whose interest it also was to ensure future of Montenegro, would concert with a view to making provision for her economic development. To meet Austrian demands one point must not be ostensibly dependent on the other, but the King could be allowed to assume it was so. To save the situation there was justification for some judicious hypocrisy, which, if morally reprehensible, was often practically useful.

[20369] No. 51.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, May 2, 1913.*

MY telegrams Nos. 84 and 85 of 1st May

At close of conversation reported in my immediately preceding telegram of to-day, I observed to Minister for Foreign Affairs that it seemed generally to be believed here that, if Austria took military measures alone in North Albania, Italy would send an expedition to Southern Albania. His Excellency seemed rather taken aback at the question being raised, and said that if Austria moved alone it would be such a serious matter for Italy that they would have to consider what they must do, but it had not yet come to that. I observed that Greece would probably regard such a step as implying the intention to exercise pressure on her in regard to southern frontier of Albania. His Excellency protested against this view, and said that it would only be a question of preserving balance in Albania within terms of their understanding with Austria. I asked him how Austria would regard such an interpretation, and he said that necessity for testing this had not yet arisen, and he hoped that now it would not.

It is rumoured that troops are being collected at Ancona and Bari. The presumption is that Italy, assuming that Austria might, after the war with Montenegro, endeavour to hold some strategical position there, proposes to secure a footing in South Albania to use as a lever for obtaining eventual Austrian withdrawal. While common action with Austria would not be acceptable here, such parallel independent action would not be unpopular.

(Sent to Athens.)

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[20257] No. 52.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 171.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, May 2, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 168 of 1st May.

I have just received an *aide-mémoire* from Russian Government of which following is a summary :—

Russian Government concur that effect which may be produced in Russia and elsewhere by immediate isolated action on the part of Austria cannot be too carefully considered.

Austrian action would be all the more unjustifiable as, the Powers having been "solidaires" in their joint resolves, this solidarity should no less be preserved in regard to means to be adopted.

Austria speaks of necessity for her to make will of Europe respected by Montenegro. Following same line of argument, it might be pointed out to Austrian Government that same respect for will of Europe obliges each of the Powers to take into consideration attitude of other Powers towards the measures to be taken.

It cannot be denied that public opinion of all countries, with partial exception of Austria-Hungary, is opposed to coercive measures against Montenegro. Argument of *amour-propre* cannot be put forward in the case of a country as small as Montenegro, whose very weakness imposes a certain moral restraint on any action against her on the part of a great Power.

King of Montenegro doubtless fully appreciates particular circumstances of his position, and uses his obvious weakness as the best weapon to attain his object. This object is to win the sympathy of public opinion in Russia and Europe, and is only furthered by attitude of Austria. Thus, in wishing to punish the King, Austria has till now only succeeded in playing King's own game by sowing dangerous discord among the Powers, who ought to be more than ever united in supreme interests of peace.

His Majesty's Government, with whom Russian Government have endeavoured to remain in close touch during the whole of the Balkan crisis, can appreciate better than anyone at its true value spirit of moderation and conciliation which the Russian Government have invariably shown in carrying out very heavy task which has fallen to their lot. It was not easy for Russia either to agree to Scutari being allotted to Albania, nor to invitation to France, as Russia's ally, to take part in naval demonstration to enforce decision of Powers. After the fall of Scutari, Russia did not hesitate to declare she was ready to abide by her attitude.

But it seems that all this is not enough for Austria, who now wishes to induce the Powers either to take part in coercive measures against Montenegro or else to give her mandate for this purpose.

Russian Government are compelled to declare that they cannot concur in the views of Austrian Government, and that they are opposed to adoption of measures which would be contrary to all their traditions and to the clear expression of public opinion in Russia.

In the event of Austria deciding on isolated action, Russia will refuse to take any share in moral responsibility which would rest with Austria, and Russian Government have thought it right to warn her of all the dangers of the policy which she seems inclined to pursue.

[20259] No. 53.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 173.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, May 2, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 377 of 1st May.

I explained our position to Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency said that he quite understood, and would not press you further on the subject.

He begged me to thank you for modification which you had introduced into proposed communication to King Nicholas, according to which His Majesty's Government would only disinterest themselves in his fate so far as question of Scutari was concerned.

[20230] No. 54.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 113.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, May 2, 1913.*

SCUTARI.

I spoke to the Prime Minister yesterday of your telegram No. 87 of 30th April. He replied that he had already made it quite clear to King Nicholas that he must expect no support of any sort from Servia. He was well aware of the importance of avoiding giving Austria any pretext for fastening a quarrel on Servia. It was in view of this that the Servian troops were being withdrawn from Albania as fast as possible. Only one regiment would be left—I understand, at Elbasan.

He feared King Nicholas would not give way, but the best chance of moving him from his present attitude would be if he were to be promised territory in the neighbourhood of Scutari.

He thought that one of the aims of Austria was eventually to receive a mandate from Europe to establish authority and keep order in Albania; she would then remain there for good. I said that I scarcely thought that Austria was looking for trouble at the present moment; she would probably confine herself to expelling the Montenegrins from Scutari.

[20229] No. 55.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, May 2, 1913.*

MEDIATION of the Powers.

Your telegram No. 85 of 23rd April.

Reply of Powers was presented to Prime Minister yesterday. His Excellency said he must as usual consult allies, but he could say that London would be chosen as place for meeting of delegates.

Servian delegates will probably be the same, with the exception of M. Nikolich, who is retained at Belgrade by his duties in Skupshtina.

[20265] No. 56.

Vice-Consul Matthews to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 2.)

(Telegraphic.) *Adana, May 2, 1913.*

I LEARN that German ship "Goeben," with the Commander-in-chief of Mediterranean Fleet on board, and the "Geier" will join German ship "Strassburg" at Mersina on 4th May. Commander-in-chief will visit Adana 5th May.

(Addressed to Constantinople, Foreign Office, and Commander-in-chief of Mediterranean Fleet.)

[20115] No. 57.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 167.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 2, 1913*

ANY separate action by Italy will presumably have to be explained as necessary to carry out the agreement of the Powers about Albania. It is difficult to see how sending of a force to Southern Albania is to be connected with operations against Scutari. You might ask Minister for Foreign Affairs, but only if he raises the point with you, what explanation he proposes to give.

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[20126] No. 58.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 164.) *Foreign Office, May 2, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

TELEGRAM from vice-admiral, 1st May, and reply.

You should enquire of Minister for Foreign Affairs. We have no desire to oppose wishes of Austrian Government respecting blockade, but while Montenegrins are recalcitrant and in possession of Scutari we do not like to instruct British admiral to relax the blockade without being sure that Austrian Government desires it.

[20376] No. 59.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 56.) *Foreign Office, May 2, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

NEWSPAPERS state that Montenegrin Government have given their reply about Scutari to the Ministers of the Powers at Cettinjé. Austrian Ambassador here gathers from his Government that they have received text of the reply from Austrian Minister at Cettinjé, and that it is very unsatisfactory.

Have you received anything?

[20095] No. 60.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 231.) *Foreign Office, May 2, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 167 of 30th April.

You should point out to Minister for Foreign Affairs that we understand that the chief reason for transporting the Turkish troops from Albania to Asia Minor is that there is great difficulty in feeding them and that sickness is rife among them. All the Powers and Turkey, and I believe the Greek Government also, are anxious that they should be repatriated on the above grounds. I should doubt if Essad's or other Turkish troops would be useful to act as gendarmerie or to maintain order, and they might, on the contrary, be the cause of disturbances. I see the point raised by Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the danger of denuding Albania completely of all armed forces, and I will consult the Ambassadors at the next meeting as to what measures could be taken for the purpose of maintaining order during the interregnum which must occur. In the meantime I trust Minister for Foreign Affairs will agree in principle to steps being taken for the repatriation. Such measures will take some little time to carry into effect, and before they are completed the Powers may have came to a decision as to what force should be left in Albania.

[20110] No. 61.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 235.) *Foreign Office, May 2, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

AT the *réunion* yesterday I proposed another effort at Cettinjé in the form of collective representation in order to avert, if possible, separate action by Austria.

I am doubtful whether Austria will wait longer before doing something, but the only chance of securing any postponement of her action is that the further representation proposed should be made at Cettinjé without delay.

I have already instructed British Minister there to impress on Montenegro how serious the situation is.

If all this fails there is no alternative but some forcible measure to give effect to decision of Powers. The British Government cannot go further in this direction without France, and France will not move without mandate from Russia, which Minister for Foreign Affairs says he cannot give. All that we can work for, therefore,

* Also to Sir R. Rodd (No. 170), *mutatis mutandis*.

will be to secure that whatever action Austria takes should be as little provocative as possible to Russian opinion.

I can see no chance of Austria giving territorial compensation to Montenegro. Austria will contend that to ask her to make further concessions after she has given up Djakova is unreasonable, and that Montenegro cannot be compensated by Austria for defying the Powers.

Whenever Austria takes separate action I shall have to explain attitude of British Government in Parliament. If Austria joins in further representation at Cettinjé and delays action in order to give Montenegro another chance of replying favourably, and if Montenegro again replies unfavourably, and France and ourselves are unable to take further steps, I do not see how I can, in defining attitude of British Government, do more than deprecate any action by Austria that may be in excess of minimum required to uphold decision agreed to by the Powers about Scutari.

Of course, if Austria rejects or disregards the proposal I made at *réunion* yesterday I should deprecate her action as being premature.

In any case I shall endeavour to make any statement of mine not inconsistent with anything that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs may have to say, but I want him to realise the impossibility of taking objection to action of Austria if it be really taken only in last resort, and is limited to securing evacuation by measures as little harsh as possible.

[20852] No. 62.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 132.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 2, 1913.*

SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON and I saw the Turkish Ambassador to-day, and gave him the draft of a treaty of peace, with the same explanations as I had just given to the Bulgarian Minister.

The Ambassador took the draft away with him, and no discussion arose as to its contents or wording.

As to procedure, it was suggested that, if the draft was adopted, all that would be necessary would be that instructions to sign it should be sent to Tewfik Pasha himself and to the representatives of the allies who were in London.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20171] No. 63.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 95.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 2, 1913.*

M. POPOVITCH called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 30th April, and after several preliminary observations as to the injustice which was being inflicted on Montenegro, which observations it was not difficult to refute, eventually drew from his pocket a paper, of which the enclosed is a copy. He said that if the proposal indicated in this paper were accepted in principle, it would be put forward officially and the line of the proposed frontier indicated in detail. Sir A. Nicolson understood from M. Popovitch verbally that the frontier between Podgoritza and Ipek should be rectified, so as to ensure direct communication between those two places, and that this would entail the incorporation of the Klementi (a Catholic) tribe into Montenegro, and also some extension of territory on the Boyana would be requested. Sir A. Nicolson repeated to M. Popovitch that the Albanian frontier had, after much discussion, been settled by the Powers, but that as M. Popovitch had received instructions to communicate the paper to me he would transmit it to me. Sir A. Nicolson said he could do no more—nor would he give any indication as to how it would be received by me or by the Powers. Sir A. Nicolson expressed his regret that, in spite of all the warnings which Montenegro had received, she had persisted in continuing the siege of Scutari and finally taking possession of the town.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 295), Sir E. Goschen (No. 147), Sir R. Rodd (No. 121), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 178), and Count de Salis (No. 14).

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Enclosure in No. 63.

Pro-memorid.

J'AI l'ordre de mon Gouvernement de demander au Gouvernement Royal d'Angleterre si, dans le cas où le Monténégro cédant à la volonté des Grandes Puissances et faisant le sacrifice de ses ambitions les plus naturelles—en acceptant la solution Scutari à l'Albanie—les Grandes Puissances lui accorderaient une compensation territoriale digne de ses sacrifices et dont la ligne frontière passerait

, avec une aide efficace pour rétablir sa situation économique et rendre la vie plus possible à ses habitants.

[19327] No. 64.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 61.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 2, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 51 of the 11th ultimo, relative to the protection of the interests of the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt in Macedonia, I transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople forwarding the observations of the representative of the British bondholders on the information contained in your despatch No. 13 of the 3rd February.*

I suggest that Sir A. Block's letter should be shown to Mr. Vice-Consul Heard.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20853] No. 65.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 62.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 2, 1913.*

I SAW the Bulgarian Minister to-day. In reminding him of his request to me for a draft treaty of peace, and of what I had said to him, I told him that there was some hesitation amongst the Powers as to whether it was desirable for them to provide the draft of any treaty. I had urged that there would be little trouble in turning the collective representation of the Powers into the form of a treaty. I had done this, and though we had been so much occupied about Scutari that it was difficult to pay attention to anything else, I had yesterday given to the Ambassadors an English draft that was to be translated into French. Till all the Governments had decided that it was desirable to give a draft to Turkey and the allies I could not say that this was the draft of the Powers; but, in order to save time, and as the Bulgarian Minister had asked for something, I gave it to him unofficially. If the Powers did not decide to call it their draft, it would be not because they objected to the substance of it, but because they thought it desirable on a point of form not to draw up any draft treaty for the belligerents. The Bulgarian and other Governments could, therefore, take this draft if they liked and treat it as their own. It did not deal with such things as the exchange of prisoners, which concerned the allies and Turkey exclusively, and which they must deal with for themselves; but it might perhaps provide something that they could sign so as to be able to demobilise, leaving matters of detail to be put into shape afterwards.

Having read the draft, the Minister observed that the names of the allies were not in alphabetical order.

I said that this, of course, they could arrange for themselves.

He also observed that he thought it had been understood that the line from Enos to Media was to be direct.

I said that my recollection was that this had been agreed to subsequently to the original *démarche*. Originally it had been intended that the line from Enos to Media was to go by the Ergene; but, as it was now to be direct, only Enos and Media were mentioned in the draft, and the natural construction therefore was that the line would go as direct as possible from one place to the other. If deviations of importance

* Sir G. Lowther (No. 312), April 24, 1913.

were intended in a line, it was usual to mention that the line would start from one place and proceed by certain other named places to the final place.

I also told the Minister that, to save time, I was giving this draft to-day to him and the Turkish Ambassador, as they had each separately asked for something of the sort; but I thought that it would be well if I gave the draft to the other allies also, for their information, stating that I had given it to the Bulgarian Minister and the Turkish Ambassador in answer to their request.

The Bulgarian Minister expressed a desire that the Powers would use their influence with the allies, if difficulties arose, to induce them to sign the treaty.

I said that I could not say whether the Powers would interfere.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20748] No. 66.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 41.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 2, 1913.*

SIR A. NICOLSON told the Greek Minister to-day that a project was under consideration to transport the Turkish troops in Albania to Asia Minor. The troops were in misery and want, and sickness was rife among them. For humanitarian considerations the removal was desirable. If the project matured, the Turkish Government would probably charter transports for the conveyance of the troops, and it would be good of him if he were to ascertain from his Government that, in the event of the project being carried out, no impediments would be placed in the way of the transports accomplishing their duties. M. Gennadius said that he would telegraph to his Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20306] No. 67.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 100. Confidential.)

Sir, *Rome, April 26, 1913.*

THE Greek Chargé d'Affaires told me he had succeeded in obtaining confidentially the text of two memoranda, prepared by the Italian military and naval headquarters staffs respectively for submission to the Italian Government, setting forth the reasons for which these authorities feel bound to oppose the possession of both sides of the Corfu Channel. The copies he has obtained, if not textually exact, followed the lines of argument used, and were virtually identic with the documents prepared for the Government. He has furnished me with copies of them, and I have the honour to forward translations herewith. The general line of argument is so similar to that which has been used in conversations by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary-General, that I have no doubt of their authenticity. The longer of the two documents is said to be drawn up by the military staff.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

Enclosure 1 in No. 67.

Memorandum drawn up by Military Staff.

(Translation.)

THE Calamas line is the only one which satisfies alike geographical and military requirements, as this river by virtue of its flow of water all the year round constitutes an admirable obstacle capable of assuring the new State of Albania an adequate line of defence. The Calamas line has for this reason always been claimed by Greece, and formed the basis of Greek demands both at the time of the Treaty of Berlin and at the period immediately preceding the Greco-Turkish war of the spring of 1897.

The compromise suggested by several papers conceding to Greece the Bay of Sagiada

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and thus including in Greek territory the district of Philiataes, *i.e.*, the greater part of Ciamuria, would form a weaker boundary both from the military and ethnographic point of view than would the Calamas boundary line.

From the military point of view, because the zone of Paracalamas constitutes both by its very considerable urban unities and by the way in which it dominates the country on the right bank of the Calamas, and in the zone of its issue into the Bay of Sagiada, a perpetual menace to the free navigation of the Corfu Channel; from the ethnographic point of view, because the district of Philiataes and the Ciamura zone, which are mostly inhabited by Albanian Mussulmans, has given clear evidence of its aversion to fall under Greek rule by firmly opposing the advance of Greek troops at the period which immediately preceded the fall of Janina.

There is no need in this case to consider the value of a plebiscite for the desires of the population of Ciamura were clearly manifested, and again in this last war as opposed to annexation to Greece.

Further, the question of the possession of the land on both sides of the Corfu Channel is one of peculiar interest for the maintenance of equilibrium in the lower basin of the Adriatic. Apart from the possibility of erecting fortifications on both sides of the Corfu Channel, which should have become entirely Greek, it is evident that the simple possession of Corfu Channel itself by reason of its geographical and nautical conditions would tend greatly to diminish the importance of Valona, and would constitute a grave menace to our military ports in Apulia and also to Taranto.

History clearly shows the menace which is involved in the possession of the two sides of the Corfu Channel by one naval Power only.

Queen Teuta of Illyria, after the defeats encountered in the centre of Dalmatia (230 B.C.), changed her base of operations to Corfu, where she established herself so firmly in the city and on both sides of the channel as to ensure the successful issue of the struggle had treachery not solved the issue.

The Venetian Republic obtained from Corfu, and from the possession of the Albanian coast between Butinto, Parga, and Prevesa, a maritime base sufficient to compensate them for the decadence of their own military spirit and for the ruin of their own fleet. Francesco Morosini's campaign in the Peloponnese furnished proof of the value of Corfu as a naval base—similar proof is also furnished at the time of the Passarovitz war.

When in the summer of 1797 Napoleon Bonaparte was engaged in systematising the territorial defences of the Adriatic, he was suddenly put in mind of the value of the Corfu Channel, and in August 1797 he wrote to the Directoire, calling their attention to the necessity of the possession of both sides of the channel, and to the urgency of their establishing themselves there.

Between 1803 and 1813 the Russians made the island of Corfu their base, as well as the two sides of the channel, from whence they extended their military and naval action along the Dalmatian coast, exciting thereby the nationalistic spirit of the Slavs against the domination of the French under Marmont.

Admiral Siniavin was in command of the Russian squadron which operated in the zones of Corfu and of the Bocchi di Cattaro.

In virtue of this eminently formidable support, the English handed over to the Russians the safe-guarding of the Otranto Straits, and were thus free to operate with Admiral Hoste's squadron in the vicinity of Lissa, preparing for the first battle of that name (the 13th March, 1811), which inflicted a serious defeat on the French naval force.

One has only to realise the value of these incidents to appreciate the fact that the command of the Otranto Channel would constitute for the future a grave peril, not only for the maintenance of the equilibrium in the lower Adriatic basin and along the Italian coast line, but still more for both the German and Austrian naval forces.

The French fleet, operating from Biserta, could easily establish a base at Corfu and constantly threaten the exit from the Channel of Otranto. A hostile fleet could also make use of it, being enabled to cruise at its convenience from Biserta to Corfu and from Biserta to Messina, thus hampering the manœuvres of our fleets in both the Tyrrhenian Sea and the Adriatic

The objection that the Greek fleet is now a small one carries little weight, as it may in the future become formidable, not so much from its own strength as from the support of the alliances which Greece may obtain with the Powers whose interest it is to counter the development of the Austro-Italian naval forces.

Even Russia may find it to her interest to see the base of the Triple *Entente* established along the shore of the Corfu Channel, because from there Slav propaganda can be carried on, as is shown by the campaign of Admiral Siniavin.

Finally, it should be observed that Greece is the Balkan Power which gains most from the war because her maritime dominions will be extended from the Corfu Channel across to the Island of Crete, to Lemnos and Imbros, thus commanding not only the Straits of Otranto, but also the entrance to the Dardanelles, and really controlling the lines of communications in the middle basin of the Mediterranean.

Such a situation may very seriously prejudice the freedom of our communications with Libya, constituting a menace similar to that which our fleet in the Tyrrhenian Sea might constitute for communications by sea between the French possessions in Africa and the ports of Toulon and Marseilles.

Enclosure 2 in No. 67.

Memorandum drawn up by Naval Staff.

(Translation.)

THE strip of the coast of Epirus situated on the Channel of Corfu is from the strategical point of view an integral part of the problem of the "command of the Straits of Otranto." This strip of coast, in fact, with the Island of Corfu, encloses a basin with two entrances (north and south) which protect a splendid sheet of water which would afford an admirable naval base for a fleet intended to operate in the Straits of Otranto.

The undisputed possession of the Channel of Corfu (which is the same distance from Santa Maria di Leuca as Taranto) would constitute as grave a danger as a an enemy occupation of Vallona, with the further disadvantage that it would be less easy to establish a blockade there.

The privileged position in which the possessor of the Straits of Corfu would be placed would not greatly enhance the strategical advantages enjoyed by Albania which already possesses Vallona (in itself a possession of the greatest strategical value in relation to the Straits of Otranto), but would, on the other hand, be of the greatest value to a country which, like Greece, already holds Epirus as well as the Island of Corfu, which is an outpost established in the Straits of Otranto, and which would be very greatly strengthened if communications with the mainland behind the island were assured. The naval base would acquire an enormous value.

The possession of the coast at Santi Quaranta would further improve the position, as it would enable the occupants to command Vallona also.

From these premises it is clear that for strategic reasons it would be for our advantage that the military importance of the Channel of Corfu should be reduced, and to do this it is necessary that as small an extent as possible of the coast of Epirus should be given to Greece, allowing her at the most the Bay of Saiada and giving the rest to Albania. And it would be of no advantage to declare the neutralisation of the whole channel if it was entirely, or even beyond the limits indicated, in the hands of Greece; such a neutralisation based only on conventional obligations, without the establishment of natural conditions (effective possession) to make it efficacious, would afford but slender guarantees in the case of hostilities. On the other hand, the result would be different and far more advantageous to us if the command of the channel remained divided, in the manner stated above, between Greece and Albania, with the additional condition of its complete neutralisation.

It is of importance to note the following distances which show the favourable situation in which the possessors of the Channel of Corfu are placed with reference to the Straits of Otranto:—

From Cape Kephali in the Island of Corfu to Santa Maria di Leuca is a distance of little more than 90 kilom., which is less than the distance between Santa Maria di Leuca and our fortified port of Taranto.

From Cape Kephali to Otranto the distance is 120 kilom. It should also be noted that the northern entrance of the Channel of Corfu, being from 3½ to 4 kilom. wide, is the more easily defended.

As regards the hinterland we should bear in mind that, in asserting a claim to the mountains which dominate Vallona from the south, Greece deprives the possession of the bay of its entire value.

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[20329] No. 68.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 358. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April 27, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul-General Barnham, covering one from Mr. Vice-Consul Biliotti, at Rhodes, suggesting the possibility of the Turkish Government establishing a naval station at Marmarice.

I must confess that the idea is a new one to me, and it does not appear to offer any special advantage as long as Turkey is able to retain the Marmora and its approaches.

But if Turkey is to maintain a fleet at all, and especially one including modern ships, the Golden Horn will no longer serve, but must be replaced by the Gulf of Ismidt as a naval base. A project in this direction has for the past three years been before the Ottoman Government, and desultory negotiations have from time to time taken place with Messrs. Armstrong on the subject. The delay on the part of the combined firms in building the Dreadnought for the Turkish Government has undoubtedly somewhat shaken Turkish confidence in English firms, and rival foreign houses have not been slow to point this out to the Turkish Admiralty.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 68.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 25.)

Sir, *Smyrna, April 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from the British vice-consul at Rhodes, suggesting that the Turkish Government should establish a naval station at the Bay of Marmarice.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 68.

Vice-Consul Biliotti to Consul-General Barnham.

Sir, *Rhodes, April 19, 1913.*

ACTUAL circumstances suggest to me the idea, which I venture to submit to your consideration, that Turkey, being henceforth unable to keep her fleet at Constantinople, which is no longer secure, will have to consider the necessity of establishing a naval military station in the Mediterranean.

To my knowledge the only spacious water, and fit in all respects to be turned into account as a naval military station, is Marmarice Bay, opposite Rhodes.

As Marmarice, which is far superior to Suda Bay, has been repeatedly visited, even in recent years, by the British fleet, I refrain from entering into a statement as to its military value, which can be furnished by the Admiralty with scientific details, which can hardly be expected from me with regard to the bay itself.

I may, however, call attention to the fact that the island of Rhodes, being situated only 20 miles from that bay, may be called upon to play a very important part in its attack or defence, according to the friendly or hostile feeling towards Turkey of the nation which may be in possession of this island should it no longer form part of Turkey.

About a fortnight ago the French ship of war "Jurien de la Gravière," which had visited the coast of Syria, on her way back to Smyrna, remained in Marmarice Bay without her presence there being known to the Italian authorities in this island.

Under these circumstances it would be perhaps advisable in the interest of the maintenance of peace that the Eastern Telegraph cable between Rhodes and Marmarice Bay, which was cut by Italian ships of war just before the occupation of the island in

May 1912, should be reconnected, or, if that is not practicable just now, that a torpedo-boat or other small ship of war should be stationed in Marmarice Bay to give immediate notice of any foreign naval movement in that bay.

I have, &c.
A. BILIOTTI.

[20310] No. 69.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 104. Confidential.)

Sir, *Rome, April 28, 1913.*

AS I have had the honour to telegraph to you this day, the Minister for Foreign Affairs dwelt upon the great urgency of Great Britain and France, or one of them, co-operating with Austria and Italy in such active measures as might be necessary to compel Montenegro to submit to the decision of the Powers, as the only alternative was the immediate and isolated intervention of Austria. Italy could not act with Austria alone for—as he said at first—a number of reasons. He then admitted that public opinion in this country would not tolerate her marching with Austria alone. Any co-operation, however small, on the part of other Powers which would suffice to maintain the character of international action exercised by mandatories of the Powers would enable Italy to join, but some such appearance of support, were it only the disembarkation of a limited number of bluejackets at Antivari or Dulcigno was indispensable.

I have little doubt that the Marquis di San Giuliano is right in forming this estimate of opinion in the country, though expression has been hitherto rigorously held in check.

With the exception of one or two Socialist organs the press can be, and is when occasion arises, officially controlled. But there is evidence that some public demonstration of opinion has recently been apprehended in the fact that detachments of troops have been unostentatiously occupying public buildings and the Ministries without any apparently sufficient reason. The Government have evidently good reason to know that an announcement that Italy was about to act with Austria alone in coercing Montenegro would lead to an explosion of this feeling all over the country.

I observed to his Excellency that as Austria appeared to have submitted a sort of ultimatium for the conference in London to decide upon this day, it was probably too late for me to telegraph to you; but he begged me to do so, and to urge upon you how much depended upon our co-operation, as it was possible some little time could yet be gained before an irrevocable step were taken.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[20352] No. 70.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 23.)

Sir, *Cettinje, April 28, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 74 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the collective representation made yesterday to the Montenegrin Government. Since the efforts of the Italian Minister, the senior representative of the Powers, to ensure that proper arrangements would be made on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to receive the representation were unsuccessful, it was decided to address to him the collective note, copy of which is herewith enclosed. I also enclose copy of the identic note received from him the same evening by each representative of the Powers.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 70.

Joint communication made to M. Vukotitch.

M. le Ministre, *Cettigné, le* 14 (27) *avril*, 1913.

LES soussignés, représentants des six Grandes Puissances, ayant reçu de leurs Gouvernements respectifs l'ordre de faire une démarche collective auprès du Gouvernement Royal de Monténégro et n'ayant pas eu l'honneur de rencontrer votre Excellence ni un fonctionnaire qualifié pour la remplacer, croient devoir, vu l'urgence, vous adresser ci-joint sous ce pli le texte de la communication qu'ils avaient l'intention de vous faire verbalement.

Cette remise équivaut à la démarche verbale qu'ils vous prient de considérer dès ce moment comme faite.

Les soussignés prient, &c.

VON ECKARDT.
GIESL.
DELAROCHE VERNET.
J. DE SALIS.
N. S. SQUITTI.
A. GIERS.

Enclosure 2 in No. 70.

Note communicated to the Montenegrin Government, April 27, 1913.

LES représentants des six Grandes Puissances ont l'honneur de déclarer collectivement au Gouvernement Royal de Monténégro que la prise de Scutari ne modifie en rien les décisions des Puissances relatives à la délimitation nord et nord-est de l'Albanie ; que, par conséquent, la ville de Scutari doit être évacuée dans le plus bref délai et qu'elle devra être remise aux Puissances représentées par les commandants des forces navales internationales.

Le Gouvernement Royal de Monténégro est invité à donner une prompte réponse à cette communication.

Enclosure 3 in No. 70.

M. Vukotitch to Count de Salis.

M. le Ministre, *Cettigné, le* 14 (27) *avril*, 1913.

LE jour de Pâques étant une fête à la fois religieuse et nationale, le Gouvernement Royal, en force d'une ancienne tradition commune à tous les États orthodoxes, ne se trouve pas en état de délibérer ni même de recevoir des communications qui n'auraient pas un caractère d'extrême urgence.

Le soussigné ne peut, par conséquent, qu'accuser réception de la lettre du 14 (27) mois courant, transmise à son domicile, en se réservant de donner, au nom du Gouvernement Royal, après les fêtes de Pâques, une réponse à la communication des Grandes Puissances concernant Scutari transmise par la lettre précitée.

Veuillez, &c.

DUCHAN VUKOTITCH.

[20333] No. 71.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 362.)

Sir, *Constantinople, April* 29, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith two despatches from His Majesty's vice-consul at Kavalla, reporting on the action of the Bulgarians in that port in forcibly converting Mahommedans.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 71.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 13.)

Sir, *Cavalla, April* 15, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that a Moslem villager from Eski Cavalla (about one hour north of Cavalla) yesterday came to Cavalla to complain that a body of Bulgarians (including some dressed as regular soldiers), accompanied by several Bulgarian priests, had come to the village and were forcing all the inhabitants to become Christian.

The other consular representatives here and myself brought these facts to the notice of Colonel Martchine, now military Governor of the town, who replied that he had just learnt of them from other sources, and had sent an officer and some men to put a stop to such proceedings, which he sincerely regretted.

There is no doubt that the forced conversion of Moslems to Christianity is being systematically proceeded with in Macedonia. In most cases violence, in some cases money, is used to effect the conversions. Up to the present the movement seems to have been directed solely against Pomaks (Moslems, speaking Bulgarian, of Bulgarian stock), and has resulted in increasing the Bulgarian population of Macedonia by many thousands.

The Moslems of Cavalla and district are naturally much alarmed at the events of Eski Cavalla, and a continuance of the campaign in this district would undoubtedly result in the exodus from this region of most of the Moslem population.

I have, &c.

JAMES MORGAN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 71.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Cavalla, April* 17, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 13 of the 15th April, I have the honour to report that a body of villagers from Eski Cavalla came to Cavalla on the afternoon of the 15th April.

The tale of the mukhtar (headman) of the village, as told to the other consuls here and to myself, was as follows :

On the afternoon of Sunday, the 13th April, four Bulgarian priests and some fifty armed men arrived at Eski Cavalla, and collecting the mukhtar and chief men drove them at the bayonet's point into a house, where they were called upon to give the names of all the inhabitants of the village, which consists of 150 families, all of whom are Pomaks. The drawing-up of the list occupied some five or six hours.

On the morrow the Bulgarians drove all the inhabitants of the village into the mosque at the point of the bayonet. The mosque had by this time been converted into a church. Most of the interior ornaments had been torn down and the minaret destroyed.

The inhabitants were thereupon forcibly baptised with full Church ceremony. Kalpaks with crosses sewn on them were then distributed to each man, and head-coverings to the women, while each person received a small cross and a paper bearing a number and a Christian name, and some pious pictures.

In the afternoon two officers arrived from Cavalla, no doubt sent by Colonel Martchine after our interview with him. They stayed about an hour, and left again for Cavalla.

After their departure, and on the following morning, a few of the inhabitants who had not yet been baptised were baptised.

Finally, at 11 A.M. on the morning of the 15th April, the priests and their followers departed in the direction of Zigosh.

The mukhtar and other villagers were in the deepest dejection on account of their forcible conversion, and begged for consular intervention to have restored to them liberty to practise their ancient faith.

On the following morning I called on Colonel Martchine at the wish of my colleagues. He told me that he had given orders that the priests and their followers should leave the district, and that they had done so. On my asking if the villagers

would in the future be free to practise the Moslem religion if they wished to do so, he replied that they would be free to do so.

The events of Eski Cavalla have caused the greatest alarm in the neighbouring Pomak villages of Keusse Elias, Korita, Kokala, Kortlu, and Horasha. Many of the inhabitants of these villages have fled to Cavalla or into the mountains, fearing the arrival of the Bulgarian propagandists.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[20394] No. 72.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received May 3.)

Sir, *Treasury, May 2, 1913.*

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Sir L. Mallet's letter of the 17th ultimo, relative to the advance of 4,000,000 fr. made by the four Protecting Powers of Crete to Prince George of Greece when High Commissioner of the island in 1901.

My Lords note and concur in Sir E. Grey's action in approaching the French Government with a view to securing that the question of repayment shall, if possible, be discussed and settled by the International Commission about to assemble at Paris to consider various questions arising out of the war.

2. Should the French Government agree that the question can properly be discussed by the Commission, my Lords trust that the British delegates will be instructed to press for an immediate commencement of interest and sinking fund payments, or alternatively for a repayment of the advance out of the proceeds of any loan which may be raised on behalf of Crete.

3. It will be within Sir E. Grey's recollection that the International Commission on Cretan affairs which reported in 1906 recommended that the payment of interest and sinking fund on the advance should be posponed until 1911, but that in view of the unsatisfactory financial position in Crete payment was not in fact commenced in that year, certain of the interested Powers dissenting from the proposal to bring pressure to bear upon the Cretan Government. To enable them to form a correct judgment on the present position, my Lords would be glad if Sir E. Grey would cause them to be furnished with the latest information as to the financial situation of the Island which may be available in your Department.

I am, &c.
ROBERT CHALMERS.

[20372] No. 73.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received May 3.)

Sir, *Treasury Chambers, May 2, 1913.*

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Sir L. Mallet's letter of the 24th ultimo, enclosing copy of a communication from the French Ambassador at this court, embodying the proposed programme of the deliberations of the forthcoming international Commission for the settlement of the financial questions arising out of the present war.

In reply, I am to request you to inform Secretary Sir E. Grey that my Lords have no observations to offer on the points comprised in this programme. The proposal to submit to the Commission the question of the repayment of the advance to Crete in 1901 is dealt with in a separate Treasury letter of to-day's date.

I am, &c.
ROBERT CHALMERS.

[20444] No. 74.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 3.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, May 3, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of telegrams, dated the 2nd instant, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 74.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *May 2, 1913.*

MY No. 62.

Turkish Colonel has informed me troops have neither supplies nor fodder for animals, and if no transports sent to take them away will have to abandon both guns and animals. He has again requested me to send a telegram to War Minister, Constantinople, making impassioned appeal for help.

Montenegrin troops, to number of 5,000, on north bank of Drin near Alessio. Turkish batteries are on south bank of the river.

Turks have received a few more days' provisions from Montenegrins.

Enclosure 2 in No. 74.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *May 2, 1913.*

H.M.S. "Yarmouth" reports that four more Greek transports with Servian troops have reached Salonica.

[20484] No. 75.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 74.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, May 3, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 164 of 2nd May: Blockade of Montenegro.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said to me to-day that the King of Montenegro had promised neither to fire on nor to seize for military purposes cargoes contained in Italian and Austrian vessels for relief of inhabitants of Scutari. Difficulty was to make sure that such a promise would be kept. Minister for Foreign Affairs therefore suggests that Austrian and Italian admirals should consult with British admiral whether it is practically possible safely to send forward to Scutari succour for civilian population. When they have settled details of how this is to be done, he suggests that Austrian and Italian naval commanders should telegraph to Governments for approval.

Minister for Foreign Affairs put forward idea that it might be possible to attract destitute population of Scutari to San Giovanni di Medua, where it might be easier to arrange for their relief.

[20485] No. 76.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 75.)

(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, May 3, 1913.*

I ENQUIRED of Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon whether it was true as stated in papers here that Austria would only await result of Ambassadors' meeting on Monday to commence military operations on Tuesday. He replied that there was no truth in this report. I pressed him not to hurry matters. He replied that he could

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not wait much longer but could fix no date. He talked to-day possibly of sending an ultimatum before taking action, but he again intimated that action would have to be delayed until negotiations with Italy were complete. He had very little hope that Montenegro would give in peacefully. His latest information went to show that the Montenegrins were fortifying Scutari as rapidly as possibly and that they meant to offer desperate resistance.

[20467] No. 77.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 174.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, May 3, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 385 of 2nd May.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said he had already in *aide-mémoire* summarised in my telegram No. 171 of 2nd May, stated views of Russian Government, whilst he had instructed Russian Ambassador to impress on you that even a restricted action by Austria would cause Russian Government great difficulties, and that if such action was not confined to Scutari he could not answer for consequences.

As regards language which you proposed to hold in Parliament, his Excellency expressed the hope that you would put matter in a rather stronger light. King Nicholas's reply had shown that he was ready to negotiate, that we had by no means exhausted our means of pacific pressure, and that in precipitating action Austria was assuming a very grave responsibility. He would like above points brought out. On the other hand, he trusted you would not use argument of Djakova.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who took very pessimistic view of situation, said that, while Italy would probably decline to participate in any action with Austria against Scutari, she might perhaps occupy Vallona. Such a step would eventually lead to partition of Albania between Italy and Austria, and have very serious results.

My personal impression is that if Austria takes isolated action all will depend on nature of such action, and on manner in which it reacts on Russian public opinion. My Italian colleague, who is well informed, believes that unless King Nicholas receives some assurance of eventual territorial compensation he will not listen to further representations, and that Austria will then advance into Montenegro and not restrict her action to Scutari. Fighting must then ensue, and some incident is bound to occur that will stir Russian public opinion to such a pitch that war will be mere question of time. It will be impossible for Government to make public understand the fact of Austria having given up Djakova renders it impossible for Powers to ask her to make any further territorial concessions at expense of Albania. Public will argue that in offering to give up Scutari in return for such compensation Montenegro had shown very conciliatory disposition, and that if Austria summarily rejects Montenegro's overtures and declines to allow Powers further time for pacific pressure, it is because she wants to enhance her prestige by some military action. Government will not long be able to resist pressure of public opinion, while Emperor himself may lose patience. Position of Government is very difficult, as they are accused of having encouraged Austria in belief that Russia will not fight, by failing to hold firmer language and by disbanding reservists.

Both Minister for Foreign Affairs and Italian Ambassador spoke to me of possibility of other Powers giving Montenegro private assurance that they would do their best to procure her some territorial concession when once Scutari was given up. They think that Austria might be more tractable when surrender of Scutari was accomplished fact. I fear that you do not share this view, but I venture to think that Austrian Government should know that in precipitating action they are embarking on course that may lead to a European war. Even if their action is restricted to Scutari, there is always a risk of a serious conflict between Austrian and Montenegrin troops which might eventually force Russia to intervene.

[20468] No. 78.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 175.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, May 3, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 381 of 2nd May.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that since conversation reported in my telegram No. 167 of 30th April, he had received information from Constantinople very similar to yours, and that therefore he would agree in principle to steps being taken for repatriation of troops from Albania.

[20464] No. 79.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 90.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, May 3, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 170 of 2nd May.

Following is explanation given :—

While siege was still in progress Italian and Austro-Hungarian Governments endeavoured to negotiate with the King of Montenegro for permission to supply provisions to aid the population of Scutari. Vessels loaded were waiting at Cattaro. As soon as surrender was announced these vessels endeavoured to carry out instructions. In view of reported opposition of admirals the Italian Government ordered their vessel to withdraw.

Secretary-General admitted under the present circumstances it was questionable whether supply of provisions was desirable.

As Austria was also involved they were referring the question to Vienna, and would conform their action to that of Austria, informing me in due course.

[20481] No. 80.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 92.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, May 3, 1913.*

I LEARN that orders have been received at Spezia for the mobilisation of Italian fleet. Press announces the arrival of two ships of war at Brindisi, where others are expected, and that staff officer of 11th Army Corps is making arrangements or quartering the troops to be concentrated there.

[20482] No. 81.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 93.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, May 3, 1913.*

OFFICIAL agency communicates that rumours in press of an agreement between Austria and Italy for partition of Albania and modification of existing agreements are unfounded. Two allied States aim at assuring autonomy and independence of Albania in conformity with decisions of the Ambassadors' Conference.

[20413] No. 82.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, May 3, 1913.*

THE vice-consul at Scutari enquires whether, in the event of the King making a solemn entry, or holding any function, he should attend.

I presume not.

[20424] No. 83.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 3.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Odessa, May 3, 1913.*

FOLLOWING sent to St. Petersburgh, No. 15 of 1st May :—

"All reservists, naval and military, in the Odessa prefecture are to appear for the purpose of verification on 8th May.

"Already done in the Odessa 'uyezd.'"

(Repeated to Constantinople.)

[19905] No. 84.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 205.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May 3, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 199 of 29th April : Adana.

British Armenia Committee learn that first batch of Mahommedan refugees have arrived at Adana in destitute condition, which constitutes grave danger to Armenian population.

Can you point this out to the Turkish Government and induce them to take steps to provide refugees with necessaries ?

[20257] No. 85.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 388.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 3, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 171 of 2nd May.

I certainly appreciate spirit of moderation and conciliation that Russian Government have shown throughout whole of Balkan crisis, and am anxious to remain in close touch.

I have already explained difficulty of saying that it will be altogether unreasonable for Austria to take any action at all if King of Montenegro remains obstinate and other Powers will take no action, but I want to know opinion of Minister for Foreign Affairs as to whether in the event of Austria landing troops in Albania the naval blockade should be maintained and the *réunion* of Ambassadors should continue to meet in London.

France will presumably withdraw from naval demonstration, if Russia desires it, and we must then withdraw too.

If Russia announces unqualified disapproval of Austrian action, *réunion* of Ambassadors must, it would seem, be discontinued or suspended.

The course I should like to see adopted, if possible, would be to indicate certain limits as desirable for Austrian action, and to say that as long as action was kept within those limits the *réunion* of Ambassadors and the naval demonstration would not be abruptly brought to an end. In this way some moderating influence could be retained over action taken by Austria.

It is desirable to know whether Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks the course I suggests will be possible. If possible, I ought to know this by Tuesday, the day Austria will apparently move, and it would be well if Russian Ambassador could be instructed what line to take at the *réunion* of Ambassadors on Monday as to further meetings in the event of Austrian action.

[20160] No. 86.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 57.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 3, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 54 of 1st May.

You can make the collective representation, even if Austro-Hungarian Minister does not join, provided that all your other colleagues are authorised to do so.

[21041] No. 87.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 102.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 3, 1913.*

THE Austrian Ambassador to-day gave me verbally a statement, of which he left me for convenience the following record :—

"We fully appreciate the value of the endeavours made by Sir Edward Grey at the *réunion* to maintain the unanimity between the Powers, as well as the urgent instruction given to the British Minister at Cettinjé, which we trust will not remain without effect.

"Regarding our attitude towards the resolution taken by the *réunion* of the 1st May, we maintain our previous communications to the Powers, which differ from the resolution of the *réunion* in the two following points :

"1. The resolution does not contemplate positive coercitive measures ; further, it does not even mention a time limit within which Scutari should be evacuated by the Montenegrins.

"2. The *démarche* at Cettinjé proposed by the *réunion* promises Montenegro economical compensation in the case of a voluntary evacuation of Scutari, whilst our point of view is that Montenegro must now comply unconditionally with the will of Europe, which, of course, does not preclude that the Powers should consider some financial assistance for the country after Montenegro has submitted to the will of the Powers. Although we have reserved it to us to take part in subsequent conversations on this subject, it would be impossible to join in a *démarche* which contains a formal promise to Montenegro in this respect.

"In consequence of this, we are not in a position to give instructions to our Minister at Cettinjé to take part in the collective *démarche* suggested in London. The situation remains the same in the sense that, now as before, we must refrain from making any further proposals and must reserve it to ourselves to take, *au moment donné*, the measures which appear necessary to carry out the European decisions.

"In abstaining from this collective *démarche* at Cettinjé we by no means intend to hinder the other Powers in carrying out such representations to the Montenegrin Government. We would on the contrary welcome it if the impressive language of the representatives of the other Powers could determine King Nicholas to give way and in doing so to forestall the *sommation* from us."

I said that the second objection to the *démarche* in Cettinjé appeared to be a pure point of form. All that the *démarche* suggested was to tell King Nicholas that, if he evacuated Scutari peaceably, he would get financial assistance afterwards ; and that, if he did not, he would get none. It seemed of little use to argue, and I would therefore only express my regret that Austria had not joined in the representation, as her refusal would make things more difficult in St. Petersburgh. My desire was to secure, if possible, that if and when Austrian action was taken Russia should agree that, if it was kept within certain limits, the concert should be preserved. The only chance of securing this was that I should be able to urge that everything else had been tried, and that there was really nothing left but Austrian action. Now M. Sazonof would urge that there had been still a chance, even if it was the last chance, of bringing Montenegro to reason, and that Austria had not taken it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20973] No. 88.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 150.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 3, 1913.*

I SPOKE to the German Ambassador to-day in the same way as I had to the Austrian Ambassador about the Austrian refusal to join in the *démarche* in Cettinjé.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[20465] No. 89.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 216.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, May 3, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 215 of 1st May.

Reply received from Porte accepts invitation of Powers to cease hostilities immediately, and adds that, having named its plenipotentiaries, it suggests London for meeting.

Plenipotentiaries are not named, and I understand that some difficulty is being experienced in inducing nominees to accept duty.

[20472] No. 90.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, May 3, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 56 of 2nd May.

I forwarded to you in my telegram No. 76 of 30th April reply of Montenegrin Government received that afternoon respecting Scutari. Telegram was *en clair* of about 660 words.

A similar telegram from Russian Minister sent to St. Petersburgh has equally not been received.

We are asking for explanations.

It seems to us in the circumstances that Montenegrin Government delayed telegram, desiring that their reply, which was unsatisfactory, should not be known to meeting of Ambassadors Thursday, 1st May. Their reply would probably have been postponed beyond Wednesday if the Russian Minister had not warned them that continued delay would provoke an immediate catastrophe.

Text of reply was also sent by post in my despatch No. 25 of 30th April. It should reach you Monday at latest.

Chamber is summoned for 7th May. You may anticipate that its meeting may be put forward as a fresh reason for delay.

[20473] No. 91.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, May 4, 1913.*

YOUR telegram of 1st May.

I have spoken yesterday at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in the sense of your instructions. This evening King asked me to transmit to you, in reply, the message transmitted in my immediately following telegram, stating that he places the fate of Scutari in hands of Powers.

[20474] No. 92.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, May 4, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 82 of 4th May.

Following is text of message addressed to you by King :—

"Mon Gouvernement a exposé dans sa note du 30 avril les raisons de son attitude dans la question de Scutari.

"Cette attitude a été inspirée aux principes imprescriptibles de la justice. J'affirme une fois de plus, avec mon peuple, notre droit consacré par l'histoire et par la conquête.

"Ma dignité ainsi que celle de mon peuple ne me permettant pas de me soumettre à des sommations isolées, je remets le sort de la ville de Scutari entre les mains des Puissances.—NICOLAS."

[20475] No. 93.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, May 4, 1913.*

SCUTARI.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is absent and will not return until midnight. I have read to Political Director your private letter of yesterday and telegrams therein mentioned. He communicated to me instructions which were telegraphed to French Ambassador in London this morning. They are as follows :—

"We must make the greatest efforts to avoid rupture which is threatened to-morrow. We can only succeed if Russia will make up her mind to realise impossibility of persisting in her present attitude, which does not enable either England or ourselves to take part, even by mere presence of our ships, in coercive measures which may be necessary. The responsibility which M. Sazonof would incur, were he, by abstaining himself and thereby entailing our abstention, to deprive us of means of limiting the Austrian attitude, is so evident that I hope still that he will not desire to assume it. Speak to this effect to Russian Ambassador in London. I am acting in same sense at St. Petersburgh."

[20476] No. 94.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, May 4, 1913.*

I WAS informed this afternoon by M. Paléologue that a communication to the following effect was made to him yesterday, in the absence of M. Pichon, by M. Isvolsky.

The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs considers that a new situation has been created by the communication made to you by the Montenegrin representative, as it offers to surrender Scutari on terms which will throw the responsibility for any evil consequences resulting from a refusal not on Montenegro but on Austro-Hungary, if they be not accepted by that country. M. Pichon is requested by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to urge the Austro-Hungarian Government to agree in principle to territorial and economic compensations for Montenegro. The territorial compensation, however, should be found by a modification of the boundaries of Albania, and not at the expense of Servia, whose share in the division of territories, which is the concern of the Allies only, is still an unknown quantity.

It was pointed out to the Russian Ambassador by M. Paléologue that it would be difficult for the French Government to act in the manner desired by the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, without the concurrence of the British Government, as the proposal put forward in this communication was a fresh one and differed from the decisions of the *réunions* in London.

M. Pichon has approved the reply of the political director to the Russian Ambassador.

[20477] No. 95.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 62. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, May 4, 1913.*

I SAW M. Paléologue this afternoon and received from him information to the following effect :—

"It has been reported to the French Government from a secret source which they regard as reliable that Austria-Hungary and Italy are in process of reaching, under German inspiration, an understanding by which Italy is to occupy the south and Austria the north of Albania. M. de Jagow is, it is stated, being urged by the Marquis di San Giuliano to press the Austro-Hungarian Government to conclude a convention to this effect without delay. The Austro-Hungarian Government have put

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forward a proposal that Italy shall be compensated for the inclusion in Dalmatia of Mount Lovcen by the annexation to Italy of one or more of the Ægean Islands. The German Government have concurred in this Austrian proposal, and, even in the event of the surrender of Scutari by King Nicholas, they will not raise any objection to Austria-Hungary and Italy dividing Albania between them."

[20478] No. 96.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 63. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, May 4, 1913.*

FOLLOWING instructions have been telegraphed to French Ambassador for to-morrow's *réunion* at the Foreign Office: -

"You should be guided by considerations—

"1. Albanian question is a European one. At the request of Austria and Italy, Powers decided last December that Albania should be made an autonomous State under their guarantee and control. None of them have denounced this agreement. They are therefore bound loyally to abide by it.

"2. If (and I can scarcely believe it) Austrian and Italian Governments should not admit this decisive agreement and should claim to land their troops on Albanian coast, the other Powers should take part in this military operation in order to mark the European provisional character of the occupation.

"3. If Austria and Italy should have the ulterior motive of definitely dividing Albania between them, Adriatic would cease to be neutral, and balance of power in eastern basin of Mediterranean would be the more seriously affected, as the Italian fleet holds Tobrouk and Rhodes.

"4. Albania between Austria and Italy would be a check to Triple *Entente*, and, in state of effervescence prevailing in Russian opinion, it is a question whether general peace would not be endangered."

[20470] No. 97.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 177.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, May 4, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs, to whom I gave memorandum embodying your telegram No. 388 of 3rd May, received me and French Minister together this afternoon. He told us that he had just been informed by Italian Ambassador that if King Nicholas's answer was unsatisfactory Austria would at once march and that her action would extend over whole of Montenegro. This, his Excellency said, would create most serious situation and render nugatory course you proposed taking at meeting to-morrow. Action by Austria would in itself suspend meeting of Ambassadors, as Austrian Ambassador would have to withdraw. Naval demonstration should, however, be maintained.

Minister for Foreign Affairs then said he had reliable information to the effect that Austria and Italy contemplated military occupation of Albania independently of how Scutari question was settled. Albania would then be partitioned into Austrian and Italian spheres of influence. He had instructed Russian Ambassadors to urge on His Majesty's Government and French Government, in the event of the above being confirmed, France and England should declare their intention to disembark troops at certain points in Albania. Russia would give France mandate to do so.

Scutari question was but part of larger question of Albania, and provisional occupation of Albania by international troops would serve to effect pacific solution of Scutari question. It would be advisable that each point occupied should be occupied by troops belonging to at least two different nationalities, so as to give occupation mixed character, and to prevent creation of separate spheres of influence.

Occupation of Albania would be justified by necessity of establishing régime after withdrawal of Turkish and allies' troops. Once this task accomplished, international troops would also be withdrawn.

He begged me to express earnest hope that His Majesty's Government would adopt this proposal as offering almost only hope of maintaining peace. Russian Ambassador should have received his instructions to-morrow morning, and though Minister for Foreign Affairs understands you will have to discuss question with French Government, it might be well if you could see him before Ambassadors meet to-morrow.

Should Austrian Ambassador announce that his Government have decided to take immediate action, we ought, his Excellency thought, to protest. We ought also to declare that Powers cannot disinterest themselves in any part of Albania after having accepted principle of *terra nullius* with regard to it.

On French Minister enquiring whether Russia would join in an international occupation of Albania, his Excellency said he could not reply without taking Emperor's orders. Personally he did not seem averse to idea.

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to ask you to accept what he had said about our not being able to disinterest ourselves in any part of Albania without confirmation by Russian Ambassador.

[20471] No. 98.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 178.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, May 4, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 175 of 3rd May.

In *aide-mémoire* just received, Minister for Foreign Affairs states that Russian Ambassador at Constantinople has been informed that Russian representatives at Balkan Courts have been instructed to communicate to their respective Governments Porte's request for removal of Turkish troops from Albania to Asia Minor.

Minister for Foreign Affairs notes with satisfaction that you share his view as to danger of leaving Albania without any armed force, and considers that its occupation by international troops would be best guarantee for maintenance of order.

[20486] No. 99.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 74. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, May 4, 1913.*

DIPLOMATISTS generally in Berlin, and more especially the Balkan representatives, are following with close interest the negotiations said to be in progress between the Governments of Italy and Austria-Hungary on the subject of Albania. The Balkan representatives have heard with considerable uneasiness the latest report to the effect that Italy contemplates occupying Santi Quaranta as well as Vallona. Greece would, of course, be most nearly affected by the occupation of these two towns, and more especially by the occupation of the former; and, in conversation with my French colleague and myself, the Greek Chargé d'Affaires has not attempted to conceal his great anxiety as to the excitement which this step would provoke in Greece. M. Cambon and I have both pointed out to M. Theotoky the danger to his country which a war with a naval Power like Italy would entail, and, while warning him on this point, we have impressed upon him the necessity for his Government to avoid taking any action which could possibly provoke a conflict with that country. With regard to the designs on Albania attributed to Italy and Austria-Hungary, M. Theotoky points out that there has never been any question of a mandate for those two Powers as regards that country, and that Europe sanctioned the scheme of an independent Albania on their demand, and that they should consequently be the last to think of partitioning Albania between them and thus frustrating a scheme which they themselves initiated. In his opinion the neutrality of Albania was the very first condition necessary to the independence of that country, and this opinion he had every reason to believe was also held by the Russian Government.

I appears to M. Cambon and myself that, as the Albanian question may possibly give rise to difficulties of an even graver nature than those connected with Scutari, the points to which M. Theotoky draws attention are worthy of consideration, and that, should the rumours now current prove to be correct, it might, perhaps, be advisable

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that a hint to the effect that the future of Albania is a question which concerns the whole of Europe should be given in the proper quarters.

My reason for venturing to draw your attention to these considerations is that the occupation of Santi Quarenta especially would undoubtedly be a very serious blow to the interests of Greece, and might, in the case of resentment being shown by that country, lead to complications which might prove to be a matter of concern to His Majesty's Government as possibly affecting the future of the islands.

[20483] No. 100.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 94.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, May 4, 1913.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador this morning, under instructions, informed Minister for Foreign Affairs that, since announcement at the Ambassadors' meeting on 1st May of disposition of Montenegro to treat, Russia had modified her previous view and did not any longer desire common action by Italy with Austria in coercive measures.

Reply of Minister for Foreign Affairs, which Russian Ambassador has asked me to regard as confidential here, was as follows:

Italy will continue to do all in her power to prevent Austria taking action. But should such action be taken Italy believes she will be serving cause of peace by also taking action in Albania.

Reply, of which above is a translation from French, was taken down textually by Russian Ambassador, and approved as correct by Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[20488] No. 101.

Mr. Vaughan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 4.)

(No. 67.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, May 4, 1913.*

I UNDERSTAND Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs communicated decision of Ambassadors as to Silistria privately to Roumanian and Bulgarian representatives at St. Petersburgh about a week ago.

Russian Minister here was instructed two days ago also to communicate terms of settlement privately to Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs has asked Russian Minister to obtain permission of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to his making known terms of settlement at a secret session of Roumanian Chamber.

Some resentment is felt by some of the foreign representatives here at the action of Italian Minister, who is believed to have kept Roumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed of the proceedings at the conferences in St. Petersburgh.

Decision will not be popular, but it is thought, in spite of demonstrations, Government will weather the storm owing to some arrangement with the Liberal party.

[20369] No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 171.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May 4, 1913.*

YOU should when next you see Minister for Foreign Affairs make the observation suggested in my telegram No. 167 of yesterday about action in Southern Albania.

[20354] No. 103.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 93.)
Sir, *Athens, April 28, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 69 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a further report by Lieutenant-Colonel Cunliffe-Owen on the subject of the present distribution of the Greek forces.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 103

Lieutenant-Colonel Cunliffe-Owen to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Athens, April 27, 1913.*

WITH reference to my previous despatch No. 17 of the 6th instant, it would appear now that the Greek military forces in the Salonica area have been strengthened at the expense of those in Epiro-Albanian territory. This measure, however, should not be taken to indicate that there is any the less intention to retain hold of such portions of the latter country as are at present occupied, but rather that the display of potential military force in the Salonica locality is probably held to be more urgent for the moment than in the other direction.

Reports persistently state that the 3rd division is moving east from Kastoria, and if this division, together with the 5th, last reported from Verria, are reckoned upon, we have available in the vicinity of Salonica a force of eight divisions, or roughly something over 80,000 men. The probability is that practically the whole of this force could be called upon as a field army if military operations were to ensue, for certain territorial classes, lately allowed to proceed on leave, have now been ordered to reassemble at Larissa, and the inference may be drawn that these troops will set free the 5th division and other detachments from their former garrisons. Reports also state that the heavy artillery units from Epirus have been sent round to Salonica, but their arrival at this place has not yet been observed.

2. It would appear that positions are being occupied by the Greeks along the Pravishta (north of Leftera) line and behind the Struma from Nigrita towards Chai-Aghizi, and that the 2nd and 7th divisions, probably supported by the 1st, are already established there. As regards the other divisions, I apprehend that the 4th and 6th are held in readiness around Salonica and Langaza to move eastward to still further reinforce the foregoing, with the 3rd and 5th for disposition also in this direction or towards Ghevgheli, where the 10th is stationed.

3. The above preparations show a firm resolve to maintain hold of that portion of Southern Macedonia west of the Struma, and also probably of the country between that river and Leftera, but the measures are defensive and in no way aggressive.

I have, &c.
F. CUNLIFFE-OWEN, *Military Attaché.*

[20669] No. 104.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Salonica, April 29, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, copy of a despatch, with its enclosure, which I have this day addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject of the demand of the landed proprietors of this district for some guarantee for the respect of their rights of ownership.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 104.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 37.)

Sir, *Salonica, April* 29, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a memorial which has been presented to the foreign consulates in Salonica on behalf of a number of the principal landed proprietors of this district, soliciting the support of the Great Powers with a view to obtaining some sort of guarantee that their rights and interests should be respected in the coming settlement.

The statements contained in this memorial are in no way exaggerated. The passage of the allied troops was immediately followed almost everywhere by a species of "Jacquerie," the peasants, whether "Métayers" or free villagers, throwing themselves ravenously upon the property of the landowners, carrying off all such cattle, grain, or other farm produce as the soldiers had not already consumed, the agricultural implements, the furniture, and even the windows and planking of their houses, cutting down their trees, devastating their gardens, and destroying much that they could not carry away. In many cases the houses themselves were fired or otherwise demolished, the woodwork being torn out for use as fuel. In one case, close to Salonica, the house of a distinguished Turkish officer was wantonly destroyed by Bulgarian troops.

It must not, however, be supposed that this treatment was reserved exclusively for Turkish beys, the property of Christian and Jewish owners, and even of foreign subjects, being similarly devastated. The loss in individual cases has been estimated at over £ T. 15,000.

In some instances the peasants, after appropriating all movable property, proceeded to divide up the land itself amongst them, and, if in the Greek districts some efforts have been made by the authorities to protect the owners' interests, I do not think as much can be said for the Serbs, and certainly not for the Bulgarians. Agents sent out by the proprietors after the alleged restoration of tranquillity for the purpose of reasserting their rights having been murdered or frightened away by threats of murder. Similarly, as regards the future, whilst the Greeks have proclaimed their intention of fully respecting all rights of property, in the Bulgarian zone there seems reason to suppose that the fears expressed in the memorial are not altogether groundless. I am told that the lands and houses of all Mussulman fugitives from the Bulgarian zone have already been declared "caduc" or forfeit to the State, whilst, wherever fields had been sown before the owners' flight, the growing crops have been put up for sale by public auction.

Article 7 of the Treaty of Peace between Turkey and Greece, concluded at Constantinople in December 1897, says:—

"Les musulmans habitants ou originaires de la Thessalie . . . . seront libres d'émigrer ou de fixer leur domicile en Turquie.

"Tous les émigrés continueront à jouir pleinement et sans aucune entrave . . . . de leurs propriétés immobilières sises en Grèce et à les administrer."

I understand the desire of the memorialists to be that some such article as this should be inserted in the definitive treaty now to be concluded between Turkey and the Balkan States permitting them to retain their Ottoman nationality, and at the same time preserving their proprietary rights against the danger of confiscation or compulsory expropriation.

As is quite correctly pointed out in the memorial, a very large proportion of the land in Macedonia has never been under cultivation. With the enormous diminution of the population that will result from the war, it will be within the means of every Government to provide amply for the legitimate requirements of its rural populations without the necessity of laying hands on the private property of those landowners who desire to retain it in their own.

I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure direct to His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, and also to His Britannic Majesty's Legation, at Athens.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 104.

Memorial addressed to Foreign Consulates in Salonica.

M. le Consul, *Salonique, le 21 avril*, 1913.

NOUS soussignés, propriétaires terriens en Macédoine, avons l'honneur de vous exposer la situation qui nous est faite par suite de la guerre balkanique, et de vous prier de transmettre à votre Gouvernement la présente requête, à laquelle nous vous serons obligés d'accorder votre haut appui.

Depuis l'occupation de la Roumélie par les alliés, les populations rurales de certaines de nos régions font, au mépris de tout droit, main basse sur les tchiftliks (fermes), objet de leur convoitise; elles les envahissent en grande partie et tentent de se les approprier. De tels actes constituent une violation flagrante du droit de propriété, et l'attitude hostile des paysans nous inspire les plus vives appréhensions pour l'avenir. Cet état de choses, en effet, nous fait redouter la réapparition d'une ère d'agitation, qui, certes, ne manquerait pas d'être très préjudiciable aux intérêts généraux du pays. Se basant sur l'utilité ou sur la nécessité de posséder nos fermes en vue de satisfaire aux désirs d'une catégorie de paysans métayers, le Gouvernement à venir pourrait, craignons-nous, recourir à l'expropriation forcée, en lésant gravement les intérêts des propriétaires.

C'est à pareille éventualité que nous venons vous solliciter de parer, en prenant dès maintenant en main la cause des propriétaires terriens. Ainsi seulement pourrait être évitée l'atteinte aux droits sacrés d'une classe de la population roumaïote. Le précédent créé en Thessalie dans les circonstances identiques, lors de la cession de cette province au Royaume de Grèce, pourrait être invoqué pour suggérer aux Gouvernements futurs le respect de la propriété des tchiftliks.

Au reste, la population rurale dans nos contrées n'est pas à ce point dense qu'il faille recourir aux moyens extrêmes, à l'expropriation. Le chiffre de cette population par kilomètre carré est certainement bien au dessous de la moyenne de ces pays-ci. Au surplus, il existe ici d'immenses étendues des terres incultes appartenant à l'Etat (érazii halié) et qu'on pourrait livrer à l'agriculture. La répartition de ces terres aux paysans donnerait à ceux-ci toute satisfaction et dispenserait le Gouvernement de procéder à une expropriation forcée, qui ne serait pour nous rien moins que ruineuse.

En considération de ce qui précède, nous venons, en notre nom et au nom de nos nombreux compatriotes, solliciter de la bienveillance des Grandes Puissances l'insertion dans le prochain traité de paix d'une clause spéciale que préserverait nos droits acquis sur les fermes par des titres de propriété officiels, et qui s'opposerait à l'adoption de toute mesure illégale visant la possession de nos terres.

Dans l'espoir que les Grandes Puissances, animées d'un haut esprit de justice et d'équité, voudront prendre notre requête en sérieuse considération, nous vous prions, &c.

OSMAN ADIL BEY MAHZENI,
ex-Préfet intérimaire de Constantinople.
IBRAHIM BEY.
ABDI BEY SHEWKET.
SAMI BEY.
HUSNI PACHA.
MEHMED DJEMIL BEY.
SELAH-ED-DIN BEY.
ALI ECHREF BEY.
HOULOUSSI BEY.
HAFIZ ALI BEY.
ISKENDER-PACHA-ZADÉ SIRRI BEY.
HUSNI BEY, *Conseiller d'Ambassade.*
TEWFIK BEY, *ex-Maire de Salonique.*
HAMID HAMDI BEY.
J. S. MODIANO,
HASSAN NOURRI BEY,
et trois autres.

[22235] No. 105.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 24.) *Cettinjé, April 30, 1913.*

Sir,

AS already reported to you, the town of Scutari capitulated in the early hours of Wednesday, the 23rd April.

According to the accounts published here, communications were first opened on the initiative of Essad Pasha between the Montenegrins and the besieged, but it has subsequently been rumoured that the first steps in the matter may have been taken by the Servian general, Bojevitch, who had had a meeting with Essad in order to arrange that the Servian troops should not be molested during their withdrawal from their advanced posts. Little or nothing transpired here at the time with regard to the negotiations, but it was nevertheless decided by the military authorities that it was desirable to prevent any news leaving Montenegro, and early on Monday morning, the 21st, it was given out in Cettinjé that no communication would be allowed with Cattaro. Telegrams were refused, and the post was not despatched. Maintaining that no such measures could properly be applied to communications between a foreign legation and its Government, the Austrian Minister despatched the military attaché to Cattaro in a motor. At a sharp turn in the road about a mile beyond the Montenegrin village of Njegush the car narrowly escaped being wrecked by a deep trench dug across its path, and before reaching Cattaro on foot the military attaché was detained for some hours at a point close to the frontier line between the two States. An awkward incident was thus created, for which Austria has required satisfaction.

The objectionable regulations were revoked in the course of the day.

The negotiations at Scutari, which led to no result on Monday, were resumed on the following day, and late on Tuesday night a vague rumour was current here that the fall of the place might be imminent. It was not, however, till 2 o'clock on the following morning that definite news was received, and the capitulation was announced by the repeated firing of a gun and the ringing of the church bells.

On the evening of Thursday, the 24th, an official account of the surrender was published in the "Glas." It was stated that, in the night of Monday to Tuesday (21st–22nd), there had been a general attack on the enemy's positions, accompanied by a terrible bombardment. The Turks had endeavoured to hold their ground, but had been defeated and driven back. A considerable movement had been observed among the Turks at 10 o'clock on Tuesday morning, the 22nd, and shortly afterwards a flag of truce had been sent to the Crown Prince offering to surrender the town, and begging that a direct request might be sent to the King to allow the garrison to retire under arms. The King, desiring to show his appreciation of the gallant conduct of the Turks, had been graciously pleased to be merciful, and had granted that Essad Pasha should withdraw with his arms, and should receive all the honours due to his gallant defence.

It has subsequently transpired that these statements were not at all in accordance with the facts. There was no attack whatever before the capitulation. The British Red Cross station with the besieging forces on the west side of the lake at Zogaj have reported that, during the two days in question, only one casualty occurred—an accident—while at the advanced station on the east side of the lake at Vraka Boritch no wounded were brought in at all, and the medical staff there seemed to have walked into Scutari with, or even before, the Montenegrin troops. The population, according to all accounts, were suffering severely from want of food, and several deaths from starvation were occurring during the last few days of the siege. The troops, on the other hand, appeared to be in good health.

The Crown Prince returned here on the morning of the 27th April, the Orthodox Easter Sunday, and was well received by a small crowd before the palace. But there was considerable disappointment and some misgiving when it was observed that there were no military trophies or prisoners, and it was subsequently felt that the capture of the town had been due, not to a military exploit, but rather to a mutual arrangement with Essad, the nature of which was still unknown. I enclose what I believe to be a more or less correct version of the terms of the capitulation as regards military matters, but neither these articles nor, still less, any others dealing with a possible political understanding arrived at between the parties, have so far been officially made known.

On Sunday, the 27th, a proclamation was issued to the inhabitants of the town. I have the honour to enclose herewith a French translation. From reports received

from various sources, it would appear that excellent arrangements were made for the preservation of order as soon as the town was occupied.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 105.

Terms of Capitulation of Scutari.

ENTRE le Prince héritier Danilo de Monténégro, commandant en chef des troupes monténégrines assiégeant Scutari, d'une part, et le Général de brigade Essad Pasha, command du corps d'armée de Scutari, d'autre part, il a été décidé ce qui suit relativement à la place fortifiée de Scutari:—

1. Tous les soldats réguliers, réservistes ou territoriaux pourront quitter Scutari emportant librement leurs armes, leurs effets et tous leurs équipages militaires ainsi que toutes les munitions y respectives.

2. Les Scutarins désireux de partir avec l'armée pourront également emporter leurs armes, bagages.

3. Les habitants de la ville n'auront à souffrir d'aucun pillage, d'aucune atteinte à leurs droits individuels. Ceux qui ont pris part à la guerre, n'ayant ainsi accompli que leur devoir, ne seront pour cela aucunement puni; ils auront le libre exercice de leur culte, de leurs traditions nationales. Leur honneur sera respecté.

4. En partant les soldats pourront emmener leurs chevaux de selle et de bât, transporter les ustensiles nécessaires à la confection de leur nourriture, les chaudrons, les gamelles ainsi que des tentes, des tapis, leurs effets personnels.

5. Les fonctionnaires, tant militaires que civils, les gendarmes, les agents de police pourront s'ils le désirent librement accompagner l'armée.

6. Un général et quelques officiers monténégrins accompagneront l'armée à son départ.

7. Les prisonniers serbes seront consignés au généralissime monténégrin. Toutes les précautions possibles seront prises pour assurer les soins aux blessés tant militaires que civils. En conséquence, il sera provisoirement laissé à Scutari à la disposition du Gouvernement monténégrin un nombre suffisant de médecins, pharmaciens et infirmiers. Les malades et les blessés après leur guérison, rentreront dans l'armée ottomane accompagnés du personnel médical; les frais seront à la charge du Gouvernement ottoman.

8. Tous les documents et dossiers militaires seront emportés. Parmi ceux du ressort de l'administration civile, le commandant pourra emporter les registres et papiers qu'il jugera nécessaires.

9 et 10. Tous les fusils à répétition, les canons de campagne à tir rapide, leurs munitions seront emportés ainsi que tous les appareils de correspondance de toute nature.

Ceux qui ont service du Gouvernement turc ont fait de l'espionnage ou rendu des services analogues pendant la guerre seront amnistiés.

12. Les personnes tant monténégrines que d'autres nationalités qui se seraient enfuies du Monténégro pour venir à Scutari participer à la guerre seront, elles aussi, exempte de toute punition.

13. En cas de nécessité et dans la mesure du possible le Monténégro fournira en quantité suffisante des vivres aux soldats partants.

14. Les points fortifiés qui ont servi à la défense de Scutari seront consignés intacts au généralissime monténégrin.

15. Le 10 avril, à partir de 8 heures, il sera procédé à l'occupation des fortifications du Taraboche, de Kutchuk Bardanjolt et de Ylan Ovassi. L'occupation de Fessad Tépé sera effectuée demain à 11 heures du matin, celle de Bardanjolt à 1 heure de l'après-midi et celle de Ylan Ovassi à 3 heures de l'après-midi.

Le Commandant en chef des Forces monténégrines,
Prince héritier DANILO.

Le Gouverneur général commandant du Corps d'Armée de Scutari,
ESSAD.

Enclosure 2 in No. 105.

Proclamation to the Inhabitants of Scutari.

(Traduction officielle.)

HABITANTS de la ville de Scutari,

L'armée victorieuse de Sa Majesté le Roi de Monténégro entre dans vos murs non pas en armée conquérante, mais en force libératrice du joug ottoman, sous lequel vos ancêtres sont tombés après une fière lutte, en ce même mois, il y a 435 ans.

L'armée monténégrine vous apporte, avec la délivrance, le respect de vos lois et de vos coutumes, ainsi que toutes vos confessions religieuses qui trouveront en moi leur protecteur et le fidèle interprète des traditions de tolérance religieuse du Monténégro et du peuple serbe.

Habitants de la ville de Scutari,

En prenant possession, au nom de Sa Majesté le Roi de Monténégro de votre glorieuse ville, dont le nom brille dans l'histoire du peuple serbe de l'éclat d'une grande et noble capitale, je vous garantis l'inviolabilité de vos personnes et de vos propriétés, l'impartialité dans l'administration de la justice, la paix et l'ordre, tous les bienfaits d'un État chrétien et civilisé.

Reprenez à vos occupations habituelles. Soyez tranquilles et respectueux des ordres qui émaneront de l'autorité supérieure, car autrement vous épouvrerez toutes les rigueurs de la loi.

Habitants de la ville de Scutari,

Votre traditionnelle douceur et votre hospitalité puissent-elles briller de tout leur éclat en ce moment où vos destinées, sous les drapeaux victorieux du Monténégro, se relient de nouveau à l'histoire serbe dont elles furent il y a quatre siècles, séparées par la violence.

Habitants de la ville de Scutari,

Unissez vous avec nous dans le cri : " Vive Sa Majesté le Roi Nicolas Ier ! "

Le Commandant en chef de l'Armée monténégrine,
Prince héritier DANILO.

Scutari, le 14 (27) *avril*, 1913.

[20657] No. 106.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 25.)

Sir, *Cettinjé, April* 30, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 76 of this day's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the reply of the Montenegrin Government to the collective representation made by the representatives of the Powers on the 27th instant with regard to the evacuation of Scutari.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure in No. 106.

Reply of Montenegrin Government to Representatives of Great Powers.

LE Gouvernement Royal a eu l'honneur de recevoir la communication des Grandes Puissances du 14 (27) avril.

Il croit remplir un devoir envers elles et rendre, en même temps, hommage à la cause nationale dont il a la charge, en justifiant son attitude par un exposé des raisons qui l'ont déterminé à ne pas prendre purement et simplement acte de la décision des Grandes Puissances concernant les frontières nord et nord-est de l'Albanie.

Le Gouvernement Royal regrette, avant tout, profondément, de n'avoir pas été consulté, avec ses alliés, au sujet de la délimitation de l'Albanie. Celle-ci a été

cependant délivrée du joug turc par les armées victorieuses des alliés et c'est à eux seuls qu'elle doit son émancipation politique.

D'autre part, ses limites déterminent l'assiette territoriale des États alliés, en même temps qu'une foule d'intérêts politiques et économiques qui ne sauraient les laisser indifférents.

Le Gouvernement Royal ne peut, par conséquent, s'empêcher de croire qu'une consultation des alliés—surtout depuis la présentation des mémorandums des délégués balcaniques à Londres—s'imposait aux délibérations des Grandes Puissances, l'évolution politiques des États balcaniques étant profondément et uniquement affectée par la formation d'un nouvel État albanais.

Le Gouvernement Royal croit, en outre, que la fixation des limites de l'Albanie ne pouvant, de par sa nature, être exécutoire qu'après la conclusion de la paix entre les alliés et l'Empire ottoman, toute mesure prise par les Grandes Puissances pour l'évacuation des places ci-devant assiégées et des territoires occupés, ainsi que pour la cessation des hostilités, implique nécessairement une violation de la neutralité, c'est-à-dire du droit qu'ont les alliés d'opérer, comme belligérants, sur toute l'étendue du théâtre de la guerre turco-balcanique et, par conséquent, une limitation arbitraire de la base des négociations pour la paix avec l'Empire ottoman.

Le Gouvernement Royal regrette que les raisons précitées ne lui aient pas permis de prendre acte de la délimitation des frontières en question, surtout pour ce qui concerne le règlement de la question de Scutari et de son territoire, dont la délimitation, toute à l'avantage d'un État inexistant, est dirigée, assurément bien contre les intentions des Grandes Puissances, contre la sécurité de l'État monténégrin et contre ses intérêts les plus vitaux, ce qui, dans l'opinion du Gouvernement Royal, constitue une manifeste injustice.

Les Grandes Puissances ayant délibéré le blocus de la côte monténégrine pour exercer une pression sur le Monténégro en vue de l'abandon du siège de Scutari, ce n'est pas avec l'intention de défier la volonté de l'Europe, mais plutôt dans la plénitude de la conscience de ses devoirs nationaux que le Gouvernement Royal refusa de se soumettre à une décision qui le privait d'une ville et d'un territoire considérés par lui, d'accord avec la nation entière, comme essentiellement importants pour le Monténégro.

Et c'est animé du même esprit et déterminé par les besoins impérieux de sa conservation, qu'il a eu l'honneur de déclarer le 8 (21) avril, année courante, aux Grandes Puissances—d'accord avec ses alliés—qu'il se réservait dans le cours des négociations avec la Porte le droit "de débattre avec les Grandes Puissances les questions se rapportant . . . . à la fixation des frontières de l'Albanie."

Sur ces entrefaites, la ville de Scutari capitula.

Le Gouvernement Royal, soucieux de témoigner sa déférence aux Grandes Puissances, s'empresse de déclarer que ce fait nouveau ne constitue aucunement dans sa pensée un défi à la décision concernant le sort de la ville de Scutari.

La prise de possession de cette ville, à la suite de la capitulation du 23 avril, n'est que la conséquence logique et naturelle d'un état de choses antérieur, une opération militaire conçue et exécutée en vertu de cette pleine et entière liberté d'action, que le Gouvernement Royal a hautement revendiqué plus d'une fois au cours de cette guerre, en hommage aux principes imprescriptibles du droit des gens.

Le Gouvernement Royal est obligé cependant d'appeler l'attention des Grandes Puissances aux manifestations qui ont suivi l'entrée des troupes monténégrines à Scutari et qui, de l'aveu des témoins les plus impartiaux, n'ont été qu'une série de justifications de la thèse du Gouvernement Royal, formulée à Londres, sur l'état d'esprit de la population de Scutari.

L'accueil chaleureux et unanime que toutes les classes de la population, a quelle confession religieuse qu'elles appartiennent, ont fait à l'armée monténégrine, les déclarations de loyalisme et d'attachement faites par l'Archevêque de Scutari, par le clergé et les notables catholiques, aussi bien que par les notables musulmans, ne laissent planer aucun doute sur les dispositions de la population de Scutari qui sont bien celles du désir de voir se réaliser une annexion profitable à la ville tant au point de vue politique qu'au point de vue économique.

Ces preuves non équivoques d'adhésion de la part de la population pourraient être de nature à modifier les résultats de l'enquête faite par les Grandes Puissances sur des données insuffisantes.

En présence de cet état de choses et pour les raisons que le Gouvernement Royal vient d'analyser et de soumettre au jugement éclairé des Grandes Puissances, le Gouvernement Royal a l'honneur de déclarer, qu'il reste fidèle à la communication faite aux Grandes Puissances en date du 8 (21) mois courant, et qu'il se réserve

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d'aborder la question de Scutari le jour où, dans le cours des négociations pour la paix avec l'Empire ottoman, les alliés débattront avec les Grandes Puissances la fixation définitive des frontières de l'Albanie.

Le 17 (30) *avril*, 1913.

[20499] No. 107.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 365.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April* 30, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 211 of the 17th March last, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica reporting the alleged murder of Greek villagers by the Bulgarian troops at Dimitrich.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 107.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 35. Confidential.)
Sir, *Salonica, April* 23, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 18 of the 10th ultimo, concerning the conflict which took place in the early part of last month between Greek and Bulgarian troops at Nigrita, I have the honour to report the following facts, which have only quite recently come to my knowledge from a confidential source. The incident seems to have been intentionally kept dark here, as tending to inflame popular feeling to an unnecessarily dangerous extent, and no mention of it has been allowed to appear in the local press. I consider it, however, worth reporting for the lurid light which it throws upon the relations existing between the allied nationalities in the districts either jointly occupied or in contestation between them.

On the 9th March the Bulgarian force, which had been repulsed from Nigrita and compelled to retire on Serres, passed through the Greek village of Dimitrich and carried off from these the priest and schoolmaster, named respectively Dimitri Hadji Zapris and Yani Kapetanos, together with the moukhtar, Apostolos Papacosta, and seven other villagers.

The Greek authorities repeatedly demanded the liberation of these persons, but without result, until on the 8th April a corpse was thrown up on the banks of the Strouma Kara-sou, followed by two more on the 11th. The latter were too far decomposed to be recognisable, but the former was identified by several witnesses as that of the schoolmaster, Yani Kapetanos, and the medical examination to which it was subjected disclosed the existence of five bayonet wounds on the right side and a deep cut on the head, the latter of which was probably the immediate cause of death.

No doubt is entertained by the Greek authorities here that all ten of the captives were done to death by the Bulgarians and their corpses thrown into the river.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[20500] No. 108.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 366.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April* 30, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch, from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Cavalla on the subject of the situation in that district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 108.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Cavalla, April* 15, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that Colonel Martovine, commanding the 1st brigade of the 8th infanty division (Haskovo) has arrived here from Adrianople and become military Governor of the town.

Most of the regular troops in Cavalla left the town some five or six days ago for Bademli Chifulik—one hour distant from Cavalla, in the Drama plain—and Pravishta. Their departure was due to a small outbreak of sickness among the troops, which was probably cholera, although the medical authorities hesitated to publish any verdict. No cholera occurred in the town during the stay of the troops or since their departure.

I hear from Drama that the railway is absolutely closed to passenger traffic, and that troops are continually passing towards Serres and Doiran from Adrianople, and that large bodies of troops are massed at Doiran.

It is forbidden to export anything, provisions or otherwise, from Cavalla to Greek villages in the Pravishta or Mount Pangheim district. As the Greeks, however, are in possession of the ports of Leftera and Oxphano, to which ports steamers are running from Salonica, the attempt to prevent the provisioning of large bodies of Greeks in the districts above-mentioned is not likely to succeed.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[20501] No. 109.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 367.)
Sir, *Constantinople, April* 30, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir, on the subject of military movements in the neighbourhood.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 109.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 22. Confidential.)
Sir, *Monastir, April* 22, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that General Yourishitch-Sturm, Commandant of the 1st Danube Division, and the 7th regiment left Monastir on the 20th instant for Komanova. The 14th regiment, which recently arrived here from Central Albania, left to-day for Kuprilu. It belongs to the 2nd Timok Division. Two companies of the 13th regiment (same division), which have for some time been at Perlepé, are preparing to leave for an unknown destination.

There are now no Turkish troops north of the Semeni River. The line of Servian occupation in Central Albania now follows the Semeni River from its mouth on the Adriatic to Tapia (7 miles north by west of Berat), and thence runs with the Devoli River to Progri (12 miles north-east of Gorcha). Prior to the recent campaign against Javid Pasha, the Skumbi River was the southern limit of Servian occupation west of Elbassan.

There are no indications of an intention to withdraw the Servian troops from Central Albania, where they still include the Independent Morava Brigade, and the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd regiments, amounting to about 20,000 men, with two field batteries and two mountain batteries.

I learn that some 1,500 troops have recently arrived at Dibra from Gostivar, but have at present no information as to their description.

The military authorities are having great difficulty in provisioning these troops. This is especially the case as regards the region west and south of Elbassan. Three thousand carts are continually employed for the purpose between Monastir and Kyuks, whence their contents are carried by pack-animals. Owing to the difficulty of

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provisioning regular troops, Christian Albanian irregulars are being, to some extent, used to patrol the district between the Skumbi and the Semeni-Devoli Rivers. The Commandant of the 1st Morava Division admits that rifles have been given to some 500 Christian Albanians. According to Turkish accounts the number is much greater.

The Servian authorities state that it is not their intention to occupy Berat or Fieri unless they are molested by the Turks.

The troops who have recently returned (the 14th regiment) from the Albanian districts appear to be in good condition.

The Albanian authorities at Valona recently sent to the Servian Commandant at Elbassan an emissary to request him to withdraw from their territory. The emissary, who was formerly a Turkish gendarmerie officer at Valona, with two gendarmes who accompanied him, was arrested and sent to Belgrade. The Servian authorities justify his arrest on the grounds that he might have been a Turkish spy, and that they cannot recognise a State too weak to prevent the occupation of its territory by a Turkish force hostile to themselves.

My Russian colleague is of opinion that the withdrawal of the Servian troops from Central Albania would be followed by disorders in that region. No doubt he is reporting to his Government in that sense. I am of opinion that no serious disorders would occur in Central Albania unless it suited the Austrian and Italian agents to provoke them. The poverty—almost starvation—to which some places are reported to have been reduced by the military occupation might, however, lead to some raiding.

An influential Albanian of Monastir, who is generally closely in touch with some of the Albanian leaders, assures me that the latter count on the support of the local Bulgarian organisation in certain circumstances. The Albanian in question has many dealings with the Austrian consulate, which, I believe, is busily endeavouring to convince the local notables of all denominations, and especially the Bulgarians, that autonomy is preferable to annexation to Servia. My Austrian colleague is making great efforts to ascertain what chance there is of the local Bulgarians rising unsupported against the Serbs, in the event of their being deprived of outside help as a result of a peaceful settlement of the present questions between the Bulgarian and Servian Governments.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

P.S.—I learn from the staff of the 1st Morava Division that Javid Pasha's purpose in the recent campaign was probably to break through the line of Servian occupation along the Skumbi River, which might have had the effect of raising the Moslems of the surrounding districts, and to make his way with a horde of tribesmen to Scutari.

C. A. G.

[20502] No. 110.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 368.)
Sir,
Constantinople, April 30, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 314 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica containing further observations concerning the relations between the allies.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 110.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 34.)
Sir,
Salonica, April 21, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 29 of the 10th and Mr. Vice-Consul Morgan's of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report that practically the whole of the Greek second division having now been disembarked here, the first and seventh are preparing to move out into the territory of which the possession is contested by the Bulgarians, the former to Langhaza and the latter to Nigrita.

The second division was supposed to have been reduced to 7,000 men by its losses in Epirus, but, as it required over twenty vessels to transport it here, it would appear that the wastage must have been made good. It seems, however, to have been accompanied by an unusually large proportion of artillery.

During the past few days persistent rumours have been current of a serious conflict between Serbs and Bulgars in the neighbourhood of Ishtib or Kiuprulu, in which, according to one version, at least eighteen of the former were killed. I have, however, been unable to obtain official confirmation of these rumours from any source whatever, and am therefore inclined to believe that they constitute merely an intelligent anticipation of events on the part of the public of Salonica, and I mention them merely as indications of the trend of local opinion in regard to the relations actually existing between the allies.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[20503] No. 111.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 369.)
Sir,
Constantinople, April 30, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 274 of the 5th April, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir reporting on the Turco-Servian campaign in Central Albania.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 111.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 20. Confidential.)
Sir,
Monastir, April 15, 1913.

IN my despatch No. 16 of the 27th March it was reported that Javid Pasha, with a force of about 10,000 men with five field-guns and two mountain-batteries, had established his headquarters between Rasa and Balaini (some 17 miles south-west of Elbassan).

His force was then supposed by the Servian military authorities to consist mainly of Albanian irregulars, which does not seem to have been the case. It is now known to have been stronger than was thought, and to have had six to eight mountain-guns and about the same number of machine-guns, but no field-guns.

The Servian force round Elbassan consisted of the independent Morava brigade, the 1st and 3rd regiments, and probably portions of the 2nd and 14th regiments, amounting to some 20,000 men, with four mountain-batteries and three batteries of field-guns, under General Goicovitch, who commands the 1st Morava division, with headquarters at Elbassan.

A series of engagements beginning on the 23rd March culminated in a battle in the immediate neighbourhood of Ljushna (about 10 miles south-west of Pekinj) on the 6th instant, when the superior numbers and artillery of the Servian forces compelled the Turks to retire towards Fieri. Eighteen Turkish officers and about 1,000 men, mainly invalids, were captured, and have since arrived here. Nothing certain is known of the losses in killed and wounded on either side, but I learn from both Turkish and Servian sources that Javid Pasha repeatedly assumed the offensive and that there was much fighting at close quarters.

The number of Turkish officers captured by the Serbs during the recent operations in Central Albania now amounts to about 40, and the number of men to about 1,500.

From some of them I learn that Javid Pasha has received no help from the Albanians, who have molested him as much as they have the Serbs, and that at Permeti, where he withdrew from the Kolonia district after the fall of Janina, he found the Albanian flag flying and tore it in pieces with his own hands.

Between Permeti and Ljushna his men were frequently sniped by the tribesmen.

One Turkish officer tells me that Javid has received sixty cases of rifle ammunition from the Adriatic by Austrian help; but from others I learn that the self-appointed

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authorities at Valona are intensely hostile to the Turks, but Javid Pasha's prestige is such that they are unlikely to go out of their way to attack him, although they dispose of some armed force. My Italian colleague states that the Valona authorities have a sufficient force to deter the Turks from approaching Valona.

It appears that Ali Riza Pasha, commander-in-chief of the western army, Zekki Pasha, and Karasaid Pasha have taken no part in the recent operations, preferring to live under the Albanian flag at Beirout and more recently at Fieri. They are accused by all the Turks whom I have met of cowardice and incompetence.

When Javid Pasha was at Permeti, Ali Riza, with whom he has long been on bad terms, ordered him to hand over his command to Mustapha Pasha, commandant of the 17th division; Javid replied that he no longer recognised his authority.

The commandant of the 1st Danube division tells me that he considers the Servian operations in central Albania at an end now that the Turks have retired towards Fieri; that the Serbs have instructions not to occupy territory south of the Skumbi River; and that General Goicovitch, commandant of the 1st Morava division, will return in a few days from Elbassan, when he himself will leave for Kumanovo or Uskub. The 7th regiment is expected to leave for the same destination.

Since the 10th instant 1,000 recruits have arrived here. A thousand recruits are to be drafted into each of the regiments in this district.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG

[20505] No. 112.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 371.) *Constantinople, May 1, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 201 of the 21st instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Rhodes, reporting on the occupation of Castellorizo by the Greeks on the 18th April last.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 112.

Vice-Consul Sir A. Biliotti to Sir G. Lowther.

Rhodes, April 20, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to confirm the following telegram which I have just sent in code to your Excellency:—

"Military occupation by Greece on 18th instant of Castellorizo Islands."

The details obtained from unofficial sources of this occupation are, that two transports, accompanied by the cruiser "Hydra" and two torpedo boats, landed on that Island from 600 to 800 troops without encountering any opposition.

I have, &c.
A. BILIOTTI.

[20506] No. 113.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 372.) *Constantinople, May 1, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 63 of the 26th February last, I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of a letter which I have received from the chairman of the Keshan Collieries (Limited), transmitting a memorandum regarding the position of the company in view of the present situation, and enclosing a map showing the way in which it would be affected by the new frontier line.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 113.

Keshan Collieries to Sir G. Lowther.

Constantinople, April 26, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to the reply dated the 26th of February last from the Foreign Office to your Excellency's despatch No. 110 of the 11th February, respecting damage done by the Bulgarian troops to the properties of the Keshan Collieries (Limited) and of the Enos Forest Syndicate (Limited), I have not yet been able to get into communication with the companies' manager at Keshan, and I cannot therefore yet furnish the detailed information respecting the damage sustained, which was asked for.

But, meantime, I enclose herewith a memorandum and map showing the position of the Keshan Collieries Company's property, and how it will be affected by the new frontier line, which is apparently desired by the Bulgarian Government to include the coalfield of Keshan.

I have, &c.
THO. ENGLISH,
Chairman Keshan Collieries (Limited).

Enclosure 2 in No. 113.

Memorandum.

THE property of the Keshan Collieries Company consists of the benefit of three firmans, granted by the Imperial Ottoman Government for a term of ninety-nine years from 1908 for the working of coal deposits situated close to the town of Keshan, in the province of Adrianople, about 20 miles inland from the north shore of the Gulf of Xeros, and of a concession authorising the construction of a mineral railway from Keshan to the fort of Ibridji in the same gulf, and of harbour works at the latter place.

These firmans were obtained through the good offices of the British and French Embassies after about nine years of fruitless applications by the company to the Ottoman Government, as the late Sultan refused to give his signature, though all the legal steps had been taken and the prescribed formalities and enquiries had been completely satisfied.

The right to a concession for the mineral railway for the carriage of coal to the seaboard is included in the firmans, the detailed surveys have all been made, and the plans were finally approved by the Ottoman Government in June 1912.

The firman rights comprise some 26,000 acres, or 40 square miles, and the boundaries of the property correspond as nearly as practicable with the margins of a coal basin 10 to 12 miles east to west, and 4 to 8 miles north to south, containing a seam of good coal 3 to 4 feet thick.

The coal seam crops out for at least 3 miles near the town of Keshan, on the southern edge of this basin, where the coal is now being worked, according to the best information obtainable, by the Bulgarian Government for their own use in the steam flour mills of Eyun Kuprí and Keshan.

The property, it is estimated, contains the aggregate total of no less than [illegible] tons of workable coal.

The proposed frontier line between Bulgaria and Turkey if taken straight from Enos to Midia would apparently pass through the property.

If the line starts from a point on the coast 2 miles eastward of Enos, the whole coalfield would be on the Bulgarian side of the frontier, and the proposed mineral railway from Keshan to Ibridji would cross the frontier and obviously be useless.

If the frontier passes through Muradli station on the Oriental railways and thence in a curved line to Enos it is impossible, without knowing the shape of the curve, to say whether the coalfield would become Bulgarian or not, but in any case the port of Ibridji would remain in Turkey.

If the coalfield becomes Bulgarian there would be no difficulty in the construction of a branch railway about 16 miles long, with a bridge across the River Maritza from Keshan to Bidigli station on the railway between Adrianople and Dedeagatch, and in making the latter place the port of shipment instead of Ibridji.

I venture to hope that in this case the Bulgarian Government may be asked either

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to authorise the construction of such a branch railway or to buy up the Keshan Collieries at His Majesty's property on equitable terms.

At present, no British capital has, up to the present, been spent in the business.

I have, &c.
THO. ENGLISH, *Chairman.*

[20508] No. 114.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 274.) *Constantinople, April 30, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the English translation of a telegram in French which was received by wireless on His Majesty's ship "Zealandia" on the 28th April, with instructions to communicate it to the Grand Vizier.

It will be seen that the message purports to come from Essad Pasha at Alessio, and asks for instructions as to what he is to do with the force under his command. The captain of the "Zealandia" made the communication, and in due course received from the Grand Vizier the telegram of which I have also the honour to enclose a copy, with a request that it should be transmitted to Essad Pasha through the same channel.

Captain Sheppard hesitated, owing to the nature of the message, to comply with this request without special instructions, and laid the matter before me stating that he proposed to the first place to telegraph to Vice-Admiral Burney to enquire whether he was authorised to forward the message. I approved this proposal, and suggested that in his telegram to the vice-admiral he should add a sentence to the effect that, in my opinion, it would be injudicious to forward the message unless the vice-admiral could be in communication with Essad Pasha with the full knowledge of His Majesty's Government. My reasons for counselling caution were, not only that the transmission of such a telegraphic correspondence obviously transgressed the rules of strict neutrality, but that the message could be read by every ship of the international squadron now in the harbour, Essad Pasha's message having been sent *en clair*, and Captain Sheppard having assured me that the rules of the service prevented his using cypher for his reply.

The enquiry was accordingly sent to Vice-Admiral Burney, who replied that he was not in communication with Essad Pasha, and Captain Sheppard informed the Grand Vizier to this effect.

It now transpires that Essad Pasha's original message reached the admiral through a Servian general. The Grand Vizier's reply was eventually sent through the Ottoman Ambassador in Rome, but I have no knowledge as to whether it has reached its destination.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 114.

Translation of Telegram in French from Essad Pasha to the Minister of War, Constantinople.

WE arrived this morning at Alessio without having any accident, and the commander-in-chief, his officers, and nearly all the Servian troops that were in the town, landed us. This evening we shall bivouac near Matnechry. The batteries *de* [illegible] will remain in company to the south of Alessio until the transports arrive to [illegible] to embark them. I am going to disembark them at Durazzo, as I have already telegraphed the day before yesterday that we are nearly without resources and necessary money. Inform me definitely what I must do in the neighbourhood of Teranu, taking into consideration the condition of my weary troops.

I await now your reply.

Grand Vizier to Essad Pasha.

(Télégraphique.)

IL serait convenable licencier troupes locales après avoir pris armes, et embarquer reste troupes avec armes et bagages destination Beyrouth. Dans le cas où flotte internationale s'opposerait dites troupes destination Beyrouth, il serait opportun de les débarquer à Talona pour opérer jonction avec reste armée ouest se trouvant entre Talona et Bérat.

En ce cas, couvrerons vivres et argent Talona.

[20510] No. 115.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 276.) *Constantinople, May 1, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your telegram No. 195 of the 23rd April last, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the collective note on the subject of the proposed peace negotiations which was presented to the Ottoman Government to-day.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 115.

Collective Note communicated to Ottoman Government.

LES Ambassadeurs soussignés d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'Angleterre, de France, de Russie, d'Allemagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur d'informer le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman que les Puissances, ayant reçu la réponse des Etats alliés à la note dans laquelle elles formulaient les bases de paix et pris acte de l'acceptation par eux de ces bases, les ont invités à cesser immédiatement les hostilités et à désigner leurs plénipotentiaires ainsi que le lieu de la réunion pour la négociation de la paix.

Ils sont chargés par leurs Gouvernements respectifs d'adresser, et adressent par la présente, la même invitation à la Turquie en leur nom collectif.

Constantinople, 1er mai, 1913.

[20517] No. 116.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 169. Confidential.) *Berlin, May 2, 1913.*

Sir,

AS Herr von Jagow was yesterday at Potsdam all the morning, and as the Emperor paid him a long visit in the afternoon, I was unable to see his Excellency until late in the evening. I then communicated to him the substance of your telegram No. 190 of the 30th ultimo, which I received yesterday morning.

Whilst admitting the importance of keeping the European concert intact, he again maintained the Austrian point of view that every day's delay would render more difficult the task of expelling the Montenegrins from Scutari, should King Nicolas still remain recalcitrant, that it was unlikely that further summons to him to evacuate Scutari would be met by a prompt response, and that the time occupied by further negotiations would be used by His Majesty for fortifying important strategic points, placing guns in position, and generally taking measures to render operations against him as difficult as possible. I duly emphasised your point that, as the Powers were in entire agreement as to Scutari being incorporated in Albania and as to the necessity of their decision being carried out, the time which it might take to achieve that result was of less importance than the necessity of preserving the concert of Europe. To this he replied that delay might, in his opinion, be almost as detrimental to the maintenance of the concert as to the operations which Austria might have to carry out, and he called attention to the fact that even now the Powers were not so united as they were a fortnight ago. I said that on the main point the Powers were just as invited as ever, and that the only difference of opinion was as to

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whether it was not better to secure a certain result by the exercise of a little patience rather than by hurried and separate action which contained elements of danger. In reply, he alluded to the great patience shown hitherto by the Austro-Hungarian Government, and to the difficulty for Count Berchtold to maintain that attitude in view of the excited state of public opinion in the Dual Monarchy.

In referring to your apprehensions of the effect that separate action on the part of Austria might have upon the public opinion of other countries, he repeated his absolute conviction that Russia would not move. M. Sazonof had been perfectly loyal all through this crisis, and he was not likely now to raise objections to any measures that Austria might take to enforce the decision to which Europe had come and to which Russia had agreed. I replied that I was in full agreement with him as to M. Sazonof's perfectly loyal attitude, but his position was anything but easy, and it was positively certain that he would prefer any other methods of securing the enforcement of the will of Europe in this matter to separate action on the part of Austria. I could not, moreover, share his conviction that there was absolutely no danger in such action. There was no telling how far the force of circumstances might compel Austria to go in any operations she might undertake, and I could quite imagine circumstances which might excite public opinion in Russia to a dangerous extent. His Excellency presumed I meant if Austria advanced into Montenegro. He could assure me that Austria had no such intention. They would probably, if they did act alone, go straight to Scutari from Cattaro and starve the town into surrender.

As regards public opinion in Russia, his Excellency said that Panslavist influence in Russia was very much exaggerated, that it was very superficial, and that the Russian Government had the situation well in hand. Moreover, there were other forces at work in Russia which made her extremely anxious to avoid foreign complications.

I said that however strong his convictions on this head might be, there were many people who thought otherwise. In any case, I was sure that he would agree with you that in a matter of such international importance no risks should be taken and nothing neglected which offered a chance of preserving the peace of Europe. I hoped, therefore, that he would give the points which I had, by your instructions, laid before him his most earnest consideration.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[20643] No. 117.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 225.) *Paris, May 2, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acquaint you that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, replying to the note which I addressed to him under the instructions conveyed to me by your despatch No. 260 of the 17th ultimo, in regard to certain financial questions in connection with Crete which are under consideration by the protecting Powers, has sent to me a communication to the following effect:—

The French Government concur in the proposal that an indemnity should be furnished to the family of the murdered Mussulman rural guard from the proceeds of the 3 per cent. surtax now lying at the disposal of the protecting Powers, and instructions have been sent to the French consul-general at Canea to support the action of his British colleague in the matter.

In regard to the suggestion that the indemnity to be paid to M. Zaimis should be drawn from the same source, M. Pichon reserves his reply until he has consulted the Minister of Finance. His Excellency recalls the fact that in December last his Department had concurred in the suggestion of His Majesty's Government that the Greek Government should be held responsible for the payment of the indemnity awarded to M. Zaimis, and states that it is necessary to acquaint M. Charles Dumont with the new state of this question.

With regard to the matter of the repayment of the advance of 1,000,000 fr. made by the four protecting Powers to the Cretan Government, and to the suggested desirability of entrusting the examination of this question to the financial conference which

is about to assemble in Paris, M. Pichon points out that the conference, in which eleven Powers will take part, will be required to express an opinion on questions of a controversial nature. This, his Excellency remarks, is not the case as regards the debt contracted by Greece; for by the very fact of the annexation of the island of Crete and the disappearance of the Cretan State, that Power is under the strict obligation of assuming entire responsibility for debts contracted by the annexed State. His Excellency is therefore of opinion that it would not be advisable to submit to the conference this question, which only concerns four of the Powers which are to meet in Paris.

M. Pichon adds that he proposes to reply in the above sense to any enquiry which may be made to him on the subject by the Russian and Italian Governments.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[20647] No. 118.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 229.)

Sir, *Paris, May 4, 1913.*

I DULY acquainted the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in accordance with the instructions conveyed to me by your despatch No. 265 of the 22nd ultimo, with the reasons for which His Majesty's Government did not think it desirable to accede to the request made to them by the Turkish Ambassador in London to support the proposal that the Ottoman Public Debt Administration should be represented on the forthcoming Financial Commission in Paris.

I have the honour to acquaint you that M. Pichon informs me, in reply to my communication, that he entirely shares your views with regard to the matter, and that in the event of a similar representation being made to his Department by the Turkish Ambassador at Paris, a reply will be returned to his Excellency in the same terms as the one which you have made to Tewfik Pasha.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[20799] No. 119.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 5.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, May 5, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 5th instant, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 119.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *May 5, 1913.*

YOUR No. 337.

Have taken action as proposed and detailed arrangements made for sending relief to Scutari if approved.

This action would really nullify the blockade, and I desire therefore to be informed whether His Majesty's Government agrees to food being sent.

The idea of inducing destitute population of Scutari to move to San Giovanni di Medua is, I think, impracticable.

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[20617] No. 120.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 5.)

(Confidential.) *Admiralty, May 5, 1913.*

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 120.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

May 3, 1913.

(Telegraphic.) NO more Servian troops at Durazzo or San Giovanni di Medua, all transports having left. Albanians are assembled round Alessio on south bank of Drin and hoisted Albanian flag over the castle there this morning.

Enclosure 2 in No. 120.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

May 4, 1913.

(Telegraphic.) ABOUT 100 Montenegrin troops carrying Montenegrin military flag have been observed since daylight to-day marching into San Giovanni di Medua.

Enclosure 3 in No. 120.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

May 4, 1913.

(Telegraphic.)

MY Nos. 60 and 66.

Further representations made to me, and desire therefore to be informed whether any action has been taken on these telegrams.

Montenegrin troops which reached San Giovanni di Medua to-day do not apparently intend to remain here.

Montenegrin authorities at Alessio have granted Turks permission to move with their goods into San Giovanni di Medua, and propose to do so to-morrow, as dysentery has broken out among them and they are being robbed by marauding Albanians.

Enclosure 4 in No. 120.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

May 4, 1913.

(Telegraphic.) TWO Greek transports arrived at Salonica 3rd May with Servian troops. Ten Greek transports with troops on board passed to southward of Corfu 4th May.

Enclosure 5 in No. 120.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII."

Admiralty, May 4, 1913.

(Telegraphic.) BRITISH Ambassador informed yesterday by Austrian Foreign Minister that King of Montenegro had given a guarantee that cargo contained in Austrian and Italian ships for relief of inhabitants of Scutari would not be fired on or seized for military purposes. As it is difficult to ensure that this promise will not be broken, the Foreign Minister suggests consultation between British, Austrian, and Italian admirals as to possibility of safely sending help to civilian population of Scutari.

He suggests that the Italian and Austrian admirals should telegraph to their Governments for approval when they have made detailed arrangements for sending assistance to Scutari. He suggests further that it would be easier to arrange for the relief of the destitute population of Scutari at San Giovanni di Medua if they could be induced to go there.

[20801] No. 121.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 95.) *Rome, May 5, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 171 of 4th May.

I asked Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning how he proposed, if Italy took action in Albania, to explain it to Powers. He said he had not yet decided on any definite form for communication which would no doubt have had to be made. On my asking if he had contemplated asking for a mandate he said Austria would have gone to Scutari without the mandate of Europe. I pointed out that such action would have been directed against Montenegro, whereas independence of Albania was outcome of agreement of the Powers. He said it would have been represented as a form of co-operation with Austria, but in view of decision of King of Montenegro to withdraw from Scutari he hoped that it was no longer necessary to consider matter.

[20802] No. 122.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 96.) *Rome, May 5, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.) R.

MY telegram No. 95 of to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs begged me to assure you that Italy did not covet a yard of territory in Albania. Official communiqués did not tend to convince, and he therefore desired to reiterate this to me personally. His only aim was to carry out the agreement of the Powers. When I added "and to secure a hostage as against Austrian designs" he did not repudiate.

[20800] No. 123.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 220.) *Constantinople, May 5, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.) R.

MY telegram No. 216 of 3rd May.

Grand Vizier informs me Osman Nizami, Batzaria Effendi, Minister for Public Works, and Rechid Bey, legal adviser to the Porte, have been appointed delegates and leave to-morrow for London.

[20797] No. 124.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 5.)

(No. 84.) *Cettinjé, May 5, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.) R.

MY telegram No. 78 of 1st May.

In a note, dated yesterday, addressed to the Austrian Minister at Montenegro, the Government have unconditionally promised satisfaction in accordance with Austrian demands as regards both incidents. All existing causes of tension would now seem to be removed.

The Government have resigned.

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[20041] No. 125.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May 5, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 83 of 21st April and your telegram No. 62 of 1st May: Greek 2½ per cent. Guaranteed Loan.

Following for delegate on Financial Commission:—

"I see no *prima facie* objection to proposal of National Bank of Greece, having regard to increase in assets held against note issue between 1898 and present date.

"Above applies to National Bank only, and not to Ionian Bank, for it might be found on fuller consideration that some of the objections urged by Mr. Young in 1909 against proposals of latter bank were still of force."

[20413] No. 126.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May 5, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 80 of 3rd May: Attendance of vice-consul at functions at Scutari.

Certainly not.

[20474] No. 127.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 5, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 83 of 4th May.

You should express my appreciation of the message addressed to me by the King, and say that I am sure his decision is a real contribution to general peace, and is in the true interest of Montenegro.

The procedure by which effect should be given to this decision has been referred by the Ambassadors to their Governments, in order that a communication in the name of the Powers may be made by the Ministers at Cettinjé.

(Confidential.)

It is proposed to instruct the naval officers to arrange to take possession of Scutari with an international detachment, and no doubt your colleagues will soon receive instructions to make this communication at Cettinjé with you. It will of course be important that when the naval officers are ready to arrange to take over the town the Montenegrin Government should not make difficulties or delays.

[21208] No. 128.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 5, 1913.*

AT the meeting of Ambassadors to-day the following resolution was adopted:—

"Sir E. Grey having received a message from the King of Montenegro stating that he places the fate of Scutari in the hands of the Powers, the meeting is of opinion that note should be taken with satisfaction of this declaration. The representatives of the Powers at Cettinjé will at the same time make known to the Montenegrin Government that dispositions will be taken to ensure the handing over of the town to the

commandants of the international fleet. The representatives will request the despatch of instructions to the Montenegrin authorities at Scutari enjoining them to proceed to the evacuation of the town in agreement with the naval commanders."

As soon as your colleagues have received the necessary authority, you should join with them in making a communication in the above terms.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 195; Rome, No. 172; Vienna, No. 165; Berlin, No. 193; and St. Petersburgh, No. 302.)

[21208] No. 129.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 72.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 5, 1913.*

THE following resolution was adopted at meeting of Ambassadors to-day:

"The Sublime Porte having asked for the assistance of the Powers that no hindrance be placed in the way of the repatriation of the Turkish troops in Albania, the meeting is of opinion that the representatives of the Powers at Athens should ask the Greek Government not to oppose the transport of the troops whom the Ottoman Government may repatriate."

[21207] No. 130.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 307.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 5, 1913.*

I SAW the French and Russian Ambassadors together this morning.

After informing them of the news from Cettinjé, I said that I proposed to suggest that the naval officers should arrange to send up an international detachment to take over the town.

To this both Ambassadors agreed readily.

They expressed much apprehension respecting the reported plan of Austria and Italy to divide Albania.

The French Ambassador also spoke of the Ægean Islands.

I said that I entirely agreed that, if action was required in Albania in consequence of Essad Pacha's proceedings, or to preserve order, we should give it an international character. With regard to the islands, the matter was about to be considered by His Majesty's Government, in order that I might be able to be in a position to state very firmly, if necessary, our view that no Great Power should keep one of the islands.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21206] No. 131.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 103.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 5, 1913.*

THE Austrian Ambassador informed me this morning that his Government had received information from the Austrian Minister in Cettinjé saying that King Nicholas, recognising that resistance was useless against the determination to enforce the decisions of Europe, had decided to offer the unconditional evacuation of Scutari. At the same time, the Austrian Minister was informed confidentially from the Montenegrin Court that the Montenegrin Cabinet had resigned, and a request was added that Count Berchtold should consent to defer any military action for 48 hours. Count Berchtold had not replied to this request, but had refrained from ordering a bombardment with a short time limit, in order to give the Montenegrins, if they honestly meant to do what they said, an opportunity to comply within the limit of time now named by

* Also to Sir G. Buchanan (No. 187).

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them with the invitation originally addressed to them by the commanders of the international fleet, and to ask the commanders to send detachments to take over Scutari from the Montenegrin garrison.

I told Count Mensdorff of the message that I had received from the King of Montenegro, and the change in the situation was the subject of mutual expressions of satisfaction on the part of Count Mensdorff and myself.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21208] No. 132.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 104.) *Foreign Office, May 5, 1913.*

Sir,

AT the meeting with the Ambassadors this afternoon, I informed them of the communication from the King of Montenegro, saying that he placed the fate of the town of Scutari in the hands of the Powers.

Count Mensdorff informed the *réunion* of the information that he had given me this morning.

The following resolution was then adopted :—

"Sir Edward Grey ayant reçu un message du Roi de Monténégro déclarant qu'il remet le sort de la ville de Scutari entre les mains des Puissances, la réunion est d'avis qu'il y a lieu de prendre acte avec satisfaction de cette déclaration. Les représentants des Puissances à Cettigné feront savoir en même temps au Gouvernement monténégrin que des dispositions sont prises pour assurer la remise de la ville aux commandants de l'escadre internationale. Ils réclameront l'envoi aux autorités monténégrines de Scutari d'instructions leur prescrivant de procéder d'accord avec les commandants à l'évacuation de la ville."

It was decided that I should send instructions in this sense to His Majesty's Minister in Cettinjé, on which he should act as soon as all his colleagues were similarly instructed.

The meeting also arrived at the following resolution :—

"La réunion pense également qu'il y a lieu de prescrire à l'amiral commandant l'escadre internationale de se mettre en rapport avec les autorités monténégrines de Scutari pour fixer le jour où une commission composée d'officiers désignés par les commandants et accompagnée de détachements internationaux procédera à la prise de possession de la ville au nom des Puissances. Cette commission réglera les détails de l'évacuation et de l'enlèvement du matériel de guerre. Les Puissances resteront en possession de la ville jusqu'à l'organisation d'un Gouvernement autonome. Le blocus sera levé aussitôt après la prise de possession."

I promised that His Majesty's Government would instruct the British admiral accordingly to take the necessary action as soon as all his colleagues were similarly instructed.

Count Mensdorff pointed out that Count Berchtold had made no reply to the Montenegrin request for the postponement of Austrian action, and contemplated that the Montenegrins should apply to the naval commanders of the international fleet to take over Scutari.

I urged that it would be a great pity to dwell upon a point of form, and to wait for the Montenegrins to communicate with the naval commanders. The latter had better be instructed to communicate at once with the Montenegrins in Scutari.

The meeting then proceeded to the consideration of the repatriation of the Turkish troops in Albania, and the following resolution was arrived at :—

"La Sublime Porte ayant reclamé le concours des Puissances pour qu'aucun obstacle ne soit apporté au rapatriement des troupes ottomanes d'Albanie, la réunion pense qu'il y a lieu de prescrire aux représentants des Puissances à Athènes de prier le Gouvernement hellénique de ne pas s'opposer au transport des troupes rapatriées par le Gouvernement ottoman."

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 308), Sir E. Goschen (No. 153), Sir R. Rodd (No. 125), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 188).

It was agreed that the next meeting should take place on Thursday, the 8th instant.

The Italian Ambassador stated that the project for the organisation of Albania, which the Austrian and Italian Governments had been requested, in accordance with the decision of the meeting of the Ambassadors some months ago, to draw up, was now ready.

It was decided that this should be communicated to us at the next meeting.

I took the opportunity of observing that we were now back on the *terrain* of international action as regards Scutari, and that it would be very desirable that we should keep on this *terrain*. If it became necessary to take measures in Albania for the preservation of order, they should be international.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20974] No. 133.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 151.) *Foreign Office, May 5, 1913.*

Sir,

I TOLD the German Ambassador this morning the news that King Nicholas had given way about Scutari.

He joined with me in expressing the greatest satisfaction.

I took the opportunity to say that it was all the more satisfactory because there were rumours that, had Austria been obliged to take action separately, it might have led to a division of Albania between Austria and Italy, and have affected even the question of the Ægean Islands. The moment that any Power occupied territory separately, or claimed territory for itself, the whole foundation on which we had been proceeding would be cut away, for all our proceedings had been on the assumption that no Power was going to ask for any territory for itself as a result of the Balkan troubles.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[19244] No. 134.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Foreign Office, May 5, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th ultimo, relative to the revenues at the service of the Ottoman Public Debt in the occupied territories.

I am to inform you in reply that the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury are correct in their presumption that Sir E. Grey does not for the present expect any further observations from them on the subject.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[17929] No. 135.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Foreign Office, May 5, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 20th February last, relative to certain questions connected with the collection of the revenues assigned to the service of the Greek debt, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of further correspondence with His Majesty's Minister at Athens on the subject.*

It will be observed that the British delegate on the International Financial Commission, in his report which forms the enclosure in Sir F. Elliot's despatch, points out the dangers to the interests of the bondholders which are likely to arise from the annexation

* To Sir F. Elliot, No. 26, March 12; Sir F. Elliot, No. 71, April 9, 1913.

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by Greece of the territories now occupied by her troops, and suggests, as a means of removing them, the abolition of the system of plus-values.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive the observations of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury on this suggestion, and on Mr. Beaumont's further proposal that the initiative in the matter should be taken by the International Commission which is to settle in Paris the questions arising out of the present war.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[20954] No. 136.

Consul Samson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Adrianople, March 30, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of your Excellency, the following report on the political and military situation in this town from the 3rd February to the 23rd March, thus completing my report on events preceding its capture, which will form the subject of a further despatch.

Reported Prolongation of Armistice.

It was generally understood that the armistice would terminate at 7 P.M. on the 3rd February, but, on the afternoon of that day, two Servian officers, with a flag of truce, presented themselves at Papas Cheshme, on the Mustapha Pasha road, to announce officially that the armistice had been prolonged for a period of four days. No communication was, however, made in writing. Shukri Pasha, having received no instructions on the subject from the Commander-in-chief, telegraphed requesting information, and, whilst warning the garrison to be on the alert, issued orders that no firing was to take place except in reply to that from the enemy. In discussing the matter with me on the 6th February, he expressed his regret that Servian officers should have employed such a manœuvre, which he characterised as not being in consonance with the principles of military honour. On the other hand, it should be noted that the Servians have played an almost entirely passive part in the siege of the town since the resumption of hostilities, not having fired a shot until the 11th March.

Hostilities Resumed.

Hostilities were resumed at 8·15 P.M. on the 3rd February, at which hour the Bulgarian batteries opened fire on the eastern defences, the bombardment of the town being recommenced half an hour later. On the following day the Bulgarians began moving towards the north and east of the town the siege artillery which had hitherto been concentrated to the west of it. Shukri Pasha ordered a sortie on the 9th February against a battery of 15-centim. guns, which was already in position to the north of Musubeili. The troops engaged included nine battalions, of which four of the 10th Nizam Division and five of the Baba Eski Redif Division, two field batteries, and one horse artillery battery. The attack, which commenced at 6 A.M., terminated at about 12·30 P.M., being repulsed by the Bulgarian infantry, two battalions of which were in position near the guns, with two battalions in reserve. Turkish losses were heavy, 800 killed and wounded being probably their approximate total. On the night of the 10th (11th) the Turkish advanced line from Malteps to Mezartepe was attacked by two Bulgarian regiments, the first attack being commenced at 9·50, the second at 10·30, and the third at midnight. All three attacks failed.

With the exception of these two movements, military operations from the 3rd February to the 23rd March were confined to an exchange of shots between the batteries on both sides and the bombardment of the town itself. Towards the end of this period the Turkish batteries fired a large number of rounds, the Bulgarians only occasionally replying, in order not to disclose the position of the batteries, which they were gradually establishing in position to the east of the town. Considerable difficulty was experienced in restraining the Bulgarian gunners from replying to this fire, by which they were much harassed, but their officers succeeded in doing so, by pointing out to them that their opportunity would come when the final assault on the town was delivered.

Bombardment of the Town.

General Ivanof informs me that it was his intention to attack the eastern section of the defences a few days after the close of the armistice; it was therefore in pursuance of this plan that a bombardment of a somewhat severe nature was commenced at 8·30 P.M. on the 3rd February, which was maintained with the same severity up to the 8th, when the idea of immediate attack was abandoned, in consequence of the receipt of instruction to that effect from headquarters. By the 12th it had considerably decreased in intensity, being limited to the firing of a few rounds in the early morning and during the night. Six days later it again increased, but was directed chiefly against the barracks, with the exception of the 16th, when a number of shells of a new pattern were fired into the residential quarters of the town. By the 17th March it had practically ceased, being resumed only during the assault on the fortress.

From the 3rd to the 8th February a large number of projectiles were fired at one time, at the rate of three shells per minute, but, except during those days, the bombardment cannot be described as severe. The shells used were of the same type as those employed during November and December, with the exception of those referred to above, which, I understand, were of German manufacture. All quarters of the town suffered more or less, but the damage done was comparatively small, for the reasons stated in my despatch No. 65 of the 31st December, 1912; the number of persons actually killed is stated to be sixty-four. The panic amongst the civil population was even greater than that which prevailed during the first bombardment. The Kale quarter, which had suffered most from this, was practically emptied of its inhabitants, who removed to Yildirim, on the extreme west of the town, in the belief that it was out of range of the bombarding guns, an impression which was dispelled on the following day. A number of Turkish women and children were housed near the Yanik Kishla (barracks), whilst the families of officers were given shelter in the cavalry barracks. Shukri Pasha took up his quarters at Hadirlik fort, the centre of the western defences, where also the vali passed his nights, after having been compelled to remove from the Yeni Kishla (barracks), where he had at first established his office. Austrian subjects were assembled at the School of the Sœurs d'Agram, where my Austro-Hungarian colleague was obliged to take refuge, owing to the partial destruction of his consulate by a shell. British, French, and Russian subjects, together with my French an Russian colleagues, found shelter in the School of the Resurrectionist Community, the cellars of which probably afforded the best protection existing in the town against shell fire. I was personally able to remain in the consulate, whence, being close to the school building, it was easy for me to afford those who had taken refuge there any assistance that might be required. A number of the better class of non-Moslems removed from the town to the suburb of Karagach, where comparatively few shells fell, others finding shelter in some of the older buildings in the town itself, in particular, at the Rustem Pasha Han, whose solidly constructed walls the shells failed to penetrate. About 4,000 of the Jewish community were housed in the School of the Alliance Israelite, chiefly in the cellars. The organisation and sanitary measures adopted by those in charge of this school were excellent, so that, despite overcrowding, no outbreak of sickness occurred amongst the inmates. There were four births in this building during the siege.

Details of the Siege.

On the 5th February notices in French and Bulgarian were dropped from a Bulgarian aeroplane containing a description of the situation at Constantinople and Chatalja, recapitulating Bulgarian successes since the commencement of the war, and calling on the garrison and civil population to surrender of the town. A further notice was dropped on the following day containing slighting references to the Young Turkish party and to Shukri Pasha. I enclose copies of both these together with a translation of Shukri Pasha's notice of the 17th January, 1913, referred to in the latter.*

Representations of Religious Chiefs.

On the 10th February the heads of religious communities, including the mufti, called on Shukri Pasha with a view to obtaining his consent to their making a

* Enclosures not printed.

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personal appeal to General Ivanof to cease the bombardment of the town. Shukri Pasha received them courteously but informed them that he was unable to accede to their request, expressing the opinion that in any event their appeal to General Ivanof would be fruitless.

Severe Weather.

Very severe weather set in on the 13th February, with a heavy snowfall on the 23rd, and though a partial thaw occurred on the 28th there was a further heavy fall of snow on the 2nd March accompanied by intense cold which lasted until the 6th. The Turkish troops suffered severely from frostbite and exposure so that the hospitals which had been gradually discharging patients since the commencement of the armistice were again filled. In certain of them insufficient attention was paid to frost-bitten patients to whom much needless suffering was caused.

Capture of an Aviator.

On the 21st February a Russian aviator, who had taken service with the Bulgarians, whilst returning to Mustapha Pasha from a reconnaissance through Keshan, Malgara, Gallipoli was compelled to descend in the neighbourhood of the town owing to a temporary defect in his machine, in the belief that the Bulgarian troops were closer to the fortress than was actually the case he alighted near Kaveas fort where he was captured by the Turkish infantry. He was exceedingly well treated being confined at first in the cavalry barracks and subsequently at the headquarter offices being sent to the French mission during the final assault on the town.

Bulgarian Movements.

Towards the beginning of March it became clear that certain Bulgarian batteries were being moved from the western to the eastern side of the fortress being placed in position near Skendrikeni. About the same time it was reported that a fresh contingent of Bulgarian troops, said to be 20,000 had arrived, and an attack was expected. I gathered from the headquarter staff that it was anticipated that this would be directed against the southern face. As a matter of fact no attack was delivered until the final assault on the 26th March which ended in the capture of the town.

Slaughter of Horses.

The impossibility of finding food for them necessitated the slaughter of all the horses belonging to the garrison with the exception of those belonging to the cavalry and artillery the latter being used for transport purposes. Many of these animals were killed on the banks of the Maritza whose waters were contaminated by the presence of the carcases which were only removed after I had made continued representations to the vali in the matter.

Demonstration by Greek Women.

The distress which had for some time existed amongst the poorer classes found expression on the 13th March in a demonstration by Greek women in front of the Government offices where a crowd assembled clamouring for bread. The women were addressed by the kaimakam of the town who assured them that the authorities were doing their utmost to meet the needs of the people. The Greek Metropolitan finally succeeded in persuading the crowd to disperse. This was the only demonstration of any kind which took place in the course of the siege, during the last month of which the moral effects produced by lengthy confinement in the fortress under the prevailing conditions were apparent on all sides and amongst all classes. Amongst the more intelligent of the Turkish population the idea gained ground that the relief of the town was an impossibility. It was believed that the end would come through famine about the 7th April. The lower classes of Moslems were, however, singularly uncomplaining, and at no time attempted to bring pressure to bear on the authorities to surrender the town.

Execution of Soldiers. Military Pamphlet.

On the 13th March five men of the Gumuljina Redif Division were shot for having displayed cowardice under fire during the action at Kartal Tepe in the preceding

November, and on the following day Ismail Hakki Effendi, an artillery officer employed in the correspondence department of the printing office, was sentenced by the court-martial to forty-two days imprisonment for the publication of a pamphlet entitled "Turk Ojaghi," which purported to expose certain abuses in the army, all copies of the pamphlet in circulation were seized by the authorities.

Death of the King of the Hellenes.

News of the death of the King of the Hellenes was received here by a radio-telegram on the 19th March. On the following day Shukri Pasha published a notice, a translation of which I append,* stating that His Majesty had been assassinated by the Bulgarians, expressing regret at the occurrence, together with the belief that the incident would enhance the discord already existing between the armies of the allies. Shukri Pasha sent his chief of the staff to convey to this consulate his condolences on the death of a relative of the Royal Family of Great Britain, at the same time placing at my disposal the radio-telegraphic apparatus should the British colony here desire to convey their condolences to His Majesty the King. In the course of a visit which I paid him to thank him for his condolences, Shukri Pasha stated that he would have wished to have used even stronger terms than those employed in that day's notice to express his abhorrence of the assassination of the King of the Hellenes, but that he had been compelled to take into account the frame of mind of the people.

Political Situation.

My despatch No. 2 of February last referred to the complete ascendency of the Union and Progress party in the town, and to the prominent part played in its affairs by Dr. Behaeddin Shakir Bey and Aziz Bey, both well-known members of the Committee. Between that date and the close of the siege the influence of the former became still more marked, indeed, he may be said to have practically assumed the position of a dictator, the influence of the vali, the nominal head of the Government, being entirely subordinated to his. It is somewhat difficult to arrive at the exact position in which he stood to Shukri Pasha; but, in discussing with my Austrian colleague the passive rôle played by the Servian troops in the siege of the town, he stated that he had "ordered the troops to fire on the Servians." It is certain that Shukri Pasha and his Staff both feared and disliked him, and it was generally considered that the formation of the Supply Committee was due to the former's desire to make the local members of the Union and Progress party jointly responsible with him should famine necessitate the surrender of the town. The popularity which this party had enjoyed amongst the garrison consequent upon their decision to continue the war waned with the hopes of the relief of the town, and the belief previously referred to as existing among the civil population that it must eventually fall having spread to the officers, it became generally recognised that the policy of Kiamil and Nazim Pashas would have been wiser than that of the existing Government.

Consular Corps and Local Authorities.

Relations between the consular corps and the local authorities during the last two months of the siege were maintained on the same satisfactory footing as in the earlier period. On the 9th February the vali informed my colleagues and myself in writing that it was his intention to cause visits to be paid to the houses of foreign subjects at Karagach, in order to ascertain what food-stuffs they possessed. I suggested to my colleagues that we should ask the vali if he would agree to these visits being paid by a representative of the respective consulates, a list of the food-stuffs found being furnished to the local authorities with whom we could confer as to what amount, if any, should be handed over to the Supply Committee. My colleagues agreed to this proposition, which I afterwards communicated to the vali, who accepted it, and lists were furnished in due course. The Supply Committee, acting under the orders of Dr. Behaeddin Shakir Bey, after carrying out a strict search during the second and third weeks in March at the houses of Ottoman subjects, commenced on the 22nd to make perquisitions in the houses of foreign subjects. The manner in which these visits were carried out caused much annoyance to the inmates of the houses concerned, to whose feelings very little regard was shown, an Italian priest, the vicar of the Roman Catholic church at Karagach, in particular, being treated with great discourtesy. Learning that these visits were taking

* Not printed

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place, my French colleague and myself paid a visit to the vali to ask him whether they were being carried out by his orders. He assured us that it was not so, but that the Supply Committee had acted upon their own responsibility, and promised that they should cease forthwith. He at once sent instructions to that effect, which were complied with. The houses of Austrian subjects only had been visited, but the Supply Committee had announced their intention of visiting those of all foreign subjects. Behaeddin Shakir Bey, whose action it is somewhat difficult to reconcile with his position as head of the Red Crescent Society's hospital, declaring, in response to all objections, that "there was no law." With this exception, however, members of the foreign colonies were treated with the greatest consideration during the siege, though they were necessarily required to comply with all regulations imposed by the military authorities.

On the 7th February my colleagues approached me with a view to obtaining my consent to the despatch of a telegram to our respective missions at Constantinople reporting the nature of the bombardment and confirming our telegram of the 31st January, in which we had suggested that endeavours should be made to obtain the fixing of a neutral zone for foreigners, and permission for such of them as desired to do so to leave the town. I found that a difference of opinion existed between my colleagues and myself as to the degree of intensity of the bombardment, and the right of the attackers to employ it, I myself holding that they were fully justified in doing so. Finally, however, I agreed to the despatch of a modified form of the original telegram.

On the 17th February telegrams from the missions at Sophia were received by the consular corps through General Ivanof and Shukri Pasha asking for full lists of their respective nationals. Replies to these were duly forwarded, but I ascertained that in my case all British subjects, with two exceptions, desired to remain in the town. On the following day the vali invited my colleagues and myself to meet at his office, where he informed us that the Bulgarian military authorities had agreed to the appointment of a neutral zone for foreigners, and suggested Karagach, the suburb near the railway station, as a suitable place. He asked if we agreed to this. We replied in the affirmative, and at the same time expressed our satisfaction that under the circumstances it would not be necessary for foreign subjects to leave the town, adding that in any case we ourselves would not have done so. The rumour which had spread through the town that the consuls and foreign colonies were about to leave it had produced a feeling of great despondency amongst the non-Moslem communities, who seemed to have feared the possibility of ill-treatment should only Ottoman subjects remain, and I understand that their religious chiefs were preparing to memorialize the consular corps on the subject. Under these circumstances it became clear to my colleagues and myself that anything in the nature of a general exodus of foreign subjects or the departure of the consuls would be highly undesirable, we therefore willingly acceded to the vali's request that he should be furnished with a written statement signed by ourselves to the effect that we accepted the suburb of Karagach as a neutral zone, and did not desire that foreign subjects should leave the town, and further agreed that this statement should be forwarded to the Bulgarian commander. On the following day my colleagues and myself despatched a radio-telegram to our respective missions informing them of our decision in the matter. As your Excellency is doubtless aware the suggestion as to the fixing of Karagach as a place of residence for foreign subjects was not accepted by General Ivanof, who has since informed us that he had declined to agree to the principle of a neutral zone. It seems clear, therefore, that the statement of the vali to my colleagues and myself on the 18th February that this principle had been accepted by the Bulgarians was not in accordance with the actual facts.

Supplies.

The chief difficulty with which Shukri Pasha had to contend during the last months of the siege was the question of food supply, as there were sufficient sheep and cattle in the town to provide both garrison and population with meat the problem was confined to the supply of bread. The flour on hand on the 14th February, together with the grain, was sufficient to meet the requirements of the garrison and population for twenty days. A Supply Committee was formed by Shukri Pasha's orders with the vali as nominal president, but the work of the Committee being actually directed by Dr. Behaeddin Shakir Bey, the Committee being composed entirely of members of the Young Turk party. A house to house search was carried out by the Committee,

who discovered considerable quantities of grain. On the 27th February the supply of flour and grain amounted to 10,500 sacks of 75 kilos. (165 lbs) each composed as follows:—

	Sacks.
Good wheaten flour, military reserve	1,150
Inferior quality, for public use	2,000
Good quality, for public use	500
Canary seed and broom seed..	3,000
Total	10,500

The minimum requirements of the garrison and civil population were estimated at 500 sacks a day, of which 200 were allotted to the civil population, calculating on this basis there was on the 27th February a supply of grain and flour sufficient to last until the 19th March. As more grain was subsequently discovered, and both the military ration and the size of the civilian loaf were diminished, the supply lasted longer than had been anticipated, but my information leads me to believe that had the siege continued all flour and grain in the town would have been exhausted by the 5th April. Small quantities of flour were to be purchased until close upon the end of the siege at the rate of 10*l.* per sack of 165 lbs, whilst a little barley was also obtainable. Bread was issued to the civil population in exchange for tickets which were supplied by the heads of the districts of the town, but it frequently occurred that the bakeries at which these were to be presented had insufficient bread to supply the demand. In such cases the preference was always given to Moslems. The military reserve of flour being much larger than that in the hands of the civil authorities, the quality of bread supplied to the troops was much superior to that which the civil population were able to obtain, the latter being composed chiefly of bran, canary-seed, and broom-seed, with a sprinkling of barley. This caused such dissatisfaction in the town that Shukri Pasha was ultimately obliged to allow the use of a certain portion of the military reserve for the civil population.

On the 4th February the daily bread ration of the troops was 1·05 lbs, on the 13th ·87 lbs, and on the 5th March ·7 lbs. The civil population on the latter date were receiving about ½ lb per head. At the commencement of March the authorities began to distribute horse-flesh to the poorer classes to supplement the bread supply, whilst some days later they took over all the butchers' shops in the town, selling meat at a uniform rate of 4*d.* per oke (2·82 lbs.).

Situation and Condition of the Garrison, March 23.

The period of comparative inactivity to which the garrison had been condemned since the commencement of the armistice, together with the severe weather and the lack of food, had combined to affect the morale of the troops. It is somewhat curious that Shukri Pasha should not have employed the infantry in the construction of new shelter trenches and the improvement of those already existing, particularly upon the eastern face. Work of this nature would have at least given the troops an occupation which was usually lacking, and might possibly have served to restore the morale which, under the strain of the siege, was fast deteriorating. Many desertions took place, but though some discontent existed amongst the rank and file, there seems to have been a general determination to defend the town to the last. General Wasof informs me that he frequently questioned deserters on this point, and arrived at the same conclusion as myself. The men showed comparatively little outward signs of the privations through which they had gone, but their physical state was apparent in the rate of marching, which was latterly very slow in moving from point to point.

The jealousy which had existed between Shukri and Ismail Pashas had somewhat diminished, though the latter never entirely recovered from the disappointment due to his supersession in the command of the town at the commencement of the siege. The headquarter staff appears to have been ill-informed as to the intentions of the investing forces and the number of batteries which they had established on the east of the fortress. During the last six weeks of the siege I was permitted to freely visit that section of the defence, one of the commanders of which assured me, on the 15th March, that there were only four Bulgarian batteries in the neighbourhood of Buyuk Duluk, whereas there were, in fact, ten. From a conversation which I had with Shukri Pasha's chief staff officer on the 20th March, I gathered that no attack was anticipated,

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but it was believed the town would shortly fall through lack of supplies unless the situation should be changed by an important Turkish victory at Chatalja, where, according to a telegram received from the War Minister, fighting had been proceeding for four days, which had resulted in a Turkish success.

The position of the Bulgarian lines had not materially changed since the resumption of hostilities, as far as could be observed, and beyond an increase in the number of rounds fired by the batteries on the southern and eastern defences, there was nothing to indicate that the fall of the town was at hand.

I have, &c.
L. L. R. SAMSON, *Major.*

[20813] No. 137.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 106.) *Rome, May 2, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 100, Confidential, of the 26th ultimo, I have the honour to report that in the course of a conversation which I had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning, after I had sounded him as to the rumoured intention of Italy to despatch an expedition to Southern Albania if Austria took action above to compel Montenegro to evacuate Scutari, his Excellency once more repeated the language which I have already reported, to the effect that it was a mistake to suppose that Italy was alone in opposing the extension of the northern frontier of Greece so as to include the whole coast of Epirus opposite the island of Corfu. He insisted that the head-quarters staffs of both the Austrian army and navy had come to precisely the same conclusions as the staffs of the Italian army and navy, examining the question without any collusion. In each case the reports had been similar, and it was accordingly held that the Power occupying both sides of the Corfu Channel would be in a position to menace the gate of the Adriatic. He did not see how either of the two Governments could give way on this point, which involved a grave national interest, but there was room for compromise between the views advanced by Austria and Italy and the claims of Greece, and the line might, he thought, be extended somewhat north of the River Kalamas, provided some part of the coast at the narrowest northern end of the channel was excluded from Greek territory. On the other hand, he had been confidentially informed at Vienna that, so long as this point was secured, they could afford to treat Greek claims in the hinterland in a liberal spirit, and he was doing his best to bring the Austrian Government round to this point of view.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[22753] No. 138.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 145.) *St. Petersburgh, May 2, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of an *aide-mémoire* which I have received from the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, defining the attitude of the Imperial Government in the event of isolated action being taken by Austria.

I had the honour to send you a full summary of this *aide-mémoire* to-day by telegraph.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 138.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir G. Buchanan by M. Sazonof.

EN réponse à l'aide-mémoire en date du 18 avril (1er mai), année courante, le Ministère Impérial a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique ce qui suit :—

Ainsi que Sir E. Grey a fort judicieusement observé, on ne saurait trop prendre en considération l'effet que pourrait produire chez nous et ailleurs une action immédiate et séparée de l'Autriche contre le Monténégro.

Un tel acte serait d'autant moins justifié que, si les Puissances ont été solidaires dans les résolutions prises en commun, ce serait déroger à l'esprit de cette solidarité que de recourir à la force par rapport aux intéressés.

L'Autriche parle de la nécessité pour elle d'agir dans le but de faire respecter la volonté de l'Europe par le Monténégro. Dans le même ordre d'idées, on pourrait observer au Cabinet de Vienne que le même respect devant la volonté de l'Europe oblige chacune des Puissances qui le proclament de tenir compte du point de vue des autres Puissances concernant les mesures à prendre.

Or, il serait difficile de nier que l'opinion publique dans tous les pays, excepté en partie l'Autriche-Hongrie, se montre contraire aux mesures coercitives contre le Monténégro. L'argument de l'amour-propre blessé ne saurait être avancé par rapport à un pays aussi petit que le Monténégro, dont la faiblesse même devrait imposer une certaine retenue morale pour une action contre lui d'une Grande Puissance.

Il est fort probable que le Roi de Monténégro se rend bien compte de cette particularité de sa situation et que sa faiblesse évidente lui sert de meilleure arme pour le but qu'il voudrait atteindre. Ce but ne consiste-t-il pas à s'appuyer sur les sympathies de l'opinion publique en Russie et en Europe, que l'attitude de l'Autriche-Hongrie à l'égard de Monténégro ne fait qu'accroître? Et c'est ainsi qu'en désirant châtier le Roi le Gouvernement de Vienne n'a jusqu'à présent réussi qu'à faire son jeu en semant une discorde dangereuse entre les Puissances, que nous désirerions plus que jamais voir unies dans l'intérêt suprême de la paix.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, avec lequel nous avons eu le bonheur de rester en contact intime durant toute la crise balkanique, peut mieux que les autres apprécier à sa juste valeur tout l'esprit de modération et de conciliation que le Gouvernement Impérial a invariablement apporté dans l'accomplissement de la tâche parfois bien lourde qui lui a échu. Il ne nous a pas été facile ni de consenter à attribuer Scutari à l'Albanie ni d'inviter la France en qualité de Puissance alliée à prendre part à la démonstration navale pour appuyer le respect de la résolution prise. Après la chute de Scutari, le Gouvernement Impérial n'a pas hésité à déclarer qu'il était prêt à maintenir son point de vue.

Or, tout cela, à ce qu'il paraît, ne suffit pas au Cabinet de Vienne, qui veut maintenant engager les Puissances ou bien à prendre part à des mesures de coercition contre le Monténégro, ou bien à lui en attribuer le mandat.

Le Gouvernement Impérial se voit obligé de déclarer qu'il ne partage pas la manière de voir du Cabinet de Vienne et qu'il se prononce contre l'application des mesures qui iraient à l'encontre de toutes les traditions ainsi que de l'opinion publique nettement prononcée de la Russie.

Dans le cas où le Cabinet de Vienne se décidait à une action isolée, la Russie refuserait d'assumer une part quelconque de la responsabilité morale qui incomberait à l'Autriche, que le Gouvernement Impérial a cru devoir prévenir sur tous les dangers à son point de vue de la politique qu'il paraît enclin à suivre.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 19 avril (2 mai), 1913.

[20819] No. 139.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 146.) *St. Petersburgh, May 3, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the reply of the Russian Government to the communication which I addressed to them on receipt of your despatch No. 163 of the 21st ultimo on the subject of the seizure by the Balkan allies of certain Ottoman fiscal stamps.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

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Enclosure in No. 139.

Aide-mémoire communicated to Sir G. Buchanan.

EN réponse à l'aide-mémoire de l'Ambassade de la Grande-Bretagne concernant la communication circulaire turque sur la saisie par les Bulgares et les Grecs de timbres et de papiers de valeurs ottomanes dans les territoires annexés, le Ministère Impérial a l'honneur de l'informer qu'il n'est pas encore en possession de ladite communication circulaire. Quant au fond de la question de la saisie des timbres et des valeurs, le Gouvernement Impérial partage entièrement la manière de voir du Cabinet de Londres.

Saint-Pétersbourg, le 19 avril (2 mai), 1913.

[20864] No. 140.

Sir P. Harvey to Sir L. Mallet.—(Received May 6.)

Paris, May 4, 1913.

Dear Mallet.

WE had a semi-formal meeting yesterday with the French and German delegations, and a sub-committee was appointed to prepare the detailed figures of Turkish revenues, &c., which are to be presented as a basis of discussion to the Commission when it meets. The committee is composed of the French and German technical delegates, Crawford, and myself.

We have also had private conferences with the Germans, with Crawford, and with Raffalovich, the Russian.

The point which will evidently present the greatest difficulty is that of the 3 per cent. customs surtax. The Germans wish to include it in the calculation of the revenues at present ceded to the bondholders; the Russians (and no doubt the allies) wish to exclude it. The reason advanced for excluding it is that it was granted to the Turks by the Powers for only seven years, and expires, if not renewed, next year; the bondholders cannot therefore at present count on it as permanently available. The Germans claim that it should be included, because, as they quaintly expressed it, they absolutely need it, "it is their daily bread" (meaning that it will be required to defray the service of the Bagdad Railway loan), and because, therefore, it certainly will be renewed.

Crawford has felt some difficulty as to the attitude the Turkish Government should take, for he sees that the assumption of the continuance of the 3 per cent., while it will enable us to throw an annuity corresponding to, at any rate, a part of it, upon the allies, will, on the other hand, strengthen the allies' claim to an indemnity, seeing that this 3 per cent. surtax, so far as not assigned to the service of the Debt, was expressly assigned by the Powers to the requirements of the territories about to be ceded.

From the point of view of the British Government it would seem that, to allow the surtax to enter into the calculations, involves the admission that we shall consent to its renewal, and the abandonment of any *quid pro quo* which we might have asked as a condition of such renewal.

From the bondholders' point of view, on the other hand, the inclusion or exclusion of the 3 per cent. surtax may prove to be, after all, a matter of little importance, for this reason. The share of the surtax which accrues to the service of the Debt is employed exclusively to increase the sinking fund of the Unified Debt and lottery bonds. If the share of the Debt to be taken over by the allies is to be capitalised, the capital sum to be paid by the allies will be the same, whether the sinking fund includes or does not include the surtax; if the annuity includes the larger sinking fund, the period in respect of which it will be payable will be correspondingly shorter: if the annuity contains only a smaller sinking fund, the period will be correspondingly longer.

The Germans admit this reluctantly, but will do what they can to get the surtax recognised as an established revenue of the Turkish Government in the hopes of getting something out of it for their Bagdad loans. (I should add that if the allies do not pay a capital sum, but annuities, the larger annuity for the short period is, in practice, more advantageous to the bondholders than the smaller annuity for the long period.)

The Russian, Raffalovich, who may be taken as representing the views which the

allies will probably advance, assured us that the latter would decline to take over a share of the Debt unless they were promised an indemnity. He thought that the closing of the European money markets to them would prove a vain menace, as they would find means of getting money enough to carry on long enough to exhaust Europe's patience. He thought that the only practical course would be for Europe to guarantee a Turkish loan, and impose, as a condition of their guarantee, a more extended financial control on Turkey. Out of this loan would be paid a war indemnity to the allies, which would serve, in fact, to pay off that part of the present Turkish Debt which might be allotted as the share falling to the allies, or, if not all of it, at any rate a part.

Failing some such arrangement, he thought the allies would be unable or unwilling to capitalise their share, and would insist on paying by annuities. When I asked him as to the guarantees they could offer, he said that any suggestion of their furnishing guarantees would be looked upon by the allies with extreme disfavour, and that the Power that first suggested it would give them grave offence. I said that after the experience Turkey had had of the financial execution of the Treaty of Berlin, such offence would hardly be justified. Still, it would, no doubt, be desirable that any such demand should come from the representatives of the bondholders as a whole.

I should be obliged if you would let me know the views of the Foreign Office as to the admission that the 3 per cent. surtax is likely to be renewed. The question will arise immediately.

I fear I shall not get back to London till towards the end of the week.

Yours sincerely,

H. P. HARVEY.

[20955] No. 141.

M. Coromilas to Greek Legation.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, May 6.)

(Confidential.) *Athens, May 5 (22), 1913.*

WE willingly accede to the desire which has been expressed through the Under-Secretary of State that we allow a free passage to merchant-ships for the repatriation of the Turkish troops in Albania. The greater part of these troops certainly live by rapine and by exactions, and by no means offer any guarantee for order.

At the same time we would draw the attention of the British Government to the danger of withdrawing the entire contingent of Turkish troops. The situation in Albania is a difficult one indeed. Italy and Austria are seeking only for a pretext to intervene; and it would be hardly prudent not to consider means for the maintenance in Albania of a state of things somewhat tolerable.

Greece is most anxious that the new State should not become the centre of trouble and of disorders. We think that the only solution which presents itself is that the Great Powers should decide, until a regular Government is established, to occupy Albania in common. Should this be found absolutely impossible, they might perhaps give a provisional mandate to Greek and Servian troops.

COROMILAS.

[20921] No. 142.

Council of Foreign Bondholders to Foreign Office.—(Received May 6.)

Sir, *17, Moorgate Street, London, May 5, 1913.*

WITH reference to our letter of the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to state that we have been in communication with the various syndicates representing the holders of Turkish bonds, and understand that there is a universal concensus of opinion that the bondholders should have their own representatives at the Paris conference. The Council of Foreign Bondholders therefore trust that Sir E. Grey will be kind enough not to lose sight of the request made in their letter above referred to, viz., that an official invitation should be sent to the Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt to nominate and send delegates to the meeting.

I have, &c.

JAMES P. COOPER, *Secretary.*

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[20810] No. 143.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 6.)

(Confidential.) *Admiralty, May 6, 1913.*

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of telegrams dated the 5th instant relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 143.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII."

Admiralty, May 5, 1913.

(Telegraphic.)

KING NICHOLAS has submitted the future of Scutari to the decision of the Powers. To-day's meeting of Ambassadors considered that the Admiral in command of the international fleet should communicate with the Montenegrin authorities in the town with a view to fixing a day for the handing over of Scutari to the Powers. Possession should be taken by a commission composed of officers appointed by the naval commandants and accompanied by international detachments, and the commission should arrange for the removal of war material and other details of evacuation. The blockade will be raised whenever possession has been taken of the town. The Powers will remain in occupation of Scutari until an autonomous Government has been organised.

Whenever your colleagues have received the necessary authority from their Governments, the above instructions should be carried out.

Enclosure 2 in No. 143.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII."

Admiralty, May 5, 1913.

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR No. 66.

If all your colleagues agree, transports for removing the Turkish troops from Albania to Asia Minor should be given a *laissez-passer.*

Your No. 70.

If your colleagues agree, His Majesty's Government have no objection whatever to supplies being sent.

[20964] No. 144.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 156.) *Sophia, May 6, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.)

PRESENT distribution of Bulgarian army is approximately as follows: 4 divisions [illegible] 1 division at Bulair, 1 division in Thrace, 3 divisions between Drama, Serres, Kukus, and Doiran, 1 Macedonian division at Istallia, 1 division on the Servian frontier west of Sophia.

There are also Macedonian irregulars, numbering probably 20,000, with the Bulgarian troops.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[20906] No. 145.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 115.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, May 6, 1913.*

SERVIAN delegates to the Peace Conference are leaving for London this week. The delegates are the same as on the last occasion, but the military advisers may be changed.

[20960] No. 146.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 66.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, May 6, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 72 of 5th May: Repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania.

I have informed the Prime Minister of the resolution of the Ambassadors, saying that I did so without instructions. He said that the Greek Government are ready to facilitate repatriation, but think that some force should be left in Albania to keep order unless international contingent are employed.

[20962] No. 147.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 179.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, May 6, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 177 of 4th May.

Minister for Foreign Affairs reverted in conversation this afternoon to projected Austro-Italian occupation of Albania, and said that if effect was given to it England and France must take part in it. He was going to take Emperor's orders to-day as to eventual participation of Russia.

President of Council last night expressed similar views, and said he had told Minister for Foreign Affairs that he might draw on him for whatever sum he liked, as he considered it essential that Russia, France, and England should participate, so as to give occupation joint character.

[20963] No. 148.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 6.)

(No. 180.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, May 6, 1913.*

BUCHAREST telegram No. 67 of 4th May and my despatch No. 128.

Decision has not yet been signed, as Austrian Ambassador submitted to Minister for Foreign Affairs a few days ago modified text of concluding paragraphs, in which reference was again made to some eventual territorial compensation to Bulgaria. Minister for Foreign Affairs declared this quite unacceptable, and drafted another, which Austrian Ambassador has referred to his Government. If latter accept it we hope to sign it on 9th May.

In informing me of above his Excellency said that Austria's evident object was to persuade Bulgaria that our attitude throughout had been unfriendly, and had frustrated all Austria's efforts on her behalf. He was taking steps to correct this impression. Perhaps His Majesty's Minister at Sophia might also let Bulgarians know that we have done all that was possible to safeguard their interests.

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[20955] No. 149.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 208.) *Foreign Office, May 6, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

GREEK Government agree to allow free passage to merchant ships for the repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 196; Rome, No. 173; Berlin, No. 194; Vienna, No. 166; and St. Petersburgh, No. 395.)

[20041] No. 150.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Foreign Office, May 6, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of a despatch and telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Athens relative to a request made to the International Financial Commission at that capital by the National Bank of Greece to be released from the obligation imposed in 1898 of holding in reserve bonds of the 2½ per cent. Guaranteed Loan given the bank in payment of advances to the Government prior to that date.*

It will be observed that British delegate on the Commission agrees with his colleagues in considering this request a reasonable one, and I am to enquire whether, in view of their opinion, the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury consider it to be one which can properly be granted.

I am to transmit to you herewith, in order to assist their Lordships in reaching a conclusion, copies of the papers referred to in Mr. Beaumont's despatch to Sir F. Elliot,† and I am to request that these may be returned with your reply, which, in view of the urgency of the matter, Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive with as little delay as may be convenient.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[20979 No. 151.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 382.) *Constantinople, May 3, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith an extract from the "Gazette financière" of the 22nd ultimo, showing the total of the extrordinary credits for the year ending 1st (14th) March. They amount to £ T. 12,650,000, of which £ T. 10,490,000 are for military purposes.

The ordinary and supplementary revenue and expenditure will have been so much affected by the war that it is impossible to take them as any guide as to what the actual results of the year's working will be, and it is sufficient to recall here the estimated deficit was placed at £ T. 3,973,000.

It will be remembered, however, that Sir R. Crawford has stated that, at the end of the war, Turkey will require to raise at least £ T. 25,000,000.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 151.

Extract from the "Gazette financière" of April 22, 1913.

LE BUDGET DE 1328 ET LES CRÉDITS SUPPLÉMENTAIRES.

NOUS avons publié dans nos deux derniers la liste détaillée des crédits supplémentaires au budget de 1328, accordés au cours de l'exercice.

* Sir F. Elliot (No. 83), April 21; Sir F. Eliot, Telegraphic (No. 62), May 1, 1913.
† Not printed.

En voici le tableau récapitulatif par départements, en laisant de côté les crédits supplémentaires (3,552,660 piastres) alloués à la Banque agricole, qui est dotée d'un budget spécial ne faisant pas partie du budget général :—

	Piastres.
Dette publique	8,224,160
Ministère des Finances	84,912,232
Grand Vizirat	15,000
Cour des Comptes	600,000
Direction générale des Douanes	2,073,000
Poste et Télégraphes	11,650,000
Direction générale (Cadastre)	180,000
Intérieur	32,078,656
Conseil d'État	120,000
Affaires Étrangères	1,270,000
Cheikh ul-Islamat	1,545,000
Justice	5,941,000
Instruction publique	18,521,135
Travaux publics	3,755,888
Agriculture, Mines, Forêts	1,058,568,591
Guerre	3,200,000
Fabrication Engins de guerre	21,765,220
Gendarmerie	
	1,297,838,160

[20980] No. 152.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 383.) *Constantinople, May 3, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the British consul at Dedeagatch on the subject of the landing of goods at that port.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 152.

Vice-Consul Badcock to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 8.) *Dédéagatch, le 29 avril, 1913.*

Sir,

JE me fais un devoir de vous remettre ci-inclus copie d'une communication qui m'a été faite aujourd'hui par les autorités militaires bulgares au sujet du débarquement des marchandises destinées au commerce.

Cette mesure tout à fait draconienne a été à mon tour transmise télégraphiquement à notre légation de Sophia.

Personne ici n'a la moindre idée de ce que veut dire "débarquement." L'intendance bulgare n'est pas à hauteur dans cette question si importante pour l'armée. Les vapeurs chôment sur rade. Le Gouvernement a dû payer des sommes folles à titres de surestaries, et à l'ultime la décision citée plus haut est une entrave bien grave pour le commerce et la navigation.

Dans les diverses branches administratives on relève une ignorance crasse dans la procédure. En particulier, les contributions indirectes nuisent beaucoup aux intérets des négociants, car les employés, doués d'une arrogance déplacée, dénoncent les ayants droit à vaquer aux formalités du retrait de leurs marchandises, ce qui fait que ces dernières pâtissent dans les dépôts de la douane à cause des prétentions insensées dans l'estimation des droits. Voilà en peu de mots dans quelle triste situation nous nous trouvons actuellement.

La ligne de conduite de l'envahisseur en ville n'est pas meilleure; lors de l'entrée des comitadjis une des deux mosquées existantes a été brûlée, celle demeurée intacte a été transformée en église, on tatarait en chaire et les offices de Pâques ont été célébrés en grande pompe. Par condescendance, on aurait dû éviter un tel scandale aux quelques Turcs restés encore ici.

Depuis que son Excellence Rechid Bey est parti [illegible] se dirigeant

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vers Drama et Serrès. Les 11e et 24e régiments d'infanterie doivent, dit-on, tenir garnison ici, et nous eûmes l'arrivée de quelques lots de soldats.

J'ai, &c.
G. BADETTI.

Enclosure 2 in No. 152.

Colonel Kirgief to Vice-Consul Badetti.

(Traduction.) *Dédéagatch, le 16 avril, 1913.*

Monsieur,

SUIVANT télégramme du quartier général, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que le déchargement des marchandises commerciales dans ce port sera interdit à partir du 22 courant (v.s.) pour l'avenir et jusqu'à nouvelle décision.

Je vous prie, M. le consul, de prendre note de la présente et donner connaissance à qui de droit.

Agréez, &c.
Colonel KIRGIEF,
Commandant militaire, Dédéagatch-Rodosto.

[21105] No. 153.

Aide-mémoire communicated by Turkish Embassy, May 7, 1913.

DANS la note remise par les Grandes Puissances à la Sublime Porte sur les bases de leur médiation, il avait été précisé que la nouvelle frontière turco-bulgare devra suivre une ligne droite allant de Midia sur le littoral de la mer Noire à Enos sur la mer Egée. Le projet de traité de paix rédigé par les Puissances parlant simplement "d'une ligne tirée d'Énos à Midia," la Sublime Porte interprète ces termes comme signifiant également une ligne droite.

Quant à la délimitation de cette ligne, le Gouvernement Impérial est désireux que, indépendamment des délégués techniques ottomans et bulgares, des délégués des Grandes Puissances médiatrices fassent également partie de la commission *ad hoc*.

Les articles 7 et 8, &c., du projet de traité de paix, amendés ensuite par l'article 7 unique, emploient le terme "question de juridiction." Cette expression pouvant donner lieu à des équivoques, la Sublime Porte tient d'ores et déjà à préciser que ces mots se réfèrent simplement, d'après elle, aux anciens traités passés entre l'Empire ottoman et chacun des États alliés, et qui rentrent en vigueur conformément à la théorie de "postliminie" du droit des gens, mais n'impliquent pas les Capitulations, dont la suppression a déjà été promise dans les traités conclus avec l'Autriche-Hongrie et l'Italie, et dont l'abolition avait été précédemment sollicitée des Grandes Puissances par le Gouvernement Impérial.

Il paraît nécessaire de bien préciser ces points afin d'éviter que le silence sur ces questions ne soit interprété lors de la discussion comme une acceptation tacite de la part de la Sublime Porte d'octroyer de nouvelles concessions dans le domaine de la juridiction.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 5 mai, 1913.

[21034] No. 154.

M. Misu to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

Légation de Roumanie, Londres,
le 6 mai, 1913.

M. le Secrétaire d'État,

MON Gouvernement me charge d'intervenir auprès de votre Excellence pour la prier de vouloir bien insérer dans le traité pour la conclusion de la paix entre la Turquie et les États balkaniques une clause concernant l'amnistie complète et entière des Roumains (Koutzo-Valaques) se trouvant sur les territoires des belligérants.

Cette clause s'impose d'autant plus qu'elle figure d'une manière constante dans les différents traités de paix et est consacrée aussi par le droit des gens (Bluntschli, "Droit international codifié," article 710).

Convaincu que votre Excellence voudra bien prendre en sérieuse considération la juste demande du Gouvernement roumain, je saisis, &c.

N. MISU.

[21112] No. 155.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 7.)

(Confidential.) *Admiralty, May 7, 1913.*

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 7th instant, relative to movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 155.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *May 7, 1913.*

REPORT from H.M.S. "Yarmouth," at Salonica, 7th May:—

"Russian hospital ship with Servian wounded, one Turkish hospital ship, two transports with Servian troops, and three transports with Greek troops have arrived here."

[21038] No. 156.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, May 6, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 59 of 5th May.

The King, to whom I have communicated your message, told me that British admiral had sent ashore to express the wish to enter into communication with Montenegrin authorities with regard to handing over Scutari. The Civil Governor, who is here, was accordingly being sent to-night to San Giovanni di Medua.

The King added that he was ready to hand over the town at any time; all he asked for was that he might have sufficient time in order to move Turkish war material, which he presumed was his by right. He strongly recommended that, on transfer of possession, there should be no interval during which disorderly elements could pillage. Would I communicate with admiral on these matters? I replied that you had placed that question yesterday before the Ambassadors, who were referring to their Governments. Meanwhile I did not consider myself authorised to take any action separately.

[20994] No. 157.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 86. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, May 6, 1913.*

THE French Minister tells me he knows from trustworthy source that the King is asking the allies to hand over to Essad some of Turkish ammunition captured during the war.

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[21121] No. 158.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 68. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, May 7, 1913.*

THE Prime Minister understands that the Italian Government maintain their objection to the retention by Greece of the coast of Epirus opposite Corfu notwithstanding her offer to undertake that it should be neutralised. He supposes that objection is based on the fear that the engagement might not be kept. He therefore asks you to consider whether you could suggest as from yourself—not from the Greek Government—that a European commission should be appointed to reside permanently at Butrinto to inspect both sides of the Gulf of Butrinto and see that no military works are carried out, the sovereignty of the country remaining Greek. The expenses of the commission might be charged to the Greek Government, if desired.

[21120] No. 159.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 7.)

(No. 184.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, May 7, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has received Emperor's sanction to Russia's participation in any international occupation of Albania that may be eventually decided on.

[21179] No. 160.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.°

(No. 209.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 7, 1913.*

If it is the intention to reassemble a Peace Conference in London His Majesty's Government ought to have notice so as to make suitable arrangements.

It would seem that, if Turkey and the allies are prepared to sign with little or no alteration the draft treaty now in their hands, this can be done by their representatives now in London, and His Majesty's Government could give suitable facilities for this at any time.

If, on the other hand, there are likely to be serious difficulties about the draft treaty, it would be well to investigate them before any formal conference reassembles.

You should communicate with Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[20963] No. 161.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 105.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May 7, 1913.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 180 of 6th May: Bulgaria and Roumania.

You should, in the manner which you consider to be the most suitable, let the Bulgarian Government know that our attitude throughout the question has been quite impartial and that we have always kept in view the interests of Bulgaria, and have been solely animated by the desire to see the question settled in as fair and as pacific manner as possible.

° Also to Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No. 106), Sir F. Elliot (No. 73), Sir R. Paget (No. 88), and Count de Salis (No. 61).

[21541] No. 162.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 106. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 7, 1913.*

THE Austrian Ambassador gave me to-day the same draft as the Italian Ambassador had already given me for the organisation of Albania.

He told me confidentially, for my own information only, that Austria would prefer to eliminate the reference to the suzerainty of the Sultan. It was really nullified by the last sentence of article 2.

I said that I thought to propose any alteration of what had been originally agreed to by the Powers would arouse suspicion and apprehension. Some Powers would want to know what was the reason for making the alteration, and I thought that it would give rise to difficulties.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21543] No. 163.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 107.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 7, 1913.*

THE Austrian Ambassador said to-day that there was a little apprehension lest the King of Montenegro might make difficulty by saying that it was only the town of Scutari that he conceded. The Austrian Government held that the cession should include all the fortifications and Tarabosh.

I read to the Ambassador Count de Salis's telegram No. 85, and said that I had no indication that the King of Montenegro was likely to make this difficulty.

I added that I presumed that he was entitled to the Turkish war material and would be told so, and that his people could remove it at leisure after the international detachment had occupied the town.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20211] No. 164.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 135.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 7, 1913.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade, relative to the collection by the Servian customs authorities at Ghevgheli of an export duty of 1 per cent. on tobacco exported.°

Your Excellency will observe that while the local representative of the Commercial Company of Salonica (Limited), from whom the payment of this duty has been demanded, denies that it was collected under Turkish rule, the Servian Government assert that it was.

I have accordingly to request your Excellency to endeavour to ascertain the truth about the matter and to report to me the result of your enquiries.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21540] No. 165.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 127.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 7, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador gave me to-day the following draft for the organisation of Albania, pointing out that there were some things in article 7 that were not

° Sir R. Paget, No. 88, April 28, 1913.

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quite settled yet, so that that article must be regarded as not definitive. He was not yet sure whether he would have instructions to communicate the draft to the *réunion* to-morrow, but he hoped to do so.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 165.

Draft respecting Organisation of Albania.

ARTICLE 1er.

L'Albanie sera autonome sous la suzeraineté de Sa Majesté le Sultan.

ARTICLE 2.

La suzeraineté de Sa Majesté le Sultan devra être purement nominale. Tout autre lien entre la Turquie et l'Albanie doit être exclu d'une manière définitive.

ARTICLE 3.

L'Albanie devra être neutralisée; sa neutralité est garantie par les six Puissances.

ARTICLE 4.

La sécurité et l'ordre public seront assurés par l'organisation internationale de la Gendarmerie. Cette organisation sera confiée à des officiers étrangers, qui auront le commandement supérieur et effectif de la gendarmerie.

Ces officiers seront choisis dans les armées européennes, comme, par exemple, de la Belgique, Hollande, Suisse, Suède, Norvège, Espagne, à l'exclusion des six Puissances, des Etats balkaniques et des Gouvernements ayant des intérêts directs dans les questions balkaniques. La mission des officiers instructeurs étrangers ne portera pas atteinte ni à l'uniformité du service ni à l'emploi d'officiers, sous-officiers et gendarmerie indigène.

ARTICLE 5.

Une commission composée d'un représentant de chacune des Grandes Puissances et du Gouvernement albanais sera chargée de proposer un régime judiciaire pour une période de six années adapté aux conditions de l'Albanie et s'inspirant des principes adoptés pour la constitution du régime judiciaire introduit en Egypte.

L'organisation et le contrôle de l'administration civile et des finances de l'Albanie seront confiés à un comité composé d'un représentant de chacune des Grandes Puissances et du Gouvernement albanais, dont les attributions seront proposées par la commission internationale susmentionée.

ARTICLE 6.

A l'expiration du délai mentionné à l'article 5, les six Puissances décideront, d'après les conditions du pays, si le régime établi aux points 4 et 5 sera renouvelé ou s'il y aura lieu de le modifier.

ARTICLE 7.

Afin de prévenir les effets préjudiciables qu'une transition trop rapide du régime des Capitulations à un régime de droit international doit nécessairement produire sur les intérêts du commerce étranger, les Puissances tombent d'accord de maintenir le régime des Capitulations en matière de commerce et des institutions commerciales d'industrie, de navigation, des droits de douane et des impôts, ainsi que de leur perception, enfin de tous les privilèges dont jouissent leurs ressortissants sous ces rapports.

Les Puissances se réservent de renoncer chacune pour son compte et en échange de nouveaux traités à conclure avec l'Albanie, à l'exercice desdits privilèges dès que la consolidation politique et administrative de l'Albanie offrira des garanties suffisantes qui leur permettront d'abandonner leur position privilégiée sans porter préjudice à leurs intérêts commerciaux et aux conditions économiques de leurs ressortissants établis en Albanie.

Il va sans dire que les concessions spéciales qui ont été données en Albanie par le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman à des compagnies ou entrepreneurs étrangers, ou bien à des entreprises dans lesquelles le capital étranger est engagé, seront reconnues valables par le Gouvernement albanais.

ARTICLE 8.

Le prince sera proposé par l'Autriche-Hongrie et l'Italie aux autres Grandes Puissances.

ARTICLE 9.

L'Italie et l'Autriche-Hongrie proposent qu'il soit laissé aux Albanais la faculté d'exprimer leur propre désir en tant que ces derniers, bien entendu, soient compatibles avec les dispositions générales prises par les Grandes Puissances.

ARTICLE 10.

Tant que le régime judiciaire dont il est question à l'article 5 ne sera pas appliqué, les Capitulations resteront en vigueur dans leur intégrité, et non seulement dans les limites prévues par l'article 7.

[21566] No. 166.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 128.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 7, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in talking to the German Ambassador in Rome, had given the following review of the situation:—

He thought that feeling in Vienna would now subside, and that then the remaining questions should be surveyed in a calm spirit. Every action in Albania by Austria and Italy should be avoided. It was true that there might be a certain amount of disorder in Albania, but there had been disorder there for centuries, and it need not be taken too seriously. The Italian proposals for the reorganisation of Albania had been accepted by Austria; they were based on European control, which was what Italy had always advocated. There must be no talk of compensation for Montenegro, especially not of territorial compensation. If territorial concessions to Montenegro were mentioned while Austria was in her present spirit, she would refuse categorically and the door would be shut on them for ever. The object should be to assure to Montenegro a certain degree of welfare, to make her an element of order rather than a source of agitation. She should be given financial help, and the delimitation of the boundaries agreed upon by the Powers should be traced eventually with a benevolent disposition. It should be recognised, after what had happened, that the Great Powers must not play with fire; they must respect the limit beyond which no Great Power could give way, and be careful of entering upon a slippery path that might be dangerous.

I said that these were most excellent sentiments, with which I entirely agreed; and, with regard to the application of what the Ambassador had last said, I hoped that the Ægean islands would be borne in mind; because, if any Great Power claimed or retained one of the Ægean islands, we should feel that the whole strategic position in the Mediterranean was being altered, and our interests in that way affected.

The Ambassador proceeded to speak of the south of Albania, and told me the utmost limits that Italy could concede to Greece.

I observed that we must not drift into the position, from which we had just emerged about Scutari, of coming to an agreement, and then being confronted with the defiance of Greece and the problem of how to turn her out by force, for she already occupied a great part of the territory that Italy wished to reserve for Albania. It would therefore be desirable that Italy should find some means of getting Greece to accept a boundary of Southern Albania on which the Powers could agree; and I suggested that concessions about the Ægean islands might be used by Italy for this purpose.

The Italian Ambassador abounded in this sense. He said that it was his own idea, and that he had been pressing it strongly on his Government.

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But when I came to instance Rhodes as one of the islands that I had in mind, he said that it was quite impossible for the Italian Government to give up Rhodes to Greece. They were bound to restore it to Turkey.

I said that if Italy could not give Rhodes to Greece because it belonged to Turkey, and if Turkey signed a treaty by which she left the decision as regards the islands to the Powers, the Powers were then free to decide what should be the fate of Rhodes.

The Ambassador urged that Turkey could not leave Rhodes to the decision of the Powers because it was in the occupation of Italy, and Turkey had to fulfil some obligations to Italy before the island could be restored to her.

I observed that, when it was suggested that Rhodes might be ceded by Italy to Greece, the reply was that this could not be done because it belonged to Turkey; when it was suggested that Rhodes could be ceded to Greece because it was Turkish, the reply was that this could not be done because Italy was in occupation on certain conditions. It was clear that Turkey and Italy between them had the fate of Rhodes in their hands, and the occupation by Italy was already beginning to excite some suspicion and apprehension.

The Ambassador assured me that we need be under no apprehension whatever as to Rhodes being retained permanently by Italy. She was not going to claim it.

He informed me that, as regards other islands, by which I understood him to mean Mytilene and Chios in particular, Austria was quite willing that they should go to Greece, but the difficulty was in Berlin.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21542] No. 167.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 129.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 7, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that the view of the Italian Government was that there ought to be an evacuation of Scutari without conditions and as soon as possible, but when the Austrian spirit had calmed down the Italian Government would do their best to get favourable terms for Montenegro. They would like us to use our influence in this sense in Vienna and Berlin, and also in Cettinjé, so that there should be no delay or difficulty about the evacuation of Scutari.

I told the Ambassador that, after the meeting with the Ambassadors last Monday, the 5th instant, though I had not instructed the British Minister in Cettinjé, in making a grateful acknowledgment of the message from the King of Montenegro, to spoil it by saying that there must be no delay, I had pointed out to Count de Salis that it was most important that, when the naval commanders approached the Montenegrin Government to make arrangements for taking over Scutari, there should be no delay and no difficulty placed in their way. He was therefore prepared for this point should it arise.

I told the Ambassador of the purport of Count de Salis's telegram No. 85, and I said that I presumed that the King would be entitled to take away the Turkish war material from Scutari, but that that need cause no delay in handing over the town, as the Montenegrins, who were removing the Turkish material, could remain and continue their work after the international detachment had taken possession of the town.

The Ambassador agreed in this course.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21135] No. 168.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 94.)
Sir, *Athens, April 30, 1913*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 11 of the 1st ultimo, I have the honour to report as follows on the minor events of the months of March and April:—

1. Her Majesty the Queen left Salonica for Epirus on the 7th March; she was accompanied from Athens on the 10th by Their Royal Highnesses Prince and

Princess George. They were at Athens on their return journey when the news arrived of the assassination of King George, since which date the movements of the Royal Family have been chronicled in other despatches. Prince Nicholas returned to Athens for the Greek Easter—last Sunday—but has gone back to resume his duties as Military Governor of Salonica.

2. The tercentary of the Romanoffs was made the occasion of a popular pro-Russian demonstration. A special service was held in the Greek Cathedral, and the Russian Minister was warmly cheered on his way to and from it. The mayor and a deputation of the Town Council also waited upon him and exchanged speeches.

Another demonstration, more embarrassing to the Russian Minister, took place on the 23rd instant, when a noisy, but unrepresentative, crowd celebrated the fall of Scutari by cheering the Minister, who is in charge of Montenegrin interests in Greece. His Excellency addressed a few non-committal words to the people, and called for cheers for King Constantine.

3. On the 23rd March Major-General Danglis was appointed principal aide-de-camp and Lieutenant-Colonel Dousmanis aide-de-camp to His Majesty the King. These appointments are for service on the military as distinct from the Palace staff of His Majesty, who intends to retain the effective command of the army. This raises a delicate question, for, although the Constitution (article 32) provides that "the King commands the land and sea forces," this was not intended to imply responsible executive command. Furthermore I have reason to believe that if His Majesty's intention is carried out, General Eydoux, the head of the French Military Mission, will decline to retain his position.

4. On the 26th March M. Zographos, who was Minister for Foreign Affairs in M. Rhallys's Cabinet in 1909, was appointed "Governor-General of the Greek lands of Epirus occupied by the Greek army." The appointment was received with a chorus of approval, and is no doubt a good one if M. Zographos, who suffers from heart disease, finds his health equal to the task.

5. The editor of the "Chronos" was condemned by the military court to a week's imprisonment for the publication of articles calculated to injure the relations between Greece and Bulgaria and to endanger public order, in contravention of the law sanctioning the proclamation of a state of siege.

6. By Royal decrees the enrolment of the 1912 recruits was successively postponed to the 14th April and the 3rd May.

7. The enrolment of the naval recruits of the second series of 1912 was postponed *sine die*.

8. On the 9th April the destroyer "Keravnos" bombarded the Turkish military telephone station of Aivali and destroyed it, as well as the new barracks and landing stage of Aliarnaka. This was officially announced, but no official notification has been made of the other operations which appear to have taken place at the entrance of the harbour of Smyrna.

9. The battleship "Hydra" and some destroyers have been since about the 10th April off Port Said on the look out for the "Hamidieh" in case she passes once more through the Suez Canal.

10. The Turkish torpedo-boat "Tokat," which was sunk by the Italians off Prevesa in October 1911, has been raised and brought to the arsenal at Salamis.

11. The crew of the Greek steamer "Leros," whose fate was for some time in doubt, have returned to the Piræus, having been released by the Turks, and have confirmed the report that their ship was sunk at sea by the "Hamidieh" before the destruction of the transports at San Giovanni di Medua on the 12th March.

12. On the 17th April M. Argyropoulos, a civilian airman attached to the Greek army, essayed a flight near Salonica in a Blériot monoplane taken from the Turks, taking with him M. Constantine Manos as a passenger. Owing to a failure of the engine, the aeroplane fell from a great height, and both the pilot and passenger were instantly killed. M. Argyropoulos, though a very young man, was one of the pioneers of aviation in Greece. M. Manos, who will be remembered as one of the hot-headed promoters of disorders in Crete, has lately been serving in command of a Cretan contingent, and took part in the capture of Prevesa, where he was wounded. The accident is the second fatal one in the history of Greek aviation.

13. Count A. de Bosdari, the new Italian Minister, presented his credentials to His Majesty the King on the 19th April. On the following day M. Floresco, the Roumanian Minister, finally left Athens, having resigned his appointment for private reasons.

14. The celebration of the national festival of Independence Day on the 7th April

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was postponed on account of the national mourning until the Feast of St. Constantine, the 3rd June.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[21136] No. 169.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 95.)
Sir, *Athens, May 1, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a note which I have received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, informing me that instructions have been given to the Greek naval authorities to allow free passage to salt produced at salt-pans conceded to the Ottoman Public Debt.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 169.

M. Coromilas to Sir F. Elliot.

Athènes, le 16 (29) avril, 1913.

M. le Ministre,

J'AI l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que des instructions ont été données aux autorités navales helléniques, par le Ministère Royal de la Marine, afin que le transport du sel provenant des salines concédées au Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane fût effectué désormais librement.

Veuillez, &c.
L. S. COROMILAS.

[21139] No. 170.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 98.)
Sir, *Athens, May 2, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the paper which was sent yesterday to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, signed by the representatives of the six Great Powers, in reply to the last note of the Balkan allies on the subject of the terms of peace. The text is that received by the majority of my colleagues, the difference between it and that conveyed to me in your telegram No. 67 of the 23rd ultimo being as follows:—

The latter read in first paragraph: ". . . acceptation des bases de paix ayant été déjà agréées par la Sublime Porte. Les Puissances . . ." In the second paragraph "distribution" took the place of "délimitation," and the words "de nouveau" were omitted.

The delay in making the communication was due to the non-arrival of the Russian [illegible] instructions. It was made in writing, in order to avoid a too frequent repetition of the visits of the six representatives in a body to the Ministry, for the purpose of giving or receiving communications upon which no discussion is possible.

Yesterday being M. Coromilas's reception day, he alluded in the morning to the forthcoming reply, of the tenor of which he was already aware, and said that it [illegible] that, although what [illegible] upon converting it [illegible] in a second conversation [illegible] him in the evening, he repeated the remark, adding that, if such was the case it would be better and fairer to say so at once, although, he said, he did not see how the allies could be deprived of the right of discussing the frontiers of Albania and the fate of the islands.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 170.

Note communicated to Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Representatives of the Six Great Powers.

LES Soussignés, représentants de l'Allemagne, de l'Autriche-Hongrie, de la France, de la Grande-Bretagne, de l'Italie et de la Russie, ont l'honneur de faire à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Grèce la communication suivante:—

"Les Puissances prennent acte avec satisfaction de la réponse des alliés à leur dernière note et de leur acceptation des bases de paix formulées dans cette note. Ces bases de paix ayant été déjà agréées par la Sublime Porte, les Puissances invitent les belligérants à cesser immédiatement les hostilités, désignent [illegible] et le lieu de la réunion pour les négociations de la paix.

"Quant aux réserves de la réponse des alliés relatives aux îles et à la délimitation de l'Albanie, les Puissances font de nouveau observer que ces questions sont exclusivement de leur ressort. En conséquence, elles font remarquer que la cession des îles par la Turquie ne peut être mentionnée comme le font les alliés dans le paragraphe 2 de leur réponse."

Athènes, le 18 avril (1er mai), 1913.

[21143] No. 171.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 111.)
Sir, *Rome, May 5, 1913.*

WITH reference to your despatch No. 111 of the 21st ultimo on the subject of the seizure by the Greek and Bulgarian authorities of Ottoman fiscal stamps in the territories occupied by their troops, I have the honour to transmit to you, herewith, translation of a *pro-memorid* from the Italian Government stating that they have instructed their representatives at Sophia and Athens to report on the attitude of the Bulgarian and Greek Governments in the matter, and that pending the receipt of these reports they are inclined to adhere to the views of His Majesty's Government that the stamps in question come within the category of articles which a belligerent is entitled to appropriate in territory occupied by him, and that therefore neutral Power have no grounds for intervention.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

Enclosure in No. 171.

Pro-memoriâ communicated to Sir R. Rodd by Italian Government.

(Translation.)

THE Turkish Embassy have lately called the attention of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the [illegible] referred to in the *pro-memoriâ* from the British Embassy, dated the 27th April last, regarding the seizure by the Greek and Bulgarian authorities of Ottoman fiscal stamps in the territories occupied by their troops.

Before coming to the attitude which it seems to this Royal Ministry should be assumed on the Turkish Embassy, the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs have thought it well to obtain, as to the Royal Government's views [illegible] principles [illegible] in the matter, as to the [illegible] which it may be [illegible] to adopt on the question.

While [illegible] they [illegible] may arrive at [illegible] to adhere to the view expressed in the above-mentioned *pro-memoriâ*, viz. that, considering that the fiscal stamps in question come under the category of those articles of value which a belligerent is entitled to appropriate in territory occupied by him under article 53 of the Fourth Hague Convention, it is not for the neutral Powers to interfere as regards the manner in which the Greek and Bulgarian authorities propose to profit by the capture by sneaking the value thereof in other provinces of the Ottoman Empire.

Rome, May 3, 1913.

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[21144] No. 172.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 112.) *Rome, May 4, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 114 of the 22nd ultimo, instructing me to enquire of the Italian Government what attitude they propose to adopt towards the proposal put forward by the Sublime Porte to the effect that the Ottoman Public Debt Administration should be represented at the forthcoming International Financial Commission in Paris, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a *pro-memoriâ* from the Italian Government, informing me that they are disposed to agree to the Porte's proposal, subject to the proviso that the representatives of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration do not have the right to vote.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

Enclosure in No. 172.

Pro-memoriâ communicated to Sir R. Rodd by Italian Government.

(Translation.)

WITH reference to the Ottoman Public Debt's proposal that they should be asked to send special delegates of their own to the forthcoming international conference at Paris, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs has enquired of the other Cabinets concerned what are their views on this question, before coming to any decision themselves.

From the information so far received by them it results that the French Government consider that the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt might send, in addition to their own delegates, one of their representatives on the debt administration, who would, however, represent not the public debt but the Turkish Government.

The Austro-Hungarian Government on the other hand considers that it would be useful that the debt administration should be represented by delegates of its own; and is not disposed to oppose their desire for representation, provided the delegates do not have the right to vote.

The German Government for their part regard the request of the public debt as justified, and propose to give it a favourable reply.

In view of the consideration put forward by Turkey that the Ottoman Public Debt Administration is directly interested in the questions which will be dealt with in Paris, and is, moreover, in a position to furnish the conference with useful information and explanations, the Royal Government is in principal disposed to agree to the request of the administration, with the proviso suggested by the Austro-Hungarian Government.

Rome, May 3, 1913.

[21204] No. 173.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir A. Nicolson.—(Received May 8.)

(Privée.) *Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres, le 6 mai, 1913.*

Chère Excellence,

EN relisant la minute de l'aide-mémoire que je vous ai remis ce matin, je m'aperçois avec regret qu'un point que je tenais beaucoup à relever a été omis par inadvertence. Mon Gouvernement est en effet anxieux, pour des motifs aisément compréhensibles, que dans l'article 7 amendé, qui réserve *post pacem* la discussion d'un certain nombre de questions, telles que juridiction, nationalité, &c., à régler par des conventions spéciales, soit également inséré le terme de "vakoufs."

Cet article 7 amendé pourrait avoir ainsi la rédaction suivante:—

"Les questions concernant les prisonniers de guerre, juridiction, nationalité, les vakoufs et le commerce seront réglées par des conventions spéciales."

Je saisis, &c.
TEVFIK.

[21185] No. 174.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 8.)

(Confidential.) *Admiralty, May 8, 1913.*

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs copy of telegrams dated 7th and 8th instant, relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 174.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) P. *May 7, 1913.*

THE Governor of Scutari, with whom we had opened communications yesterday while he was still at Cettinjé, came to San Giovanni di Medua to-day. The Governor informed me that the King of Montenegro had given him full instructions and that His Majesty is fully prepared at once to hand over Scutari to the representatives of the Powers. The Montenegrin troops in the town, of whom there are about 10,000, would take four or five days to evacuate it and remove their war material. They would leave behind enough men to preserve order until the international detachment arrives. I will telegraph later the exact date by which the evacuation can be completed. The King promises that all possible steps will be taken to prevent a collision between the international detachment and the Montenegrin troops, but, if the former take over the town at once, he cannot guarantee the peaceful behaviour of the latter, as the feeling which exists among them on the subject of the evacuations is considerable. I would therefore propose that in order to avoid a collision the troops should be allowed to evacuate Scutari before the arrival of the international detachment.

His Majesty requests that Montenegrin workmen without arms may be allowed, after the town is taken over, to complete removal of all war material and movable Government stores which were previously the property of Turkey, if these have not already been removed before the international detachment arrives. His Majesty also begs that the Russian grain steamer, which is now loading at Trieste, may be allowed to enter Antivari with a view to relieve the distressed inhabitants.

In taking over Scutari, I should propose to proceed thither with the Austrian admiral and the French, German, and senior Italian captains, with a detachment consisting of 500 officers and men from the fleet. A further detachment of the same number would follow the next day. I would propose that this commission should remain in Scutari as long as is thought necessary, and that on its departure its duties should devolve on a junior commission, which should, I would suggest, consist of the captain of this ship and the commanders or senior lieutenants of the ships of the other nations composing the international fleet.

Enclosure 2 in No. 174.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *May 8, 1913.*

I AM sending by first post letters from influential Albanians on subject of Government.

[21281] No. 175.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 8.)

(Confidential.) *Admiralty, May 8, 1913.*

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams, dated

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the 8th instant, from the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to movement of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 175.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *May* 8, 1913.

FIVE more transports with Servian troops, making twenty-two in all, arrived Salonica the 8th May.

Enclosure 2 in No. 175.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *May* 8, 1913.

H.M.S. "MEDEA" ordered to return Malta, no longer needed as repeating at Corfu. Propose she should relieve "Weymouth" at Constantinople when defects rectified. Latter has been Constantinople since the 5th November, and relief desirable. His Majesty's Ambassador has signified approval.

[21333] No. 176.

Memorandum by Sir P. Harvey.—(Communicated to Foreign Office May 8, 1913.)

Balkan Financial Settlement.

I SHOULD be glad to know the views of the Foreign Office on the following points:—

1. The result of the informal discussions which have been taking place in Paris is to show that the share of the Ottoman Debt to be taken over by the Balkan States will be much the same, whether calculated by the French formula (on the proportion of the revenues of the ceded territories to the total revenues of the Turkish Empire) or on the yield from the ceded territories of the specific revenues given as guarantees to the bondholders.

Under these circumstances the French delegates are inclined to press that their formula be adopted.

The German delegates urge the advantage of adopting the other formula for the following reason:—

The practice of lending on the guarantee of specific revenues is growing. Large amounts of British, French, and German capital have been lent in China, South America, &c., on an assignment of particular revenues of particular territories (*e.g.*, the customs duties of specified ports). It would be of the greatest advantage to the lending Powers to take this opportunity of getting the principle recognised of the inviolability of such guarantees on the transference of territory from one Government to another; the principle, that is, that the guarantee is in the nature of a mortgage which adheres to the territory and passes with it. This principle finds some support in writers on international law, but instances where it has been applied are lacking.

2. I understand that the allies are likely to raise the question of a war indemnity immediately the question of their participation in the Debt charge is broached, and that they will be supported by the Russian delegates. It will be urged that Turkey's expenditure will be reduced more than her revenue as a result of the cession of the European provinces, and that she can afford to pay, and therefore should pay, a war indemnity.

I believe the view of the Foreign Office is that it would be inequitable to make Turkey pay an indemnity in addition to ceding territory.

As regards her capability to pay, I propose to urge that the maladministration and backwardness of Turkey are in a large measure due to her extreme poverty (the

Powers recognised that this was so in the case of Macedonia), and that the only chance of improvement is not to cripple her financially.

3. The question of the 3 per cent. customs surtax will give rise to much discussion.

The Germans are anxious that the surtax be renewed on its expiration, and wish to assume, for the purpose of calculating the allies' share of the Ottoman Debt, that the bondholders are entitled to reckon on this source of revenue indefinitely; but

(*a.*) The bondholders have no right to assume that the surtax will be perpetuated;

(*b.*) The assumption will not, in fact, benefit them if the allies' share of the Debt is to be discharged by a capital payment. The bondholders' share of the surtax goes to a special sinking fund. If the surtax be included in the calculation the allies would pay a larger annuity for a shorter period; it it be not included, they would pay a smaller annuity for a longer period; the capital value of the two annuities would be the same;

(*c.*) The assumption will enable the allies to argue that 75 per cent. of the surtax is available to provide a war indemnity;

(*d.*) The recognition by the delegates that the 3 per cent. will be continued would make it more difficult to obtain from Turkey the conditions which the Powers may wish to attach to the continuance.

In these circumstances it seems preferable to argue that the continuance of the surtax beyond 1914 cannot be assumed.

H. P. HARVEY.

May 8, 1913.

[21166] No. 177.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 221.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, May* 8, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 208 of 6th May.

Ottoman Government informs me that ships for transport of troops will soon be sent.

[21282] No. 178.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 222.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, May* 8, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 209 of 7th May.

Minister for Foreign Affairs does not anticipate that there will be any difficulty on the part of Turkey in accepting draft treaty which has been communicated to them, but considers that it will be necessary that it should be signed by a formal conference, for which purpose its delegates have proceeded to London as a result of collective communication made to them here on 21st March inviting them to name their delegates.

[21285] No. 179.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 157.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May* 8, 1913.

ROUMANIA.

I have carried out wishes expressed in your telegram No. 105 of 7th May.

Prime Minister asks me to thank you, and says that he is aware that the attitude of His Majesty's Government has been entirely impartial, and has been animated throughout by a desire to settle question fairly.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs has already informed Bulgarian representative of what has been going on, and Prime Minister realises that Austrian Government are trying to keep friends with both Roumania and Bulgaria at the expense of Triple *Entente*.

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[21284] No. 180.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 116.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, May 8, 1913.*

PEACE Conference.

Your telegram No. 88 of 7th May.

Both Minister for Foreign Affairs and Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs are indisposed, and I was unable to see them, but I handed a *note verbale* to Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He said that the last communication of the Powers had of course to be answered before a conference could be held; that at present Servian Government had not yet heard the views of either Bulgarian or Greek Governments on this communication. They had also not yet received the draft treaty proposed by the Powers, which the Servian Chargé d'Affaires was sending by post from London.

I remarked that M. Novakovitch's departure in the circumstances seemed somewhat premature. He replied that he had only gone as far as Paris, and if it was considered advisable to hold a conference in London the permission of His Majesty's Government would naturally first have to be sought.

[21283] No. 181.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 8.)

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, May 8, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 73 of 7th May.

Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs has only received a summary of draft treaty, but has telegraphed for the full text.

He says that there must necessarily be discussions with Turkey about the release of suspects on both sides, release of Greek ships, &c., and also with a view to find a formula to secure speedy negotiations of supplementary conventions concerning nationality, &c. Greek delegates to the Peace Conference therefore will be the same as before, with the exception of the Prime Minister.

An answer to the last note of the Powers is being considered by the allies. The Minister says that it is impossible for them to accept beforehand without reserving the right of discussion the decisions of the Powers respecting the islands and the southern frontier of Albania.

[20921] No. 182.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.[a]

(No. 198.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May 8, 1913.*

MY despatch No. 136 of 22nd April: Representation of Ottoman Public Debt on Paris Commission.

Can you expedite reply of German Government?

French Government share our views.

[21425] No. 183.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 211.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 8, 1913.*

ADMIRALTY desirous of withdrawing battleship from Constantinople, second flagship from Smyrna, and also "Black Prince" from Syria coast. What are your views?

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[a] Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 169) and Sir R. Rodd (No. 176), *mutatis mutandis*.

[22130] No. 184.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 67.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 8, 1913.*

THE Bulgarian Minister came to see me just before the meeting with the Ambassadors to-day. He stated that, in a communication made early in April, the Bulgarian Government had said that the line of frontier was to go from Media by Sarai, Muratli Station, passing south of the town of Airahol, proceeding between the towns of Keshan and Malgara, and thence on the watershed to the Ægean Sea to the east of Enos. The Bulgarian Government could not be content with any line in the treaty of peace less definite than this line; otherwise there would be a dispute when the line came to be traced. The Powers were bound to this line because, in replying to the Bulgarian Government, they had said that the first point did not give rise to any objection.

I said that my recollection was that the Powers had first proposed a line from Enos to Media by way of the Ergene River. Subsequently it had been asked that the line should be direct from Enos to Media. The Powers had agreed to this, and were committed to it. In the treaty we might refer to say "une ligne droite," but I did not see how we were to introduce any further definition.

The Minister said that the phrase "une ligne droite" would be too vague, and that his Government could not be sure that, with only this definition, the line would be traced satisfactorily. He urged me to promise that there would be put into the treaty the definition demanded by his Government, and to which, he asserted, the Powers were already committed.

I said that there was difficulty in putting details into the treaty, and I had thought that the details were to be settled by an international commission. All I could say was that I had taken a note of what he had said, and that I could not pronounce upon it till it had been discussed at the meeting with the Ambassadors.

I am, &c
E. GREY.

[22131] No. 185.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.[a]

(No. 108.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 8, 1913.*

THE Austro-Hungarian and Italian Ambassadors communicated to the *réunion* to-day a project of organisation for Albania, and the following record was made:—

"Les Ambassadeurs de l'Autriche-Hongrie et de l'Italie ont communiqué à la réunion un projet d'organisation de l'Albanie, en faisant observer qu'il a été préparé conformément à la résolution prise par la réunion en décembre dernier. Les deux Ambassadeurs ont déclaré que l'article 7 de ce projet n'était pas encore définitif.

"L'Ambassadeur de l'Autriche-Hongrie a dit, en motivant son opinion, que son Gouvernement préférerait supprimer les articles 1 et 2 relatifs à la suzeraineté du Sultan et écarter cette suzeraineté.

"L'Ambassadeur de l'Italie s'est exprimé dans le même sens.

"On a décidé de soumettre ce projet d'organisation à l'examen des différents Gouvernements."

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador made verbally the following observations in support of his view:—

"L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, propose d'éliminer dans le projet d'organisation de l'Albanie la stipulation établissant une suzeraineté du Sultan.

"*Motifs.*

"1. Quand la réunion a admis, le 17 décembre, la suzeraineté du Sultan la situation ne se présentait pas comme aujourd'hui. Alors il semblait possible que la

[a] Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 312), Sir E. Goschen (No. 154), Sir R. Rodd (No. 131), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 190).

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Turquie conserverait une plus grande partie de ses possessions en Europe ; on pouvait même s'attendre à voir une Macédoine autonome. Aujourd'hui, que les événements de la guerre ont refoulé la Turquie derrière la ligne Midia Enos, la distance immense qui sépare la Turquie et l'Albanie rend tout lien de suzeraineté à peu près impossible.

"2. Une suzeraineté turque en Albanie devrait avoir pour conséquence logique le maintien de la suzeraineté turque sur le territoire également autonome du Mont-Athos, qui est beaucoup plus rapproché de Constantinople que l'Albanie, ce qui serait aussi contraire aux désirs des couvents du Mont-Athos que le serait la suzeraineté du Sultan à l'intérêt des Albanais.

"3. L'opinion publique en Turquie est opposée au maintien de la suzeraineté turque sur l'Albanie, qui, ne pouvant être que purement nominale, ne serait d'aucun avantage pour la Turquie et lui créerait seulement des difficultés, comme l'ont fait jusqu'à présent toutes les suzerainetés plus ou moins fictives créées par le Congrès de Berlin.

"4. Les Albanais, et surtout les chrétiens, sont opposés à la suzeraineté turque, qui pourrait inspirer aux Albanais musulmans des velléités de domination sur leurs compatriotes chrétiens, comme c'était le cas au temps du régime turc.

"5. Comme l'Albanie doit être neutralisée, le maintien de la suzeraineté turque créerait des complications pour le cas que la Turquie serait impliquée dans une guerre, ce qui pourrait alors faire naître parmi la population musulmane des aspirations et des tentatives de venir se ranger dans la guerre à côté de leur suzerain, la Turquie."

I read to the Ambassadors the information received in the telegram of the 7th May from the vice-admiral, respecting the taking over of Scutari. A paraphrase of the telegram was given to the Ambassadors.

I said that I presumed that all the Governments would have received the same information from their respective naval officers. The procedure proposed seemed quite straightforward, and instructions would be sent to the vice-admiral to proceed as he proposed when his colleagues were ready to co-operate.

I informed the *réunion* of what the Bulgarian Minister had said to me about defining the line from Enos to Media. I also communicated to the meeting the *aide-mémoire* from the Turkish Ambassador about the Treaty of Peace. The following was then recorded :—

"Sir E. Grey a fait connaître une communication du Ministre de Bulgarie relative à la délimitation de la frontière turco-bulgare entre Midia et Enos. Cette ligne serait établie à travers les points suivants, à partir de Midia : Sarai, Muradi, au sud d'Airabol, entre Keshan et Malgara, pour aboutir sur le versant de la mer Égée à l'est d'Enos.

"Le 5 avril M. Guéchof avait exprimé aux représentants des Puissances à Sophia le désir de voir adopter cette ligne, tout en se réservant de consulter à ce sujet les alliés de la Bulgarie. Aucune communication officielle dans ce sens n'a été adressée depuis aux Puissances.

"L'Ambassadeur de l'Autriche-Hongrie dit avoir reçu de son Gouvernement l'instruction d'appuyer une demande bulgare qui aurait fait au commencement d'avril l'objet d'une note du Gouvernement de Sophia, mais la réunion n'a pas connaissance de cette note.

"Elle a admis, sur la demande du Gouvernement bulgare, que la ligne Enos-Midia serait considérée comme base de négociations et non comme frontière définitive. Mais, ainsi qu'elle l'a indiqué dans l'article 2 du projet du Traité de Paix approuvé par toutes les Puissances et communiqué en ce moment à tous les belligérants, les détails de la délimitation doivent être réglés par une commission internationale qui, de l'avis de la réunion, comprendrait des délégués de toutes les Puissances.

"La réunion estime donc qu'il n'y a pas lieu de revenir sur cette façon de procéder, et qu'il ne convient pas d'examiner un vœu ayant pour objet la fixation détaillée de tous les points de la ligne.

"Sir E. Grey a communiqué à la réunion une note de Tewfik Pacha aux termes de laquelle la Sublime Porte accepte les principes posés par la réunion au sujet de cette délimitation."

The German Ambassador brought forward a request from the Roumanian Minister in London that the amnesty for the Koutzo-Vlachs should be dealt with in the Treaty of Peace.

After some discussion, I pointed out that the object of the draft treaty was to enable the allies and Turkey to sign something and demobilise as quickly as possible. If we tried to make use of this draft to secure special advantages for the Koutzo-Vlachs or others, we should delay or defeat altogether the primary object of the draft, which was to induce the Turks and allies to make peace quickly.

Finally, it was decided to deal with the request of the Roumanian Minister by a resolution in general terms applying to all minorities, and the following was adopted :—

"La réunion pense qu'il convient de recommander aux alliés de proclamer aussitôt après la conclusion de la paix une amnistie générale pour tous les faits de guerre et la participation des minorités de race ou de religion aux opérations militaires."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20212] No. 186.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 137.)
Sir,
Foreign Office, May 8, 1913.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 101 of the 9th February, relative to the interference of the officials of the allied Balkan States with the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt in the territories occupied by their troops, I transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade reporting the presentation of a protest to the Servian Government on the subject.*

Your Excellency should inform the representative of the British bondholders of the step which has been taken.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21303] No. 187.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 171.)
Sir,
Berlin, May 7, 1913.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 133 of the 21st ultimo enquiring as to the views of the German Government regarding the seizure of Ottoman fiscal stamps by the Greek and Bulgarian authorities, I have the honour to inform you that I have received a communication from the Imperial Foreign Office informing me that in February last the Ottoman Government asked the German Government for their support in obtaining the restitution of these stamps. The Imperial Government thereupon instructed their representatives at London, Paris, Rome, and Vienna to enquire the views of the Governments to which they were accredited regarding the request of the Porte. They were, however, informed that none of the Governments in question had received this appeal from the Porte, but the French and Russian Governments declared themselves prepared in principle to support such a request should it be received.

The Imperial representatives in Sophia and Athens were accordingly instructed to make representations to the Bulgarian and Greek Governments in the sense desired by the Turkish Government, but up to the present the Imperial Government have received no report of the result of these representations.

The note from the Imperial Foreign Office adds that the following reasons influenced the German Government in their decision in the matter :—

The papers which have been confiscated are intended for levying dues and taxes, and consequently cannot be utilised in the territories occupied by the Greek and Bulgarian troops. But it cannot be denied that a certain danger exists that these stamps might be removed to other parts of the Ottoman Empire and used there for the purpose of evading taxes or for other similar objects. This illegal misuse of the stamps would not only constitute an infringement of the sovereign rights of the Turkish Government, and be contrary to the principles of international law, but might at any rate indirectly prejudice the interests of the Turkish bondholders, to whom these taxes have been pledged as a security for their rights.

* Sir R. Paget, No. 89, April 28, 1913.

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The communication ends by expressing the hope of the German Government that His Majesty's Government will see their way to complying with the request of the Porte and will send the necessary instructions to their representatives at Sophia and Athens.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[21304] No. 188.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 172.) *Berlin, May 7, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of the reply of the German Government to the note which I addressed to them on receipt of your despatch No. 136 of the 22nd ultimo, in which you instructed me to ascertain the views of the Imperial Government as to the proposal that the Ottoman Public Debt should be represented at the forthcoming International Financial Commission in Paris.

The German Government, while sharing the objections of His Majesty's Government to the Ottoman Debt sending an independent representative to the Commission with the right to vote, are nevertheless of opinion that it should be allowed a consultative voice in the proceedings, and propose that Sir Adam Block should be appointed for this purpose.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 188.

Note verbale communicated to Sir E. Goschen by German Foreign Office.

(Translation.)

THE Foreign Office has the honour to inform the British Embassy, in reply to its *note verbale* of the 25th ultimo, that the Imperial Government share the view of the British Government that it is hardly practicable to grant to the Ottoman Public Debt the right of independent representation with voting power at the forthcoming International Financial Commission in Paris, beside the Great Powers, Turkey, and the Balkan States. On the other hand, the Imperial Government are of opinion that there would be no objection to allowing the Turkish State Debt Administration to have a consultative voice in the negotiations in question and that such a course would even be in the interests of all the Turkish State creditors. It is true that some of the delegations will be assisted by members of the Debt as advisers. But the latter are naturally primarily appointed to safeguard the interest of the creditors of their own nationality and cannot be regarded as real mouthpieces of the Turkish Debt Administration. Though it is of course clear that the interests of the various groups of creditors coincide, generally speaking, with those of the Debt Administration, yet cases may be imagined in which these interests might clash and in which it might be desirable to hear the views of the Debt as such. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that the figures and the technical means at the disposal of the Debt as such are not in an equal degree at the disposal of its individual members.

The most suitable representative of the Ottoman Public Debt is clearly the president of the Administrative Council, Sir Adam Block. It seems to the Imperial Government all the more desirable to include this gentleman in the Paris Commission, as his knowledge and long experience of Turkish conditions would give him undisputed authority in the questions to be discussed. Should the British Government, in spite of the views set forth above, object to admitting Sir Adam Block to the Paris Commission in his capacity as president of the Administrative Council, perhaps a solution could be found by appointing him to the British delegation as technical adviser.

Berlin, May 6, 1913.

[21432] No. 189.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 9.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, May 9, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of telegrams relative to Montenegrin affairs.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE

Enclosure 1 in No. 189.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII."

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, May 8, 1913.*

YOUR No. 72.

His Majesty's Government considers proposed arrangement for taking over Scutari satisfactory, and it has been put before the meeting of Ambassadors by Foreign Secretary. Presumably your colleagues have communicated in similar terms with their Governments, and if they are willing to co-operate you may take action as proposed. If your colleagues see no objection His Majesty's Government are willing that the grain cargo should be landed to relieve distress.

Enclosure 2 in No. 189.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, May 9, 1913.*

YOU may take action as proposed in your No. 383.

Enclosure 3 in No. 189.

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *May 8, 1913.*

ITALIAN rear-admiral, on board "Giuseppe Garibaldi," has joined the international squadron off Montenegro.

[21370] No. 190.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 87.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, May 8, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 60 of 5th May.

Before taking action in accordance with resolution, representatives of Powers were informed that Montenegrin Government had sent instructions to their delegate respecting the handing over of Scutari. I send you translation of these instructions in my telegram immediately following. I have repeated them to admiral.

My colleagues and I will accordingly inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that our respective Governments have taken act with satisfaction of the message addressed to you by King, and, further, we are communicating to them instructions sent to Montenegrin delegate.

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[21315] No. 191.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 88.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Cettinjé, May 8, 1913.*

FOLLOWING is translation of instructions sent by Government Montenegrin delegate respecting handing over of Scutari :—

"You should conform to wishes of Admiral Commander-in-chief as regards day for evacuation of town and manner in which evacuation is to be conducted. You should ensure free transport of war material of town, fortress, and entrenchments of Scutari and Medua, as well as of any object having belonged to Ottoman Government. Take care at same time of all material which may remain after evacuation, stipulating for liberty to remove it according to means of transport. For the transport of material presence is necessary of at least 1,000 of our men, who could bivouac beyond the Bojana in a spot to be indicated by the admiral. Every time that our troops enter the town to fetch material they will be under the orders of the admiral."

[21456] No. 192.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, May 9, 1913.*

A CABINET has been formed by General Janko Vukotich, in which Minister for Foreign Affairs is M. Pyerre Plamenatz, formerly Chargé d'Affaires in Constantinople.

[21448] No. 193.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 158.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, May 9, 1913.*

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 187 of 8th April: Silkworms.
Prohibition withdrawn.
(Sent to Constantinople.)

[21450] No. 194.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 159.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, May 9, 1913.*

MACEDONIAN outrages.
My despatch No. 56 of 18th April, last two paragraphs.
My German colleague has called attention of the Bulgarian Government seriously to this matter both verbally and in writing; he has especially alluded to the lamentable state of things in districts of Rupchos and Novrocop (see Salonica despatch No. 28 to Constantinople).
This action, together with that of His Majesty's Government, has made an impression, and it would be still more satisfactory if the French Minister, who has sufficient information in his hands, could be instructed to act in the same sense.

[21441] No. 195.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 224.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, May 9, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 211 of 8th May.
I understand that Admiralty have already decided to replace "Weymouth" here by "Medea," a very small ship.

Flagship can be withdrawn from Smyrna, and "Black Prince" from Syrian coast, though removal of former would deprive us of our cypher communication. But it seems somewhat premature to leave Constantinople with only one small ship, and I would prefer, if possible, to see signature of some sort of peace, and even disbandment of part of forces, before battleship is withdrawn.

[21453] No. 196.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 186.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, May 9, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 180 of 6th May: Bulgaria and Roumania.
Decision signed to-day.
Minister for Foreign Affairs will inform two Governments of its signature, but will not communicate text till preliminary treaty of peace is signed.

[21454] No. 197.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 9.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, May 9, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 66 of 6th May.
Greek Government having informed Bulgarian Government of proposed repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania, the latter have replied that they object absolutely until peace is signed.
Minister for Foreign Affairs told German Minister this morning that the Greek Government must conform to views of their ally.
The communication of [? to] Bulgarian Government, although inconvenient to us, was natural in view of importance of maintaining correct relations between the two countries.

[20128] No. 198.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.**

(No. 64.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 9, 1913.*

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople forwarding a request from the Sublime Porte that steps may be taken to secure the restitution of Ottoman fiscal stamps seized by the Bulgarian authorities.†

On the receipt of this communication I addressed a circular despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburgh, and Rome expressing the views of His Majesty's Government on this question, and asking for an expression of the opinion of the various Governments concerned. Copy of this despatch is also enclosed.‡

The French Government are the only one of those addressed who have so far replied to my request, and I transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from Sir F. Bertie embodying their views.§

You should accordingly address a note to the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the sense of the representations already made by your French colleague.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir F. Elliot (No. 42), May 9, 1913, *mutatis mutandis*.
† Sir G. Lowther (No. 248), March 28, 1913.
‡ To Sir F. Bertie, &c., April 21, 1913.
§ Sir F. Bertie (No. 219), April 30, 1913.

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[21346] No. 199.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 43.) *Foreign Office, May 9, 1913.*

Sir,

M. SKOULOUDIS called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 7th May. He said that he had read the draft treaty of peace, copy of which he had sent to his Government. He was hitherto unaware of their views, but, speaking quite academically and unofficially, he thought that his Government would find difficulty in signing a treaty by which they left to the Powers, absolutely and without any reserves, questions so important to Greece as those of Southern Albania and the islands.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Skouloudis that, speaking equally unofficially, he could not see what Greece would gain by hesitating to sign with Turkey a treaty which caused hostilities to cease. From the outset the Powers had made known that Albania and the islands were matters which they reserved to themselves; this attitude the Powers would continue to maintain.

M. Skouloudis said that it was common knowledge that certain Powers—two, in any case—were not favourable to Greek wishes as regards Southern Albania and the islands. Sir A. Nicolson observed that, admitting that this were so, the refusal of Greece to sign a treaty with Turkey in which the two questions were left to the Powers would not in any way influence or alter the attitude of any Power or, indeed, the situation as regards Greek aspirations and hopes. M. Skouloudis said this was true—and then proceeded to enlarge on the necessity of Greece securing the littoral of Epirus up to Corfu, including Santa Quaranta, as well as most of the localities occupied by Greek troops in Epirus. She could not yield on those points. He said the Epirus frontier question was causing great anxiety to his Government, and he trusted Greek claims would be recognised. Montenegro had entered Scutari against the expressed will of the Powers, but Greece had never been warned not to advance into Epirus, and therefore had some claim to retain occupied points.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Skouloudis that the operations of war and occupation of points did not necessarily justify retention, and instanced Servia and Durazzo.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[20662] No. 200.

Foreign Office to Board of Trade.

(Confidential.) *Foreign Office, May 9, 1913.*

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you, for the confidential information of the Board of Trade, a copy of a memorandum,* communicated by his Highness Hakki Pasha on the 1st instant, setting forth the various points to which the Ottoman Government desire to secure the assent of His Majesty's Government.

As regards point 1, it will be observed that the Turkish Government ask for the assent of His Majesty's Government to an increase in the customs duties not for a limited period, but for an indefinite one. It has been urged in the negotiations by Hakki Pasha that if the increase were limited, say, for a period of seven years, as His Majesty's Government proposed in their note of July 1912 to the Turkish Ambassador, the Turkish Government would not be able to make full use of such an increase as security for advances.

Subject to the assent of all the Powers concerned being obtained to a permanent increase, Sir E. Grey is disposed to concur in the request of the Turkish Government. He would, however, be glad to receive the views of your Department on this point; and, inasmuch as it was originally proposed that the Shatt-el-Arab Conservancy Convention should be subject to denunciation after twenty-one years so as to coincide with the expiry of a period (say, the third of seven years) for which His Majesty's Government would have given their assent to the levy of customs duties at 15 per cent. *ad valorem*, the question now arises whether His Majesty's Government should not stipulate that, if they assent to the levy in question for an indefinite period, the Shatt-el-Arab convention should not be modified so as to remain in force for at any

* Hakki Pasha, May 1, 1913.

rate a longer period than twenty-one years. Sir E. Grey would propose eventually to substitute fifty for twenty-one years in the draft convention, but he desires in the first instance to be furnished with the views of the Board of Trade and India Office.

As regards point 2, this is a matter which principally concerns your Department. Subject to any views you may express, Sir E. Grey is disposed to reply that in principle His Majesty's Government will agree to a specific tariff if the other Powers do so, but that the details must be the subject of negotiation and mutual accommodation In regard to this subject, however, I am to refer to your letter of the 6th instant. I am also to state that Sir R. Crawford is understood to be in favour of a specific tariff in Turkey.

3. Sir E. Grey is disposed to say that the embassies at Constantinople are already in negotiation with the Turkish Government regarding the temetta tax, and the conditions on which the Powers can assent to it.

4. The question of foreign post-offices in Turkey is raised in a letter addressed to the Post Office to-day. A copy has been furnished to your Department.

5. As regards the Capitulations, Sir E. Grey is well aware that their abolition would be regarded as impracticable by the embassies at Constantinople under present conditions. It will be observed, however, that all that is asked is that His Majesty's Government should not refuse "to study" the question.

If the issue of the present negotiations proves as favourable as is indicated by the draft conventions which have been initialled, Sir E. Grey would be glad to be able to gratify Turkish *amour-propre* by not returning a flat refusal to this request.

He would be disposed to say that His Majesty's Government do not think the majority of the Powers would agree to the abolition of the Capitulations in present conditions, but that His Majesty's Government are nevertheless prepared, while reserving their final decision, to enter upon a study of the whole question with a view to deciding if, under certain conditions (judicial and other), they would, in concert with the other Powers, agree to a modification of the capitulatory régime.

I am to ask for an early reply to this letter.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

[21509] No. 201.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 384.) *Constantinople, May 4, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 376 of the 1st May, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the reply received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the collective note of the Ambassadors on the subject of peace negotiations.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 201.

Note communicated to Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople by Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs.

LE soussigné, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, a pris connaissance du contenu de la communication collective que leurs Excellences MM. les Ambassadeurs d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'Angleterre, de France, de Russie, d'Allemagne et d'Italie ont bien voulu lui remettre en date du 1er mai courant

En réponse, il a l'honneur d'informer leurs Excellences que le Gouvernement Impérial, prenant acte de cette communication, déclare accepter l'invitation des Puissances à cesser immédiatement les hostilités et à désigner ses plénipotentiaires en vue de négocier la paix.

Le Gouvernement ottoman ayant désigné ses plénipotentiaires, choisit, pour sa part, la ville de Londres comme lieu de réunion des plénipotentiaires.

SAID HALIM.

Constantinople, le 3 mai, 1913.

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[21511] No. 202.

Sir C. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 386.) *Constantinople, May 4, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I learn from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana that on the 28th ultimo an engagement took place between some Turkish troops with two naval guns, posted at a coast village in the Selefkeh district, and a converted Greek cruiser. According to the statement of the vali the Turkish troops had one casualty, while the Greek vessel was sunk.

It is further reported that two hundred troops were despatched to Selefkeh on the 2nd instant.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[21514] No. 203.

Sir C. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 390.) *Constantinople, May 6, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to confirm my telegram No. 216 of yesterday reporting that the three Ottoman delegates for the London Peace Conference are leaving Constantinople to-day.

The first delegate, General Osman Nizami Pasha, ex-Ambassador in Berlin, was second delegate during the negotiations of last December and January, and is consequently known to you. He will probably break his journey at Vienna.

The second delegate, Bazzaria Effendi, Senator and Minister for Public Works in the present Cabinet, is a Kutzo-Vlach from Krushevo, in the province of Monastir. He was formerly dragoman at *H.* a-month in the Austrian consulate at Monastir, and is a strong sympathiser with Triple-Alliance-cum-Roumanian policy in the Near East. He has been on intimate terms with the Salonica, or inner, ring of the Committee of Union and Progress and a frequent contributor to the Jewish Zionist organ the "Jeune Turc." He intends spending a day or two at Paris, probably in order to consult with Djavid Bey.

The third delegate is Reshid Bey, Conseiller légiste at the Porte, who is also known in London, whither he proceeded in 1912 in connection with the Bagdad Railway and Persian Gulf negotiations. He may possibly not leave Constantinople till Thursday the 8th instant.

They are accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Mustapha Edib Bey, a staff officer, as military advisor.

The local papers announce that, in addition to the sum of £T. 400 allowed to each delegate as travelling expenses, they are each to receive £T. 10 per diem for maintenance during their stay in London.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[21648] No. 204.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 10.)

(Confidential.) *Admiralty, May 10, 1913.*

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs copy of telegrams dated the 9th and 10th May, 1913, relative to affairs in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 204.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII."

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, May 9, 1913*

HIS Majesty's Minister at Constantinople informed by Turkish Government that ships will be sent shortly for repatriation of Turkish troops.

Enclosure 2 in No. 204.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

May 10, 1913.

(Telegraphic.)

CONVENTION of evacuation of fortified town of Scutari by Montenegrin troops, for its occupation at 2 P.M. on the 14th May by international detachment, and for simultaneous raising of blockade drawn up to-day at Conference attended by Governor of Scutari. It stipulates that 1,000 men of Montenegrin army remain on right bank of Boyana to assist in removing war material from town and forts which could not otherwise be removed by the 14th May. The convention will be made public, and the Governor has accordingly given a separate personal guarantee on behalf of King Nicholas that all the troops, except the 1,000 referred to above, should be withdrawn outside a radius of 10 kilom. from the town in order that they may not be unnecessarily excited.

Of these 1,000 men 800 would be about 5 or 6 kilom. away, and 200 employed for a time at Tarabosch barracks. When all the gear has been removed the 1,000 men would also be withdrawn outside a radius of 10 kilom. from Scutari.

The Austrian admiral stated to me, after the Conference, that unless the convention expressly stipulated for the occupation of Tarabosch Fort by a portion of the international detachment with authority to dismantle, he would withhold his signature. This point was actually covered by the mention of the word Tarabosch in the convention and agreement.

Strong feeling exists among the troops, many having been killed in storming Tarabosch, and the Governor would not therefore agree to the word being inserted in the convention.

In the end, by inserting "fortress of" as well as "town of" Scutari I effected a compromise to which both the Governor and the Austrian admiral agreed.

Copy of convention and agreement which have been signed will be sent on by first post.

[21480] No. 205.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 90. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, May 9, 1913.*

ACCORDING to a [group omitted : ? report] based on authority of King, Essad Pasha has received 16,000*l.* from the Servian Government, nominally as compensation for requisitions in Albanian territory.

[21479] No. 206.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 160.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, May 9, 1913.*

MEDIATION proposals.

Your telegram No. 106 of 7th May.

Prime Minister states that Bulgarian representative will be instructed to inform you that Bulgarian Government are disposed to sign treaty as drafted as soon as Midia–Enos line has been defined as proposed by them.

They do not believe treaty will give rise to serious difficulties.

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[21665] No. 207.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 161.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, May 10, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 58: Ottoman bonds.

After discussing matter with Prime Minister my French colleague and I have sent him identic note.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[21678] No. 208.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 162.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, May 10, 1913.*

ALL Servian troops, with ammunition, artillery, and transports, have now left Bulgaria. The delay on the part of Bulgarian authorities in providing trains for them has caused much friction and ill-feeling between the two countries.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[21570] No. 209.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 226.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, May 10, 1913.*

FOLLOWING for consular officer at Smyrna:—

"Vice-consul at Rhodes corrects his telegram of 20th April. There was no Greek military occupation of island."

[21657] No. 210.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 117.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, May 10, 1913.*

FOLLOWING is repetition of telegram from Monastir to-day:—

"I am informed that Servian troops have evacuated Elbassan after establishment of mainly Albanian administration."

[21691] No. 211.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 10.)

(No. 118.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, May 10, 1913.*

ACCORDING to my Bulgarian colleague, who has just returned from Sophia, there is no real diminution of tension between Bulgaria and Servia. The Servians are concentrating troops along the frontier, and feeling in Bulgaria is very bitter.

He says Bulgarian Government recently requested Russian Government to intervene and arbitrate on the differences. Russian Government agreed, and notified Servia that they would be willing to assist in settlement of the dispute. Servian Government are replying, presumably at the instigation of the Russian Minister here, that they wish to try to negotiate direct with Bulgaria at first, but if this fails they are willing to accept Russian mediation, with the reserve, however, that they must be assured that there will be a revision of the territorial arrangements laid down in the existing treaty.

Bulgarian Minister considers that it is quite useless for Servian Government, if they maintain this attitude, to approach his Government direct.

(Sent to Sophia.)

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[22137] No. 212.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 108.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May 10, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 125 of 5th April.

Did Bulgarian Government address an official note to you embodying the desire expressed verbally to you by M. Gueshof as to frontier line? If so, please telegraph its terms.

[21645] No. 213.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.**

(No. 89.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 10, 1913.*

AT the meeting of the Ambassadors on 8th May the following resolution was adopted:

"La réunion pense qu'il convient de recommander aux alliés de proclamer aussitôt après la conclusion de la paix une amnistie générale pour tous les faits de guerre et la participation des minorités de race ou de religion aux opérations militaires."

When all your colleagues have received the necessary instructions you can act accordingly.

[21680] No. 214.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 76.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, May 11, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 86.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me this morning that Austrian Government share view that it would be difficult to admit Ottoman Public Debt Administration to have special representation on Paris Commission with right to vote. But they see no reason why the Administration should not take part in the negotiations with an advisory voice. It is true that several members of the Council of the Debt are already appointed as expert advisers in the Commission, but they cannot be considered as special representatives of the Debt Administration. It appears to Austrian Government expedient that, in addition to bondholders whose interests are protected by respective representatives of their Governments, the Administration of the Debt as representing the interests of combined Turkish bondholders should have a voice in the deliberations, and be able to give all necessary information and details of Turkish finance.

Austrian Government would therefore consider it advisable that Council of the Debt should be invited to be represented by Sir A. Block with a consultative vote.

Despatch follows.

[21679] No. 215.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 11.)

(No. 163.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, May 11, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 108 of 10th May.

There was no official note, but Prime Minister handed to each foreign Minister a piece of paper containing proposed definition of line, full text of which was given in my telegram No. 125 of 5th April.

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* Also to Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No. 107), Sir F. Elliot (No. 76), and Count de Salis (No. 62).

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[21450] No. 216.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 109.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May 11, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 159 of 9th May: Outrages.

You should, if you have not already done so, ask your French colleague to obtain authority to speak to Bulgarian Government.

See my telegram No. 101 of 16th April.

[21676] No. 217.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 229.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, May 12, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 221 of 8th May and Athens telegram No. 70 of 9th May.

Porte has sent me list of transports proceeding to Albania on 15th, 17th, 19th, 21st, and 25th. Three thousand troops are to be landed at Beirout, remainder at Smyrna, Constantinople, and Black Sea ports. Porte are apparently unaware of objections raised by Bulgaria.

To prevent misunderstanding or hitch, do you wish me to inform Porte of objection before ships start on 15th?

(Sent to Athens and Sophia.)

[21659] No. 218.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 230.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, May 12, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 229 of to-day.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me he has heard from Berlin of Bulgarian objections to repatriation of troops, and until matter is settled proposed arrangements are suspended.

(Sent to Sophia and Athens.)

[21697] No. 219.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Athens, May 12, 1913.*

REPLY of allies to communication of 1st May begins by reciting its substance, and continues:—

"Les Grandes Puissances répètent dans cette communication qu'elles n'admettent pas les réserves relatives à la délimitation de l'Albanie et aux îles. Les Gouvernements alliés ne peuvent cependant croire que dans la médiation proposée il s'agissait de leur refuser de débattre les questions touchant à leurs intérêts vitaux et résultant de la guerre victorieuse et libératrice qu'ils ont entreprise. La différence des deux points de vue ne doit pas toutefois arrêter les négociations en vue de conclure la paix, et les Gouvernements alliés, dans leur désir de déférer aux démarches des Grandes Puissances, déclarent qu'ils sont prêts à cesser les hostilités, et désignent Londres comme lieu de réunion pour la conférence de la paix, à laquelle la Grèce délègue comme plénipotentiaires MM. Skouloudis, Gennadius, Streit"

[21698] No. 220.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 164.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Sophia, May 12, 1913.*

FOLLOWING is the official reply to the collective communication of 1st May:—

"Les Gouvernements alliés ont eu l'honneur de recevoir la communication du 18 avril, par laquelle les Grandes Puissances, prenant acte de l'acceptation par les quatre États balkaniques des bases de paix formulées dans la note collective du 1er (14) avril, les invitent à cesser les hostilités et à désigner leurs plénipotentiaires ainsi que le lieu de réunion pour les négociations de paix. Les Grandes Puissances répètent dans cette communication qu'elles n'admettent pas les réserves relatives à la délimitation de l'Albanie et aux îles. Les Gouvernements alliés ne peuvent cependant croire que dans la médiation proposée il s'agissait de leur refuser de débattre des questions touchant à leurs intérêts vitaux et résultant de la guerre victorieuse et libératrice qu'ils ont entreprise. La différence des deux points de vue ne doit pas toutefois arrêter les négociations en vue de conclure la paix, et les Gouvernements alliés, dans leur désir de déférer aux démarches des Grandes Puissances, déclarent qu'ils sont prêts à cesser les hostilités, et désignent Londres comme lieu de réunion pour la conférence de la paix, à laquelle ils désignent les mêmes plénipotentiaires comme par le passé."

[21666] No. 221.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 165.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, May 12, 1913.*

FOLLOWING information has been received by both Prime Minister and by Greek Minister:—

May 7.—North-west of Cavalla half-company of Bulgarian infantry were attacked by Greeks.

Greek commander admits aggression. Casualties unknown.

May 10.—There was fighting near Eleotheroon, south-west of Cavalla, 2,000 villagers siding with Greeks, Bulgarians using artillery. Greeks' attempt to land near Cavalla repulsed. About 300 Greeks and over 100 Bulgarians killed.

Greek Minister informs me that his Government have ordered an entire division to occupy region concerned.

[21667] No. 222.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 12.)

(No. 166.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Sophia, May 12, 1913.*

M. DANEF and General Paprikof, with suite of three, are due London 16th May.

[21454] No. 223.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 202.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 12, 1913.*

SIR F. ELLIOT'S telegram No. 70 of 9th May.

Ask Government to which you are accredited whether they are willing to send instructions to their representative at Sophia to request Bulgarian Government not to raise difficulties, pointing out to them that repatriation was asked for and agreed to on purely humanitarian grounds, that troops would be taken to Asia Minor, and that Powers would obtain from Turkish Government engagement that troops would not be employed in further hostilities.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 214.)

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* Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 201), Sir R. Rodd (No. 180), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 405), and Sir F. Cartwright (No. 172).

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[21789] No. 224.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 74.)
Sir, *Sophia, May 2, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 66 of the 17th February and to previous correspondence relative to the frontier question between Bulgaria and Roumania, I have the honour to state that the Prime Minister, in the course of conversation with me yesterday, referred to this question, which has been submitted to an Ambassadorial Conference at St. Petersburgh.

As you are aware from my previous despatches, M. Gueshof has never concealed his anxiety on this subject. He has always stated to me that the enforced cession of any habitable portion of Bulgaria to Roumania would lead to his retirement from office. His private fortune comes from Roumania and he has banking relations with that country. He is therefore considered by the general public to be particularly favourably disposed towards the Roumanian people. He will therefore be held responsible for any important territorial concession, even if, as is the case on the present occasion, such a concession has been agreed to by a decision of the Great Powers. His Excellency stated that no Grand Sobranjé would pass a resolution ceding Bulgarian territory to Roumania and keep the Ministry in office which had agreed to such a cession, or which had submitted the question to arbitration. The above accounts for the obstinacy shown by M. Danef during the negotiations which took place on this question in London.

It is difficult for anyone who has not lived in Bulgaria to realise to what an extent the Roumanians are despised. They are designated by the populace as "mamaligars," or "eaters of Indian maize," which is considered as an expression of opprobrium. They are referred to openly as a race of cowards and slaves, and they are thoroughly looked down upon.

In view of the many difficulties with which Bulgaria is now threatened, the decision of the Great Powers will be sullenly accepted, but it should be borne in mind that as soon as the occasion presents itself, and when Bulgaria has had time to recuperate, she will take the first favourable opportunity of going to war with Roumania, and will, if successful, not only take back the territory she is now about to lose, but will endeavour to annex the Dobrudja as well, and acquire a conterminous frontier with Russia.

Such action on her part will only be prevented by the greatest pressure and energy on the part of the Great Powers, and even to that she is not likely easily to submit.

I am sending copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Bucharest.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[21742] No. 225.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey. (Received May 13.)

(No. 92.)
Sir, *Belgrade, May 4, 1913.*

IN my telegram No. 100 of the 19th ultimo I stated that the Bulgarian Government were protesting to the Servian Government concerning the ill-treatment of the Bulgar population at various places in Macedonia, especially at Egri Palanka.

Referring to this subject, M. Stefanovitch yesterday told me that the accusations of the Bulgarians were unfounded, and not made in good faith. He explained that it was idle to speak of definite ethnographical divisions in Macedonia; that the population could not be designated as either Serb or Bulgar. All that could be said of it was that it was Slav, and it would declare itself Serb or Bulgar, as might seem most expedient at the moment. Bulgarian agents had been at work in most of the districts occupied by the Servian army spreading the report that the Servians were only in temporary occupation, and that it would be most inadvisable for the inhabitants to declare themselves to be Serbs. So great had been this intimidation that now, rather than remain in their villages and accept minor offices under the Servians, the inhabitants fled, and, in order to curry favour with the Bulgarians, invented tales of ill-treatment.

M. Stefanovitch said the Bulgarians had caused all sorts of accounts of supposed

outrages by the Servians to be published in the foreign press, and that it seemed deplorable the two countries should thus wash their dirty linen in public.

I asked him whether there was any truth in the report which has appeared in several newspapers that Russia had intervened between Servia and Bulgaria. He replied negatively, and added that Russia's position was extremely embarrassing, as she was bound to disappoint one side. He subsequently endeavoured to convey to me the impression that Russia was favouring the Servian contentions, but he spoke with but little assurance.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[21743] No. 226.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 93.)
Sir, *Belgrade, May 5, 1913.*

WHEN I spoke to the Prime Minister in the sense of your telegram No. 87 of the 1st instant, he replied that he was well aware of the importance of depriving Austria of any pretext for fastening a quarrel upon Servia, and it was with this object in view that he had some time ago ordered the evacuation of Albania by all Servian troops with the exception of one regiment which was being left at Albassan merely to watch events. King Nicolas could cherish no illusions as to the intention of Servia to hold completely aloof regarding Scutari, and he had only a few days ago urged the King to be reasonable, and not set himself up against the will of the Powers. It seemed, however, mere waste of time to give such advice at the present moment, though, possibly, the Powers might make the situation easier by promising Montenegro territorial compensation in the neighbourhood of Scutari. This was the only suggestion he could make for overcoming King Nicolas's stubbornness by pacific means.

M. Pashitch expressed the opinion that Austrian aims went far beyond the mere expulsion of the Montenegrins from Scutari, and that, once in Albania on the pretext of establishing authority and keeping order, Austrian troops would remain in permanent occupation.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[21790] No. 227.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 75. Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, May 6, 1913.*

I HAD the honour to receive your despatch No. 57 of the 29th ultimo, in which you were good enough to inform me of the conversation which took place between the Bulgarian Minister and Sir A. Nicolson on the 26th ultimo.

Since that date a *détente* has been observable in this capital in the relations between Bulgaria and Servia, and, although a considerable tension still exists, a general feeling is prevalent that the Russian Government will eventually settle the difficulties existing between the two countries, without recourse being had to the arbitrament of war.

Generally speaking, the remark made by the Bulgarian Minister to Sir A. Nicolson, to the effect that the Bulgarians were not afraid either of the Serbs or of the Greeks, is a true one, but at the present time the Bulgarian army is not in a condition to take the offensive. The losses in killed and wounded concerning which I have already had the honour to report to you, are enormous, and the army as a whole is throughly stale.

The policy of this Government, at the present time, is to endeavour to arrange all questions *à l'amiable*: they are therefore greatly in favour of a general demobilisation on the part of all the allies, and they will use all possible endeavours to push this forward.

The hint conveyed to Sir A. Nicolson by M. Madjarof that if the Servian Government continued their present policy they might find opposed to them not only Bulgaria,

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but also a Great Power—meaning Austro-Hungary—is of especial interest. It clearly shows the present weakness of the Bulgarian army.

There can be no doubt that the position of Russia has been vastly shaken in Bulgaria. The Russian Government have been attacked by a certain portion of the press, both for their lack of support in the Roumanian question, and for their expressed wish to this Government that a triumphal entry into Constantinople should not take place, as it would be unfavourably viewed by them. Some leading Bulgarians also consider that, were it not for Russia, they would have been able to retain Rodosto, and thus have access to their own territory direct from the Sea of Marmora. But between this feeling and that of throwing themselves into the arms of Austria there is a vast gulf fixed. Ninety per cent. of the population would view with great dissatisfaction any policy which would not only alienate them from their former protector, but would turn him into a dangerous enemy. Slav sentiment is strong in Bulgaria, and the similarity of religion and language greatly strengthens it. The Russian Government have thrown away many chances lately, both by the unfortunate choice of their Minister, who is, in all ways, a striking contrast to his predecessor, the late M. Sementowsky-Kurilo, by their general dilatoriness and want of tact during the present crisis, and by their action in the Roumanian-Bulgarian dispute, but, in my opinion, the lost position can be regained by judicious discretion, because the heart of the Bulgarian nation is with the Russians rather than with the Austrians.

It must, however, be borne in mind that King Ferdinand and his entourage are Austrian at heart, and a certain number of politicians, especially some of those in the Radoslav and Stamboulof parties favour Austria for their own ends, and in order to curry favour with the court.

On the whole, therefore, Russia still remains uppermost in the continued *jeu de bascule*.

M. Gueshof and his party hold the scales between the two countries more evenly than would any other Prime Minister, and when he resigns it will be interesting to note who his successor will be. Should it be M. Danef, it will be a sign of the prominence of Russia; should it, on the other hand, be General Savof or M. Radoslav, then the Austrian policy will be uppermost. Even, however, should this be the case, it is not a necessary corollary that Bulgaria will become a party to any arrangement which would be likely to cause a rupture in her relations with the Imperial Russian Government.

I am forwarding copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and to His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[21744] No. 228.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 94.)
Sir, *Belgrade, May 6, 1913.*

M. NOVAKOVITCH, who is leaving for London to-day, as one of the Servian peace delegates, yesterday handed me a *pro-memoriâ* on the "Partition of the Balkan Territory and Reciprocal Delimitation," which he had drawn up as representing the Servian official view on the present differences between Servia and Bulgaria.

As the memorandum is of considerable length, I have thought it advisable to summarise the main points, especially as it is not improbable M. Novakovitch may himself, when in London, wish to present the Servian side of the case to His Majesty's Government, and therefore communicate the full text.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 228.

Pro-memoriâ by M. Novakovitch.

WHEN at the time of the negotiations of the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty the Bulgarians insisted on a precise delimitation of spheres, Servia being anxious to conclude an agreement and thinking she was only sacrificing hypothetical pretensions, consented to the Bulgarian proposals. Neither Servians nor Bulgarians understood

that territory could not properly be apportioned until it was known how much territory would be conquered and how much would remain for apportioning; they likewise took no account of the fact that the concession of Greece to the alliance would necessitate a consideration of Greek claims; and, further, that the intervention of the Powers might upset the calculations of the allies. It is, indeed, the omission to provide for the latter possibility which constitutes the weak spot in the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty, as subsequently became evident. Servia, being the only Balkan State excluded from the sea, had as her principal object in undertaking the war the appropriation of a portion, at least, of that part of the Adriatic littoral which had belonged to her in former days. This intention, however, met with the opposition of the Powers, Russia even included, and there was evolved an autonomous Albania, with the result that Servia now again finds herself debarred from the sea and the only Balkan State without a littoral. The Great Powers were well aware of this hardship, but all they had to offer Servia as a sop were some commercial and economic privileges in any Albanian port of her choosing.

Now the Greeks have certain claims in Thessaly, and also in Macedonia on the right bank of the Vardar, and they even aspire to Florina and Monastir, though the latter town was captured by the Servian army, and, under the circumstances, if the Bulgarian view is to prevail, which attributes the whole of Macedonia to Bulgaria, Servia, whose army has fought alike on the battle-fields of Macedonia and Thrace together with the Bulgarians, and at Scutari with the Montenegrins, will obtain nothing more than the sanjaks of Uskub, Prishtina, and Prizrend, and parts of Ipek and Novi-Bazar, and she would be cut off entirely from all contact with Greece by some 40 or 50 kilom. of Bulgarian territory. Such a result would produce immense discontent in the country.

If the pretensions of the Bulgarians to Prilep, Ochrida, and Monastir were allowed in accordance with the terms of the present treaty, the amount of territory gained by Bulgaria would be 69,500 square kilom., that by Greece 29,500, and that gained by Servia, when robbed of Albania, only 22,400 square kilom. It cannot have been the object of the alliance to create one inordinately large State which would place the others in a position of inferiority and thus disturb the natural equilibrium. Consequently Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece must now proceed to a fresh partition of the peninsula. This partition must be undertaken altogether irrespectively of the former treaty, without reference to historical, sentimental, or ethnographical traditions. It should only take into account considerations of "reciprocal equilibrium, geographical symmetry," and it should be in relation to the effort made and the territory occupied by each of the allies during the war. The amount of territory Servia claims from Bulgaria is 12,000 square kilom., comprising the districts of Prilep, Monastir, and Ochrida. Bulgaria should remember that, if she has to surrender a few villages on the right bank of the Vardar, Greece will lose a good many more on the shores of the Archipelago and the Black Sea. If the Balkan alliance is to flourish it must rest upon a just basis, and then, if one State thinks to have incurred a loss, it will be more than sufficiently compensated by the common advantage.

[21756] No. 229.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 391.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 6, 1913.*

AS is perhaps not unnatural, the Committee of Union and Progress has seized the opportunity of the recent events in Albania to attempt to detract public attention from their own lack of success in their internal and external policy. Several violent articles (one of which I enclose herein in translation*) have appeared in the "Tanin," the recognised organ of this party, in which many of Turkey's misfortunes have been attributed to Albanian treachery and duplicity, while special horror is expressed at the manner of the deaths of Niazi Bey and Hassan Riza. "The Turkish army, when it leaves Vallona," the writer, Ismail Hakki Babunzade, somewhat truculently declares "should leave behind it a deep track of justice."

The death of Niazi Bey is held to be a great blow at the Constitution, and it is contended that the Government should issue formal orders that the stain of the murder should be wiped out before the Turkish forces leave Vallona.

* Not printed.

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Apart, however, from the question of the past misdeeds of the Albanians, which are thus used as a cloak for the shortcomings of the present Turkish Government, the future of the country has begun to arouse considerable anxiety and misgivings.

"The Albanian movement is the first one on racial lines which has ever occurred in the east," runs another article by the same author, and the attitude of Turkey towards Albania now becomes one of the highest importance. The instigators of the rebellion of 1912 should be severely dealt with; the "Young Albanians" with their cry, "Albania for the Albanians," should direct their attention to reforming their country and change their war-cry into the more apposite one of the "Albanians for Albania"; while the Albanians who reprobate, as do the Turkish Government, the deplorable misdeeds of their fellow-countrymen must be encouraged.

The great majority of Albanians are, it is contended, Moslems, and it is therefore Turkey's sacred duty to work for the establishment of a Moslem form of political administration, *i.e.*, a State under a Moslem ruler.

The appointment of a foreign prince would be as painful to Turkey as the succession of a king to the Throne of Morocco or Afghanistan.

It is, however, interesting to note that, in spite of this desired dependence on the Ottoman Empire, it is expressly stated that the bond should be a moral one, and that "were Albania to revolt or make war on a neighbour, or were she invaded by a foreign Power, Turkey would not be bound to give her financial or other aid."

The alternative of an entirely independent Albania raises, to the Ottoman idea, the unpleasant prospect of the appointment of an Albanian diplomatic representative in Constantinople whose activities would necessarily to a great extent be taken up with questions arising from appeals for protection from Albanians in other parts of Turkey.

The conclusion is that the creation of an autonomous but subject State would obviate these difficulties, and that Turkey should limit her requirements to demanding of the Powers the appointment of a Moslem prince or vali, while, as it is somewhat unexpectedly interpolated, "Albania should of course be freed from her portion of the debt."

If the Austro-Italian policy of settling the matter on a national basis were to be followed, the article continues, the Moslems will do, as those left in Bulgaria, Greece, and Servia have done, namely, flee to Turkey.

"Since the cry is to let the will of the Albanians prevail, let them be asked by means of a referendum whether they want a Moslem or Christian as a ruler."

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[21855] No. 230.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 104.) *Athens, May 6, 1913.*

Sir,

I ASKED M. Venizelos a few days ago about the relations between Greece and Bulgaria. He said the difficulty was to get the Bulgarian Government to say what they wanted. At the beginning of the war, either just before or just after the occupation of Salonica, when the collapse of the Turkish resistance made it evident that the allies need no longer confine themselves to the primary object of the war—the reform of the Turkish Administration—but could look forward to the partition of Turkey in Europe, he had suggested to the Bulgarian Government a line of demarcation between the future Bulgaria and Greece. To this suggestion he received no reply. Later, during the Peace Conference in London, he had approached M. Daneff with a similar though modified suggestion, but all that he could extract from him was that the Greek demands were excessive. Latterly he had made a third proposal through the Greek Minister at Sophia, to which an answer had been sent through the Bulgarian Minister at Athens to the effect that the Bulgarian Government could not accept the suggestions of the Greek Government as a basis of discussion, and asking them to put forward new ones. To this he replied that he had now made three separate proposals, each of which had been rejected by the Bulgarian Government without any indication of their own views. Let the latter state what they considered an acceptable line, and the Greek Government would be ready to discuss it, but it was impossible for them to go on putting forward proposal after proposal, as if they were beggars suing for a bounty. It was the turn of the Bulgarians, and if after discussion agreement was found

impossible, the matter could be referred to the arbitration of the Powers of the Triple *Entente*.

M. Venizelos believed that M. Gueshof himself and his Government were ready to discuss the frontier question in an amicable and reasonable spirit, but that they were not sure how far they could control the army.

I asked his Excellency whether there was any arrangement with Servia with regard to the differences between that country and Bulgaria (see Sir H. Bax-Ironside's Secret telegram No. 139 of the 15th April). He said there was no arrangement, but that the Greek Government attached the greatest importance to having the Servians as neighbours on the right bank of the Vardar. This is the line taken by the Greek newspapers in general, some of which insist that it is a matter of greater importance even than the possession of Salonica.

In a further conversation with me this morning, M. Venizelos said that nothing more had been heard from the Bulgarian Government, and he repeated that he would be ready to refer the dispute to the arbitration of England, France, and Russia. He said the Bulgarians continue to strengthen their forces facing the Greek lines. I said that the Greeks appeared to be doing at least as much (as is evident from Mr. Lamb's and Colonel Cunliffe Owen's reports). He said that was only natural, remembering the affair at Nigrita, where the Bulgarian advance led to a regular pitched battle in which there were sixty casualties on the Greek side.

According to M. Coromilas, the Mixed Commission appointed to settle matters temporarily on the basis of priority of occupation has attained very little result, owing to the attitude of the Bulgarian delegates.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[21856] No. 231.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 105.) *Athens, May 7, 1913.*

Sir,

A GREAT anxiety has been removed by the news that the King of Montenegro has yielded to the will of Europe in regard to Scutari, and that the schemes of Austria and Italy concerning Albania have thus been frustrated. The fear that the views of Italy with regard to the southern frontier of Albania may still prevail still remains, and I believe that isolated action on her part to enforce them would be resisted, although the bulk of the Greek army having been transported from Epirus to Salonica, there can be little hope of successful opposition to an Italian invasion.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[21747] No. 232.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 70.) *Vienna, May 7, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 67 of the 17th March, on the subject of the murder of the Franciscan priest Luigi Palitch by Montenegrins, I have the honour to report that the mixed commission which was appointed to investigate the case, after contending with manifold difficulties and obstructions, terminated their labours and presented their report on the 14th April. According to this report, the commission were unable to arrive at any decisive result. It, on the one hand, no proof was adduced in support of the Albanian version that the priest Palitch had been murdered on the road to Ipek for no cause whatever, it was, on the other hand, impossible to verify the Montenegrin statement that he had met his end while attempting to fly from his captors.

Simultaneously with the examination of the Palitch case the mixed commission went into the question of the forced conversions. The result of this enquiry was likewise

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somewhat unsatisfactory, as the witnesses, fearing reprisals, declined to reveal the whole truth.

The Austro-Hungarian Government, after considering the report of the mixed commission, addressed the following three demands to the Montenegrin Government:—

1. That the Montenegrin Government shall erect a cross where Father Palitch fell, and further that they shall facilitate the building of a Catholic chapel which the Austro-Hungarian Government contemplate in this connection, and shall send eventually a representative of the rank of General or Minister to the solemn consecration of this building.

2. That the Montenegrin Government shall take the necessary steps for conveying the body of Father Palitch to Zumbi and shall send a representative to the funeral.

3. That the Montenegrin Government shall guarantee to the Catholics who were forcibly converted perfect freedom in the choice of their future dwelling-places, as their lives might be imperilled by a return to their original faith.

The Austrian public have this morning been informed through the medium of the semi-official press that at first the Montenegrin Government had declined to accede to these demands, but on second thoughts had yielded to the energetic representations of the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Cettinjé.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[21868] No. 233.

Sir C. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 149. Confidential.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, May 7, 1913.*

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 161 of the 19th ultimo, I informed M. Sazonof of the memorandum which had been communicated to you relative to the protection of the commercial interests of foreign Powers in the territory to be annexed by the Balkan States as a result of the present war, and I enquired of his Excellency whether the Imperial Government had received a similar communication from the German Government, and, if so, what reply they proposed to return to it.

I have the honour to inform you that I have to-day received an answer from the Russian Government stating that no such communication has been made to them by the German Government, but transmitting *à titre confidentiel* copies of correspondence which has passed between the Austrian Embassy here and the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs in regard to a proposal put forward by the Austrian Government for the submission to the conference of Ambassadors in London of certain questions arising out of the present war relative to commerce and navigation in the ports and territorial waters of the Balkan States.

The view taken by the Austrian Government in this correspondence agrees with that held in the memorandum communicated by Herr von Kühlmann to the Foreign Office on the 20th February last, namely, that the Great Powers have the right to safeguard their commercial interests in the districts in question, and that an attempt should be made to come to some arrangement between the Powers in the matter.

In the replies, however, the Russian Government express the opinion that the territories which may be annexed by the belligerents will be, as regards commerce and navigation, legally subject to the régime established by existing treaties between third Powers and the Balkan States respectively. They urge that this point of view is in conformity with the doctrine and practice of international law, which prescribes that, in cases of territorial change, the annexed territory is subjected to the application of the treaties and conventions which bind the State annexing it, and they quote the case of the recent annexation of Tripoli in support of this contention.

Any other solution of the question raised by the Austrian Government can, in the opinion of the Russian Government, only be arrived at with the free consent of the Balkan States themselves. If the latter accordingly express a desire to do so, the advisability of certain of the measures proposed by the Austrian Government might be discussed with them. The Russian Government therefore suggests for this purpose

that the question be submitted in accordance with point 3 of its programme to the technical commission in Paris at which the Balkan States themselves will be present.

Subject to your instructions on the subject, I am not forwarding copies of the correspondence in question, but I can do so if you so desire by next messenger.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[21858] No. 234.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 107.)
Sir, *Athens, May 7, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Valaority, governor of the National Bank of Greece, has left Athens for Paris, where, together with M. Romanos, the Greek Minister, he will represent this country upon the international technical commission on the financial questions arising out of the war.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[21758] No. 235.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 396.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 7, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 368 of the 30th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica on the subject of Graeco-Bulgarian relations.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 235.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 38.)
Sir, *Salonica, May 2, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 34 of the 21st ultimo and to previous despatches on the subject of the relations existing between the allied States, I have the honour to report that, according to such information as I am able to obtain, the Greek forces garrisoning this district are at present disposed as follows:—

The 4th division, centred on Toptchin, guards the railway line as far as Ghumendja and the Galiko Valley as far as kilometre 14.

The 6th division is quartered in Harmankeui, Gradobor, and Daoud-Bali, and other villages to the west of the Langhaza road.

The 2nd is at Langhaza and in the villages surrounding the lake of that name.

The 7th, which hitherto had its centre at Tchai-Aghzi, at the head of the Gulf of Orfano, with detachments at Orfano and other places beyond the Strouma as far east as Lefteri and also up the Strouma as far as Nigrita, is being gradually pushed across the river and replaced by the 1st, which will eventually centre on the last-named place.

The 5th is at Karaferia, and the 3rd is moving down from Korytza, viâ Florina, to Yenidje-Vardar and Ghumendja, where it will, to a certain extent, relieve the 4th.

A considerable proportion of the field artillery has been concentrated on the line of the Strouma Kara-sou from Tchai-Aghzi to Nigrita, while the twelve siege guns brought round from Epirus (six 15-centim. and six 10·5-centim.) have, I believe, been placed in position on the line of hills separating Salonica from Langhaza. One division, believed to be the 4th, was recently warned to be in readiness for reshipment to Epirus, but I understand that this intention has again been abandoned, or at least postponed.

The Bulgarian forces, on the other hand, received general instructions on the 25th ultimo to execute a movement of concentration in the direction of Doiran and

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Demir-Hissar, the central point of which, I am told, is at the defile of Dova-tepe, between the stations of Akindjali and Poroj. All the artillery in Salonica left the town on the 26th, and the infantry is gradually and unostentatiously following it. Langhaza and the adjacent villages were evacuated about three days ago, as was also Sukho, and the nearest point now in the occupation of Bulgarian troops is believed to be Negovani, on the old Serres road.

In official circles it is intimated that this withdrawal is the outcome of the deliberations of the Mixed Commission, of which General Ilessaptchieff and M. Sarafof are the principal Bulgarian members, and which is declared to have established the priority of Greek occupation in all the places now evacuated by the others. Bulgarian officers, however, openly declare that they are withdrawing purely and solely because they find themselves at present dangerously outnumbered by the Greeks, but that they firmly intend to return as soon as ever they feel strong enough to do so effectively.

The Servian troops which went from here to Albania in March are now returning to the number, I am told, of 22,000, and are being entrained for Servia after a very short sojourn in Salonica. The contemplated evacuation of Gheygheli by the Servians in favour of the Greeks, alluded to in my despatch No. 31 of the 12th ultimo, has not yet taken effect, from which, and other slight indications, the deduction has been drawn that something has occurred to disturb the complete understanding which, three weeks or so back, appeared to exist between these two nationalities, whilst I am assured, on more or less serious authority, that a slight *detente* has taken place in the relations between Serbs and Bulgars. I do not think, however, that very much importance can be attached to these statements, whilst, on the other hand, the articles which continue to appear in the local press would seem to indicate that the general position remains very much as I have previously reported. This is confirmed by statements which have been in circulation here for the past three days, based on telegrams and letters received by local merchants and banks from their correspondents in Dedeaghatch, to the effect that the Bulgarian authorities have decreed the levy of import duty at the rate of 100 per cent. on all goods imported into the territories in their occupation from those occupied by either of the allies. I am unable to obtain official confirmation of this news, but the Bulgarian representatives here decline to contradict it, and I learn that difficulties are again being placed in the way of passengers and cargo from here being landed at Cavalla.

I am sending copies of this despatch direct to His Majesty's Legations at Athens and Sophia.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[21791] No. 236.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 76.) *Sophia, May 8, 1913.*

Sir,

DURING the fortnight which has elapsed since the writing of my despatch No. 69 of the 25th ultimo the storm-centre in Balkan politics has shifted to Montenegro, with a corresponding lull on the eastern side of the peninsula, and events have been comparatively few.

The suspension of hostilities against Turkey has been prolonged as a matter of course, and practically *sine die*, pending the conclusion of the negotiations for peace, whose progress is nowhere watched with more impatience than in Bulgaria.

The *démarche*, in pursuance of the instructions contained in your telegram No. 102 of the 23rd ultimo, was long delayed, the Russian Minister having received no instructions, but was finally made on the 1st instant, in the terms of which I have the honour to enclose copy. By that time it was in fact out of date, as it was already understood that the steps which it proposed had in part been already taken and in part would be rendered unnecessary by the presentation to the belligerents by the mediating Powers of a draft treaty of peace prepared by them.

Upon the frontier question with Roumania, in some of its aspects, I have had the honour of reporting to you in a separate despatch, as also on the present situation as between Bulgaria and Servia.

I have, &c.
H. G. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 236.

Note communicated to Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs by Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

LES Puissances prennent acte avec satisfaction de la réponse des alliés à leur dernière note, et de leur acceptation des bases de paix ayant été agréées par la Sublime Porte. Les Puissances invitent les belligérants à cesser immédiatement les hostilités, et à désigner leurs plénipotentiaires et le lieu de la réunion pour la négociation de la paix.

Quant aux réserves de la réponse des alliés relatives aux îles et à la délimitation de l'Albanie, les Puissances font de nouveau observer que ces questions sont exclusivement de leur ressort. En conséquence, elles font remarquer que la cession des îles par la Turquie ne peut être mentionnée comme le font les alliés dans le paragraphe 2 de leur réponse.

Sophia, le 18 avril (1er mai), 1913.

[21761] No. 237.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 399.) *Constantinople, May 8, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 321 of the 6th May on the subject of Albania and the committee, press view advocating that the new State, being mainly Moslem, should be given an Ottoman colour, provided that this involved no financial or other obligation on Turkey, I have the honour to report that the Committee of Union and Progress has since completely changed its point of view, and that its organ yesterday and to-day insist on the necessity of Albania being erected into an independent State having no connection whatsoever with Turkey.

As Albania is mainly Moslem and had centuries-old connection with Turkey, to whom the Albanians have rendered enormous services, both as statesmen, *e.g.*, the Kuprili Viziers and in the Turkish army, in which, whether as officers or privates, the Albanians have always held a high record, the first view seemed the natural Turkish one, as it was also that of Russia and, it was imagined, of the Triple Entente. This rapid change of front in the matter is attributed to the influence of the Triple Alliance, in whose interest the Committee of Union and Progress seems to work even in matters apparently at variance with Turkish instincts and traditions.

With this rapid change of theory there has also come a corresponding change of attitude towards Albanians who are being arrested right and left and deported from the capital at a moment's notice. In fact the same treatment is being meted out to them as to the Greeks during the anti-Hellenic boycott.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[21749] No. 238.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 72.) *Vienna, May 8, 1913.*

Sir,

IT is natural that considerable relief should be felt throughout Austria at the news of the submission of the King of Montenegro to the will of the Powers. King Nicholas's previous defiance and the provocation which it was felt he was offering to this country in particular had raised very bitter feelings in Austria-Hungary. Impatience was growing; there was a demand for immediate action, and much it was thought the Monarchy would lose much of her prestige. The long period of suspense and agitation during the past months, culminating in the Scutari crisis, the necessary preparations for all eventualities, the bad effect upon trade, the general feeling of unrest—all this had tended to produce a state of nervousness which the definite surrender of Scutari, when realised, will greatly diminish.

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With the exception of a few journals, the press of Vienna shows relief and satisfaction at the news which, though there may yet be dangers lying ahead, should render unnecessary an expedition into Albania.

The "Fremdenblatt" says it is undoubtedly due to the determined attitude of Austria-Hungary that the steps taken against Montenegro have had the desired effect. The policy of the Dual Monarchy has thus, not for the first time in the course of the present crisis, saved the prestige of Europe from a serious defeat. Now it is to be hoped that the remaining decisions of Europe on Albanian questions will also be carried out without complications arising and without any avoidable delay; further, that these decisions will meet the urgent necessity of re-establishing order in Albania and, at the same time, will correspond to the determined will of the two most interested Powers to see that their great interests in that country are under no circumstances disturbed.

The "Neue Freie Presse" believes that the submission of King Nicholas is a defeat for Servian policy. Servia will, it is hoped, at length convince herself of the necessity for good relations with Austria-Hungary, who would be ready to forget what has happened before the evacuation of Durazzo. It is a relief that the Monarchy has been spared the necessity of warlike action. A joint expedition of Austria-Hungary and Italy was not to be thought of with any great pleasure; new points of friction might have arisen. Less violent measures will now suffice to remove Essad Pasha from Albania. The fight which the Monarchy has been obliged to carry on—not against Montenegro and Servia, but against the ill-will aroused by Panslavists in St. Petersburgh and Paris—ends in the realisation of the fact that Austria-Hungary does count for something in the Balkans and in the world.

The "Neues Wiener Tagblatt" remarks that the success of Austria-Hungary in the Scutari crisis is to be esteemed all the greater because it has been obtained in a peaceful manner. Serbs and Panslavists must now see that their manœuvres against the prestige of the Monarchy are fruitless, and that nothing definite can be decided in the Balkans without her consent.

The "Reichspost" observes that the whole situation turned in Austria's favour the moment she showed a firmer front and threw the sword into the balance. This might have been done sooner. The same paper publishes a letter from a London correspondent, in which it is said that English statesmen are beginning carefully, but surely, to loosen the threads of British policy from the web of the Triple *Entente* and returning to the principle of "splendid isolation." Great Britain's position in the world is stronger and more independent than in the days of the *entente* policy.

The "Arbeiter Zeitung" says there must now be an end to all warlike speculations. Austrian blood should not be shed for Albania. "We have had enough of Scutari, and enough of Albania."

A few newspapers strike rather a different note. The "Zeit" maintains that an evacuation of Scutari is no merit to Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in view of the means that have been used and the costs incurred. It was a hasty policy not carefully enough thought out. The immense expenses are almost unjustified; what has the Monarchy got for her money? An Albanian Scutari. A platonic and too dearly-bought success.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[21801] No. 239.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Bucharest, May 9, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that a meeting of the Conservative Party was convoked yesterday, at Bucharest, at the Conservative Club, under the auspices of M. Carp, the former chief of the party, and of M. Filipesco, late Minister of Domains, who, as reported by Mr. Vaughan in his despatch No. 44 of the 21st ultimo, resigned his portfolio in M. Maioresco's Cabinet because of the divergence of his views from those of his colleagues as to the handling of the differences with Bulgaria. The object of the meeting was to discuss the solution of the Romano-Bulgarian differences decided upon by the Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh. I understand that the meeting was attended exclusively by M. Carp's and M. Filipesco's followers. None of the members of the Cabinet and but few Members of Parliament were present, the Conservative

members of the Cabinet having publicly announced that they would abstain from attending, in as much as Parliament was the proper place for the proposed discussion.

M. Carp strongly condemned the solution proposed by the Ambassadors as humiliating to Roumania. He recalled the circumstances which had led him to retire for a time from political life. He had been asked to form a coalition Cabinet with the Conservative Democrats but had refused. At the same time in order not to hinder the coalition he had resigned his position as chief of the Conservative party. His resignation had never been accepted and recently his political friends had declared that he was still the chief of the party. In these circumstances he must declare that he could only resume the position on two conditions (1) that the party would refuse to submit to the decision of the Ambassadors, and (2) that the party's collaboration with the Conservative Democrats should cease. M. Carp's speech was greeted with much applause and a motion was carried expressing agreement with his views, praying him to resume the effective direction of the party and promising the party's support for the realisation of his views, both in foreign and home politics.

It is too early to judge how far the Cabinet will be shaken by this open declaration of war from MM. Carp and Filipesco and their friends, but it is significant that M. Marghiloman, the Minister of Finance, who was M. Filipesco's chief support in the Cabinet when the latter was urging military measures against Bulgaria, still stands firm with the Ministry.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[21745] No. 240.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 95.)
Sir, *Belgrade, May 9, 1913.*

IMMEDIATELY upon receipt of your telegram No. 88 of the 7th instant, I called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. I found, however, that both M. Pasitch and M. Stefanovitch were absent owing to indisposition. Under the circumstances I left a *note verbale*, copy of which I enclose, with the Assistant Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and in doing so I remarked that the departure of M. Novakovitch for Paris and London, as Servian delegate to the peace conference, had struck me as being somewhat premature, but I had made no observation to this effect, as I did not know what communications might have been received by His Majesty's Government through the Balkan representatives in London.

M. Shainovitch said that M. Novakovitch had for the present only gone as far as Paris, that of course the last communication of the Powers had still to be formally answered, and if it was thought necessary to hold a conference, the permission of His Majesty's Government to hold it in London would naturally be asked. He could venture no opinion concerning the draft treaty drawn up by the Powers, as its text had not yet been received from London. He would at once submit my *note verbale* to the Prime Minister.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 240.

Note verbale communicated to Servian Foreign Office.

SI l'on est dans l'intention de réunir une conférence de la paix à Londres, cela aurait dû être notifié au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de façon à prendre les arrangements convenables.

Il semble que, si la Turquie et les alliés sont disposés à signer, avec peu ou point de modifications, le projet du traité qui se trouve entre leurs mains, cela pourrait être fait par leurs représentants actuellement à Londres, et le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté pourrait leur donner toutes facilités pour le faire à tout moment.

Dans le cas où, d'autre part, il pourrait survenir de sérieuses difficultés quant au projet du traité, il serait bon de les examiner avant la réunion formelle de la conférence.

Belgrade, le 7 mai, 1913.

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[22050] No. 241.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received May 13.)

Treasury Chambers, May 10, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Sir W. Langley's letter of the 6th instant, transmitting copies of a despatch and telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Athens relative to a request made to the International Financial Commission at that capital by the National Bank of Greece to be released from the obligation imposed in 1898 of holding in reserve funds of the 2½ per cent. Guaranteed Loan given the bank in payment of advances to the Government prior to that date.

In reply to Sir E. Grey's enquiry whether their Lordships consider the request as one which may properly be granted, I am to state that, having regard to the increase since 1898 in the assets held by the bank against its note issue, my Lords see no reason for differing from the opinion which the Financial Commission have formed in the matter.

With reference to Mr. Beaumont's suggestion that the application of the National Bank may be followed by a renewal of the request of the Ionian Bank for a similar release, I am to say that my Lords could not express an opinion on this point until further information is before them. It might be found that certain of the objections raised by Mr. Young to the application made by this bank in 1909 were still of force, and the question will therefore require further consideration in the event of an application being made to the Financial Commission.

The enclosures referred to in the last paragraph of the letter under reply are returned herewith.

I am, &c.
ROBERT CHALMERS.

[21966] No. 242.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 13.)

(Confidential.)

Admiralty, May 13, 1913.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 12th instant, relative to movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 242.

Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

May 12, 1913.

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR No. 161.

"Gloucester" ordered to proceed Smyrna; "Proserpine" to remain on Syrian Coast, proceeding Port Said to complete with coal; "Hibernia" and "Black Prince" to Malta.

Subsist Beirut should remain headquarters of "Proserpine," as Smyrna is 600 miles from Syrian Coast. "Gloucester" would remain Smyrna as repeating ship.

[22196] No. 243.

Memorandum communicated by M. de Fleuriau, May 13, 1913.

L'AMBASSADE de France à Constantinople a récemment remis à la Sublime Porte deux notes verbales indiquant les conditions auxquelles le Gouvernement de la république serait disposé à autoriser la perception sur ses ressortissants de l'impôt sur les revenus mobiliers, conformément au projet élaboré par la Commission des Réformes financières. La première de ces notes, conforme à un texte identique remis de concert par les diverses ambassades, est relative à des conditions générales applicables à toutes les Puissances; la seconde est relative à des conditions spéciales à la France au Gouvernement français.

Mais, en dehors de ces deux ordres de conditions, le Gouvernement ottoman a également demandé s'il n'y aurait pas lieu, avant de consentir définitivement à la perception de l'impôt sur les revenus mobiliers, de spécifier que le produit de cet impôt ne serait pas affecté au service des emprunts du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad. Il se produirait en effet que, s'appuyant sur une disposition du decret du 28 moukarrem 1294, relatif à l'impôt des patentes, l'Administration de la Dette publique prétendrait faire verser dans ses caisses l'excédent de l'impôt sur les revenus mobiliers qui dépasserait les patentes. Dans ce cas, 75 pour cent de la part encaissée par la Dette publique devraient, en vertu des Conventions du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, en date des 2 juin, 1908, et 21 mars, 1911, être affectés au service des séries 2 à 6 des emprunts de cette entreprise. Or, le Gouvernement français ne saurait consentir à soumettre ses ressortissants à l'impôt sur les revenus mobiliers qu'afin de fournir des ressources au Gouvernement ottoman; il ne pourrait imposer cette charge aux Français dans le but de faciliter l'achèvement d'une entreprise particulière comme celle du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad; il lui semblerait donc opportun de ne donner son assentiment à l'application de l'impôt sur les revenus mobiliers qu'en spécifiant des réserves semblables à celles déjà faites pour l'augmentation des droits de douane ottomans.

Si telle était également l'opinion du Secrétaire d'État pour les Affaires Étrangères, il y aurait lieu d'exercer à Constantinople une action commune de la France, de l'Angleterre et de la Russie en vue de soustraire le produit de l'impôt sur les valeurs mobilières à la garantie du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.

M. de Fleuriau saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 13 mai, 1913.

[22265] No. 244.

Mémoire communicated by Tewfik Pasha, May 13, 1913.

1. REVENIR sur question engagement de fonctionnaires anglais avec prière d'en activer le choix et la désignation.

2. Rapatriement des troupes ottomanes en Albanie. Le Gouvernement hellénique ne soulevant aucune objection, prier Gouvernement britannique user de ses bons offices auprès des autres États balkaniques pour ne pas retarder embarquement.

3. Clauses du traité de paix. Pour éviter toute discussion et malentendus possibles, demander suppression terme "question de juridiction." Demander en outre insertion dans traité clauses spéciales prévoyant régime des vakoufs, la restitution des biens meubles et immeubles des émigrés musulmans, le traitement sur le pied d'égalité des populations musulmanes se trouvant sur les territoires cédés, un délai de faveur et le délai d'évacuation des territoires qui devront faire retour à la Turquie.

Afin de ne pas retarder le retour à la paix, demander le remplacement du mot "ratification" dans l'article 1er par celui de "signature du présent traité de paix."

4. Prière donner suite à l'affaire vapeur "Marmaris" rejeté [illegible]

5. Réponse aux renseignements sur Congrès des Sourds-Muet

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 13 mai, 1913.

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[22061] No. 245.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 91.) *Cettinjé, May 13, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

FIRE took place at bazaar of Scutari on the night of 7th May. The Montenegrin Government have shown to me yesterday a report according to which 150 shops were destroyed, two suspected Albanians having been arrested.

According to report just received from British vice-consul about 350 shops were destroyed, damage being serious. He states that general opinion is that after previous robbery of merchandise the place was set on fire by Montenegrin soldiers and that international military occupation is anxiously awaited by the entire population. The British admiral is to arrive on 14th May.

[22063] No. 246.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 167.) *Sophia, May 13, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 165 of 12th May.

The Prime Minister spoke to me respecting the recent fighting between the Greek and Bulgarian troops near Cavalla.

He thinks the situation somewhat serious, and has instructed the Bulgarian Minister to draw your attention to it.

I was careful not to express any opinion.

[22066] No. 247.

Sir R. Rodd to Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 98.) *Rome, May 13, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs observed to me that in previous stages of Balkan issue friendly conversations between London and Berlin had been most useful. At the Ambassadors' conference each point for discussion had to be introduced *seriatim*, and without reference to the other points. He thought, therefore, interval before the next meeting might be utilised with advantage to examine what room there was for compromise, and for balancing one interest or concession against another.

Great Britain and Germany were, he thought, indicated as the Powers least directly interested, most likely to take just view, and able to influence the respective groups. He therefore wished to submit the suggestion that such friendly discussion between them might advantageously be renewed.

[22065] No. 248.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 78.) *Berlin, May 13, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

[illegible] telegram of 12th May. Repatriation of Turkish troops.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informs me that instructions in exactly similar sense were sent to Sophia this morning.

[21659] No. 249.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 215.) *Foreign Office, May 13, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegrams Nos. 229 and 230 of 12th May.

We are asking other Powers to join with us in endeavouring to remove Bulgarian objections, but we had been informed that the troops would be taken to some port in Asia Minor, and, if some are to be taken to Constantinople and Black Sea ports, Bulgaria will in all probability maintain her objections. Before informing Greek and Bulgarian Governments of change of destination of a portion of the troops, I should wish you to ascertain whether Turkish Government will not abide by their previous intention of conveying all troops to a port in Asia Minor. Of course an engagement must be given that such troops will not engage in further hostilities during present war.

[20150] No. 250.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 66.) *Foreign Office, May 13, 1913.*

Sir,

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the Turkish Ambassador, protesting against a decree which his Highness states has been issued by the Bulgarian Government to confiscate the property of Mussulman refugees from the occupied territories.*

I request that you will ascertain and inform me as soon as possible whether such a decree has in fact been issued by the Bulgarian Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[17929] No. 251.

Foreign Office to Secretary to the Council of Foreign Bondholders.

Foreign Office, May 13, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Athens, in which is enclosed copy of a report from the British delegate on the international financial commission dealing with certain questions connected with the collection of revenues assigned to the service of the Greek Debt in newly occupied territory.†

After due consideration, in consultation with the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, of the questions raised by Mr. Beaumont, Sir E. Grey replied to Sir F. Elliot's despatch as follows:—

As regards the first question, viz., whether the bondholders can claim any share of the increase of the revenues in which they are interested (*i.e.*, stamps and monopolies) in territory which may be ceded to the Kingdom of Greece, it would appear to be premature to come to any decision. The anticipation of Mr. Beaumont,‡ that the Greek Government will be saddled with some charges in connection with the Ottoman Debt, is likely to be realised, and it is possible that specific revenues in the ceded territory may be assigned for the service of that Debt. In these events it would probably be impracticable to charge the ceded territory for the Greek Debt also, and His Majesty's Government are disposed to think with Mr. Beaumont that the Greek bondholders cannot properly claim any share of the new revenues. However, pending developments, it may be well not to make any statement which would prevent His Majesty's Government from supporting such a claim, if it was necessary, [illegible] the interests of Greek bondholders.

* Memorandum communicated by Towfik Pasha, May 1, 1913.
† Sir F. Elliot, No. 178, November 15, 1912.
‡ Extract from Mr. Beaumont, No. 3, Confidential, April 8.

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The second question, as to the guarantees required to secure that the new conditions shall not adversely effect the revenues now encashed by the financial commission, does not admit of any definite answer at present.

It is not, however, clear to His Majesty's Government that Mr. Beaumont's suggestion, viz.: identity of prices and dues in the new territory and in the existing kingdom, will completely safeguard the position. Is there no danger that, even though the prices and dues are identical, measures might still be taken to increase the sales, &c. in the new territory at the expense of those in the old and so divert revenues at present encashed by the commission?

It may well be that the commission may be required to undertake the service of the share of the Ottoman Debt to be assumed by Greece. In that event, it might be advisable to recast the list of articles of monopoly, &c., to extend it to the new territory and to apply the receipts to both the Greek Debt and the assumed Debt. This arrangement would be a satisfactory one (provided it did not substantially affect the plus-values which could be preserved on their present bases if a fixed sum was applied to the assumed Debt).

Sir E. Grey at the same time informed Sir F. Elliot of a suggestion which had been made to abolish the system of plus-values in connection with the Greek Debt and to come to the arrangement for a fixed rate of interest acceptable to the bondholders, a course which, if feasible, might meet any objection felt by the latter in connection with the first point raised by Mr. Beaumont without throwing any additional burden on the Greek Government.

I am to transmit to you the substance of Mr. Beaumont's observations on the points raised above which have now been received in a further despatch from Sir F. Elliot and to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive any observations which your Council may have to offer on these questions.

I am, &c.
W. LANGLEY.

[22091. No. 252.

Sir C. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 401.) *Constantinople, May 10, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 396 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, reporting on the alleged sinking of a converted Greek cruiser off the village of Besh Parmak.

When I saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 8th instant, his Excellency referred to the incident, but did not confirm the sinking of the vessel, but merely said that he understood that she had been badly damaged.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 252.

Vice-Consul Matthews to Sir C. Lowther.

(No. 2.) *Adana, May 5, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 15 of the 12th ultimo, I have the honour to report to your Excellency that I am informed by the British vice-consul at Mersina that the Turkish cruiser "Hamidieh" captured a Greek sailing vessel some time ago off the village of Besh Parmak, between Selefkeh and Anamur, in the sanjak of Selefkeh. The cargo, consisting of ammunition, was confiscated, and the "Hamidieh," suspecting that the sailing vessel had a rendezvous with some Greek transports, landed twenty marines and two naval guns, which were placed in position on the heights above the village. A detachment of 150 troops was sent from Selefkeh to Besh Parmak. On the 1st instant a Greek cruiser appeared, whereupon the Turks opened fire on her from the shore, but the result of the action was unknown. Two hundred troops had been sent from Mersina to Besh Parmak on the 2nd instant.

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The vali, with whom I had a conversation yesterday, gave me the following information:—

The "Hamidieh" captured a Greek sailing vessel off Besh Parmak about six weeks ago and landed guns and marines, as described by Mr. Kean, the sailing vessel being anchored off the village of Besh Parmak as a decoy. About a week ago a Greek converted cruiser appeared, headed for the village, and when close in was subjected to as heavy a fire as the Turkish force could manage. After an action of about twenty minutes the Greek cruiser was sunk. Greek losses were unknown, but the Turks had had one man wounded. Besh Parmak was, the vali stated, near Ghulnar (or Chelenderch), between Selefkeh and Anamur. He did not know the name of the Greek converted cruiser, but said that she was a similar vessel to the "Makedonia," which [illegible] on sight shortly after the "Hamidieh" left the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[22093] No. 253.

Sir C. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 403.) *Constantinople, May 10, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch, from His Majesty's acting vice-consul at Cavalla, reporting on Greco-Bulgarian relations in that district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 253.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir C. Lowther.

(No. 17. Confidential.) *Cavalla, May 5, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that by order of the Bulgarian authorities no one, foreigner or otherwise, is allowed to leave Cavalla.

This order has been in force some five days. The reason for it is not clear, but there is a general tendency to connect it with increased tension in Greco-Bulgarian relations. It seems unreasonable that foreigners should be affected by the order, and there seems no reason why English subjects whose passports are in order and who are recommended by their consular representative should not be authorised to freely leave the town.

In the Pravishta district, a small Bulgarian force, which since the Greek occupation of that hamlet and port, had been stationed at Leftera (a port situated on the western horn of the Gulf of Cavalla) has now been withdrawn to the town of Pravishta. Cavalla is being fortified more strongly against any attack on the land side, and two heavy siege guns are to be mounted on the hills between Cavalla and Pravishta.

On Friday last an order was issued that all male Christian and Moslem Ottoman subjects between the ages of 20 and 30 should present themselves within twenty-four hours at the town hall to be inscribed on the lists there with a view to their being enrolled as recruits in the Bulgarian army. Protests were immediately made by the Christian and Moslem elements and for the moment the order is not to be enforced. The result of this order has been to fan to still greater intensity the feelings of irritation and hatred entertained by the local Greek population against Bulgarian rule. On their side the Bulgarian local authorities, a number of whom are not distinguished for experience and tact, are not slow to work off their feelings of annoyance and ill-will against the Greeks in general on the local Greek population.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN

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[22095] No. 254.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 405.) *Constantinople, May 10, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 226 of to-day, I have the honour to enclose herein a despatch which I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna, reporting on the incident in the island of Castellorizo on the 14th of last month.

As you will notice, the second paragraph of the despatch enclosed appears to be in contradiction to the information given by His Majesty's vice-consul at Rhodes as forwarded to you in my despatch No. 371 of the 1st May; I accordingly asked His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna for an explanation of this discrepancy, and my telegram No. 226 above referred to was the substance of his reply—namely, that Mr. Biliotti wished to correct his telegram, and that there was no Greek military occupation of the island by the Greek Government.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 254.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 28.) *Smyrna, May 6, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report to your Excellency that I have received a despatch from Mr. Billotti, vice-consul at Rhodes, giving information as to the present situation at Castellorizo, such as he has heard it described from the lips of a native merchant of that isle who reached Rhodes recently.

On the 14th April the Greek flotilla, with a rear-admiral on the "Hydra" in command, reached Castellorizo, but all the ships left without landing a man on finding that the reported massacring of Christians by Moslems was untrue.

The Turkish authorities and other Moslem residents in the island are, however, held in confinement (they are said to number 370 families or about 2,500 persons) by the violently pro-Hellenic section of the population (about one-third of the total inhabitants), which has worked public feeling up to a high pitch. These Mahommedans are being kept as hostages for the safety of the Christian residents on the opposite coast of Asia Minor.

Meanwhile, all communication with the outer world is being stopped, and no food-stuffs reach the isle.

Mr. Biliotti adds that the situation is extremely delicate; that the presence of Turkish or even Italian, forces might precipitate untoward events.

Once the Hellenic fleet has disappeared from the scene he suggests that only the presence of one, or preferably two, foreign ships-of-war of different neutral flags sent with a mandate to re-establish order can safely extricate the island from the present impasse it has reached through the unruly population having been left to its own dangerous devices.

I have, &c.

HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[22100] No. 255.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 73.) *Vienna, May 12, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 86 of the 22nd ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith translation of a note which I have received from the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, giving the views of the Imperial and Royal Government on the proposal of the Turkish Government that the Ottoman Public Debt should be represented at the forthcoming International Financial Commission in Paris.

I have already reported by telegraph the substance of this note.

I have, &c.

FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

Enclosure in No. 255.

Note communicated to Sir F. Cartwright by Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office.

(Translation.)

IN reply to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador's note of the 11th instant, the undersigned has the honour to state that the Ottoman Government has also expressed to the Austro-Hungarian Government the wish that the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt should be represented by special delegates in the forthcoming International Financial Commission in Paris.

From the Austro-Hungarian Syndicate of the Turkish bondholders a similar request has been addressed to the Imperial and Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The Austro-Hungarian Government is of the same opinion as His Britannic Majesty's Government, that it appears hardly practicable that the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt should be allowed a special representation, with a right to vote, at the Paris Commission with the Powers there represented. On the other hand, there would appear to be, in the view of the Austro-Hungarian Government, no objection to the Administration taking part, with an advisory voice, in the negotiations of the commission. It is of course true that several members of the Council of the Debt will already sit on the commission as expert advisers of the official delegates, but they possess in this capacity the character of official representatives of their own Governments, and cannot be considered as special representatives of the Turkish Public Debt Administration. But it would appear expedient, in the opinion of the Austro-Hungarian Government, that, in addition to the separate groups of creditors, whose interests are protected by the respective delegates of their Governments, the Administration of the Debt should also have a voice in the deliberations of the commission, as representing the combined interests of the Turkish bondholders, and should have the opportunity of giving the necessary detailed information and the desired explanations as to the finances of the Ottoman Government.

The Austro-Hungarian Government would, therefore, consider it useful that the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt should be invited to be represented at the negotiations by its actual president, Sir Adam Block, with a consultative voice.

The undersigned, &c.

(For the Minister).

E. OTTO.

Vienna, May 10, 1913.

[22075] No. 256.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 92.) *Cettinjé, May 13, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram to Athens No. 67 of 23rd April: Mediation.

Montenegrin Government have replied in the same terms as their allies. Text sent by post. Plenipotentiaries the same as last time.

[22186] No. 257.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 93.) *Cettinjé, May 14, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.) R.

AT the request of the vice-admiral, I am informing the Montenegrin Government that the blockade will be raised from 2 o'clock this afternoon.

[22211] No. 258.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 77.) *Vienna, May 14, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 172 of 12th May.

The Austro-Hungarian Government have already caused representations to be made at Sophia in the desired sense.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs learns that the Porte has renewed its assurance that Turkish troops in Albania will be conveyed to Asia Minor, and their destination will be Syria.

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[22225] No. 259.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 78. Confidential.) *Vienna, May 14, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

AUSTRIAN Chambers meet to-morrow, and I am told that there is an intention of interpellating the Government on their foreign policy, and disbanding the reserves.

I am informed confidentially that if the Austrian Government are in doubt as to having a majority they will prorogue Parliament.

Should they, however, feel sure of a majority, they propose to answer interpellation in this sense: that it impossible to send reserves home until the situation in the Balkans is entirely cleared up in a manner which safeguards the interests of Austria-Hungary.

I told my informant that I thought that this would produce a bad impression in Europe, and would be interpreted to mean that until Austro Servian relations were put on a satisfactory footing no demobilisation would take place on this side.

He agreed with me, and added that if the Government felt sure of a majority they would put a stop to a general debate on foreign affairs, beyond allowing the interpellation to be raised and answered.

[22217] No. 260.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 120.) *Belgrade, May 14, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

SERVIA and Bulgaria.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that Servia would shortly approach Bulgaria with a view to a revision of the treaty.

The Bulgarian Minister, whom I have just seen, takes a very pessimistic view, and thinks that Servian communication will be in the nature of an ultimatum. He says that trainloads of troops are being sent from here to the frontier daily, and that Servia is merely awaiting the completion of her concentration to present an ultimatum, well knowing that Bulgaria is unable to bring away troops from their present positions in time to oppose her. It is probable that M. Daneff, who passed through Belgrade last night on his way to London, will lay the situation before you.

My own impression is that Servian aggressiveness will depend entirely on what assistance can be counted on from Greece, and if the Greek support were withdrawn Servia would not venture to attack Bulgaria single-handed.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[22221] No. 261.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 189.) *St. Petersburgh, May 14, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR circular telegram of 12th May: Repatriation of Turkish troops.

Minister for Foreign Affairs is sending instructions in the sense desired to the Russian Minister at Sophia.

[22220] No. 262.

Sir H. Rax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 168.) *Sophia, May 14, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

MY immediately preceding telegram of 13th May.

The Greek Minister informs me that he has received instructions to warn the Bulgarian Government of the serious consequences likely to arise from the continued aggression of Bulgarian forces in the neighbourhood of Cavalla.

The Bulgarian Government are adopting a similar attitude towards the Greek Government.

Commission of enquiry at Salonica reported in my telegram No. 91 having failed to agree on provisions of occupation, the Bulgarian Minister at Constantinople, who was representing his Government at that enquiry, who will now proceed to Athens in order to assist the Bulgarian Minister there to come to an arrangement on the whole question of the frontier.

[22203] No. 263.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 14.)

(No. 99.) *Rome, May 14, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 180 of 12th May: Repatriation of Turkish troops.

Italian Government have instructed their representative at Sophia to join in representations to the Bulgarian Government.

[21203] No. 264.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 44.) *Foreign Office, May 14, 1913*
Sir,

THE Greek Minister asked Sir A. Nicolson, on the 2nd May, as to peace negotiations, procedure, &c. Sir A. Nicolson told him that, as one or two of the belligerents, Turkey and Bulgaria, wished, in order to expedite peace, that some draft of a treaty could be drawn up for the allies and Turkey to sign, the Powers had been considering the matter, and that he, Sir A. Nicolson, thought it possible that they might fall in with the idea. M. Gennadius enquired what would be the nature of the draft treaty. Sir A. Nicolson gave him vaguely a sketch of it, and he said that he presumed Greece would be consulted as to the islands and Albania. Sir A. Nicolson replied that he knew very well that these questions had from the outset been reserved by the Powers for their decision. Sir A. Nicolson could not see what Greece could possibly gain by making difficulties on the subject. Supposing that the Powers did communicate a draft treaty which reaffirmed that the questions of the islands and of Albania were reserved to the Powers, would Greece refuse to sign or make reservations, and thereby prolong a state of latent hostility with Turkey and defer indefinitely the conclusion of peace? Sir A. Nicolson quite understood the anxiety of Greece as to the two questions, but did not see how she could improve matters by the course he had indicated. To Sir A. Nicolson's mind the best plan would be for Greece to make peace as soon as possible, and not make difficulties. However, she of course was the judge of her own action.

M. Gennadius asked if he could have a copy of the draft treaty.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[20329] No. 265.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Confidential.) *Foreign Office, May 14, 1913.*
Sir,

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the British cables cut by the Italian fleet in the Ægean Sea, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople on the subject of the possible establishment of a Turkish naval base to replace the Golden Horn which is rendered impracticable in the changed conditions produced by the present war.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey would be glad to receive the observations of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on Sir G. Lowther's despatch and especially on the last paragraph of the report from the British vice-consul at Rhodes which forms the second enclosure therein.*

* Sir G. Lowther, No. 358, Confidential, April 27, 1913.

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I am to add that, as peace between Turkey and Greece is now imminent, Sir E. Grey presumes that the Eastern Telegraph Company will shortly, in their own interest, take steps to reconnect the cable without any pressure on the part of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[22354] No. 266.

Consul Samson to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 5.) *Adrianople, April 26, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of your Excellency, the following account of the military operations from the 24th March, which resulted in the fall of this fortress:—

Preliminary Remarks.

Operations from the 27th October to the 3rd December, the date on which the armistice was signed, had been confined almost entirely to the southern and western sectors. I understand, however, from General Ivanof that it was at no time his intention to attempt an assault from either of these directions. He states that he had deliberately held his troops at some distance from the eastern face on which he intended to make a sudden attack. General Savof, however, would not permit him to incur the risk entailed by such an operation, which it was believed would prove far more costly to the assailants than was actually the case. Further, the plan of the general staff did not at that period include the taking of the town, the majority of the Bulgarian army being required for the operations to the eastward. General Ivanof, however, states that he is confident he could have taken the town by assault at any time after it ha' been invested.

On the resumption of hostilities it was definitely decided to attempt this. General Wasof, after a reconnaissance which is said to have taken a month, presented to General Ivanof a report recommending that the assault should be delivered against the eastern face, where there was only one line of defence besides the actual advanced positions. His plan was adopted, and with a view to its execution the whole of the siege batteries which had, prior to the armistice, been established on the western face, were transferred to the eastern. The operation was a somewhat lengthy one, owing to the absence of regular roads and the bad weather. The ammunition was conveyed in ox-carts, each of which carried five or six shells, and occupied from five to six days on the journey, the guns being moved by teams of six oxen per gun. By the 15th March all the artillery was in position, where it remained until the date fixed for the assault. The Turkish Staff appear to have had a very incomplete idea of the number and position of the batteries, which did not open fire until the 24th March. As stated in my despatch No. 4, of the 30th March, 1913, the position of the Bulgarian and Turkish advanced lines had remained practically unchanged during the armistice, but the result of the Bulgarian attack on the night of the 3rd December, which has been already described in my despatch No. 65, of the 30th December, 1912, had been to advance the former in the neighbourhood of Mezar Tepe (south-east of Kavkas), and thus to secure a favourable artillery position in that neighbourhood.

Details of Opposing Forces.

TURKISH.

The disposition of the Adrianople garrison at 6 A.M. on the morning of the 24th M[illegible] was:—

Eastern sector: Babaeski redif division, twelve battalions.
Western sector: Adrianople redif division, ten battalions.
Southern sector: Gumuljina redif division, nine battalions.

The 4th Nishanji regiment of three battalions was in the neighbourhood of Ahurtsuc and the 11th nizam division (less [illegible]), with one battalion of the Bursa redif regiment at Papa Tepe, between the Arda and Karitza, whilst of the

10th nizam division the 1st and 3rd battalions, 28th regiment, were with the advanced line, the 2nd and 3rd battalion, 30th regiment, in reserve on the eastern face and the 1st battalion, 29th regiment, in the town, the [illegible] being stationed in the Adrianople infantry barracks as a general reserve. In addition to the fortress batteries, sixty-nine in number, there was a reserve of artillery composed as follows:—

Howitzer 15 centim.: three batteries;
Howitzer 12 centim.: three batteries;
Heavy field artillery 10·5-centim.: three batteries;

together with ten old pattern field gun batteries and one battery of old pattern horse artillery, making a total of twenty batteries which were stationed at different points of the defences. It is somewhat difficult to arrive at a correct estimate of the number of men available on the 4th March, but it was probably about 53,000, not including non-combatants, such as transport, medical service, labourers, &c. The troops had suffered greatly from insufficient food and exposure, and complained, not without reason, of the neglect of their officers, many of whom were in the habit of leaving their men in the trenches and batteries and coming into the town. Shukri Pasha himself possessed but little personal influence amongst the troops, who rarely saw him during the latter stages of the siege, as he remained entirely at his headquarters at Hadirlik Fort.

Investing Forces.

The following was the disposition of the allied forces at midnight on the 23rd–24th March:—

BULGARIANS.

Eastern Force.—General Wasof.

2nd brigade, 3rd division, 29th and 32nd regiments.
3rd brigade, 4th division, 43rd and 44th regiments.
2nd brigade, 8th division, 10th and 23rd regiments.
3rd brigade, 9th division, 53rd and 54th regiments.
2nd brigade, 11th division, 57th and 58th regiments.
1st brigade, 3rd division, 12th and 30th regiments.
4 squadrons of cavalry, of which 2 were Servian, 118 siege and 100 field guns.

Southern Force.—General Kirkof.

3rd brigade, 8th division, 51st and 52nd regiments.
1st brigade, 8th division [illegible]
with 34 siege and 60 field guns, 24 of the former being Servian.

Western Force.

55th infantry regiment, with four siege and thirty-six field guns.

SERVIANS.

Western Force.

Timok division: General Konditch; Danube division: General Ratchitch, with four siege and seventy-two field guns.

The eastern force operated from the left bank of the Tunja to the left bank of the Maritza; the southern from the right bank of the latter river to the right bank of the Arda; whilst the western force extended from the left bank of the Arda to the right bank of the Tunja, the small Bulgarian portion of it filled in the gap existing between [illegible] The operations were directed by General Wasof at Golesh[illegible] [illegible] Kavkas Fort. The Servians were under the command of General Stefanovitch.

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massed. The position of this is shown on the enclosed map,* for which I am indebted to General Wasof. The detail of the guns employed on this face is as follows:—

14 guns of 15-centim. calibre, Krupp;
20 howitzers of 15-centim. calibre, Creusot;
38 guns of 12-centim. calibre, chiefly Creusot;
28 howitzers of 12-centim. quick-firing Creusot;
18 howitzers of 12-centim. calibre, Krupp; with
100 quick-firing field guns 7·5-centim. Creusot, and 8·7-centim. Krupp, a total of 218 siege and field guns under the command of Colonel Zagorsky.

The northern group of these guns was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Skawchef, and the two eastern groups by Lieutenant-Colonel Wulchenof. It will be noticed that the positions of the batteries permitted those on the north to bring a frontal fire to bear on the Turkish batteries facing them, and a flanking fire on the batteries facing east, whilst the fire from the Bulgarian guns to the east, which was frontal as regards the Turkish batteries facing them, was flanking in regard to the batteries facing north, the fire of both groups converging on the angle formed by Aivas Baba and Ayi Yolu Forts.

Commencement of Attack (March 24).

At 1 P.M. on the 24th, artillery fire was opened on the southern and western faces, coupled with a series of unimportant attacks, the object of which was to divert the attention of the Turkish commander from the eastern face. This manœuvre was successful in confirming Shukri Pasha in the belief, which he had held throughout the siege, that the main attack would be directed against the southern face, where the attacking artillery fired throughout the day, ceasing at 7 P.M. Whilst this was in progress the Bulgarian troops detailed for the attack on the north-eastern face, which was to commence on the following morning, began to move into their positions. Commencing from the north, the 2nd brigade, 8th division, was opposite Maslak, Mal Tepe, and Sapunjilar, with the 3rd brigade, 9th division, as a sectional reserve. More to the south was the 2nd brigade, 3rd division, from Sapunjilar to Mezar Tepe exclusive, with the 3rd brigade, 1th division, as a sectional reserve, whilst the 2nd brigade, 11th division, for which no sectional reserve was provided, was facing Mezar Tepe, Demir Kapu, and Kenalu. To the extreme south, on the Constantinople road, were two squadrons of Bulgarian and two squadrons of Servian, cavalry with a machine gun.

Turkish Forces. Eastern Face.

The Turkish force on this face, on the 23rd March, consisted of the Babaeski redif division of four regiments, each of three battalions, 1st and 2nd battalion, 28th, and 2nd and 3rd battalion, 30th nizam regiments, the 6th and 7th fortress artillery regiments, eight and a-half batteries mobile artillery, four machine guns, and two companies of engineers, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Ali Shefik Bey of the General Staff, commanding the Babaeski division, with Colonel Nouri Bey as artillery commander, and Lieutenant-Colonel Shefik Bey commanding the engineers. The troops were disposed as follows:—

Artillery.—7th fortress artillery regiment with a battery of 15-centim. howitzers, two 12-centim. howitzers, and two guns heavy field artillery (10·5-centim.), in addition to the permanent batteries, from Tashtabia to Kestanlik Fort. The remainder of the front, including the batteries south of Kavkas Fort, being occupied by the 6th fortress artillery regiment, with two 10·5-centim. guns on the ridge to the west of Yildiz Fort and two similar guns in the cemetery west of Kaik Fort. The position and armament of the permanent batteries is indicated on the map. In addition to the above there were six and a-half batteries in the advanced positions disposed as follows: Two 12-centim. howitzers and a field artillery battery (Mantel, 8·7-centim.) at Mezar Tepe, a battery of 15-centim. howitzers and an 8·7-centim. battery at Mal Tepe, the remainder, two 7·5-centim. quick-firing batteries and an old pattern horse artillery battery, being between these two points.

Infantry.—Babaeski regiment Tashtabia to Ayi Yolu, thence to between Kestanlik and Kurucheshme Forts, the Chorlu regiment, with the Keshan regiment between it and

* Not reproduced.

the Kirk Kilisse regiment, which stretched down to the Constantinople road. The first line of defence on the Mal Tepe–Mezar Tepe crest was held by battalions from each of these regiments with the 1st and 3rd battalions, 28th nizam regiment, whilst the 2nd and 3rd battalions, 30th nizam regiments were in reserve in the Kokarja ravine. The chief points on the outpost line and all the batteries were telephonically connected with one another and with the divisional headquarters at Kaik Fort, which was in turn connected with fortress headquarters at Hadirlik Fort.

Terrain.

Excepting for the steep slopes to the north of Tashtabia and Aivas Baba the ground consists of a series of gently sloping valleys which had been stripped of the vines and cherry trees with which they were ordinarily covered in order to furnish fuel for the troops during the winter. Along the front of the main line stretched a barbed-wire entanglement with iron uprights, but the advanced positions was protected only by an indifferently constructed entanglement with wooden stakes.

Commencement of the Main Action.

The following particulars of the action on the eastern face are drawn partly from personal observation and partly from other sources of information to which I have had access:—

At 1 A.M. on the 25th the Bulgarian force which was to attack the northern and eastern faces commenced to advance, and by 4 A.M. was at Koumdere. The Turkish advanced line was attacked at 4·30 A.M. Very little resistance was encountered on the north and south, though the troops in the centre stood better. By 6 A.M. all advanced positions were taken, the Turks retiring on the main line pursued by the fire of the Bulgarians, who commenced to entrench themselves about 2,000 yards from it. As soon as the infantry were in position twelve field-gun batteries advanced to the line vacated by the Turks. The success of this attack was largely due to negligence on the part of the defenders, who retired in such disorder that they were compelled to abandon the majority of their guns, eighteen of which fell into the hands of the Bulgarians, though the breech mechanism was reported in most cases to have been removed. The following is the detail of the guns captured with their positions:—

Hadum Agha	..	..	..	..	..	4 guns of	7·5 centim.
Saka Ogloa	..	..	..	..	..	2 „	8·7 „
Deurt Yol	..	..	..	..	..	2 howitzers of	12 „
„	..	..	..	..	..	2 guns of	7·5 „
„	..	..	..	..	..	2 „	8·7 „
Sapunjilar	..	..	..	..	..	4 „	7·5 „
„	..	..	..	..	..	2 „	8·7 „
Mal Tepe	..	..	..	..	..	2 „	8·7 „

The position was most dangerous to the south of the line, where the Kirk Kilisse regiment was completely demoralised, the Keshan regiment to the north of it having also suffered severely. The eastern commander telephoned to headquarters for reinforcement, and in reply was instructed to utilise the two battalions of the 30th regiment which were in the Kokarja ravine. Owing to the refusal of the regimental commander to move without an order from the commander-in-chief, it was not until 7 o'clock that these two battalions reinforced the main line trenches north and south of Yildiz Fort, these having in the meantime been occupied by fortress artillerymen with rifles pending the arrival of the infantry. At 7·35 Ali Shefik Bey reported that the enemy was advancing in strength and approaching the main line, and asked that further reinforcement should be sent to Jevizlik. He also sent a message to the town commandant asking that men retiring into the town should be sent back to the trenches.

At 7·45 A.M. a thick mist began to blow in from the eastward which greatly assisted the Bulgarian infantry in their advance towards the main line. The limit of vision during this mist, which lifted at 10·30, was about 1,500 yards.

The Bulgarian artillery, which had commenced to fire at 4 A.M., had now concentrated their efforts on the north-eastern angle of the defence at Aivas Baba and Ayi Yolu, where between 8 and 9 o'clock the position was already becoming serious. The artillery and infantry commanders on this section were Bimbashi Mustapha Bey, commanding the 7th fortress artillery regiment, and Bimbashi Halil

Fc 4.34/3.45
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Bey, commanding the Baba Eski regiment, both of them represented the need for urgent reinforcements and for more howitzer ammunition, which by 2·30 was exhausted. The concentrated fire from the Bulgarian siege batteries was already producing its effect, and by this hour eleven guns of the 7th regiment were unable to fire. In response to the request of the officer commanding Baba Eski regiment, the 1st battalion, 28th regiment, was withdrawn from Kavkas and despatched to his assistance, occupying the trenches between Aivas Baba and Ayi Yolu, the position vacated by it being filled one and a-half hours later by the 1st battalion, 30th regiment, which had been stationed in the town. Reserve artillerymen from the 8th and 9th regiments on the western face were also sent to replace the casualties of the 7th regiment. The Bulgarian troops had received orders to make no general advance during the day, and by 12 noon the eastern commander considered that he had repulsed the attack. But half-an-hour later the three batteries of the 7th regiment, which, as mentioned above, had been partly disabled, were completely silenced, whilst the infantry were continually leaving the trenches and seeking shelter in rear. Shortly after 1 P.M. it became necessary to remove the sections of 10·5-centim. field guns and of 12-centim. howitzers from Aivas Baba to Turna Tepe, and horses for this purpose were sent from the town. At 2 P.M. the guns of the main line batteries, which had been silenced, were rendered useless by the destruction of their breech mechanism in accordance with instructions sent to their commander.

The Bulgarian infantry on the north-east had been gradually moving forward, utilising the folds in the ground which facilitate an infantry advance to the front of Ayi Yolu, where they were observed drawing closer to the wire entanglement. The 1st battalion, 30th regiment, was withdrawn from the rear of Kavkas Fort and despatched to the trenches at this point, which the Uzunkeupru battalion, demoralised by the artillery fire, had abandoned. The effect of this fire may without exaggeration be described as terrific, and it was hardly a matter for surprise that the partly-trained men who composed the Babaeski redif division should fail to preserve their discipline under it, exposed as they were in badly-constructed trenches, devoid of any kind of head-cover. The 1st battalion, 30th regiment, suffered severely whilst arriving, and one company retired. The 10th Nishanji battalion had by this time been sent by Shukri Pasha as a further support, and, together with a machine-gun section, reinforced the Aivas Baba trenches, where the artillery fire was preventing the infantry from firing on the Bulgarians, who, carrying their rifles at the slope, were advancing under cover of the Provadiadere. At this period the eastern commander reported that the Bulgarian force was gradually increasing, and asked for further reinforcements. On the other hand, the advance towards Tashtabia Fort on the extreme north-east had been checked, but an endeavour to remove a battery of 8·7-centim. guns from the flanks of that fort having failed, the breech mechanism was destroyed. An hour later the advancing infantry had reached the wire entanglement in front of Aivas Baba, where the situation appeared so desperate that the colours of the Babaeski regiment were sent to divisional headquarters at Kaik Fort.

Shukri Pasha had by now realised the extreme seriousness of the situation on the eastern face, and had issued instructions for reinforcements of artillery and infantry to be despatched from the southern and western faces. He also issued a circular memorandum to divisional commandants, directing that in case of necessity all arms, ammunition, and military stores, together with transport, should be destroyed in order to prevent them from falling into the hands of the enemy. Parties of engineers were sent to the different faces to be ready to carry out the destruction if necessary. The situation on the north-east was rapidly becoming worse, the artillery having no ammunition, and the men in the trenches being subjected to the fire of the Bulgarian infantry, who were by now close to the wire entanglement, in addition to the artillery fire, and were losing heavily.

An effort was now made to prepare a second position at Turna Tepe, to which the 10·5-centim. guns and 12-centim. howitzers had been withdrawn. Two engineer companies were sent there to construct trenches on both flanks of that hill. They were however, unable to do so in consequence of the heavy artillery fire to which they were exposed.

The artillery reinforcements promised by Shukri Pasha now commenced to arrive, two 7·5-centim. quick-firing guns being sent to the Jewish cemetery to the south of Kaik Fort, two to the garden to the east of the fort, one 8·7-centim. battery close to the Constantinople road and another to Ayi Yolu. A section of 12-centim. howitzers being also sent to Jevizlik Fort. The unsteadiness of the battalion of the Keshan regiment under a heavy fire was beginning to cause some uneasiness to the eastern commander, who

moved a battalion of the 30th regiment from the south of Yildiz Fort further northward in the hope that its presence might give confidence to the regiment.

The seriousness of the situation at Aivas Baba was beginning to extend, though in a less degree, to the neighbourhood of Yildiz and Kavkas Forts. The Bulgarian infantry here had been unable to follow the example of their comrades to the north in approaching close to the wire entanglements, but the artillery fire to which this section also was subjected necessitated the withdrawal of the 10·5-centim. field guns and the 12-centim. howitzer battery near the two forts mentioned to a less exposed position in rear.

By 6 o'clock the position was as follows: All the batteries from Tashtabia to Ayi Yolu were silenced, the infantry between those points but rarely firing. The Bulgarians were close to the wire entanglement at the latter point and at Aivas Baba, where the Turkish infantry were completely demoralized by the heavy fire to which they were exposed, one of the nizam battalions refusing to enter the trenches. This demoralization had spread further south to the Keshan regiment, in front of which a company of Bulgarian infantry had succeeded in reaching an entrance to the entanglements. The mobile artillery to the north and east had been withdrawn from the front line to a second position in rear, and fresh points for the distribution of ammunition had been established. Telephonic communication between Turna Tepe and the trenches to the north was interrupted. The eastern commander regarded the situation as highly critical.

At 8.30 P.M. the 29th nizam regiment arrived, the 1st battalion being sent to the trenches near Aivas Baba and the 2nd and 3rd to Turna Tepe, where the second line position was under the command of Bimbashi Mustapha Bey, commanding the 7th fortress artillery regiment.

Southern and Western Faces.

Whilst the engagement described above had been in progress, the Bulgarians to the south and the Servians to the west had occupied the Turkish advanced positions, with the exception of those on Papas Tepe, which was still holding its own. The situation at this point enabled a section of 10·5-centim. field guns to be withdrawn and sent to the eastern face, to which also were despatched from other points in the defences two batteries of 7·5 quick-firing field guns, one battery of 8·7 field guns, and a section of 12-centim. howitzers. One of the quick-firing field batteries was placed at Yildiz and another on the north of Kestanlik Fort, the section of 10·5 guns being stationed to the south-west of Yildiz Fort.

Eastern Face (9 A.M. *to* 11 P.M.).

Little of interest took place during the night, but Ali Shefik Bey issued an encouraging order to his command calling on his men to stand firm, and appealing to them in the name of their religion. It was generally believed amongst the troops that Shukri Pasha, realising the position was a desperate one, had issued instructions regarding the hoisting of the white flag should circumstances necessitate it. I have been unable to obtain any definite evidence on this point, but it is certain that he insisted that the manager of the Imperial Ottoman Bank should telegraph to Constantinople the credit of the military funds, and that he refused to accept that official's suggestion to wait until the following day to do so. The civil funds, on the other hand, were not, so I am informed, similarly transferred. The private arrangements made by members of the Headquarter Staff were such as to leave little doubt as to their view of the situation.

The artillery fire continued without intermission throughout the night and the demoralisation amongst the Turkish troops increased, many of the infantry taking shelter in the batteries.

March 26 (12·50 A.M. *to* 2·20 A.M.)

The officer commanding at Aivas Baba asked for infantry ammunition shortly after midnight; a requisition was sent for it to the second in command of the fortress but the ammunition had not reached its destination by 6 A.M. on the following day. The local reserve of ammunition had been exhausted, doubtless by the large number of rounds fired. In visiting this point after the engagement, I counted a number of piles of empty cartridges each of which had been fired by one man, and found that the average number

was 146, which had presumably been fired between about 8 A.M. on the 25th and 6 A.M. on the 26th.

At 2·20 A.M. the eastern commander transferred his headquarters to the hill south-west of the Kokarja magazine which was telephonically connected with Kaik fort.

The Bulgarian artillery which had been firing continuously for nearly twenty-four hours began to increase the rate of fire at 3 A.M. It may here be mentioned that it fired in all for twenty-eight hours, save for a short period during the early morning of the 25th when firing was interrupted by the mist. The number of rounds was from 200 to 250 per gun. I am informed that a series of lantern signals had been arranged by which the position of the advancing infantry was indicated to commanders of artillery, and that the system worked well. I am, however, unable to say from personal observation what was the actual value of the method adopted as it could not be seen from the Turkish lines, but there is no doubt that the infantry advance was admirably supported by the artillery, particularly in its later stages

Commencement of the Assault (March 26, 3·50 A.M. to 9·30 A.M.).

At 3·40 A.M. the artillery fire ceased for ten minutes at the expiration of which it was again resumed thus giving the signal for the infantry to move forward to the assault. At this moment some field batteries are said to have moved forward to the line Kush Tepe-Mal Tepe-Maslak, about 2,200 yards from the Turkish main position.

At 3·50, the infantry advance began. It was met with a hot fire from the Turkish trenches, but by 4·30 the 10th regiment had succeeded in penetrating the wire entanglement and in capturing the trenches at Ayi Yolu fort with the adjoining battery. It would appear from an inspection of the position that the wire entanglement, which shows but little sign of having been destroyed by the advancing infantry, was passed at a point where a road leading it was closed by a single line of wires. The four leading companies with No. 7 company seized the fort itself, No. 8 company moving southwards, whilst the remaining six companies captured the battery adjoining. By 5·45 A.M. the 1st, 43rd regiment, had taken the trenches at Kestanlik fort and the Turkish infantry between that point and Jevizlik were retiring. The headquarters of the eastern commander, which at 4·20 A.M. had been transferred to Kokarja Chessme, the fountain in the ravine of that name, were moved at 6·20 A.M., to the fortress commission building at the head of the bridge leading to the main infantry barracks. Various statements are current as to the hour at which Aivas Baba and the adjoining trenches fell, but satisfactory evidence of Turkish origin shows that the actual time was a few minutes before 6 A.M. by which hour the northern group of the trenches and batteries from Kestanlik to Tashtabia was in the hands of the Bulgarians and the success of the assault assured.

Six of the field batteries which, as previously mentioned, had advanced to the Kush Tepe-Mal Tepe line now moved forward to the Kurn Cheshme-Aivas Baba crest which had been occupied by the sectorial reserves of the brigades which had captured it. Only three batteries succeeded in reaching it, and these opened fire on the Turkish second line position at Turna Tepe where, as already indicated, the 10·5 centim. field artillery, 12 centim. howitzers, and a quick-firing field battery had been stationed on the previous day. The commandants of the Baba Eski and Chorlu regiments acting under instructions from the eastern commander endeavoured to move forward the 2nd battalion, 26th, and 2nd and 3rd battalions, 29th regiments, from Turna Tepe with a view to a counter-attack, but failed to succeed, their movements being greatly accelerated by the fugitives retiring from the trenches to the north. At 7 A.M. Yildiz fort, with the adjoining trenches and batteries, was captured by the 2nd brigade 3rd division who moved towards town.

The attack on Kavkas had met with less success than that to the north of it. The three howitzer batteries at Skenderkeui had moved forward at 6 A.M. to Mezar Tepe and, subsequently, to a position 2,400 yards from Kavkas fort, but the attack had been checked. By 8 A.M., however, with the assistance of the troops to the north this fort had fallen, and the whole of the north-eastern front was in the hands of the Bulgarians.

The most formidable resistance offered by the Turks was at this point, and at Aivas Baba alone, as General Wassof informs me, the Bulgarian losses were 1,100.

The majority of the troops on this face retired into the Tunja valley where they surrendered, being subsequently confined in an island in the Tunja known as Saint Ilia.

On my return to the town at 7·15 A.M. after witnessing a portion of the engagement, I received a number of men from the trenches near Aivas Baba who I learned had

begun to arrive in the town about an hour previously. They were soon followed by men from the other works who commenced looting the bakers' shops, breaking their rifles and discarding their uniforms, in many cases taking refuge in houses in the Turkish quarter. No other shops were looted by the troops who were merely actuated by hunger in pillaging those of the bakers. It may here be mentioned that Shukri Pasha had issued orders on the 25th March that 2½ lbs. of biscuit per man was to be issued to the troops, this supply being considered sufficient for the day.

Although the eastern face had been taken, firing continued on the [illegible] At 9.35 A.M. I observed a white flag hoisted on the wireless telegraphic apparatus at Hahedlik Fort, the headquarters of Shukri Pasha, while at 9.40 a similar flag was hoisted at the tower in the centre of the town. At 10 A.M. I received a visit from the chief of gendarmerie, who stated that he had been directed by the vali to inform me that he had received a telegraphic message from Shukri Pasha to the effect that he was surrendering the town.

Your Excellency is already aware of the different versions, Turkish and Bulgarian, of the formalities which are now said to have taken place, Ismail Pasha stating that, acting on telephonic instructions from Shukri Pasha, he sent two officers to the Bulgarian commander with a document conveying the surrender of the town, whilst General Ivanof assures me that no such document reached him, adding that the town having been taken by assault, there could be no question of its surrender. Immediately on the taking of Kavkas Fort, Colonel Markoff, who commanded the four squadrons of Bulgarian and Servian cavalry referred to at the commencement of this report, entered the town by the Constantinople road. He immediately despatched a squadron to the Mihal Keupru (bridge) over the Tunja, sending another to patrol the Christian quarter, with a view to checking any possible anti-Christian movement on the part of the Moslem population. Leaving a third squadron in the street to guard the entrance to the military headquarter offices and those of the civil government, he entered the courtyard of the former. Placing Ismail Pasha, second in command of the fortress, and Rifaat Pasha, commanding the fortress artillery, in a carriage, he proceeded, accompanied by a squadron of cavalry, to Haberlik Fort, where I understand Shukri Pasha was informed he must consider himself a prisoner. Later in the day the latter had an interview with General Ivanof near Memdouh's Kiosk, just outside the north-east of the town, but the formality of tendering his sword in token of surrender was reserved for the following day, when King Ferdinand received it in person. The Bulgarian infantry marched into the centre of the town at 11 A.M., the 29th regiment, headed by its band, being the first to enter. The troops were well received by the few people, all non-Moslems, who remained in the streets. The arrival of the troops continued during the day, when great quiet generally prevailed save that the Christian population first of all revelled in the streets as at Easter, exchanging also the Easter greeting of "Christ is risen," in recognition of the fact that the town was once more under Christian rule.

The troops retiring from the eastern face had blown up the magazine and set fire to a depôt in the main infantry barracks which contained equipment and stores. The provision depôt in the Kale quarter, which contained flour and biscuit for the use of the troops, though not destroyed was looted during the morning by the non-Moslem population. The majority of the rifles in the hands of the troops were [illegible] by them or thrown into the rivers and wells.

Artillery fire continued on the southern and western faces until about 10 A.M., but shortly after 9 A.M. the infantry left the trenches and the officers proceeded to carry out the destruction of arms, stores, documents, &c., in accordance with instructions contained in Shukri Pasha's memorandum on the subject. At 9 A.M. the magazine near Haderlik Fort was destroyed. It was not, however, until 10.30 A.M. that the railway bridge over the Arda at Marash was blown up, whilst the destruction of the last magazine near the Arda Fort was carried out half an hour later. [illegible] on the southern face, after breaking their rifles and throwing away their ammunition, came into the village of Karagach, where they quietly awaited the arrival of the Bulgarian forces, whose infantry entered at 2 P.M., the cavalry preceding them at

Reference to the accompanying map* will show that operations on both these faces had been limited to the capture of the infantry trenches, the batteries remaining intact. The 4th Nishangi Regiment, on the eastern flank of the southern line, is said to have greatly distinguished itself, and to have done credit to the training which it had received as the model regiment at the hands of the German instructors, Major Bals. One officer of German nationality, Lieutenant Wagner, actually fought [illegible] is understood to have behaved with great gallantry. He was, however, on a different

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footing from the instructors, not holding a commission in the German army. The only other foreigner, so far as I am aware, who served in the garrison during the siege, was a German non-commissioned officer who was employed in the preparation of plans in the fortress engineers' department.

Losses.

The official Bulgarian statement of killed and wounded on both sides is 7,000 Bulgarians and 10,000 Turks. I venture to think that both these are somewhat in excess of the actual numbers. Although the Turks undoubtedly suffered heavily from the artillery fire during the 25th, and in their retreat towards the Tunja Valley on the following morning, the combat during the assault was of comparatively short duration, and I do not consider the losses could not be described as determined. Further, the number of wounded in the hospitals after the action was not such as would justify the Bulgarian estimate. It is more difficult to judge of the latter's losses, as the wounded were transported to field hospitals outside the town, but they suffered considerably less from artillery fire than did their opponents, as the Turkish siege artillery was chiefly engaged on duty with that of the field opponents.

Concluding Remarks.

It needs but a cursory inspection of the Turkish defences to show that the fall of the town, whilst doubtless due in part to the fact that the trenches were manned by ill-trained troops demoralised by a five months' siege, is in the main to be attributed to the badly constructed works which defended it. Although some of the batteries on the southern and western faces had been concreted, these at the north-eastern angle, where the Bulgarian artillery fire was concentrated, were mere earthworks, not capable of withstanding the fire poured into them. Both batteries and trenches were devoid of head cover of any kind, whilst communicating trenches and similar devices were but lately constructed. Further, there exists nothing in the nature of flanking works, such as would render a fort untenable to an enemy when once taken. It is also difficult to understand the failure of Shukri Pasha to prepare beforehand a regular second position at Turna Tepe, under cover of which he could, after the fall of the northern forts, have collected his scattered troops, and with the aid of nizam battalions in reserve there, launched a counter-attack against the Bulgarian centre. But these facts, whilst possibly in part explaining the capture of the fortress, in no way detract from the value of the great feat of arms performed by the Bulgarian army, in which skilful leadership, well directed artillery fire, and a determined infantry assault, each played their part.

In concluding my report on the siege of this town, I desire to bring to the notice of your Excellency the name of Mr. Leon G. Khatibian, the dragoman and secretary of this consulate, who has rendered me valuable assistance on many occasions, and has faithfully carried out his duties, often under somewhat trying circumstances.

I have, &c.
L. L. R. SAMSON, *Major.*

[22355] No. 267.

Consul Samson to Sir G. Lowther.—(Received at Foreign Office, May 15.)

(No. 6. Confidential.) *Adrianople, May 6, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that, in preparing my despatch No. [illegible] descriptive of the military operations which resulted in the fall [illegible] different commanders on the eastern face [illegible] correspondence which passed between the [illegible] and therefore drawn from this correspondence and from personal observation of the action in question.

I have, &c.
L. L. R. SAMSON, *Major.*

[22236] No. 268.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey. (Received May 15.)

(No. 27.)

Sir, *Cettinje, May 9, 1913.*

ON the evening of the 5th May you communicated to me by telegraph the resolution adopted by the meeting of Ambassadors that afternoon to the effect that the representatives of the Powers at Cettinje were to make known to the Montenegrin Government that dispositions would be taken to ensure the landing over of the town of Scutari to the commandants of the international fleet; they were at the same time to request the despatch of instructions to the Montenegrin authorities at Scutari, enjoining them to proceed to the evacuation of the town in agreement with the naval commanders.

Before proceeding to take any joint action in the matter the representatives of the Powers were informed by the Italian Minister that he had learnt that the requisite instructions had already been despatched to the Montenegrin delegate to place himself in communication with Vice-Admiral Burney. It was accordingly arranged that it should be suggested that these instructions might be officially communicated to the Powers before any formal request were made.

I have now the honour to transmit herewith copy of the identic note addressed in consequence to each representative of the Powers, as well as copy of the identic reply returned by them. As you will observe, the representatives state that their respective Governments have taken act with satisfaction of the message addressed to you by the King on the subject of the fate of Scutari. They acknowledge at the same time receipt of the note communicating to them the instructions sent to the Montenegrin delegate respecting the evacuation of the town and state that it will be communicated to their respective Governments.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 268.

M. Ramadanovitch to Count de Salis.

M. le Ministre, *Cettigné, le 25 avril* (*8 mai*), 1913.

LE Gouvernement Royal, en exécution de son engagement pris en date du 21 courant envers les Grandes Puissances au sujet de la ville de Scutari, a l'honneur de vous informer qu'il a donné à son délégué, M. Pierre Plamenatz, qui s'est rendu à cet effet à Saint Jean de Medua, des instructions précises pour l'évacuation de la ville de Scutari et pour la remise de la ville aux forces navales internationales représentées vis-à-vis du Gouvernement Royal par l'amiral britannique, commandant en chef de la flotte internationale dans les eaux monténégrines.

Le Gouvernement Royal vient d'adresser en dernier lieu à M. Plamenatz la dépêche suivante: —

"Conformez-vous aux désirs de l'amiral commandant en chef quant au jour et à la manière d'évacuer la ville de Scutari. Assurez-vous du libre transport du matériel de guerre de la ville, de la forteresse et des retranchements de Scutari et à Medua ainsi que de tout objet ayant appartenu au Gouvernement ottoman. Prenez soin en même temps de tout le matériel qui resterait après l'évacuation en stipulant la faculté de l'enlever au fur et à mesure de nos moyens de transport. Pour le transport de matériel la présence est nécessaire d'un moins [illegible] qui pourraient bivouaquer en deçà de la Bojana, dans un endroit qui sera indiqué par [illegible] matériel elles seront [illegible]

[illegible]

Le Président du Conseil Royal:
Le Directeur général du Ministère
S. RAMADANOVITCH.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 268.

Count de Salis to Montenegrin Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Cettigné, le 9 mai, 1913.

M. le Ministre,

J'AI l'honneur de porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement Royal que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique prend acte, avec satisfaction, du message que Sa Majesté le Roi de Monténégro a adressé au Principal Secrétaire d'État Britannique pour les Affaires Étrangères, et par lequel Sa Majesté a déclaré qu'il remet le sort de Scutari entre les mains de la Puissances.

J'ai en même temps l'honneur de vous accuser réception de la communication de votre Excellence en date du 25 avril (8 mai), aux termes de laquelle des instructions précises ont été données au délégué du Gouvernement Royal monténégrin pour la remise [illegible] aux Puissances [illegible] représentées par l'amiral britannique, commandant en chef de la flotte internationale, et ajoutant que lui reste présent de se conformer aux désirs de l'amiral en chef quant au jour et à la manière d'évacuer la Ville de Scutari.

Je porte la communication susmentionnée du Gouvernement Royal à la connaissance du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique.

Je saisis, &c.

J. DE SALIS.

(222?9 No. 269.

Sir E. Egerton to Sir E. Grey.—(Received May 15.

(No. 240.) *Paris, May 13, 1913.*

Sir,

THE leading article in this evening's issue of the "Temps," copy of which is enclosed herein, is concerned with the reports which have been current in the press for the last few days of the approaching conclusion of the Anglo-Turkish negotiations for the settlement of outstanding differences in the region of the Persian Gulf and other questions relating to the Asiatic provinces of Turkey, and with the concurrent negotiations which are said to be taking place between Turkey and Germany.

The article states that Great Britain is merely developing the system of the Cyprus Convention of 1878, where by she guaranteed Turkey in the possession of her Asiatic dominions in return for the cession of Cyprus and an undertaking to introduce reforms in the Armenian provinces. Now, however, in return for a renewal of that guarantee, Great Britain demands the recognition of her special position and interests in the region of the Persian Gulf, which, although not mentioned in the text of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, formed the subject of a letter addressed by you to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh and attached to the convention, and in which the Russian Government have acquiesced. In the meantime, it is alleged, an effort is being made, by means of conversations between Turkey and Germany and England and Germany, to reconcile the conflicting interests of the two last-named Powers in the valleys of the Tigris and the Euphrates.

No surprise need be felt, the writer remarks, at what is taking place in view of the negative policy of French diplomacy in the East, to which the "Temps" has so frequently drawn attention. Germany came to an agreement with Russia in 1911 in regard to the Bagdad Railway, and followed it up with a fresh convention with Turkey. England and Germany are composing their differences, with Germany as a benevolent spectator, [illegible] in such a manner as to safeguard British interests in regard to the Bagdad Railway. All that remains to France is a possible sub participation, without control [illegible] the great trusts [illegible] Une fois de plus, les affaires d'Asie evoluent dans [illegible] sans que la diplomatie [illegible] ait su s'y faire sentir.

Emanating, as [illegible] the opportunities which French diplomacy has missed, the foreign editor revives the misleading interpretation which was placed on your statement last year in the House of Commons with regard to Syria—an interpretation to which, as you will remember, I drew attention in my despatch No. 635 of the 31st December last, [illegible] a new M. Cambon's attention at the time. At this moment, however, the

article says, "our embassy at Constantinople imposes on our consuls in Syria an attitude which discourages our Syrian friends, and leaves to the British consuls the rôle which belongs to us, however with the express consent of England, secured by M. Poincaré in 1912.

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 269.

Extract from the "Temps" of May 14, 1913

NÉGOCIATIONS ANGLO-TURCO-ALLEMANDES

DES dépêches, qu'on a lieu de croire fort bien renseignées, annoncent que parallèlement aux négociations de paix, qui se sont poursuivies, à Constantinople et à Londres, [illegible] d'un autre ordre entre la Turquie d'une part, l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne d'autre part. Nous retrouvons dans ces pourparlers toutes les traditions des deux diplomaties les plus habiles à réaliser qui soient en Europe.

La Grande-Bretagne, semble-t-il, s'est bornée à rouvrir le dossier de la négociation de Chypre de 1878, et les circonstances étant les mêmes, a mis en acte la même méthode. A la Turquie amputée, elle a promis comme jadis son aide financière, [illegible] et politique moyennant compensations. La convention relative à Chypre, en date du 4 juin, 1878, portait :—

"Sa Majesté la Reine du Royaume-Uni de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande, Impératrice des Indes, et Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, étant mutuellement animés du désir sincère d'étendre et d'affermir les relations d'amitié heureusement existantes entre les deux Empires, ont résolu de conclure une convention d'alliance défensive, dans le but d'assurer pour l'avenir les territoires en Asie de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, &c. . . . . ont convenu :

"Article 1er. Que dans le case où Batoum, Ardahan, Kars, ou aucune de ces places seront retenues par la Russie, et si aucune tentative serait faite à une époque quelconque par la Russie de s'emparer d'aucune autre portion des territoires de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan en Asie, fixés par le traité définitif de paix, l'Angleterre s'engage à s'unir à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan pour la défense des territoires en question par force d'armes.

"En revanche, Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan promet à l'Angleterre d'introduire les réformes nécessaires (à être arrêtés plus tard par les deux Puissances) ayant trait à la bonne administration et à la protection des sujets chrétiens et autres de la Sublime Porte qui se trouvent sur les territoires en question ; et afin de mettre l'Angleterre en mesure d'assurer les moyens nécessaires pour l'exécution de son engagement, Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan consent, en outre, d'assigner l'île de Chypre pour être occupée et administrée par elle."

Cette fois-ci l'Angleterre, en faisant aux Turcs des promesses analogues, s'assure les garanties qu'elle désirait depuis longtemps sur la côte du Golfe Persique et pour lesquelles elle avait obtenu en 1907 l'adhésion de la Russie. On se souvient en effet qu'à l'accord anglo-russe du 29 août, 1907, relatif à la Perse, à l'Afghanistan et au Thibet était annexée une lettre de Sir Edward Grey à Sir Arthur Nicolson, alors Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Saint-Pétersbourg, où on lisait :

"Il est désirable d'attirer l'attention sur les déclarations antérieures relatives à la politique britannique, de confirmer à nouveau d'une façon générale les déclarations antérieures relatives aux intérêts britanniques dans le Golfe Persique, et d'affirmer à nouveau l'importance qu'il y a à maintenir lesdits intérêts."

La Russie avait adhéré à cette opinion britannique. L'accord proprement dit n'en disait rien pourtant, parce que la question du Golfe ne pouvait pas se séparer de celle du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad.

C'est cette question d'ensemble qui paraît être à la veille de recevoir une solution. D'une part en effet l'Angleterre et la Turquie ont élaboré une entente qui, moyennant de l'aide promise à la Turquie par la Grande-Bretagne, reconnaît les intérêts prépondérants de l'Angleterre dans la vallée du Tigre et de Euphrate (secteur Bagdad Basseora).

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D'autre part une conversation turco-allemande et anglo-allemande s'est développée parallèlement dans des conditions encore obscures, mais avec la tendance évidente—que souligne un important article de la "Gazette de Voss" nettement favorable à la combinaison—de concilier les thèses opposées jusqu'ici.

Une fois de plus, les affaires d'Asie évoluent donc sans qu'on aperçoive que l'influence française s'y fasse sentir. Il était aisé de prévoir que tôt ou tard les intérêts en présence se rapprocheraient. C'est pour cela qu'en 1909 le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement anglais avaient résolu de demander à la Porte la concession d'une ligne, la ligne de Tripoli de Syrie au Golfe Persique par Homs et Bagdad. Les deux Gouvernements avaient, en effet, senti la nécessité de prendre position en vue des accords ultérieurs que l'on prévoyait déjà à ce moment prévoyant. Ce projet fut abandonné en 1910 par suite de l'opposition de M. Bompard, Ambassadeur de France à Constantinople. Il appartient donc aujourd'hui au passé et n'est plus susceptible d'être ranimé sous aucune forme.

En effet, à la même époque, la Russie et l'Allemagne se sont mises d'accord sur le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad en un protocole resté public au début de 1911. Puis l'Allemagne et la Turquie ont signé sur le même objet une nouvelle convention. Aujourd'hui, Anglais et Turcs s'entendent et l'Allemagne suit d'un œil bienveillant l'établissement de la suzeraineté britannique sans participation financière sans valeur directrice. Le problème politique aura été résolu sans elle.

Vous savez, vous aussi, que le "Temps" a signalé la politique négative de notre diplomatie en Orient. Il ne faut donc accuse aucune surprise de ce qui se prépare actuellement. Un tel moment même d'ailleurs notre ambassade de Constantinople impose à nos consuls en Syrie une attitude qui décourage la sympathies de nos amis syriens et laisse aux consuls d'Angleterre le bénéfice d'un rôle qui nous appartient pourtant avec le concours actif et explicite de l'Angleterre, obtenu en 1912 par M. Poincaré. Le parti pris de nos agents d'étouffer les aspirations libérales de la Syrie porte à notre situation un coup peut-être mortel. On a peine à s'expliquer l'origine d'une si grave erreur.

M. Pichon, qui se propose d'inscrire dans le prochain budget un crédit de 150,000 fr. mesure excellente à tous égards—pour les œuvres françaises de Syrie, verra ses efforts réduits à rien s'il ne réussit pas à briser l'inertie négative qui s'affirme avec tant de persistance. Il est très facile pourtant, si nos représentants en Turquie avaient eu le sens des occasions, de faire avec les Turcs sur les terrains qui nous intéressent ce que l'Angleterre vient de faire. Il ne semble pas qu'on s'en soit jamais soucié à notre ambassade de Constantinople.

[22269] No. 270.

Pro-memorid communicated by German Embassy, May 15, 1913.

THE Sublime Porte desires that in article 7 of the draft of treaty the word "gradient" should be struck out, and that a clause concerning the question of valorisation, assuring the equality of rights for Moslems in the ceded territories should be adopted. The Ottoman Government also wishes that the evacuation of such territories shall be stipulated as are to be given back to Turkey, and that it shall be decided that peace shall be considered as concluded when the treaty is signed.

The Imperial German Government would like to support these wishes.

German Embassy, London,
May 14, 1913.

[22306] No. 271.

Memorandum communicated by French Embassy, May 15, 1913.

M. PICHON propose de fixer au mardi, 27 mai, la première réunion de la Commission technique des Affaires balkaniques. Il compte adresser aux États belligérants l'invitation de se faire représenter à cette réunion.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 14 mai, 1913.

[22295] No. 272.

Sir T. Heath to Mr. Maxwell.—(Received May 15.)

Dear Mr. Maxwell, *Treasury, May 14, 1913.*

I RETURN the file relative to the Balkan financial settlement, which was sent to this Department yesterday.

As regards the first point raised in Sir Paul Harvey's memorandum, I do not think that we are in a position to offer any advice as to the weight which may properly be given to the arguments of the German delegates, involving questions of principle and international law of which this Department has no special knowledge.

We adhere to the opinion already expressed in our official letters, that, viewed merely from the financial side, the French proposal is the better on the assumption (which from Sir P. Harvey's letter appears to be satisfied) that the share of the allies calculated by this method is not less than the yield from the conquered territories of the specific revenues at the service of the debt.

As regards point 3, we are unable, in the absence of any information on the point, to judge whether the argument that the landholders have no right to assume that the surtax will be perpetuated is sound or not.

As regards Sir P. Harvey's next argument (*b*), the position seems to be as follows:—

Under the French proposal the allies will be called on to take over a certain fraction of the Turkish debt, depending on the proportion of the revenues of the ceded territories to the total revenues of the Turkish Empire. Let us assume, merely as an illustration, that this method gives as a result the fraction $\frac{1}{2}$, and that the total capital of the Turkish debt is £ *x*, which will be repaid in a period of *z* years by an annuity of £ *y*. Then the allies will have to pay either a capital sum of £$\frac{1}{2}$ *x* or an annuity of £$\frac{1}{2}$ *y* for *z* years. Sir P. Harvey points out that the effect of assuming that the customs surtax ends in 1914 is to increase the period of amortisation *z* and to decrease the annuity £ *y* without altering £ *x*, so that the capital sum to be paid by the allies, viz., £$\frac{1}{2}$ *x*, remains the same. This is true, provided that the fraction $\frac{1}{2}$ also remains unaltered, which will be the case if the share of the allies is calculated under the French method on the ratio of the revenues of the ceded territories (including the yield of the customs surtax) to the total revenues of the Turkish Empire (also including the yield of the customs surtax).

But if the customs surtax is to be excluded in calculating the share of the allies by the French method, it will be necessary to consider whether the yield of the customs surtax is derived in the same ratio as other revenues from the conquered territories and from the remainder of the Turkish Empire respectively. If not, then the effect of excluding it from the calculation may be to diminish the amount of the debt to be taken over by the allies.

The above point requires elucidation; otherwise, we agree with Sir P. Harvey's arguments in support of this proposal.

Perhaps it would be better now, if you see no objection, that you should write officially, in order that the matter may be placed on record.

Yours very truly,
T. L. HEATH

Minutes.

1. I think Sir E. Davidson, Mr. Pember, and Mr. Malkin, and the Treaty Department should be asked to give their opinion on the point of international law involved.

2. This is settled in accordance with Sir P. Harvey's own suggestion.

3. I venture to think, and I believe it is the official view, that the surtax should be excluded.*

Sir P. Harvey can probably deal with the point raised.

H. N.

Foreign Office, May 15, 1913.

R. P. M.

*I agree.—R. P. M

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I am afraid that I can do no more than refer to what Professor Oppenheim says in § 84, p. 131, and on p. 287 of the 2nd edition of his "Treatise on International Law," vol. i, *Peace*, and also to the late Sir E. Hertslet's memorandum 3558 annexed.

W. M.

Foreign Office, May 15, 1913.

There is a good deal of authority in the text-books for the proposition that the acquiring State is bound to take over part of the debt of the ceded territory. The precedents cited are, from the nature of the case, almost always treaties.

There are also traces of what may be called the "mortgage" theory—*i.e.*, that if the revenues of the ceded territory have been assigned as security for a debt the security remains unaffected by the change of sovereignty. Westlake, *e.g.*, says ("International Law," vol. i, p. 62): "The fundholders have no legal claim on the acquiring State beyond the fair of the debt, if any, so assumed, *unless their contract gave them a specific security on the revenues of the ceded province*, or on State property which passes by the cession."

There is, therefore, a certain amount of authority in favour of each course. The German arguments in favour of the latter seem to be largely based on policy.

The view which I have ventured to express on several occasions is that the text-books are very unsatisfactory in their treatment of State succession (this is said by Hall in so many words), and that many of their conclusions are lacking in authority, as is shown by the fact that they are not acted on in practice. We have to be rather careful about the point, because of the many South African claims which are being pressed upon us by the United States of America and Germany, some of which are based upon the doctrine of State succession in its mildest form. But I do not think that this consideration affects the present question, which is simply one of public debt.

H. W. M.

Mr. Pember.

Foreign Office, May 16, 1913.

Speaking generally, I agree with Mr. Malkin. I think I should be inclined to go a little further than he does, and to say that the balance of authority among the text writers was, on the whole, adverse to the existence of any legal objection on the part of the cessionary State to take over any part of the general public debt of the ceding State.

The general debt of a State is, after all, only a personal obligation.

There have certainly been instances directly in the teeth of any such rule as above mentioned, *e.g.*, the refusal of Germany to take over any part of the French National Debt, though she received both territory and an indemnity.

There may, however, be a strong moral obligation to take over (in justice to creditors - the value of whose security is almost certainly prejudiced by the dismemberment of the ceding State) some portion of the general debt. This has been recognised in a good many treaties.

It would seem that local debts of the ceded provinces, whether debts contracted for local purposes *or debts secured on the local revenues*, are binding upon the cessionary State. If the debts be secured upon special revenues derived from both sections of the dismembered State they are local to the extent that the hypothecated revenues are supplied by the two sections respectively, and must therefore be proportionately divided.

I agree with Mr. Malkin's view that this doctrine, which seems to be fairly generally held by the text writers, rests in the main on the analogy of a mortgage; it is not so much that the cessionary State comes under any personal obligation with regard to the local debts as that the principle of *transit terra cum suo onere* may be held applicable.

I agree with Mr. Malkin's observations on this German argument.

F. W. P.

Foreign Office, May 22, 1913.

I concur. Mr. Pember's minute on Paper 16739 ought also to be read in connexion with these questions, when viewed from the aspect of international law more especially.

W. E. D

Foreign Office, May 22, 1913.

I am obliged for having been allowed to see these interesting minutes. May I point out, however, that they do not enable me to judge what is the Foreign Office's view on the point of policy involved, as distinct from that of international law

All parties, including the allies themselves, are agreed that the allies can claim over a share of the Ottoman Debt—the question is whether their precise share shall be determined by one or another formula, the French formula of "proportionality" or the German formula of "special guarantees."

The practical considerations are these

(*a.*) The Turkish Government base their claim on the second formula.

(*b.*) The Council of the Ottoman Debt express a strong preference for the same.

(*c.*) The allies, at least the Bulgarians (14332 of the 12th March), accept the second formula, but reject the first. Thus all the parties are [illegible] preferring the second formula.

(*d.*) The Germans argue that the second formula, if adopted in this case, may serve as a useful precedent hereafter in other cases where loans have been granted, *e.g.*, in China or South America, on the guarantee of specific revenues of specific territories.

(*e.*) In the event of a default by the allies in the payment of the annuity allotted to them, the Balkan States will, if the annuity has been fixed on the basis of the "special guarantees" [illegible] with Turkey [illegible] Government can insist that the engagements be carried out. On the [illegible] allies taking over a part of the Turkish debt proportional to the revenues [illegible] territories the allies in case of default are only face to face with Turkey, and there is a danger of the renewal of the situation which arose after the Treaty of Berlin with regard to the financial obligations of the Balkan States.

Against these arguments, and in favour of the first formula, it is urged that the latter is simple and will avoid numerous debatable questions. I venture to say that this is in some measure an illusion, as the discussions in Paris have proved. It is true that the first formula avoids certain elaborate *calculations*. It does not, however, avoid the really crucial diplomatic difficulties, such as the question whether it is or is not to be assumed that the 3 per cent. surtax will be continued after 1914. Moreover, it contains in the following point the germ of some of the chief difficulties which arise on the second formula. The proportional formula gives fairly readily a certain annuity; but the question arises for how long is that annuity to be payable? We are thus driven to consider the probable period of amortisation of each loan, and here we are at once confronted with the question of the "special amortisation" of the unified debt and the Turkish lottery bonds, and the difficulties it entails.

I may add that the formula of "proportionality" affords no guide to the manner of distribution among the various loans of any capital sums the allies may pay in discharge of their obligations. For this we must almost inevitably have recourse to the other formula, which determines to what extent the various loans have lost their guarantees owing to the cession of Turkish territory.

For these reasons I hope the Foreign Office will see that, whatever the advantages from a Treasury point of view of the proportional formula, it may be impossible in practice to find many arguments for its adoption, or to force it upon the Turks, the bondholders, and the allies, the parties most interested, none of whom appear to want it.

Turning now for a moment to Sir T. Heath's letter of the 14th May, 1913, herein, I should have added to the statement of point 3 in my memorandum the qualification that my argument is based on the assumption that the formula of special guarantee and not the French formula, is adopted as a basis. The point made by the Treasury in regard to the possible effect, in the light of the French formula, of excluding the 3 per cent. surtax, was not overlooked on the contrary, it was examined in Paris and it was found, on the basis of the French formula and of the figures [illegible] available, which are not likely to be exceeded to any great extent, that the [illegible] of the 3 per cent. surtax will have the effect not of diminishing, but of increasing the

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share of the debt to be taken over by the allies. That is to say, the proportion of the revenues of the ceded territories to the revenues of the Empire is higher if the 3 per cent. surtax is excluded from both, than if it is included in both.

If it is thought worth while to put the matter officially to the Treasury, this point ought to be explained to them. At the same time, this is an instance of the difficulty the Treasury have in advising, on necessarily incomplete data, on the technical aspect of these complicated questions. The technical financial considerations are generally more fully present to me than they can be to the Treasury. What I desired to elicit by my memorandum was the Foreign Office view as to the practical bearing which this or that attitude might have on other matters not within my cognisance but within theirs, *e.g.*, in this case on the negotiations for the renewal of the 3 per cent. surtax.

H. P. HARVEY.

Foreign Office, May 24, 1913.

[22362] No. 273.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 15.)

Admiralty, May 15, 1913.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram No. 76, dated the 15th instant, relative to the occupation of Scutari by the commission of officers of the international fleet.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAME GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 273.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII," to Admiralty.

May 15, 1913.

(Telegraphic.)

COMMISSION of officers of international fleet representing the Great Powers took over Scutari at 2·30 P.M. Perfect order in the town and appearance and behaviour of Montenegrin troops left nothing to be desired. Received every assistance from Montenegrin general in command.

[22358] No. 274.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 79.) *Berlin, May 15, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 156 of 9th April: Silkworms.

I have just received answer of the Imperial Government to the effect that instructions have been sent to the German Minister at Sophia to join with British colleague in making representations to the Bulgarian Government.

[22352] No. 275.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 72. Confidential.) *Athens, May 15, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.)

ITALIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs has told Greek Chargé d'Affaires that he cannot allow Greece to hold both sides of Corfu channel and will make war to prevent it.

Count [illegible] for Foreign Affairs is not disposed to yield to threat, which, however, is [illegible] directed against Great Powers rather than Greece, and he wishes to know what France and England think of it.

(Sent to Rome.)

[22356] No. 276.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.— Received May 15.)

(No. 73.) *Athens, May 15, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.)

IT has been announced that M. Sarafof is to come to Athens to discuss the future frontier. The Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs states that this is premature. The Greek Government hold that the question of partition is one for discussion between the four allies together, as it is primarily one of balance of power. Moreover, Greece, Bulgaria, and Servia may all have claims to one point, such as Gheygeli.

Recent fighting near Elevtherai and Angista was serious. It was due to unprovoked Bulgarian advance, but the Greek Government acquitted the Bulgarian Government of responsibility.

[22357] No. 277.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 68.) *Bucharest, May 15, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.)

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs is somewhat embarrassed by the obligation he is under to defer submitting to Parliament the decision of the Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh until the signature of the peace preliminaries. The decision is an open secret in Bucharest, and the Minister for Foreign Affairs apparently fears that, until it is ratified by Parliament, there may be increased agitation [group omitted] against] its acceptance. He says he may at any moment be compelled to submit the decision to Parliament in secret session.

Parliament rises 24th May, and if the decision is not ratified before then the matter may have to remain in suspense until the meeting of Parliament in November.

This would seem undesirable in view of uncertain prospect as regards relations between the Balkan allies.

[22366] No. 278.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 15.)

(No. 79.) *Vienna, May 15, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.) R.

IT is announced this morning in Vienna press that Hungarian authorities have informed Turkish representative that island of Ada-Kaleh, off Orsova, in Danube, has been annexed to Hungarian Crown. Turkish representative protested pending instructions from Constantinople.

Authenticity of above news has been confirmed to me by Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

[22673] No. 279.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 133.) *Foreign Office, May 15, 1913.*

Sir,

THE Italian Ambassador told me to-day that the Turks had raised some questions about the alteration of the proposed Treaty of Peace.

I told him what had passed this afternoon with the Turkish delegates to the Peace Conference.

I also said that I thought it should be made clear at the next *réunion* that Greece would gain nothing, and discover nothing more, with regard to the Ægean islands and would lose by delaying the signature of the Treaty of Peace. Though Greece the south of Albania by delaying the signature of the Treaty of Peace. Though Greece could not be admitted to the *réunion*, there would no doubt be ways, after the signature of the treaty, in which we might attempt to influence her about [illegible] of Albania by dealing with the question of the islands in a way favourable to her.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[22675] No. 280.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 134.) *Foreign Office, May 15, 1913.*

Sir,

THE Italian Ambassador, speaking to me by the instructions of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to-day made a strong appeal to me to recognise how much Italy had done and how hard she had worked to smooth matters respecting the northern and north-eastern frontiers of Albania, by using her influence in Vienna in favour of concessions to Servia and Montenegro. He urged me to help in getting a settlement of the southern frontier of Albania, where the Corfu Canal was of real importance, Austria feeling as strongly as Italy that the possession of the whole of the Canal by Greece would be intolerable. Supposing, for instance, that France had been where Italy was, she would never have yielded on this point. M. Sazonof, forgetting all that Italy had done to help to secure a solution of the questions in which Russia was [illegible] new holding [illegible] in St. Petersburgh to the effect that the Greek occupation of southern Albania was a fact to be reckoned with, implying that the Greeks could not be turned out of what they had occupied. But, if occupation was a title to possession, it would apply to Rhodes; and the Ambassador reminded me that I had, when Italy occupied Rhodes, pointed out that occupation during a war [illegible] to imply permanent possession. He said that he, personally, was [illegible] could to secure that Rhodes should be used to ease the situation. Italy could [illegible] to let obligations to Turkey, prepared to give Rhodes to Greece, but at the suggestion came from a third Power the Ambassador would [illegible] personally in Rome. With regard to islands such as Mitylene and Chios, the difficulty did not arise in Rome, but elsewhere. The Ambassador said that he would [illegible] concessions to Greece in the hinterland of the south of Albania, provided that the coast on which there could be no further concession, was secured for Albania.

I said that I could not do anything until the other Ambassadors returned to London. I observed that the question of Rhodes was one that I thought would influence the French Government as well as the Greek Government.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[22674] No. 281.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 133.) *Foreign Office, May 15, 1913.*

Sir,

THE Turkish delegates to the peace conference were presented to me and to Sir Arthur Nicolson by the Turkish Ambassador this afternoon.

Osman Nizami Pasha raised the question of certain alterations in the draft treaty of peace, one being to the effect that the line from Enos to Media might be defined as a direct line.

I said that the danger of proposing any alteration of this kind was that the Bulgarians might propose a further definition that might not be agreeable to Turkey. They might all then drift into an attempt to define the line now, instead of leaving it to an International Commission. With regard to other alterations, such as the insertion of an article about the exchange of prisoners, I said that there was nothing in these to which the Powers could object, and indeed it would be an improvement to lay it down, as Nizami Pasha had suggested, that evacuation was to follow upon the signature, and not the ratification, of the treaty. The delegates must, however, bear in mind that proposals from one party for alterations and additions might lead to other proposals from other parties.

With regard to evacuation, Nizami Pasha pointed out that, if the Bulgarians withdrew their forces to Adrianople, they could still in a week or a fortnight operate again. I remarked that, while it would take the Turks two months to get together their defence after they had withdrawn their troops. It was demobilisation on the part of Bulgaria that Turkey really wanted, but he feared that Bulgaria might not be able to demobilise, owing to her difficulties with her allies, though this is not a reason that she could admit publicly.

I said that I should have thought that Turkey could secure her object by stipulating that any Bulgarian forces that were not disbanded, over and above the normal garrison for Adrianople, should be withdrawn so far from the Turkish frontier that they could not be regarded as a menace. Surely this could be arranged between the Turkish and Bulgarian generals.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[22137] No. 282.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rax-Ironside.

(No. 68.) *Foreign Office, May 15, 1913.*

Sir,

SIR A. NICOLSON explained on the 10th May, documents in hand, very fully to M. Madjarof the history of the frontier line, pointing out that, in the communications which had passed between the Powers and the allies, the Enos Midia line was taken as a basis, and that there was no mention whatever of the various points referred to by his Government. It could not possibly be contended that the reply of the Powers on the 8th [illegible] whatever [illegible] 8th April the Powers had [illegible] Sir A. Nicolson knew [illegible] official communication to the Powers, again repeated, without any details as to [illegible] that the Enos Midia line was to be taken as a basis. There was no misunderstanding, and on that basis the draft treaty was drawn up.

M. Madjarof said that M. Gueshof had written an official note [illegible] claiming the detailed line.

His Majesty's Government had no trace of such a note, and I accordingly telegraphed to you to enquire if you had received [illegible].

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Madjarof that the main point to be [illegible] urgent necessity to sign peace, and an international commission could very well decide on how the frontier was to run once that the two ends were fixed. M. Madjarof demurred to this, and said that, unless some indications were given as to the points through which the line was to run, a commission would never come to an agreement.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[21303] No. 283.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 157.) *Foreign Office, May 15, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 171 of the 7th instant, reporting the views of the German Government regarding the seizure of Ottoman fiscal stamps by the Greek and Bulgarian authorities in the occupied territories.

I transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris setting forth the views of the French Government,* to whom an enquiry was addressed similar to that contained in my despatch No. 133 of the 21st ultimo to yourself on the same question, from which you will observe that they have based representations to the Greek and Bulgarian Governments solely on the injury to the interests of the bondholders of the Ottoman Public Debt likely to result from the action complained of.

I have instructed His Majesty's Ministers at Athens and Sophia to make similar representations based on the same consideration, and your Excellency should inform the German Government of the action which I have taken and of its nature.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

* [illegible]

[1657] 2 E

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[22375] No. 284.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 243.) *Paris, May* 15, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch from Mr. Carnegie, reporting a conversation with the Russian delegate on the Financial Commission relative to the question of an indemnity being paid by Turkey to the Balkan allies.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 284.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 3.) *Paris, May* 15, 1913.

Sir,

THE councillor of the Russian Embassy here and delegate on the Financial Commission came to see me this morning on his return from St. Petersburgh. He said that he had the most categorical instructions to insist on an indemnity for the allies, and asked what view His Majesty's Government took and what instructions on the subject I had received. I replied that, as he knew, His Majesty's Government had, in common with the majority of the other Governments, opposed the demand for an indemnity from Turkey; but that the question was one of those to be examined by the commission, and I presumed that the decision of His Majesty's Government would be determined by the result of our enquiry into the justice of the claims of the allies and the financial conditions of Turkey. M. Sevastopoulo said that of course the Germans were violently opposed to any indemnity, as they regarded everything from the standpoint of their interests in the Bagdad Railway. He considered that the German councillor and M. Gout were far too intimate and he distrusted them both. M. Gout spoke a different language from M. Pichon, and the latter had complained to M. Isvolsky of the opposition which he encountered from his subordinates, many of whom were strongly opposed to an indemnity, while he (M. Pichon) was prepared to support the Russian views. M. Sevastopoulo went on to say that the Russian delegates would certainly not take part in any unofficial meetings of the delegates before the commission opened, as his Government considered that it was most unfair that such meetings should be held, and important decisions, perhaps, be come to, in the absence of the delegates of the allies, who had been promised full representation on the commission and participation in all its deliberations.

I told M. Sevastopoulo that he was really under a delusion in regard to the nature of the unofficial meetings which had taken place and which were proposed. The object of these meetings was solely to arrive at certain figures concerning the finances of Turkey to which we could all agree, and on which we could base our calculations and comparisons. Such figures could only be obtained by an exchange between the delegates of data and methods of calculation. There had not been—and, as far as I knew, there would not be—any discussions of a political nature, nor was there any question of taking any definite and binding decisions to which the allies could object. If we started the commission, at which eleven States were to be represented, without having agreed on some common ground on which to base our discussions, chaos would ensue.

M. Sevastopoulo said that he would be very happy, and was anxious, to exchange views with the British delegates particularly, and with the French, but separately; he would not take part in any meeting at which more than two Powers were represented. I said that he would find it advantageous to discuss matters with the Germans also, which, after some hesitation, he agreed to do.

I have, &c.
LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.

[22457] No. 285.

Council of Foreign Bondholders to Foreign Office.—(Received May 16.)

Sir, 17, *Moorgate Street, London, May* 15, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Sir W. Langley's letter of the 13th instant, transmitting copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Minister at Athens, and of a report from the British delegate on the International Financial Commission regarding certain questions connected with the collection of revenues assigned to the service of the Greek debt in the territory newly acquired by Greece.

As regards the first question, we agree with the views expressed by Sir E. Grey that it would be difficult to make the ceded territories, which have assumed their share of the Ottoman Debt, contribute also towards the payment of the Greek Debt. We also agree that, pending developments, it would not be desirable to make any statement with regard to the point.

As to the second question (we take the word "now" in the last line on p. 2 to be a typist's error for "not"), we also agree that identical prices and dues would not necessarily prevent the increase of sales in the new territory at the expense of those in the old.

We can only suggest that the Greek Government should be bound over not to take any step which could have the effect indicated.

We should think that any interference by the Government with the natural course of trade would render it very unpopular in the parts of the country unfavourably affected thereby, and we may add that if Greece came to the European markets for fresh money, any action on her part by which the interests of her existing creditors had been prejudiced would be resented, and would render the flotation of a new loan difficult and perhaps impossible.

I have, &c.
JAMES P. COOPER, *Secretary.*

[22642] No. 286.

Note verbale communicated by Count Mensdorff, May 16, 1913.

IL nous semble qu'il ne pourrait être dans l'intérêt des Grandes Puissances d'accorder aux représentants des États balkaniques à la commission siégeant à Paris le même vote décisif qu'aux Grandes Puissances, vu que les États belligérants devront assumer dès la conclusion de la paix de nombreuses charges, résultant de la dette publique et des compagnies privées qui passeront dans leurs mains.

Accepter un pareil principe serait dangereux et difficile à appliquer en pratique.

D'ailleurs, on avait tout d'abord eu l'idée de notifier simplement aux belligérants comme volonté des Puissances les décisions qui auront été prises par la réunion des Ambassadeurs (d'après le projet d'article proposé par la France) sur toute question financière qui formerait matière de principe.

De même, on avait proposé que la commission de Paris n'aurait à s'occuper que de l'élaboration des détails et qu'elle ne serait formée que par des représentants des Grandes Puissances.

C'est seulement plus tard qu'on a décidé de confier à la commission de Paris le règlement de toutes les questions de principe et de permettre aux belligérants de se faire représenter à ladite commission.

Par conséquent, il nous semble que les belligérants [illegible] un vote consultatif.

Ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie, Londres,
le 16 *mai*, 1913.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[22499] No. 287.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received May 16.)

Board of Trade, May 16, 1913.

Sir, I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th May, transmitting copy of a memorandum communicated by Hakki Pasha on the 1st May, setting forth certain proposals to which the Ottoman Government desire to obtain the assent of His Majesty's Government, and to offer the following observations thereon:—

As regards the increase of the Turkish customs duties from 11 per cent. to 15 per cent. *ad valorem*, the Board recognise that there is force in the considerations urged by Hakki Pasha to which you refer, and they are disposed to concur in Sir E. Grey's opinion that the proposed limitation of the period during which the increased duties are to be in force might be waived. They agree, further, that, should that course be adopted, an effort should be made to secure fifty years as a minimum period [illegible] the Short Arbitration.

As regards the proposed conversion of the Turkish customs tariff from an *ad valorem* to a specific basis, the Board have caused [illegible] to be prepared showing that favourable to British trade, if the Board are nevertheless of opinion that, should the proposed change meet with the approval of the other Powers, it would be difficult for His Majesty's Government to object to it in principle. I am to suggest, however, for Sir E. Grey's consideration, that it should be a point that the detail of any such tariff must be previously agreed between the two countries, and, further, that no such tariff should be put into operation without a reasonable period of notice.

The Board concur in the tenor of the reply which Sir E. Grey proposes to address to Hakki Pasha on the subject of the tonnage tax.

The Department is not directly concerned with the remaining matters to which reference is made in the memorandum, the suppression of foreign post offices in Turkey, and the abrogation of the judicial provisions of the Capitulations; but with regard to the latter, I am to say that the Board concur in Sir E. Grey's proposal to inform Hakki Pasha that His Majesty's Government are prepared to undertake the examination of the whole question with a view to determining in concert with other Powers whether and to what extent a modification of the existing régime is practicable.

I am, however, to suggest that care should be taken not to include within the scope of any such negotiations the provisions of the Capitulations under which His Majesty's Government have a right to be consulted as to any increase in the Turkish customs duties.

I am, &c.
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

[22388] No. 288.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 94.) *Cettinjé, May 15, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs tells me that, according to official reports, the [illegible] of Scutari was satisfactorily carried out yesterday. He spoke highly of the [illegible] played by British admiral.

[22403] No. 289.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 232.) *Constantinople, May 15, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR despatch No. 140 of 9th May.

The existence of foreign post-offices is based on unreliability of the Turkish post, and under the present conditions there can be no question of their suppression, even in principle. As regards the third question, the proposal that they should

use Ottoman stamps is feasible, but as working expenses would have to be charged against the Turkish postal administration, the Turks would be presumably entitled to ask questions as to expenditure. This is obviously undesirable. The tendency, further, would be to internationalise all the foreign post-offices, a result which some would find objectionable.

There is good reason to suppose that the Turks exaggerate the profits of the foreign post-offices, as at present transit rates are paid by the home offices, whereas under the proposed scheme they would be paid by the Turks.

The alternative to the use of Ottoman stamps would be to keep the existing offices precisely as they are, but to hand over the profits to the Turks. This would be preferable to the Turkish proposal, though it would do away with the existing incentive to economy in the foreign post-offices, and might be inconvenient in case of deficit.

As the question is a very important one, and foreign Governments have always acted together in the matter, [of] unilateral [group omitted] might be resented by other Governments.

[22475] No. 290.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 233.) *Constantinople, May 15, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR despatch No. 143 of 9th May.

Points 1 and 2. In theory a limited period for increase of customs duty may be good, but in practice concessions cannot well be withdrawn after expiration of time limit.

The assessment of 15 per cent. duty by means of a specific tariff would be preferable to the present system, and in framing the tariff provision should be made for periodical revision and that no change in tariff should take place except with consent of and in consultation with His Majesty's Government.

Point 3. Embassy have sent in their reserves attached to application of tonnage.

Point 4. I have telegraphed in my immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Point 5. As regards Turkish request that His Majesty's Government should agree to study the question of abolition of judicial side of Capitulations, it is to be remembered that for over five years capital has been under martial law administered by an irresponsible body which had not even a code of procedure and which has exercised the right to arrest and try foreigners. Common prudence would thus seem to dictate our refusal to undertake to study the point in question until Turkey advances to the point of constitutionalism enabling her to govern without such ultra-legal methods.

As regards Turkey's *amour-propre* in the matter, it is believed here that demand for undertaking to study the matter is made by Committee party with the object of appearing to score a political success over their opponents, and to that extent to justify the *coup d'État* of 23rd January last. I would submit advisability, in replying, to point out that it is difficult for His Majesty's Government to undertake to study the matter until Turkey has actually carried out concrete judicial reforms and until these have been in application long enough to test them. In light of last five years' experience it would seem very risky to open the door to discussion on Capitulations until the new order of things attains greater consistency and stability.

In other countries, *e.g.*, Roumania and Bulgaria, Capitulations have ceased rather less by automatic process than as the result of lengthy study and negotiation.

[22363] No. 291.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 234.) *Constantinople, May 15, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 215 of 13th May.

I have received written communication from Porte to the effect that sick and infirm soldiers will be embarked at Vallona and Durazzo to be treated in hospital at Ismilt and other troops will be sent to Beirout, and Porte further engages that these contingents will not be utilised during operations of war.

(Sent to Sophia.)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[22485] No. 292.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 235.) *Constantinople, May 16, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

WHITTALL AND Co. complain that one of their stores at Rodosto has been opened by the military authorities and store of seed sold by auction. They beg that urgent instructions be sent to prevent further seizures.

Despatch follows.

(Repeated to Sophia.)

[22486] No. 293.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 16.)

(No. 66.) *Paris, May 16, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

REPATRIATION of Turkish troops.

French Minister at Sophia has been instructed to make representations as desired by your telegram No. 202 of 12th May.

[22485] No. 294.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 110.) *Foreign Office, May 16, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 235 of 16th May: Messrs. Whittall's store at Rodosto.

You should bring this matter to the notice of the Bulgarian Government, and say that further details will follow.

[22363] No. 295.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 111.) *Foreign Office, May 16, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 231 of 15th May: Repatriation of Turkish troops.

If all your colleagues are similarly authorised, you should join in requesting Bulgarian Government not to raise difficulties, pointing out that repatriation was asked for and agreed to on purely humanitarian grounds, and adding the information contained in Sir G. Lowther's above-mentioned telegram.

[22394] No. 296.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Foreign Office, May 16, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 9th instant relative to the advance of 1,000,000 fr. made by the four [illegible] to Prince George of Greece when High Commissioner of the [illegible] Island in 1901.

With reference to the second and third paragraphs of that communication, I am to send you herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, [illegible] whether the French Government [illegible] to the discussion by the

international Commission about to assemble there of the question of the repayment of the advance.*

I am to state that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, there is some force in the considerations advanced by the French Government, but that he proposes to await the views of the Russian and Italian Governments, who have also been consulted, before taking any further action in the matter.

With reference to the last paragraph of your letter, I am to state that Sir E. Grey is not in possession of any more recent information as to the financial situation of Crete than that contained in the despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Canea, copy of which is enclosed.†

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[22542] No. 297.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey. (Received May 17.)

(No. 113. Confidential.)

Sir, *Rome, May 4, 1913.*

THE situation which has been created first by the refusal of Montenegro to withdraw from the siege of Scutari and by its subsequent surrender to King Nicholas, after its future had been otherwise determined by the Great Powers, has placed the Italian Government in a position of real dilemma. The difficulties of their position have, I should say, been considerably increased by the step prematurely taken in November last, in the renewal of the Triple Alliance six months before a decision became due. Had Italy awaited the normal date for renewal in the month of June next, as I remained unbound until that date approached, she could in all probability have derived considerable advantages from her liberty of action. Though she was still morally bound by the obligations of her alliance, the anxiety of her allies to get in her [illegible] and the [illegible] became the eventual renewal, would have enabled her to exercise a powerful influence in moderating the policy of Austria-Hungary, and the critics of the alliance would no doubt have taken full advantage of their opportunity. Italy would have been able to make conditions, and the Government would have been spared the unpleasant obligation of having to countenance such extreme measures as Austria may now elect to adopt, with all the dangerous consequences entailed, while compelled to recognise that the public opinion of the country will not allow them to co-operate with Austria in measures which such co-operation would have helped to limit in their scope.

There is some reason to believe that the precipitancy with which the renewal was made is to be attributed to considerations of internal policy and to the fear of allowing time, after the conclusion of the war with Turkey had liberated the energies of the opposition, to enable an agitation to grow up against an unconditional renewal. But, however this may be, there seems to be little doubt that this precipitancy has forced the hand of Italy and fettered her freedom of action at a very critical moment.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs has long foreseen the dangers of the contingency which has now occurred, and for many weeks Scutari has been the only topic he has been able to discuss. He has done all that lay in his power, as it was also his interest to do, to urge moderation and patience at Vienna, and to advocate the necessity, if the crisis should arise, of international co-operation to enforce on Montenegro submission to the decision of the Great Powers. The fear of isolated action by Austria has been his obsession. I had, however, not until somewhat recently realised that, should the other Powers not be prepared to go beyond the measures adopted in the pacific blockade, Italy would refuse to act with Austria alone in coercing Montenegro. I have been told, and have some reason to believe it is true that the Marquis di Casa[illegible] Affairs himself would have approved such co-operation, and had even urged it, but that the President of the Council was resolutely opposed to such a course, and the Marquis San Giuliano has [illegible] this [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

but there have been certain indications, and the Government appear to have no illusions on the subject.

Confronted with the alternative of being obliged to leave Austria a free hand, they have apparently decided, in the event of her moving alone, to counter the danger involved to Italian interests by a parallel but independent action in Southern Albania. This policy has something of a Machiavellian character, inasmuch as, it would appear, it is to be represented to the ally of Italy as a kind of co-operation for the common advantage of the two States, while in Italy itself it is intended to be regarded as a reprisal for Austrian action, and a means of securing a guarantee either that Austria shall not, by establishing a footing on the Adriatic littoral, obtain a material advantage at the expense of Montenegro, that Italy shall on her side secure a foothold on the coast, whose possession will place her in a favourable position in future negotiations either to insist on a return to the *status quo ante* or to assert a claim for material compensation.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs some days ago, in the presence of a small number of his colleagues of whom I have been indiscreet, spoke with considerable satisfaction of the proposed parallel action, and was clear that Italy should leave an adequate counterweight if Austria should take isolated action. He has also expressed to me his misgiving lest, once roused to action, the allied Empire would not content herself with merely enforcing the evacuation of Scutari.

The official press has begun to insist in energetic language on the anarchy prevailing in Albania, and on the necessity that the two States most directly interested should intervene to prevent the decision of the Powers from being nullified by the machination of bandit chieftains. It is accordingly suggested that, while Austria is dealing with the serious issue which has arisen in the north, Italy shall, by a parallel and simultaneous action in the south, to be carried out in the spirit of the existing understandings with Austria, defend the interests of Europe generally.

At the same time an official communique to the press has repudiated the idea of a division of Albania into spheres of influence, and claims that, if Italy should be obliged to act, it would be solely to defend the autonomy and independence of Albania.

I have already reported by telegraph some of the indications of naval and military preparations which are being made for an expedition to Valona, which is, I understand, the objective, and I am informed that Italian staff officers do not look forward with any great satisfaction to the possibility of an enterprise which they consider presents very serious difficulties. With the general public, however, the proposal, now openly discussed in the press, appears to be popular. The presence of Italy at Valona, which is regarded as the key of the Adriatic, will, it is agreed, neutralise any advantages which Austria might secure from Montenegro, and will make it difficult for her to contemplate imposing conditions which might compromise the equilibrium in that sea. The favourable reception of the scheme is in fact due to the presumption that it is really directed against Austria.

That such action is imminent if, after the meeting of Ambassadors to-morrow, Austria should proceed to extreme measures was practically admitted to me yesterday by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, as I have reported in my telegram No. 94 of the 4th May, though he continued to express the fervent hope that such action by Austria might still be avoided. This morning the Russian Ambassador called at the Foreign Office to announce that, after the disposition to treat which had been shown by Montenegro, Russia no longer advocated the co-operation of Italy with Austria-Hungary in measures of coercion against Montenegro, and he obtained from his Excellency the following statement which was placed on record at their interview :—

"L'Italie continuera de faire tout son possible pour éviter l'action de l'Autriche, mais si cette action avait lieu l'Italie croit servir la cause de la paix en agissant aussi en Albanie."

How far she will succeed or has succeeded in obtaining the assent of Austria to a policy which, however plausibly it may be represented as being in their common interest, can hardly be agreeable to her ally remains to be seen. And some explanation must evidently be given to the Powers by whose collective resolution the autonomy and independence of Albania has been decreed.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[22543] No. 208.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 114. Confidential.) *Rome, May 5, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 113 of yesterday's date, I have the honour to report that I was only able this morning to see the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to ask him whether he contemplated offering some explanation to the Powers to the effect that a separate action of Italy appeared to have become necessary in order to enable their agreement about Albania to be carried out. The Marquis di San Giuliano said he had just heard from London that the King of Montenegro had agreed to withdraw from Scutari, and he hoped therefore there might be no longer need to go into that question, which seems tantamount to admitting at once that action in Albania had not been necessary on its own account but was only contingent on an Austrian movement in the north of Albania. He then said that he had not yet considered what form such an announcement as I had spoken of would have to take. Nor did it would have been necessary to make some announcement. I asked him if Italy had contemplated asking for a mandate from the Powers, inasmuch as the autonomy of Albania was the outcome of an unanimous decision of those Powers. He replied that Austria-Hungary would not have asked for any mandate before going to Scutari. I pointed out that this was not the same thing, as the action of Austria would have been directed against Montenegro, whereas an Italian expedition to southern Albania would have implied that Italy was taking charge of an issue in which all the Powers were interested, though one or two of them might have more direct interests than the others. The action of Italy would, he rejoined, have been a form of co-operation with Austria, by parallel, though not by united, action. I hinted at the difficulty of representing the taking of hostages for good behaviour as being a form of co-operation, at which he smiled, and said it was always possible to exaggerate a form.

He added he wished to take this opportunity of assuring me that Italy had no desire to acquire anything for herself in Albania. Her only object was to ensure the autonomy and independence which had been resolved by the Powers. I observed that an official communique to this effect had been issued, and he said that official communiques did not always carry conviction or imply all that they appeared to, and he desired therefore to state this categorically for your information.

The Marquis di San Giuliano also said that it was difficult ever to be quite sure of the King of Montenegro, and we must still wait to see whether his apparent submission did not mask some subtle scheme, but he appeared genuinely relieved by the good news and to consider that the question of Italy's counter or parallel move might now be dismissed. I gather that the support of Italy will also be available for the compensations to be granted to Montenegro.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[22544] No. 209.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 119.) *Rome, May 8, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 113 and 114, Confidential, of the 4th and 5th instant, on the subject of the proposed Italian expedition to Albania, it is interesting to notice, in confirmation of the view expressed as to its real signification, that since the announcement on the 5th instant that the King of Montenegro had agreed to hand over Scutari to the Great Powers, there has been a general unanimity throughout the official and inspired press in announcing that the conditions of anarchy reported to have been prevailing there have been found to be exaggerated, and that there no longer seems to be any occasion to carry out such precautionary measures as had been contemplated.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[21878] No. 300.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 13.)

(No. 129. Confidential.)

Sir, *Rome, May 8, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs asked me to come and see him to-day, and spoke to me in the following sense:—

We had, he said, just surmounted a crisis which, until the last moment he had regarded as almost insurmountable. In achieving this happy result he thought Italy had rendered valuable service, in the first place, by her insistent counsels of patience and moderation at Vienna, and secondly, and not least, by the announcement of her intention, in the event of Austria having taken action alone, to send an expedition to Southern Albania, a proposal which, although put forward as constituting a form of co-operation, was really designed to make Austria pause for serious reflection before taking any action calculated to have far-reaching consequences. He was not sure how far the real significance of this move on the part of Italy had been appreciated, and it was possible that it might have been supposed that Italy had serious designs on Vallona. He could only repeat what he had already said to me—that there were no grounds for such a presumption. In any case that crisis was happily over, and the means by which the object had been attained had now only a Platonic interest.

Unfortunately, however, he had misgivings lest a new crisis should arise over the question of the southern frontier. He did not see how Italy and Austria could recede from the attitude they had adopted with regard to the Corfu channel. Neither Government could disregard the clearly-defined opinions given by their naval and military experts. The new frontier of Greece might, perhaps, be taken somewhat further north than the mouth of the Kalamas, which was the limit Italy had advocated, and no doubt there was some room for compromise between the extreme views adopted on either side. But Italy and Austria must firmly adhere to their demand that some portion of the mainland side of the Corfu channel should be excluded from the future territories of Greece. Mere neutralisation did not offer sufficient guarantees. As regards the attitude of Germany, he thought that that Government would have been naturally disposed rather to favour the claims of Greece, but they were pledged to support their Austrian and Italian allies in vital questions, and, this being so, there was every reason to anticipate once more a division of the Powers into three against three, unless certain units of the other group could be induced to realize the serious importance of this point to the Adriatic States.

He had hoped to be able to induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to be more accommodating as regards the northward extension of Greece in the hinterland, but, unfortunately, as yet he had not met with much success, and he feared that Austria would be intractable as regards the Koutso Vlachs of the Pindus. I could not help expressing some surprise at this alleged interest of Austria-Hungary in the fate of the Koutso Vlachs, and felt disposed to enquire, "What's Hecuba to him, or he to Hecuba?" The Marquis di San Giuliano admitted that the interest of Austria was vicarious. It was due to the intimacy of her relations with Roumania, and it was really a Roumanian interest which Austria was taking it upon herself to uphold. The Greeks aimed at fusing all the peoples they absorbed into the Hellenic world, and the Koutso Vlachs were convinced that they had a better chance of preserving their national characteristics in an Albania, with a civilisation and development far more rudimentary than their own, than they would have if the districts they inhabited became a part of Greece. I observed that Greece, especially Thessaly, was already full of Koutso Vlachs. His Excellency said he knew there were many established there, and he understood they were persecuted by the Greeks. I said I had no reason to believe this was the case when I visited Thessaly many years ago, but it was possible that, since the divergences between Exarchists and Patriarchists had become more accentuated, there had been a propaganda among the Koutso Vlachs which had provoked resentment. However this might be, the Minister for Foreign Affairs maintained that the Austrian Government seemed very tenacious on this point, though he could not say how far their view might be susceptible of modification when the details of the question and the distributions of population came to be examined.

I then said that, speaking from a purely personal point of view, it seemed to me unfortunate that Italy should have to adopt an attitude of opposition to the retention by Greece of the fruits of victory in both seas. Italy had taken up the position that

it was against her interests that a Slav State should be extended to the Adriatic, and appeared to dread the growing dominance of the Slav element in the Balkans. The Greeks and the Albanians were the only barrier remaining to the Slav. If Italy felt compelled to oppose the establishment of Greece on the mainland opposite Corfu, it seemed regrettable that she should intensify antagonisms by identifying herself with opposition to the retention by Greece of the Ægean islands, which, in view of the almost entirely Hellenic character of the populations, was a very natural ambition.

The Marquis di San Giuliano then said that he thought the question of the islands presented a far less serious difficulty, and it might be easier to meet the views of the Hellenic Kingdom there, at any rate in certain respects. As this was the first occasion on which I had been able to detect any tendency to defer to the aspirations of Greece in the Ægean, I ventured, tentatively, to pursue the point, and endeavoured to elicit from him whether, if the difficulties on which he had insisted with regard to the Corfu Channel were recognised as carrying weight, he would be disposed to modify the views which I had hitherto always understood him to hold with regard to the islands.

Eventually he admitted that it was possible that there might be matter to bargain with here. The islands were, he imagined, a more material object to Greece than a few kilometres more or less of coast-line to the north of Epirus, and, though it might not be desirable to put the question baldly in the form of a definite *quid pro quo*, he thought it might be possible to induce the Greeks to put up with a reduction of the extension they claimed on the west, if they could be convinced that by so doing they would secure more favourable consideration for their aims in the Ægean.

He then begged me once more to place before you with all possible urgency the gravity of the Adriatic question, in which Italy must at all risks maintain the attitude she had adopted, and expressed the hope that you might see your way to putting forward some proposal which would facilitate a solution, perhaps, on the lines above suggested.

The importance of this conversation seems to lie in the indication which it has afforded that Italy may be induced to modify a view which, if she had not very definitely expressed it, she has been known to hold in reserve as regards the islands, if there should be reason to suppose that a new crisis arising out of the settlement of the southern boundary between Albania and Greece could thereby be eliminated.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

[22578] No. 301.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 406.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 9, 1913.*

WITH reference to your circular telegram of the 7th May and my reply of the 8th May, I have the honour to enclose the résumé of a leading article by Ismail Hakki Babanzade in the "Tanin" on the subject of possible disagreement between the delegates of Turkey and those of the Balkan allies in the discussions concerning the preliminaries of peace.

Ismail Hakki Bey, who may be held to voice the views of the Committee of Union and Progress, anticipates that the fixing of what is meant by the Enos Midia line may have to be referred to the arbitration of the Powers; while in the matter of the Ægean islands, Greek pretensions will, he hopes, be combated by the Triple Alliance and England. He further trusts that, if all mention of the indemnity question is avoided at the discussion concerning the peace preliminaries, the allies will have lost all lever age for obtaining a war indemnity, and that, at the Paris Conference, Turkey will be able to evade the point.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 301.

Résumé of Article in the "Tanin" of May 8, 1913.

IN his leading article in the "Tanin" Ismaïl Hakki Babanzadé discusses the five points which, according to Reuter's telegram from London, are to form the basis of peace. It appears, he says, that the Enos-Midia line is not to be exactly determined in London. It is most probable that a Mixed Commission will be formed, subsequently, to settle the exact course the frontier is to take, and then the Bulgarian delegates will make such impossible demands that recourse will have to be had again to the Powers' arbitration.

The third point prevents the belligerents' delegates from discussing Albania officially at the Conference; it does not absolutely prevent their discussing the subject, however.

Point four is categorical: it provides for the annexation of Crete to Greece.

As to point five, Turkey need not worry about Mount Athos. She had long ago granted the widest possible freedom of worship to the monks there, and any change only opens the door to religious strife, in which not only the Greeks and Bulgarians, but the Russians also, will be concerned. With regard to the islands, however, Turkey has a great deal to say to the Powers. The islands are not handed over to the Powers as the land west of the Enos-Midia line is; the Powers are simply entrusted with the determination of the political status of the islands. Greece will doubtless never cease worrying the Powers on the subject, but Turkey must not neglect to bring her rights and vital interests before the conscience of the Powers. It is to be hoped that the Powers—the Triple Alliance and England in particular—will assist Turkey to obtain the recognition of her rights.

The fact that the summary of the treaty contains no mention of a war indemnity is worthy of special notice. The Powers have done what their word and their honour required. Doubtless the representatives of the belligerents will bring up the subject at the Conference in Paris, but it is to be hoped that the Powers will succeed in having the point set aside there also. Anyhow, when once peace has been made with Turkey in London, there is no force left to compel her in Paris to pay an indemnity. It is confidently expected that the skill of the Ottoman representatives in Paris, and the friendship clearly shown in Turkey's favour by certain of the Great Powers on the indemnity question, will at last clear this trouble definitely out of the way.

[22570] No. 302.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 108.)

Sir, *Athens, May 10, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 37 of the 30th ultimo on the subject of the protection of the interests of British and French holders of the Treasury bills issued by the National Bank of Turkey and the Bank of Salonica on the 14th February, 1912.

As instructed, I consulted M. Deville, the French Minister, and found that he had already addressed a note to the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject, and had received an answer which he had referred to his Government. He has been so good as to allow me to have copies taken of these notes, which I have the honour to transmit herewith.

Any representations from me to the Greek Government would no doubt receive the same reply, and I shall therefore suspend action upon your despatch until I receive further instructions, as it may be thought better that I should take up the matter at a later stage jointly with the French Minister if the arguments of the Greek Minister are not thought convincing.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 302.

French Minister to Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs.

LE Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la République française me charge de faire au Gouvernement Royal la notification suivante :—

Le 1er (14) février, 1912, le Ministre des Finances de l'Empire ottoman, agissant conformément à la loi des finances pour l'année 1327, a conclu avec la Banque nationale de Turquie et la Banque de Salonique un emprunt représenté par 1,500,000*l.* de bons de Trésor à échéance du 28 février (13 mars), 1913.

Les banques en question ont alors reçu un gage sur les revenus des douanes et contributions indirectes dans un certain nombre de circonscriptions de l'Empire, parmi lesquelles celles de Salonique. Ces revenus leur étaient assignés à compter du 1er (14) mars, 1912, jusqu'à complet remboursement des bons en capital et en intérêts. Ils leur étaient affectés en tant qu'ils dépasseraient la somme de £T. 642,000 (déjà affectées au service des emprunts 1902 douanes, 1901, 1905 et 1908), mais à l'exclusion du produit de surtaxe de 3 pour cent sur les droits d'importation ou de toute augmentation ultérieure de ces droits.

Il était entendu que par exception le minimum des revenus versé le 31 janvier (13 février), 1913, pour l'année précédente se monterait à £T. 300,000.

Or, à cette date les banques n'avaient reçu que £T. 75,000; et le Gouvernement ottoman a fait valoir que les revenus affectés étaient tellement diminués par suite de la guerre qu'ils suffisaient à peine au service des emprunts, pour lesquels ils étaient précédemment engagés jusqu'à concurrence de £T. 642,000.

En conséquence et en raison des importants intérêts français représentés par la Banque de Salonique, le Gouvernement de la république croit devoir porter ce qui précède à la connaissance du Gouvernement Royal et lui notifier les droits dévolus aux porteurs français des bons susvisés, afin que les revenus encaissés dans la circonscription de Salonique soient retenus pour leur compte jusqu'à concurrence du gage actuellement affecté à la garantie qu'ils ont reçue.

Enclosure 2 in No. 302.

Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs to French Minister.

M. le Ministre, *Athènes, le 17 (30) avril, 1913.*

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser le 10 (23) courant, relativement à la demande de la Banque de Salonique, tendant à ce qu'une partie des recettes de la douane de Salonique soit employée au payement d'une dette échue du Ministère des Finances de Turquie et garantie sur le produit des douanes ottomanes.

Une pareille manière de voir, si elle était admise, rendrait illusoire le droit que l'État hellénique a, en vertu des règles de la guerre, de percevoir les revenus publics dans les territoires militairement occupés et d'user, en général, de tous les moyens propres à affaiblir les ressources de son adversaire.

Si, dans un esprit libéral et pour des considérations particulières, le Gouvernement Royal fut conduit naguère à s'écarter de la rigueur des principes, admis en la matière, il conviendrait de ne pas perdre de vue que les circonstances aussi n'étaient pas absolument identiques : il s'agissait effectivement de revenus des provinces occupées affectées au service des emprunts administrés par la Dette publique ottomane, et non, comme en l'espèce, de prélèvements ou affectations sur le produit de douanes de l'Empire ottoman.

Il est à remarquer, d'ailleurs, que la non-exécution des engagements de la Sublime Porte envers la Banque de Salonique ne saurait être due à l'insuffisance des revenus des douanes ottomanes, étant donné que l'ensemble des prélèvements faits sur les recettes douanières pour le service de la dette de la Turquie représente une fraction de ces recettes telle que ces prélèvements ne peuvent être atteints par la diminution du produit des douanes occasionnée par l'occupation des provinces ottomanes de l'Europe.

Votre Excellence voudra bien convenir, après les explications qui précèdent, qu'adopter la manière de voir des intéressés, en l'espèce, ce serait permettre au Gouvernement ottoman de toucher, par une voie indirecte, les recettes douanières des pays occupés.

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Aussi le Gouvernement Royal se trouve, à son grand regret, dans l'impossibilité de satisfaire à la demande de la Banque de Salonique en l'espèce.

Veuillez, &c.
COROMILAS.

[22571] No. 303.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 109.) *Athens, May 10, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your telegram No. 71 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a despatch from the British delegate on the International Financial Commission respecting the release of certain bonds of the Greek 2½ per cent. guaranteed loan of 1898 deposited with the Bank of England by the National Bank of Greece.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 303.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.

International Financial Commission,
(No. 7.) *Athens, May 8, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to your telegram No. 71 of the 5th instant to Sir F. Elliot, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the letter addressed by the International Financial Commission to the National Bank of Greece, in reply to a formal request dated the 29th April consenting to the release of the bonds of the Greek guaranteed loan of 1898 deposited with the Bank of England in accordance with the terms of the Royal decree of the 22nd April, 1898.

I have duly noted the reservation made in case the Ionian Bank should again approach the commission with a similar request as regards the bonds held by it under the same conditions as those of the National Bank now released.

I have, &c.
H. D. BEAUMONT.

Enclosure 2 in No. 303.

International Financial Commission to National Bank of Greece.

M. le Gouverneur, *Athènes, le 24 avril (7 mai),* 1913.

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception de la lettre que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser en date du 16 (29) avril, dans laquelle vous exprimez le désir de la Banque nationale de Grèce d'être libérée de l'obligation imposée par l'article 13 du chapitre I du décret Royal du 22 avril, 1898, de conserver en portefeuille les titres de l'emprunt garanti 2½ pour cent de 1898 du montant nominal de 14,227,500 fr. (569,100l.) livrés à la banque ainsi qu'à la Banque d'Épire-Thessalie en remboursement des emprunts contractés auprès d'elles par le Gouvernement hellénique avant l'arrangement de 1898.

La Commission financière internationale ayant sérieusement étudié la question, et prenant en considération que le but dans le but ces obligations ont été déposées—à savoir, de faciliter la reconstitution de l'encaisse métallique en prévision du jour où la Banque nationale de Grèce reprendra son service en espèces—a déjà été en partie atteint par l'opération de la loi du 19 mars, 1910, ce qui a permis à la banque de constituer une réserve spéciale, remontant au 31 décembre à 100,000,000 de drachmes et qui depuis jour a été encore augmentée, n'a vu aucune objection à donner son assentiment à ce que la banque puisse disposer librement des obligations en question.

Les instructions nécessaires seront, par conséquent, envoyées à la Banque d'Angleterre [illegible] obligations à la disposition de la Banque nationale de Grèce.

Agréez, &c.
Le Président.
H. D. BEAUMONT.

[22596] No. 304.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 97.)

Sir, *Belgrade, May 12, 1913.*

COMMENTING on an article which appeared in a recent issue of the "Neue Freie Presse" and which expressed the hope that in view of the friendly attitude of the Monarchy Servia would change her anti-Austrian policy and adopt a more friendly demeanour, the "Samouprava" of the 9th instant has an article the substance of which is as follows:—

"Servia has as yet not noticed any marks of friendship or good-will on the part of the Monarchy. Rather the contrary, in fact. The 'Neue Freie Presse' accuses Servia of being in the hands of Russia, of lacking independence, and of being a mere tool of Panslavism. It is surely not unnatural that Servia turns from Austria, seeing that the Monarchy loses no opportunity of thwarting Servian aspirations. If proof be necessary of the unfriendly attitude of the Monarchy it is furnished by the autonomy of Albania and by Servia having been prevented from retaining an outlet on the Adriatic. It is still less unnatural that Servia should turn towards those nations which help and defend her against the injustices of her adversary, and, even admitting that she submits to the will of Russia, why should this not be so, seeing that it in no way hinders Servian freedom of action and that Russia helps Servia to attain her national aspirations?"

As regards the proof of Austrian friendship quoted by the "Neue Freie Presse" namely, that Austria did not enter the sanjak at the beginning of the war, the "Samouprava" observes that the reason why Austria abstained was that she expected the Turks to defeat the Servians, and that in any case Austria has counteracted the effects of her generosity by establishing an autonomous Albania and by depriving Servia of an Adriatic port.

The article concludes by stating that if Austria showed half the friendship that is shown her by Russia the relations of the two countries would be on a footing of friendship and confidence, which would be of great advantage to both. But unfortunately Austria gives proof of her good-will in a manner which is very difficult to understand. As matters now stand the friendship of Russia and her friends is of much greater value, and Servia must show herself grateful, and worthy of it.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[22587] No. 305.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 416. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 13, 1913.*

IN recent despatches I have had the honour to report on the regrettable state of things prevailing in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians in Eastern Asia minor.

The Armenian Patriarchate and National Assembly have, not unnaturally, been preoccupied with this state of things and finally decided to present a memorial to the Grand Vizier.

I have the honour to enclose a translation of this memorial,* the Patriarch Mgr. Archaroumis's statement as to the favourable reception accorded him by Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, and the latter's official communiqué published through the Agence ottomane.

As will be noticed the Armenian deputation, after pointing out that they felt it their duty towards the Ottoman state and towards their community to lay the state of affairs before the Government, proceeded to enumerate several of the grievances of which the Armenians have reason to complain, and especially laid stress on the dangerous frame of mind that has been engendered among the Moslems of Asia Minor by the stories put about to the effect that recent Turkish defeats in the Balkans were due to the treachery of the Christians serving with the Ottoman forces. As Christian in Asia Minor denotes "Armenian," and it is a matter of common knowledge that the

* Not printed.

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Armenians fought well in the recent campaign, the Patriarch and the deputation begged the Grand Vizier, who is also Minister of War, to give an official denial to these mischievous tales.

As appears from the Agence ottomane communiqué the Grand Vizier had no hesitation in acceding to this latter request, and, while paying a tribute to the bravery displayed by the Armenian soldiers in the Balkan war, styled the story that the Armenians had been the cause of Turkish defeats as a "vile calumny." Mahmoud Shevket Pasha, however, hinted that the Armenians must work with the Ottoman Government in its efforts to introduce the necessary reforms and suppress brigandage of which, he stated, the Turks and Kurds had also reason to complain.

This is the old Turkish rejoinder to the special Armenian complaints and the pleas and representations for their redress. It was the argument used by the Porte after the Russo-Turkish war, when pressed to carry out its engagements under Article 61 of the Treaty of Berlin, and this aspect of the question was dwelt on by the Ambassadors of the Six Powers in their collective Note to the Porte of the 7th September, 1880, a perusal of which would seem to show that matters in the provinces inhabited by the Armenians have not much improved since that date.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[22597] No. 306.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 98.)

Sir, *Belgrade, May 14, 1913.*

M. STEFANOVITCH told me yesterday that the Servian Government would shortly—presumably as soon as peace is signed—approach the Bulgarian Government with a request for the revision of the treaty.

Meanwhile, frequent statements have appeared in the Servian press to the effect that Bulgaria is weakening and is willing to concede the Servian demands. As there seems to be no good foundation for such an impression it is more than probable that these statements are suggested by the Government with the object of encouraging the public to believe that the Servian possession of the disputed territory is assured. Should the question then eventually come to be submitted to the arbitration of Russia M. Pashitch would endeavour to influence the Russian decision by protesting that public opinion in Servia would never tolerate the concession of the territory to Bulgaria; that if the arbitration be given against Servia his Government must resign, Russian prestige would be at an end, and he would be succeeded by a party which would turn to Austria for support.

I am informed that amongst the public the possibility of war is openly discussed, and that a feeling prevails that the Bulgarian army is exhausted, and that Servia will never have a better chance of defeating Bulgaria than at the present moment.

(Sent to Sophia.)

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[22640] No. 307.

Note communicated by German Embassy, May 17, 1913.

THE French Ambassador at Berlin has proposed to begin the work of the Paris Financial Commission on the 27th May. The Imperial Government are prepared to agree to that date, on the express condition that the representatives of the Great Powers should meet before and come to an agreement on the principal points. The Imperial Government consider that the Paris conversations are to be regarded as a continuation of the Ambassadors' conference in London.

German Embassy,
London, May 16, 1913.

[22641] No. 308.

Note communicated by German Embassy, May 17, 1913.

THE Greek Minister at Berlin has proposed the following alterations to the peace treaty:—

"L'article 3 du projet de traité de paix porte que 'les États alliés remettent aux Puissances le soin de régler les frontières de l'Albanie.' L'article 5 porte que 'le Sultan et les États alliés confient aux Puissances le soin de statuer sur le sort des iles et du Mont-Athos.'

"Nous demandons à ce que l'article 3 soit rédigé comme il suit: 'Le Sultan remet aux Puissances le soin de régler les frontières de l'Albanie,' et l'article 5 de la façon suivante: 'Le Sultan remet aux Puissances le soin de statuer sur le sort des iles et du Mont-Athos.'"

The Imperial Government sees no objection to these alterations.

German Embassy, London,
May 16, 1913.

[22638] No. 309.

General Post Office to Foreign Office.—(Received May 17.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *General Post Office, May 16, 1913.*

IN reply to your letters of the 9th and 14th instant, I have the honour to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that there seems to be no objection in principle to the abolition of the British postal agencies in Turkey. This office might indeed welcome their extinction, so soon as there is adequate security for an efficient alternative service. It is considered, however, that in the interests of British commerce their abolition is to be deprecated unless they are abolished concurrently with those maintained by other foreign countries.

With regard to the suggestion that, pending the abolition of the agencies, Ottoman stamps should be sold instead of British stamps, no sufficient reason is seen for raising objection, if acquiescence is expedient for political reasons, nor, from a post office point of view, is it considered that such an alteration in the practice at the British agencies need be made conditional on a similar change in the agencies maintained by other Powers.

I enclose a statement of the estimated receipts and expenditure at Constantinople, Beirout, and Smyrna for the year 1912-1913. The figures for Salonica have not been included, as it is assumed that future action with regard to the agency at that place will be a matter for separate consideration. It will be observed that the statement with regard to the three other agencies, without any allowance for Administrative charges in London, or for the rental value of the post office premises at Smyrna, or for stationery, &c., indicates an annual profit of approximately 1,900*l.*, or about 10 per cent. of the receipts (10,258*l.*) from the sale of postage stamps. It is suggested that, if the proposed alteration is agreed to, it should be on the principle—

1. That the Ottoman Administration should defray any deficit or receive any profit on the service.

2. That there should be no elaborate system of accounting between the two Administrations, but that agreement should be come to (after some further investigation as to probable loss or profit) for the payment of an annual sum to be fixed, say, for a period of five years.

It would be desirable to arrange that any such fixed annual payment should be subject to revision should there be any considerable change in the amount of the business during that time.

From the financial point of view it is necessary to refer to the fact that a considerable portion of the receipts of these agencies is derived from time to time from the sale of stamps to stamp dealers and collectors, and that this amount fluctuates greatly. If the British agencies adopt the use of Ottoman stamps instead of British

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stamps specially surcharged, it is to be anticipated that the sale to stamp dealers will be greatly reduced even if it does not cease altogether. Immediate steps are being taken to ascertain approximately what proportion of the stamp sales during the past year represents sales to stamp dealers; and the Secretary of State will be furnished as speedily as possible with an estimate of profit and loss after allowing for the extinction of this item of revenue.

In the meantime, it is hoped that this letter will enable the Secretary of State to take such action as he finds desirable on the question of principle, leaving the points of detail for further consideration. If objection be taken to the suggestion that the payment to be made to or by the Ottoman Administration should be a fixed annual sum agreed on beforehand, it is thought that it might be possible to arrange that the payment, so long as there is a profit, should take the form of a fixed percentage on the face value of the postage stamps requisitioned from the Ottoman Administration for agency purposes. It is of course assumed that, if the British agencies undertake to sell Ottoman stamps, these stamps will be supplied on demand without charge.

The Postmaster-General is at present travelling on the Continent; and, as the Secretary of State wishes to have an answer this week, it has been impossible to submit the question to Mr. Samuel.

The case will, however, be submitted to him at once for his decision; and, when this is received, a further communication will be sent to you.

I am, &c.
A. F. KING.

Enclosure in No. 309.

STATEMENT of Estimated Receipts and Expenditure at the British Postal Agencies at Constantinople, Beirout, and Smyrna for the year 1912–1913.

Revenue.	£	£	Expenditure.	£	£
Postage Stamp Sales*—			Salaries and Wages—		
Constantinople ..	6,392		Constantinople ..	1,733	
Beirout	1,051		Beirout	413	
Smyrna	2,805	10,258	Smyrna	728	2,874
			Pension charges on above items ..		269
Money orders.—Commission collected from public		113	Rent—		
Postal orders.—Poundage collected from public		130	Constantinople ..	339	
Postage collected in cash ..		155	Beirout	16	
Private boxes		200	Smyrna†	—	355
			Incidental Expenses—		
			Ship-letter gratuities ..	247	
			Postage, &c. ..	270	
			Stores	30	547
			Payments to foreign countries at postal union rates of transit		5,300
			Ditto on parcels		350
			Balance of revenue over expenditure‡		1,170
		10,856			10,856

* N.B.—There are considerable fluctuations in the amount of stamps sold owing to the purchases by philatelists.

† No payment from post office funds is made in respect of the rent of the Smyrna office.

‡ Exclusive of Administrative charges [illegible] at the General Post Office, London.

[22702] No. 310.

National Bank of Turkey to Foreign Office.—(Received May 17.)

Sir, *50, Cornhill, London, May 16, 1913.*

WITH reference to our letter of the 19th March, and other correspondence on the subject of Turkish Treasury bills, we beg leave to enquire whether Secretary Sir Edward Grey has arrived at any decision regarding a communication to the Governments of the allied Balkan States, and if so, whether any action has been taken in the matter.

We take this opportunity of informing you that we received on the 5th May, 1913, the sum of £T. 12,000 from the Ottoman Government in respect of these Treasury bills. With the exception of this sum, and of the sum mentioned in our letter of the 19th March, no payment has been made by the Ottoman Government in discharge of the obligation defined in article 7 of the contract. Repeated applications have been made to the Government for a statement of the receipts from the custom houses in question, and of the application of these receipts, but hitherto we have not succeeded in obtaining any information on this point.

We have, &c.
(For National Bank of Turkey),
H. BABINGTON SMITH,
President.

[22724] No. 311.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 17.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, May 17, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram relative to affairs in Scutari.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 311.

Vice-Admiral, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *May 17, 1913.*

NO funds are at present available for the expense of the administration of Scutari. Immediate provision should be made for the lighting of the town, for sanitation, and other serious services. Desire to be informed at once how money is to be obtained for the payment of these services.

A local contractor holds the contract for the fisheries in the Lake of Scutari for another year, but the Ottoman Public Debt Commissioners receive all money from this source, and also for the production of salt, which is considerable, and from the sale of receipt stamps.

I appointed a collector of customs this morning in lieu of the Montenegrin who held the post.

A loan of money for the assistance of the town is immediately necessary.

[22655] No. 312.

London Chamber of Commerce to Foreign Office.—(Received May 17.)

Oxford Court, Cannon Street, London,
Sir, *May 17, 1913.*

TOBACCO trade section.

On the 30th December last I had the honour to submit representations on behalf of members of the tobacco trade section of this chamber, who are interested in the manipulation and importation of Turkish tobacco grown in Macedonia, expressing their

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fear that, owing to the transfer of territory from the Turkish Government to the Balkan States, the new Government might decide to make the export of tobacco a Government monopoly, which would mean ruin to the British companies now engaged in that trade.

In reply, you promised that the matter will not be lost sight of by His Majesty's Government, for which assurance the members concerned were exceedingly grateful, but as the chamber understands that some of the Governments of leading European States are taking a very active interest in this matter on behalf of their subjects who are interested in the Turkish tobacco trade, I have been requested to again address you on behalf of the British firms, companies, and individuals concerned.

Owing, however, to the lapse of time since my previous communication, and that it will apparently be necessary for all the States to seek new sources of revenue to meet the extraordinary expenditure incurred during the war, it is highly probable that the opportunity of obtaining an assured source of revenue from the establishment of a Government monopoly in export tobacco may appear too advantageous to be overlooked, and the members concerned respectfully desire to reiterate the hope that His Majesty's Government will take such action as may be necessary to safeguard the British interests in the tobacco trade.

I am to suggest that if you could afford an opportunity for a personal interview to two or three delegates from the section, who would be prepared to supply information on the present position and to submit the views of the trade generally, such an opportunity would be much appreciated by all concerned, and, in this connection, I am to add that one of the partners of a British house, who spends a great deal of his time in Turkey, is now in London, and would be able to give the latest details of the present position.

Trusting that these representations may receive your favourable consideration.

I am, &c.

CHARLES E. MUSGRAVE,
Secretary.

[22732] No. 313.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 194.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, May 17, 1913.*

RUSSIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs referred in conversation yesterday to Anglo-Turkish negotiations respecting the Persian Gulf region. He seemed inclined to complain of His Majesty's Government taking present opportunity to obtain concessions from Turkey. I explained that the negotiations in question formed a natural complement of those respecting Turco-Persian frontier. His Excellency laid particular stress on press reports to the effect that His Majesty's Government have agreed to make a money advance to Turkey. He said that it had been understood between the three Powers that no money should be given to Turkey pending the conclusion of peace. I remarked that there seemed now little danger of Turkey resuming fighting.

It might, I think, be desirable to make some communication to his Excellency about these negotiations, as he seems decidedly sensitive on the subject.

[22733] No. 314.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 121.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, May 17, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 116 of 8th May.

M. Andra Nikolitch left here for London on the 15th instant, accompanied by M. Ivan Pavlovitch as fourth delegate.

[22730] No. 315.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 122.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, May 17, 1913.*

SERVIA and Bulgaria.

My telegram No. 120 of 14th May.

According to the Prime Minister, whom I have just seen, Servia will approach Bulgaria for a revision of the treaty in an entirely friendly manner, and harbours no aggressive designs whatever. The Servian military dispositions, he said, were precautionary and with a view to preventing operations by Bulgarian bands. He spoke of mediation in case it was found impossible to arrive at a settlement by direct negotiation.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[22740] No. 316.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 100.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, May 17, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 180 of 12th May.

Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Italian Minister at Sophia telegraphs that his British colleague has received no instructions regarding repatriation of Turkish troops in Albania.

[22736] No. 317.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 169.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, May 17, 1913.*

MACEDONIAN excesses.

My telegram No. 159 of 9th May.

Bulgarian Government have sent me a list of twenty-four prisoners sentenced by court-martial at Serres, and of others awaiting trial.

My French colleague has associated himself with my action.

[22737] No. 318.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 170.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May 17, 1913.*

SERVIAN and Bulgarian relations.

My telegram No. 156 of 6th May.

A concentration of Bulgarian troops is taking place on Servian frontier north of Balkans, near Blegradchik; troops employed are drawn from Shoumla, Varna, Rustchuk, and amount to about 60,000 men.

(Sent to Belgrade and Bucharest.)

[22738] No. 319.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 171. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May 17, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 168 of 14th May.

Prime Minister tells me that his offer to send Bulgarian Minister at Constantinople to Athens has not yet been accepted. His Excellency is most anxious to come to terms with Greece as soon as possible, so as to leave field clear for the settlement of question with Servia. He added that he would not himself countenance any war with the allies.

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as his country had suffered enough. Greek Government had given him to understand they would never give up Salonica unless forcibly dispossessed. Question had been recently discussed in Bulgarian Cabinet, and several of his colleagues had been of opinion that Bulgaria could not resign claim to Salonica. He himself would not make it *casus belli*, and this was known at Athens. He had hopes that good would come of M. Sarafof's mission to Athens, as the latter was most conciliatory.

His Excellency informed me that difficulties with Servia remain stationary. Servian Government having taken no action recently. He had heard, however, that they would demand revision of treaty, and this Bulgaria could never agree to.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

[22727] No. 320.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 74.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, May 17, 1913.*

SALONICA telegram No. 32 of 17th May: Ottoman Bank.

I have informed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and expressed confidence that orders will be sent to suspend any operation which might lead to a regrettable incident.

(Repeated to Salonica.)

[22528] No. 321.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 17.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, May 17, 1913.*

MY telegram of 24th December.

Greek authorities now claim right to inspect books of the Ottoman Bank with a view to controlling the accounts of Ottoman officials [? regarded as] private accounts by the bank. They threaten to resort to force to this end. With my approval and that of my French colleague, the director of the Ottoman Bank has declared that he will yield only to effective force.

(Repeated to Athens.)

[22735] No. 322.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 18.)

(No. 125.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, May 18, 1913.*

PEACE negotiations.

Prime Minister yesterday asked me to telegraph to you the request of the Servian Government that following formula be added to article 3 of the draft treaty:—(End of R.)

"... y compris les garanties en faveur de la Serbie pour un port libre, un chemin de fer et l'importation et l'exportation des marchandises de toute sorte en franchise de droit et douanes et de toute autre taxe."

[22754] No. 323.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 151.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, May 11, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, in original, with copy, the decision of the conference of Ambassadors, signed at St. Petersburgh on the 9th instant, in regard to the Roumano-Bulgarian frontier question.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

Enclosure in No. 323.

Decision of Conference of Ambassadors respecting the Roumano-Bulgarian Frontier Question.

LA conférence des Ambassadeurs, réunie à Saint-Pétersbourg, et à laquelle ont pris part, sous la présidence du Ministre Impérial des Affaires Étrangères de Russie, les Ambassadeurs d'Allemagne, d'Angleterre, d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'Italie et de France, pour se prononcer sur le différend qui s'est élevé entre les Gouvernements bulgare et roumain au sujet de la frontière méridionale de la Dobroudja;

Après avoir examiné les revendications formulées par la Roumanie et les concessions offertes par la Bulgarie,

Décide:

1. La ville de Silistrie doit être attribuée à la Roumanie.

La nouvelle frontière roumano-bulgare partira d'un point sur le Danube, à 3 kilom. environ, à l'ouest, de la périphérie de Silistrie, coupera la route de Choumla, puis la route de Varna, également à 3 kilom. environ de la périphérie de la ville, et gagnera directement la frontière actuelle.

Une commission mixte bulgaro-roumaine fixera sur les lieux, dans un délai de trois mois à dater de la présente décision, le tracé de la frontière.

Au besoin, elle pourra s'adjoindre des experts à nommer par les Puissances médiatrices.

2. Le Gouvernement roumain donnera une indemnité à ceux des sujets bulgares habitant Silistrie, ou le territoire englobé dans la nouvelle frontière, qui auront fait connaître, dans un délai de six mois, à dater de la présente décision, leur désir de quitter la ville ou le territoire ci-dessus délimité.

Une commission mixte bulgaro-roumaine, après avoir constaté le dommage, fixera le montant de l'indemnité.

Au besoin, elle pourra s'adjoindre des experts à nommer par les Puissances médiatrices.

3. Conformément à l'engagement qu'elle s'est déclarée prête à prendre, la Bulgarie n'élèvera aucune fortification le long de la frontière actuelle, du Danube à la mer Noire.

Une commission mixte déterminera, dans un délai de six mois à dater de la présente décision, la zone, à l'intérieur de laquelle la Bulgarie s'interdit de construire des ouvrages fortifiés et s'oblige à démanteler ceux de ces ouvrages qui pourraient s'y trouver.

Au besoin, elle pourra s'adjoindre des experts à nommer par les Puissances médiatrices.

4. La conférence enregistre la déclaration faite à Londres par le délégué de la Bulgarie et consignée dans le protocole du 16 (29) janvier, 1913, aux termes de laquelle "la Bulgarie consent à donner l'autonomie aux écoles et aux églises des Koutzo-Valaques se trouvant dans les futures possessions bulgares, en tant que ces écoles seront fréquentées par les enfants koutzo-valaques, et à permettre la création d'un épiscopat pour ces mêmes Koutzo-Valaques, avec la faculté pour le Gouvernement roumain de subventionner, sous la surveillance du Gouvernement bulgare, lesdites institutions culturelles."

Avant de se séparer, la conférence a à cœur de rendre hommage aux dispositions connues de la Bulgarie à maintenir et resserrer ses liens d'amitié avec la Roumanie.

Ces dispositions ayant singulièrement facilité sa tâche, la conférence exprime la conviction que les Puissances sauront gré à la Bulgarie des sacrifices qu'elle a été dans le cas de lui demander.

Fait en huit exemplaires, à Saint-Pétersbourg, le 26 avril / 9 mai, 1913.

SAZONOF.
F. POURTALÈS.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.
D. THURN.
A. CARLOTTI.
DELCASSÉ.

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[22793] No. 324.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 417.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 13, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that since the recent defeats of Turkey's land forces and the occupation by the Bulgarians of the Marmora littoral and the territory up to Bulair and Chatalja, the idea, evidently inspired, has become prevalent in Turkish circles that Turkey must henceforth devote her energies and expense to reform her navy and become a naval Power.

During recent months I have had occasion to report on the various negotiations for the immediate purchase of Brazilian and other Dreadnoughts.

One of the ideas underlying these schemes would seem to be that by the acquisition of such units Turkey might influence in her favour the solution of the question of the Ægean Islands, and in any case have after peace a navy superior to that of Greece in the Eastern Mediterranean, if not to that of Russia in the Black Sea.

In the same order of ideas the heir apparent, Prince Yusuf Izzedin, has recently paid a demonstrative visit to the Turkish Admiralty museum and written an inscription on the visitors' book to the effect: "The future, and perhaps the existence, of the State depend solely on our perfecting the navy. My father, Sultan Abdul Aziz, who understood this truth, concentrated all his efforts on the improvement of the fleet. Turkey was then a second-class naval Power. Unfortunately this programme was subsequently abandoned, and many irreparable disasters have in consequence befallen our country. Our efforts must henceforth be devoted solely to the reorganisation of our naval forces. The future of our country depends on our fleet alone."

The "Tanin," in an article on this act of the Prince, strongly urges that Turkey should henceforth concentrate on the development of her navy, and remarks that the words of the heir apparent constitute a national programme, and point out what is the duty of the whole Ottoman nation.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[22899] No. 325.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 50.)

Sir, *Bucharest, May 13, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 49 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report that the meeting of Conservatives convened at the Conservative Club at Bucharest on the 8th instant by M. Carp, formerly chief of the Conservative party, and by M. Filipesco, late Minister of Domains in the present Cabinet, has failed in its object, and M. Maioresco's Coalition Ministry remains united and unshaken, retaining the support of Conservatives and Conservative Democrats in Parliament.

With a view to evolving a vote of confidence in the Ministry, a Ministerial deputy interpellated M. Maioresco in the Chamber yesterday as to the attitude of the Cabinet in face of the resolution voted at the Conservative Club. In the debate which followed M. Maioresco, in a lengthy speech, pointed out the obvious fact that the prerogative of dismissing cabinets rested with the King and Parliament and not with a political club. The debate concluded with the passing of a vote of confidence in the Cabinet by eighty-five votes to fifteen.

It is to be hoped that M. Carp will take his defeat quietly—he has for the moment left Bucharest for the country—but there is no doubt that the sooner the Cabinet are in a position to submit to Parliament for ratification the decision of the Ambassadors in St. Petersburgh the better it will be for the Ministry. In conversation with me this afternoon at his weekly reception M. Maioresco said that he was somewhat embarrassed by the obligation he was under to defer communicating the decision to Parliament until after the signature of the peace preliminaries. His Excellency said the decision was of course an open secret in Bucharest, and he feared that if its submission to Parliament were delayed the agitation against its acceptance might increase, in which case he might be compelled, notwithstanding the wishes of the Powers, which he had every desire to respect, to submit the decision to Parliament in secret

session. Whether or not M. Maioresco's apprehensions as to agitation are justified, it should be borne in mind that Parliament rises on the 24th, after which there will in the ordinary course be no opportunity for the ratification of the Ambassadors' decision for some months and the matter might, if not definitely accepted by that date, have to remain in suspense until November. This would seem undesirable in view of the uncertainty of the outlook as regards the relations between the Balkan allies.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[22865] No. 326.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 29.)

Sir, *Cettinje, May 13, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 92 of to-day's date, respecting the proposed mediation of the Powers and the conclusion of peace, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the collective communication made to the Montenegrin Government on the 1st May, as well as the text of the reply which has just been received from them.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 326.

Collective Note communicated to Montenegrin Government, May 1, 1913.

LES Puissances prennent acte avec satisfaction de la réponse des alliés à leur dernière note et de leur acceptation des bases de paix formulées dans cette note. Ces bases de paix ayant été déjà agréées par la Sublime Porte, les Puissances invitent les belligérants à cesser immédiatement les hostilités, à désigner leurs plénipotentiaires et le lieu de la réunion pour les négociations de la paix.

Quant aux réserves de la réponse des alliés relatives aux îles et à la délimitation de l'Albanie, les Puissances font de nouveau observer que ces questions sont exclusivement de leur ressort. En conséquence, elles font remarquer que la cession des îles par la Turquie ne peut être mentionnée comme le font les alliés dans le paragraphe 2 de leur réponse.

Enclosure 2 in No. 326.

Note communicated by the Montenegrin Government, April 30 (May 13), 1913.

LES Gouvernements alliés ont eu l'honneur de recevoir la communication du 18 avril (1er mai), par laquelle les Grandes Puissances, prenant acte de l'acceptation par les quatre Etats balkaniques des bases de paix formulées dans la note collective du 1er (14) avril, les invitent à cesser les hostilités et à désigner leurs plénipotentiaires ainsi que le lieu de réunion pour les négociations de la paix.

Les Grandes Puissances répètent dans cette communication qu'elles n'admettent pas les réserves relatives à la délimitation de l'Albanie et aux îles. Les Gouvernements alliés ne peuvent cependant croire que dans la médiation proposée il s'agissait de leur refuser de débattre des questions touchant leurs intérêts vitaux et résultant de la guerre victorieuse et libératrice qu'ils ont entreprise. La différence des deux points de vue ne doit pas toutefois arrêter les négociations en vue de conclure la paix, et les Gouvernements alliés, dans leur désir de déférer aux démarches des Grandes Puissances, déclarent qu'ils sont prêts à cesser les hostilités et désignent Londres comme lieu de réunion pour la conférence de la paix, à laquelle ils enverront les mêmes plénipotentiaires comme par le passé.

Cettigné, le 30 avril (13 mai), 1913.

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[22796] No. 327.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 420.)

Constantinople, May 15, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to the general question of Ottoman provincial reform, and in particular to my despatch No. 300 of the 12th April, I have the honour to report that the Committee of Union and Progress organ, the "Tasvir-i-evkiar," published on the 9th instant an interesting article on the general condition of reform proposals in the Ottoman Empire.

The writer begins by pointing out that in this country questions of reform should be approached not only from the point of view of the actual internal benefits they secure, but also from that of the effect which will be produced abroad.

He complains of the sceptical attitude now adopted in Europe in all questions of Turkish reform, and argues that the insuccess of all previous projects were largely due to Europe itself. This lack of confidence comes from not appreciating the difficulties of the case. After all, the writer argues, the Powers participated directly in the task of reform in Macedonia, and failed themselves to achieve the ends desired.

A large proportion even of the internal difficulties met with by the Government in carrying out reforms is the fault of Europe.

For any reform the first desideratum is money, and the raising of money is at once met by the Powers with refusals, appeals to the Capitulations, and obstructions such as in the case of the temettu. Even the raising of a loan only shackles the Government with further conditions and impediments.

Again, the second desideratum in a reform movement is unity, and it is foreign intrigue and interference alone which has in the past disturbed the unanimity of all Ottomans in joining to help on the reformers.

The failure of past schemes has thus been due to the fact that sufficient firmness and prudence have not been shown to cope with these considerations, and the writer concludes that the new scheme, whose very equity is so good an augury, will be carried out with an intelligent and statesmanlike appreciation of the complicated conditions with which it has to contend.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[22797] No. 328.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 421.)

Constantinople, May 14, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 399 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to report that a further article upon Albania by Ismail Hakki Babanzadé appeared in the "Tanin" of yesterday's date.

The writer states that the future of Albania appears liable to two alternative solutions. Either it is to be an autonomous sanjak dependent on Turkey, or else a practically independent principality under the ægis of Italy and Austria. The former alternative would mean that it would be used as an element in the Russian policy of directing Greek and Ottoman currents into the main Panslavist channel; the latter alternative would entail the disappearance of Albania as an independent Moslem State, even as Morocco and Persia have disappeared.

The Russian alternative, the article continues, is one well worth the serious consideration of Turkish statesmen. But if Turkey is to undertake the trouble of maintaining her practical connection with the young Albanian State, she must get some compensation in return, and this compensation must come from Russia. The first [illegible] in such a policy would have to be the waiving by Russia of her exclusive claims on the Black Sea basin railways.

If, however, Russia is not prepared to meet Turkey half way, and if the other alternative—the Austrian alternative—is to be adopted, Turkey should not make any sacrifices to resist it. She should accept the necessities of the situation and raise no objections to Austrian and Italian aims, provided only her religious and moral requirements regarding Albania are satisfied.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[22895] No. 329.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 99.)

Belgrade, May 14, 1913.

Sir,

IT is reported that, on the 10th instant in the vicinity of Semendria, on the Danube, the Austrian frontier guards fired on a Servian steamer, wounding one of the passengers.

M. d'Ugron, of whom I enquired as to the truth of this report, tells me that the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs recently spoke to him about this alleged incident, but no report concerning it has been received by his Government from the military authorities, nor has the Servian Minister in Vienna made any representations. He considers it, however, not at all unlikely that the steamer was fired upon, for, on several occasions lately, it has occurred that Servian reservists returning to their homes have, when the steamer approached the Austrian shore, called insulting remarks and made disgusting gestures at the frontier guards, and, under the circumstances, it would be scarcely surprising if these retaliated by firing. Indeed, he said, he had protested to M. Pashitch, and had told him that if these provocative gestures were made from the Servian steamers the Austrian authorities refused to assume any responsibility for the consequences.

M. Stefanovitch tells me a commission has been sent to Semendria to enquire into the circumstances.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[22756] No. 330.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 155.)

St. Petersburgh, May 15, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that during the whole of the recent acute crisis in regard to Scutari the Russian press preserved a most praiseworthy and unusual moderation, no doubt partly due to the chance that the fall of Scutari occurred in the last week of Russian Easter, in the middle of a period of almost continuous holidays. Still even when this period was at an end there was no violent expression of anti-Austrian feeling, and even the "Novoe Vremya" refrained from its usual hysterical polemics. This may, perhaps, be largely attributed to the fact that Russia was enjoying the privilege of witnessing the triumph, temporarily at any rate, of her Slav kinsmen at the expense of Austria, and the consequent wounding of the latter's *amour-propre*. For once it was Austrian and not Russian prestige that was suffering, and Russian public opinion could consequently afford to watch the development of the situation without attempting to aggravate its difficulties. I am, however, rather inclined to believe that the moderation shown by the press was due to instructions emanating from the Government itself, which was extremely anxious that in the event of still more serious developments arising, the tone of Russian public opinion might not be held in any way to blame.

The line adopted by almost all sections of the press was that the fall of Scutari had materially changed the situation and would necessitate some alteration in the former decision of the Powers in regard to the Albanian frontier. Even if Montenegro were not permitted to retain Scutari itself, it was universally felt that she was at least entitled to receive substantial territorial compensation. Whatever decision may eventually be arrived at in this respect it is certain that public opinion here will bring all available pressure to bear on the Government to induce the latter to support Montenegro's claims to such compensation. M. Sazonof's policy has already been severely criticised throughout the war in the Balkans as not befitting the great position of Russia, and as not realising the importance of supporting sufficiently strongly the aspirations of the allied States. Any further concession to meet the wishes of Austria will consequently arouse a very widespread feeling of discontent against the policy of the present Government.

The decision of King Nicolas to hand Scutari over to the Great Powers, which was considered here to be a victory for the diplomatic efforts of the Triple *Entente* as opposed to the military threats of Austria, brought into prominence the aspirations of the latter in Albania.

The "Rech," the most moderate of all the journals in St. Petersburgh, in its comments on foreign policy, while declaring that the best solution of the question

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is to give Scutari to Albania and territorial compensation to Montenegro, expresses the fear that Austria in search of military adventure may provoke fresh complications by an occupation of Albania. The idea of an international occupation has consequently been universally welcomed in the press as the best possible means to frustrate the alleged designs of Austria and Italy in Albania.

It is extremely difficult to form any definite opinion as to the real extent and influence of Panslavism in this country. Banquets, demonstrations, and newspaper copy are all in certain degrees indicative, though they so often held up to ridicule as being superficial and characteristic of a small though noisy section of public opinion. It is argued with undoubted justice that it is not those who demonstrate and shout the loudest who are likely to fight the hardest. It is pointed out with equal force that the mass of the peasants do not want war but desire only to live in peace and to get rich.

Such is undoubtedly the case, but I would nevertheless like to mention here a conversation which I recently had with a prominent member of the Duma, and a very competent judge of local conditions. This gentleman informed me that the feeling of Panslavism was by no means, as is generally stated to be the case, confined to St. Petersburgh and Moscow, or even to the large town, but was widespread over the whole country. He quoted as an instance a collection for the Slav cause which was recently made in the small market town near which he lives. In a community composed entirely of uneducated peasants a sum of no less than 800 roubles (over 80*l.*) was raised for the fund, the feeling amongst the peasants being, as he explained, that though Russia might be compelled to make war through the fault of the Government, it was nevertheless a war in which the people themselves were ready to make the necessary sacrifices.

Moreover, there is one section of the nation, the best organised and the most powerful, which does to a very large extent actively desire war. The vast improvements in the Russian army since the Japanese war are, I believe, undeniable. Throughout the army it is felt, at any rate by the mass of its officers, that the war was not a fair test, that the army earned the shame of defeat without having come to the end of its resources, and that, if the war had been prolonged the result would have been different. I do not wish to discuss the relative truth of this feeling, as it is clear that war is the ultimate aim of the existence of all armies, but it is at the same time certain that the desire for war is more pronounced in military circles here than elsewhere, for the obvious reason that war would give the Russian army an opportunity for wiping out the disgrace of its defeats in Manchuria.

As regards the rank and file of the Russian army, it is, of course, more difficult to obtain any reliable information. I might, however, quote an incident which was recently brought to my notice from an absolutely reliable source. As a rule the disbanding of the time-expired soldiers is received with great delight by the men. This year, however, when General Rennenkampf, who commands the Vilna military district, announced to these soldiers that they were free to return to their homes, his speech to the men was received in perfect silence, and on sending for the non-commissioned officers, to discover the reason for this behaviour, he was informed that the men did not wish to go, but wanted to stop and fight the Germans.

It is possible that the incident was arranged to please the general, who is, I believe, extremely warlike, but it is, nevertheless, symptomatic, and I am convinced, that if Russia was compelled to take up arms, it would be an easy task for the authorities to make it a popular one.

The danger of revolutionary disturbances in the event of war, though still a bugbear in Government and dynastic circles, has been, I think, considerably modified in the past six months. It has indeed still to be reckoned with, but would, in my opinion, lose much of its force in the case of a war against Germany or Austria, or on behalf of any of the Slav races.

Militant Panslavism may be limited to a small section of Russian public opinion, but I do believe that every true Russian has at heart a vague sentiment of national solidarity, and any war which closely affected Slav interests would at any rate be gladly endured, if not welcomed, and would be more likely to strengthen than to weaken the dynasty.

On the other hand, any question entailing a loss of prestige for the Slav Empire would seriously affect the popularity of the dynasty and bring about the fall of the present Government.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[22856] No. 331.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 74.)

Sir, *Vienna, May 15, 1913.*

AS I have already had the honour to inform you, in my telegram No. 79 of to-day's date, the Island of Ada Kaleh on the Danube, which, although it has been held in military occupation by Austria-Hungary since 1878, has hitherto been regarded as forming part of the Turkish Empire, was formally annexed by the Hungarian Government on Monday last.

The annexation was suddenly announced without any warning, and nothing was known previously of any such intention on the part of the Hungarian Government.

A Hungarian official, accompanied by two subordinates and an officer and four men of the gendarmerie, called on the Turkish Governor of the island, Sherif Eddin Bey, and read to him the decree of annexation. In a short speech he then gave assurances that the customs of the inhabitants, and especially their religious practices, would not be interfered with, and that they would enjoy equal privileges with the other subjects of the Empire.

Sherif Eddin Bey declared himself unable to take act of the annexation until instructed to do so by the Porte, and refused to sign the protocol of annexation. He further protested against this act of the Hungarian Government.

The Hungarian official declared that, in view of his orders, he could not take act of such a protest, but he had no objection to raise to the Turkish Governor remaining on the island pending instructions from his Government. The gendarmes were left on the island to symbolise the establishment of Hungarian administration, and for the maintenance of order, while the officials retired.

According to a later report, the Turkish Governor left Ada Kaleh yesterday evening.

It is also stated that the Porte will lodge a protest with the Powers.

The "Neue Freie Presse" remarks that, in accordance with precedents, the annexation will in any case have to be confirmed by the Hungarian Legislature, and it further questions whether it will not have to be ratified also by the Austrian Legislature, seeing that such annexation constitutes an addition to the territory of the whole Empire.

The official explanation of the annexation is that, since it was to be expected that on the conclusion of peace between Turkey and the Balkan States the Turkish Governor of Ada Kaleh would be recalled, it devolved upon the Hungarian Government to take immediate measures to ensure the peaceful administration of the island.

The Island of Ada Kaleh, or Neu-Orsova, is situated on the Danube opposite Orsova, where the boundaries of Hungary, Roumania, and Servia meet. It is just over a mile long and about 500 yards wide, and is quite flat. It contains one village, entirely oriental in appearance, and surrounded by dilapidated walls and fortifications. The inhabitants, numbering about 500, are Moslem, of Turkish origin, and earn a livelihood by the sale of tobacco, wine, and fish. Though they still dress as Turks and adhere to Islam, they all speak Servian.

The island was taken from the Turks by a Hungarian army in 1716, but reconquered by the former after a four months' siege in 1738.

After Servia and Roumania had won their liberty the island was occupied, in May 1878, by Austro-Hungarian troops, and has since then been administered in fact by Hungary, although no official change in its political status was officially made. Since 1878 a half-company of fortress artillery and one company of infantry have been stationed there. The inhabitants have hitherto enjoyed especial privileges, being free from all taxation and military service, and receiving all foreign goods destined for the island duty-free.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
A. AKERS-DOUGLAS.

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[22859] No. 332.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 77.) *Vienna, May 16, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Austrian Reichsrat reassembled yesterday, and that in the course of the preliminary proceedings of the Chamber various members gave notice of interpellations they proposed addressing to the Government on the subject of the attitude of the Dual Monarchy during and after the recent war in the Balkans. Count Stürgkh, the Prime Minister, announced that he would give an opportunity for debating foreign affairs on Tuesday next, the day the Government have fixed for asking the House to vote provisional estimates, but some excuse may still be found for deferring this discussion, as the Emperor is said to be much averse to having the foreign policy of Count Berchtold subjected to the criticism of Parliament at the present moment. A foretaste of what may be expected was experienced at the opening sitting, when a Slav deputy solemnly proposed that a monument should be raised in Vienna to King Nicholas of Montenegro, amidst vociferous cheers from his fellow Slavs.

The interpellations which have been put down all go to show that the population of the Dual Monarchy require from the Government an explanation of the sacrifices they have been asked to make during the last six months. Poles, Germans, Czechs, Christian Socialists, and Slovenes have in different words expressed the same wish, that the present state of things should cease, and that trade and industry should no longer be injuriously affected by retaining reservists with the colours, and the whole country kept in a state of tension with a continued war scare.

I have, &c.

FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

[22800] No. 333.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 424.) *Constantinople, May 15, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's Vice-Consul at Monastir, giving some items of information with regard to the position in Albania.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 333.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 24. Confidential.) *Monastir, May 1, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the news of Essad Pasha's arrival at Tirana with a considerable force is confirmed by the local military authorities. There are also unconfirmed reports that the Servian troops are withdrawing from Tirana, Kavaja, and Kyuks, and that those places are being garrisoned by the troops of Essad Pasha.

The apparent transformation of the Turkish troops in Albania into auxiliaries of the Balkan allies has produced a mixed impression in official circles here.

There is a total lack of information as to the origin of the present development, the extent to which it may have been inspired or approved by the Powers or some of them, and as to the attitude of the Porte in the matter and its authority to dispose of Albanian territory.

Whilst the news is welcomed in so far as it is interpreted as an Austrian reverse, there are many officers and officials who have hoped against hope that some means would be found of securing the partition and annexation by the allies of all the occupied districts, and to them the prospect of an autonomous Albania, even with their own nominee as Chief, is a disappointment.

They believe that such a State, however controlled, advised, or protected, is destined to be a playground for propaganda of their wealthier rivals.

The personal character of Essad Pasha is another cause of misgivings. The Chief-of-Staff of the 1st Morava division assures me evidence has been found at Scutari that the murder of Hassan Riza Pasha was his handiwork. The same officer was recently at Tirana and obtained much information concerning the Toptani family of which Essad Pasha is the head. His investigations do not appear to have impressed him favourably.

From the conversation of my Austrian colleague, whose previous post was Durazzo-Tirana, I gather that some members of the family are on very friendly terms with the Austrian consulate there.

It would seem that the setting up of a Moslem ruler of an autonomous Albania in sympathy with themselves has been some time contemplated by the Serbs, although they were engaged in military operations with part of the Moslem population. Guerilla warfare ceased after Javid Pasha's bold but hopeless attempt to carry his starving army across the Skoumbi. It has been followed by Servian efforts to conciliate the population. One step to that end is the proposed despatch of supplies of flour and grain from Servia to be distributed in the Albanian villages, where there is considerable destitution.

Kenan Bey, one of the pillars of Austrian intrigue in this district, himself an Albanian, has left for Constantinople to agitate against the appointment of a Moslem ruler for Albania. He proposes to visit the different embassies.

Other Albanians have left the Gorcha district to support the candidature of Mejid Effendi. I am informed that they profess to represent the sentiments of Albanian officials in the Ottoman service.

A Greek official, who has recently been acting as Prefect of Florina, tells me that Austrian agents are endeavouring to cause discord between the Greeks and Serbs by inciting Orthodox Albanians in the Servian sphere of occupation to address petitions to the Hellenic authorities expressing preference for annexation to Greece.

I have, &c.

C. A. GREIG.

[22801] No. 334.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 425.)

Sir, *Constantinople, May 15, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir with reference to the position in Albania.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 334.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 26. Confidential.)

Sir, *Monastir, May 5, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the following administrative appointments have been made in Central Albania:—

Hamid Bey, Toptani ..	Mutessarif of Durazzo
Refik Bey, Toptani ..	Kaimakam of Tirana.
Demir Pasha	Kaimakam of Pekinj, his native place.
Shahsinar Bey... ..	Kaimakam of Kavaja, his native place.
'Umr Bey	Kaimakam of Shiak, his native place.
'Umr Effendi ...	Kaimakam of Kroia, his native place.

All these appointments were made some time ago by the Provisional Government at Valona, and have now been approved and confirmed by the Serbs, which is, perhaps, an indication that relations between the Servian authorities and the Albanian Nationalists have improved since the arrest by the Serbs of their emissaries at Elbassan (see my despatch No. 22 of the 22nd April).

So far as can be gathered here, the Servian authorities appear determined to oppose an Austrian or Italian descent in Albania. They talk freely of arming the

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Albanians, and appear confident of their ability to prevent any movement hostile to themselves in the occupied districts. In this they rely largely on the Bairakdars, at present detained in Servia. I am informed that the most important of these hostages are—

Hassan Bey, Prishtina; Shehan Pasha, Prishtina; Suleiman Bey, Prishtina; Hassan Bey, Velishta; Yeshar Pasha, Ipek; Khoja Seyyid Effendi, of Uskub; Nejib Bey, Draga.

This list is confirmed by Fehim Bey Zavaliani, an influential Albanian Nationalist, who has long resided in Monastir, and has just returned from a visit to Belgrade and Valona, where he has acted as go-between in negotiations between the Serbs and the Albanian leaders.

He states that when he left Valona seven days ago there were no relations between the Provisional Government in that town and Essad Pasha, and that Javid Pasha was then as hostile as ever to the Nationalist party.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

[22913] No. 335.

Mr. E. Grant Duff to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 19.)

(No. 14.) *Budapest, May 15, 1913.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 12th instant the Hungarian Government formally annexed the island of Adakaleh, in the Danube near Orsova. The annexation was carried out by the lord-lieutenant of the county of Krassó-Szöreny, who was accompanied by a detachment of gendarmerie.

The Turkish Governor, Sherif-ed-Din, having received no instructions from his Government to acquiesce in the proceedings of the Hungarian authorities, declined to sign the protocol of annexation and entered a formal protest. He was permitted to remain on the island pending the receipt of instructions from his Government. It is, however, stated that he left the same day.

It would appear that the action of the Hungarian Government is merely the carrying out of a previous agreement made on the 21st May, 1878, between the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Governments whereby the latter undertook to withdraw the Turkish garrison and place the island in possession of Austro-Hungarian troops.

The number of inhabitants is variously stated to be about from 500—3,000, and the size of the island is about 1½ miles long and ¼ mile broad.

I have, &c.
EVELYN GRANT DUFF.

P.S.—Since writing the above, I see in the Budapest newspapers that the Turkish Governor did not protest, but said that he would inform the Turkish Ambassador in Vienna.

E. G. D.

[22967] No. 336.

Note communicated by French Embassy, May 19, 1913.

L'AMBASSADEUR d'Angleterre à Paris fait connaître à M. Pichon que le Ministre britannique à Athènes a été invité à protester auprès du Gouvernement hellénique contre un décret qui accorde aux marchandises de provenance grecque le bénéfice de l'entrée en franchise en Crète.

Il résulte de renseignements parvenus depuis lors au Quai d'Orsay que, avant de s'acquitter de cette protestation, Sir Francis Elliot aurait tenu à soumettre au Foreign Office certaines objections. Il aurait fait observer, notamment, qu'il est difficile aux Puissances de refuser au Gouvernement hellénique pour la Crète ce qu'elles ont consenti à l'Italie, depuis plus d'un an, pour les îles de la mer Égée occupées par les troupes italiennes.

Le Gouvernement français ayant été saisi par son représentant à La Canée de la question que soulève le récent décret du Gouvernement hellénique, serait désireux de connaître l'appréciation du Gouvernement britannique sur la valeur du précédent établi par l'Italie pour certaines îles de l'Archipel et invoqué par le Ministre d'Angleterre à Athènes.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 16 mai, 1913.

[22963] No. 337.

Note communicated by French Embassy, May 19, 1913.

LES Gouvernements allemand et austro-hongrois ont appelé l'attention du Gouvernement français sur les graves inconvénients que présenterait l'admission dans la Commission financière des Affaires balkaniques des délégués des États belligérants sur le même pied que les délégués des Grandes Puissances. Ces observations ont amené M. Pichon à faire étudier la question par les commissaires français chargés de préparer les travaux de la commission internationale, et, après avoir pris leur avis, il désirerait savoir si le Gouvernement britannique accepterait la procédure suivante.

Admission des délégués des belligérants avec voix consultative à toutes les réunions où seront étudiées les questions soumises à la Commission financière des Affaires balkaniques, le vote des motions décisives restant réservé aux seuls délégués des Grandes Puissances.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 16 mai, 1913.

[23031] No. 338.

Memorandum by Sir P. Harvey.—(Received at Foreign Office May 19.)

FROM what passed at the recent informal discussions in Paris I have little doubt that the German attitude in this matter is dictated by the following considerations:—

The Germans wish the allies to take over the largest possible share of the Turkish debt with a view to the financial relief of Turkey and the benefit of German financial enterprises in that country. The French delegation do not appear disposed to go so far, and I, without of course expressing a final opinion, had occasion to criticise some of the details of their claim as excessive.

The German view will be strenuously resisted by the Russians and the allies.

In these circumstances the Germans may well think that a representative of the bondholders and a keen partisan, like Sir A. Block in particular, who would certainly support their contentions, though from somewhat different motives, would be a valuable ally at the conference.

H. P. HARVEY.

May 17, 1913.

[22962] No. 339.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 19.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, May 17, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, two copies of a telegram to the Vice-Admiral, 3rd Battle Squadron.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

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Enclosure in No. 339.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, Mediterranean.

Admiralty, May 17, 1913.

(Telegraphic.) PLEASE state the minimum sum which will be necessary during the next few weeks to meet urgent requirements.

[23139] No. 340.

Note communicated by M. de Fleuriau, May 19, 1913.

POUR bien des motifs économies pour le Trésor ottoman, intérêt de l'agriculture, réformes en Asie Mineure, qui exigeraient la présence de fortes garnisons, &c.—le Grand Vizir a dit à M. Bompard qu'il était pressé de débloquer les armées de Tchataldja et de Boulair.

Mais il n'ose pas le faire avant que les États balkaniques n'aient aussi démobilisé.

Car les préliminaires de paix ne sont pas la paix : il restera bien des questions à trancher, et la frontière même d'Enos à Midia menace de donner lieu à de graves discussions.

La Turquie ne saurait donc désarmer si les Puissances ne lui garantissent pas que les alliés ne rouvriront pas les hostilités et que leurs troupes ne franchiront pas la nouvelle frontière avant la conclusion de la paix définitive.

M. Pichon est tout disposé à examiner, l'accord avec le Gouvernement britannique, et aussi dans quelle mesure il pourrait être donné satisfaction aux désirs du Grand Vizir : il suppose que la Porte fera à ce sujet une démarche auprès des Puissances.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 19 mai, 1913.

[23033] No. 341.

Russian Amendments to Austro-Italian Draft.—(Communicated by M. de Etter, May 19, 1913.)

ARTICLE 1er. Accepté.

Art. 2. Le nom de Sa Majesté le Sultan comme Calife continuera à être prononcé dans les prières publiques des musulmans. Les droits des fondations pieuses (vakoufs) seront respectés comme par le passé et aucune entrave ne sera apportée aux rapports des musulmans avec leurs chefs spirituels, qui dépendront comme toujours du Cheikh-ul-Islam à Constantinople, lequel leur donnera l'investiture.

Art. 3. Accepté.

Art. 4. Accepté.

Art. 5. Un commission, composée d'un représentant de chacune des Grandes Puissances et à laquelle pourront être adjoints des experts albanais avec voix consultative, sera chargée de proposer un régime judiciaire pour une période de six ans, adapté aux conditions de l'Albanie et s'inspirant des principes adoptés pour la constitution du régime judiciaire introduit en Egypte, ainsi que des réformes projetées pour la Macédoine. L'organisation et le contrôle de l'administration civile, y compris le service de la gendarmerie ainsi que des finances de l'Albanie, seront confiés à un comité composé d'agents civils, qui seront nommés par les Grandes Puissances auprès du chef du Gouvernement albanais. Les attributions de ce comité, auquel pourront être adjoints des experts albanais avec voix consultatives, seront proposées par la commission internationale susnommée.

Art. 6. Accepte.

Art. 7. Accepté jusqu'aux mots "établis en Albanie" inclusivement. Continuation amendée comme suit : Il est bien entendu qu'il y aura toujours en Albanie parfaite égalité de droits de navigation et de commerce pour les ressortissants de tous les États, et que les modifications au régime existant qui pourront être acceptées par une des Puissances conformément à l'alinéa précédent n'entreront en vigueur qu'en tant que

toutes les autres Puissances y auront adhéré. La question relative aux concessions spéciales qui ont été données en Albanie par le Gouvernement turc à des compagnies, à des entreprises étrangères, ou bien à des entreprises dans lesquelles le capital étranger est engagé, sera réglée par la Commission financière de Paris.

Art. 8. Le chef d'État de l'Albanie sera proposé par les Grandes Puissances et nommé chaque fois pour une période de six ans par Sa Majesté le Sultan. Il ne pourra être révoqué avant ledit terme que de la manière prescrite pour sa nomination.

Art. 9. Il sera laissé aux Albanais la faculté d'exprimer leurs propres désirs en tant que ces derniers, bien entendu, seront compatibles avec les dispositions générales prises par les Grandes Puissances. La commission visée à l'article 5 aura à examiner la possibilité de créer un conseil représentatif albanais permanent.

Art. 10. Accepté.

[23032] No. 342.

Note communicated by M. de Etter, May 19, 1913.

Accès commercial de la Serbie à l'Adriatique.

ARTICLE 1er. Le littoral albanais sera relié aux territoires serbes par un chemin de fer international. A cet effet une compagnie sera créée, à la constitution de laquelle participeront les délégués de chacune des Grandes Puissances et de la Serbie.

Art. 2. La direction du chemin de fer destiné à relier les lignes serbes au littoral albanais dépendra du réseau serbe et, étant destiné à desservir les intérêts de la Serbie, il appartiendra au Gouvernement serbe de déterminer le point de jonction dudit chemin de fer aux lignes serbes, ainsi que le point d'aboutissement sur le littoral albanais.

Art. 3. La Compagnie internationale du Chemin de Fer adriatique sera concessionnée en tant qu'il s'agit du territoire albanais par le comité des représentants des Grandes Puissances. La concession devra se baser sur le tracé établi, conformément à l'article précédent.

Art. 4. Le Comité des Agents civils des Puissances signataires du présent traité sera chargé de veiller à son exécution. Il assurera par des mesures appropriées la sécurité du chemin de fer.

Art. 5. Il y aura pleine et entière liberté de transit par le chemin de fer et les ports de son aboutissement en temps de paix comme en temps de guerre.

[22971] No. 343.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 19.)

(Confidential.) *Admiralty, May 19, 1913.*

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of telegrams relative to affairs in Scutari.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 343.

Vice-Admiral, Mediterranean, to Admiralty

May 18, 1913.

(Telegraphic.) EARLY appointment of a civil Governor of Scutari, in my opinion, very desirable. This post should not, I think, be filled by an officer of the international fleet, and no local man is suitable for it.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 343.

Vice-Admiral, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

May 18, 1913.

(Telegraphic.)

YOUR No. 349.

Ottoman Bank has agreed to advance 1,000*l.* to meet urgent requirements, and I have arranged that this sum shall be guaranteed by the customs revenue and by the international commission. If the directors of the bank agree, and if this procedure be approved, I shall continue to raise money in this manner to meet future requirements.

I understand that when trade has resumed its normal course, customs receipts, which the town will now take, should amount to 3,000*l.* or 4,000*l.* a-month.

Enclosure 3 in No. 343.

Vice-Admiral, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

May 19, 1913.

(Telegraphic.)

THE political situation at Scutari at present, according to reliable information which has reached me, is as follows:—

Austria has in her pay and has for many years been the source of the income of certain Catholic priests, whose influence over the Albanians and especially the more warlike tribes, such as the Melissors, is now very great.

In order that they may demonstrate as early as possible, and before the conference in London has reached a decision, that combined international Government in an autonomous Albania is impracticable, they are now doing their utmost to make the international occupation of Scutari a failure.

It is not possible at present to foresee in what way the crisis will be brought about, but the Austrian admiral, with the concurrence of the Italian admiral, is endeavouring to persuade me to allow the people of Scutari to carry arms. He also wishes me to permit the Melissors to make an armed demonstration in the town. In support of these suggestions, he states that it is the custom of the Albanians always to carry their rifles. I have withheld my assent from these proposals.

[23103]

No. 344.

Papers communicated by Mr. Duncan (Imperial Ottoman Bank), May 19, 1913.

(1.)

Telegram from M. de Cerjat, May 19, 1913.

RECEVONS de Salonique télégramme suivant:—

"Représentant Gouvernement hellénique intima ordre lui déclarer et lui verser tous dépôts existants chez nous au nom tous fonctionnaires civils et militaires ottomans, arguant ces dépôts être propriété Gouvernement ottoman, les considérant comme prise de guerre, et envoya deux fonctionnaires procéder inspection nos livres, nous informant avoir ordres recourir, si besoin, à la force. Opposâmes refus formel cette demande étrange, dits dépôts ne pouvant être considérés que personnels, et déclarâmes inspection ne pourrait être faite que par emploi force effective. Consuls français, anglais approuvent pleinement notre manière de voir et firent démarche collective auprès dit représentant protestant. Après cette démarche, dit représentant écrivit de nouveau, réitérant son injonction, ajoutant que si ne consentons pas remboursement immédiat et examen registres Gouvernement hellénique tiendra responsable notre établissement et spécialement agence de Salonique pour tous dessaisissements de dépôts. En outre, personnellement responsables dirigeants cette agence pour refus obtempérer ordres Gouvernement, les menaçant poursuites pénales vertu loi martiale. Maintenons notre refus. Prévenez Direction générale, tout en faisant votre côté ce que jugerez nécessaire, sans vous laisser guider par désir nous épargner personnellement désagréments que sommes prêts à affronter dans intérêt notre banque. Consuls français, anglais télégraphièrent leurs Ministères respectifs."

(2.)

Imperial Ottoman Bank.

Balkan Seizures: Joint Opinion.

In our opinion, the Balkan Powers are not entitled, during the belligerent occupation of certain parts of Turkey, to demand payment by the Imperial Ottoman Bank of the amount of the balances standing to the credit of the Turkish Government in the books of the bank at places so occupied. They are entitled to seize such articles as were found in the branch at Salonica which are referred to in the letter of the 5th December, 1912, and they are entitled to inspection of the books, &c., of the branches to investigate the relations of the bank to the Turkish Government.

The rights of a belligerent occupant in this respect are now defined by article 53 of The Hague Convention of 1907, to which all the Balkan Powers concerned, as well as Turkey, were parties. That article is, so far as material, as follows:

"L'armée qui occupe un territoire ne pourra saisir que le numéraire, les fonds et les valeurs exigibles appartenant en propre à l'État, les dépôts d'armes, moyens de transport, magasins et approvisionnements, et, en général, toute propriété mobilière de l'État de nature à servir aux opérations de la guerre."

The translation of the phrase "valeurs exigibles" in the British Parliamentary Papers is "property liable to requisition," but the more accurate translation would appear to be that given in Higgin's "Hague Peace Conferences (1909)," p. 249, "realisable securities." The question whether the phrase includes contract debts due to the invaded State has been the subject of some difference of opinion, but the balance of authority is in favour of the view that it does not, and only includes such securities as are realisable in the ordinary course of law by anyone into whose hands they fall, *e.g.*, cheques or bonds payable to bearer (see Hall (1909), pp. 414, 415; Westlake, "War," pp. 103, 104; Lawrence (1911), p. 438; Wheaton (1904), p. 562; Heffter, p. 134; Pillet (1898), p. 170). Such securities are not merely evidence of debts: they are transferable by delivery and negotiable in the ordinary course of business at their face value, whereas instruments which are only payable when endorsed or when presented by a certain person have no face value until they have received the necessary endorsement or are duly presented. In the case of the appropriation by a belligerent occupant of such instruments payable to the invaded State, they cannot, from the nature of the case, be realised. They constitute a contract to which the belligerent occupant is no party and which he cannot implement. The occupation of the territory of a State does not create a succession to the rights of the State.

The true principle, in our opinion, is that the belligerent occupant can seize the tangible property, but cannot enforce contracts with the invaded State to which he is no party. In the case of debts due upon a contract, such as that which exists between banker and customer, there is nothing tangible for the occupant to appropriate; what, in fact, the Balkan Powers have appropriated or claimed to appropriate are moneys lying in the branches of the Ottoman Bank which were the private property of the Ottoman Bank, and had no necessary relation to the balances in question. We say that these moneys were the private property of the Ottoman Bank because that results from the relation of banker and customer existing between the bank and the Turkish Government. Money when paid into a bank ceases altogether to be the money of the customer and becomes the money of the banker, who is bound to return an equivalent by paying a similar sum to that deposited with him when he is asked for it. The banker is known to deal with money deposited with him as his own, making what profit of it he can; he is guilty of no breach of trust in employing it; he is not answerable to the customer if he puts it into jeopardy; he is answerable only for the amount, because he has contracted to repay to the customer when demanded a sum equivalent to that paid into his hands.

There does not appear to be anything in the concession, "règlement," or statutes of the Imperial Ottoman Bank which differentiates the relation of the Turkish Government and the bank from the ordinary relation of banker and customer. The bank is not a State bank. It is empowered to carry on all the operations appertaining to a banking establishment (article 8, concession). The payments made to the bank by the vilayets and departments of the State must be carried by the bank to the credit of the accounts opened to the Treasury (article 14, "règlement"). The revenues paid into the

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bank must be held at the disposal of the Ministry of Finance, to be employed according to its orders and instructions (article 7, "règlement"), and no payment of any nature can be made by the bank without the cheque or order of the Ministry of Finance (article 10, "règlement"). All these provisions are the ordinary incidents of a banking contract. There is nothing to earmark or identify the actual money paid into the bank by or on behalf of the Turkish Government; it becomes, like the payments of other customers, the property of the bank. The relation of the bank to the State is purely contractual; it is a debtor of the State to the amount of the moneys received.

In our opinion, therefore, the moneys which the Balkan Powers have appropriated or claimed to appropriate at the various branches of the Imperial Ottoman Bank were the private property of the bank, and were protected by the express terms of article 46 of The Hague Convention of 1907. At the same time, we are of opinion that the Balkan Powers are entitled to ensure so far as they can that the amount of the credit balances at the branches is not transferred to Constantinople, there to be applied in honouring the drafts of the Turkish Government. In this respect we think the action of the Bulgarian authorities as stated in the letter of the 16th January, 1913, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in France to the Imperial Ottoman Bank was justifiable.

But if, contrary to our opinion, the true view be that a contract debt due to the invaded State can be exacted by the belligerent occupant, it is clear that there must be a debt legally due and that it must be due to the invaded State in its own right. Now, in the present case the credit balances standing in the names of the Agricultural Bank and Caisse des Orphelins are not strictly debts due to the Turkish Government. They represent, we understand, deposits made by public institutions under the supervision of the State, but they do not represent what is strictly State property; they are analogous to the institutions specified in article 56 of The Hague Convention of 1907.

In the second place, we are instructed that the Imperial Ottoman Bank was not on the whole indebted to the Turkish Government, but that upon the whole account of the Turkish Government with the bank there was a considerable debit balance against the Government. Under these circumstances we do not think that the bank could legally be compelled to pay over the amount of the credit balances at the branches in the occupied territory to the belligerent occupants.

The question may be tested by considering what would happen if the occupation was to ripen into conquest. In such an event the Balkan Powers would succeed to all the rights of the Turkish Government in the conquered territory; but it appears to us that their succession could not entitle them to demand payment of credit balances carried upon the books of branches of the bank within the conquered territory when there existed at the head office or other branches outside the conquered territory sufficient debit balances to wipe out these credit balances. It would be a conclusive answer to such a demand that the bank did not owe money to the Turkish Government. It is often convenient for a bank to keep its customers' accounts as several accounts, but, for the purpose of determining the question of indebtedness, they may be regarded as one account, and the bank can at any time, in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary, give notice to combine them.

This is clear in English law (see Garnet *v.* McKewan, L.R. S., Ex. 10; Griggs *v.* Cocks 1831), 1 Simon, 438; *in re* European Bank (1872), L.R. S. chap. 41), and we think it must be so wherever banking is carried on as it is in England. Even if the accounts cannot be combined without notice by the bank to the Government—and the bank must continue to honour cheques presented at the branch where a credit balance is shown until it has given such notice—we do not think that the rights of the customer under such a contract could pass to another Power merely in virtue of occupation. That would be in effect compelling the bank to lend money to the conquering State; a contract to lend money or honour cheques when presented does not give rise to a matured debt until a request for an advance has been made or a cheque has been presented. Moreover, it would be impossible for the bank to recover such advances.

For these reasons, we are of opinion that the claims made by the Balkan Powers to appropriate the amount of the credit balances of the accounts of the Turkish Government at the various branches of the Imperial Ottoman Bank in the territory occupied by them are unfounded.

R. B. FINLAY.
GEOFFREY LAWRENCE.

The Temple, April 23, 1913.

[22724] No. 345.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 207.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May* 19, 1913.

BRITISH Vice-Admiral telegraphs information is required immediately as to how money is to be obtained for payment of public services. None is available, and provision is urgently necessary for lighting, sanitary works, &c.

A collector of customs was appointed 17th May to relieve Montenegrin official. The fisheries contract in Lake of Scutari is held for another year by local contractor, but money from this source and salt, of which there is a considerable quantity, and receipt stamps go to Ottoman Public Debt Commissioners.

Vice-Admiral has been asked what is minimum sum required for urgent purposes during next few weeks.

You should inform Government to which you are accredited, and ask for their views.

[23423] No. 346.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 71.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 19, 1913.

DR. DANEF came to see me to-day. His idea was that the Treaty of Peace should be signed without delay, and that then a conference should assemble to draw up a convention about the exchange of prisoners, commercial relations, amnesties, and other details. He urged me to use all the influence I could to get the other allies to sign the treaty, explaining how unfair it was that, in order to secure further advantages in the treaty, Greece or Servia should delay matters at the expense of Bulgaria, who was keeping so many troops at Chatalja. If the other allies did delay matters, Bulgaria alone might sign the treaty with Turkey. He added that, as it was the desire of the Powers that Bulgaria had agreed to make peace, he thought that the Powers ought to consider her entitled to sign alone, if need be, the treaty that they had urged upon her. He asked me what I thought of this procedure.

I replied that I could not say what was honourable as between Bulgaria and her allies; that was a matter between themselves. I could not say anything to the other allies about that, but I would urge that Greece should not be backward in signing the treaty. I understood the point of view of Greece in desiring to know more about southern Albania and the Ægean Islands, and if by delaying the signature she could make the Powers more favourable to her, this point of view would be not only intelligible but reasonable. But just the contrary was the case. If she or any other Power delayed the signature of the treaty, the Powers would be not more, but less, favourably disposed. Dr. Danef had spoken of the desire of Servia to have the guarantees about her access to the Adriatic inserted in the Treaty of Peace, but these guarantees would not be relevant to a treaty between Turkey and the allies.

Dr. Danef said that he thought that, if I would express these views to the allies, it would be sufficient.

I told Dr. Danef of the desire expressed by the Turkish delegates that the peace should begin from the signature of the treaty, without waiting for ratification, and Dr. Danef agreed and seemed to anticipate no difficulty in arranging this.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Also to Sir R. Rodd (No. 181), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 174), Sir E. Goschen (No. 206), and Mr. O'Beirne (No. 412).

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[23424] No. 347.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 32.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 19, 1913.*

THE Servian delegates came to see me to-day. They wished to raise some points about the northern Albanian frontier, which they said would be an impracticable one as it stood at present, according to the decision of the Powers.

I said that for several months we had been told that the frontier would be impracticable unless Djakova went to Albania, and I explained that, if any points were to be raised at all, this point of Djakova and others would be reopened.

One of the delegates said that apparently, then, *noli me tangere* was the motto with regard to the Albanian frontier.

To this I assented.

They then urged that the guarantees given by the Powers about Servian access to the Adriatic should be inserted after the third article of the treaty, and said that they were instructed not to sign the treaty unless these guarantees were put into it.

I replied that these guarantees could not be put into a treaty between Turkey and the allies. If they were put into a formal instrument, it must be one signed by the Powers who gave the guarantees, and the Powers would not sign the treaty between the allies and Turkey. I had no doubt that the Powers would confirm these guarantees, either by inserting them in the statute for the organisation of Albania or in some other instrument that they would sign.

The delegates gave me to understand that, if they were assured that the guarantees would be inserted in the Statute for Albania, they might be able to get instructions to sign the Treaty of Peace.

I said that it appeared from this that their only difficulty about signing the treaty was their wish to have the guarantees confirmed.

They assented to this.

I told them that I would bring the matter before the meeting with the Ambassadors to-morrow.

The delegates expressed a wish that I should again open the Peace Conference.

I said that I had never closed the conference, which had only been suspended; a formal reopening did not therefore appear to be necessary, but when they were all ready to sign the treaty and conclude peace I would do whatever they all desired.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23425] No. 348.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 138.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 19, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed me to-day that the point about the Ægean Islands had been settled favourably. Italy would give up to Greece the islands that she occupied to facilitate a settlement of the southern Albanian frontier. But Italy must remain firm about three conditions: (1) that the Greek frontier must not be north of the point that he had last indicated to me; (2) that the whole of the Corfu Canal must be neutralised; and (3) that the small island of Saseno, near the Bay of Vallona, must go to Albania. Italy could not, owing to her obligations to Turkey, make this proposal about the islands herself, but it might be made by a third party. It was a great sacrifice on the part of Italy, for, as I might have seen by the morning's papers, there was still fighting in Cyrenaica, and a considerable number of Turkish troops were still there: to agree to give up the islands while this was the case was a sacrifice.

I asked whether any progress had been made in Berlin respecting other islands.

The Ambassador replied that he could not speak definitely, but he believed that things were going well as regards Mitylene and Chios. He pressed me for my views.

I said that I had not seen the Russian Ambassador or the French Ambassador at all last week. I would make the best use I could of what he had told me to ease the situation, but I could not say anything more definite at present.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21868] No. 349.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 192.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 19, 1913.*

I HAVE received Sir G. Buchanan's despatch No. 149, Confidential, of the 7th instant, relative to the commercial interests of foreign Powers in the territory to be annexed by the Balkan States as a consequence of the present war.

You should thank the Russian Government for the information which they have been good enough to communicate respecting the proposals put forward by the Austro-Hungarian Government for the regulation of commerce and navigation in the ports and territorial waters of these States, and inform them that His Majesty's Government, who have received a similar proposal through the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at this Court, are in general agreement with the Russian views on this question.

It will be unnecessary for you, in the circumstances, to forward copies of the correspondence referred to in the last paragraph of Sir G. Buchanan's despatch.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23076] No. 350.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Canea, Crete, May 5, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 8 of the 16th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the 1912 class of Cretan recruits assembled yesterday, with the exception of those belonging to Milopotamo and Candia, whose enrolment has been postponed for a month on account of the prevalence of cerebro-spinal meningitis in their districts.

Of recent years, about 1,000 recruits were taken annually for the Cretan militia, but several times this number were available, and I understand that exemptions will no longer be granted on the same wholesale scale. I cannot, however, yet state what will be the exact number of the muster of 1912 recruits.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[23053] No. 351.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 111.)
Sir, *Athens, May 12, 1913.*

ON the 1st instant M. Coromilas asked me to come and see him, and said he wanted to speak about the British Naval Mission. The war, he said, had technically terminated the contract, but it had been tacitly continued, except in the case of two officers, and the others had gone on doing their work and drawing their pay. Assuming the contract to be tacitly in existence, the date had arrived on which it must be renewed or terminated.

The Government fully recognised the good work which had been done by the mission, and were most anxious that British officers should continue it, but owing partly to the pressure of public opinion, partly to opinion in the Greek navy itself, they had come to the conclusion that the mission should be entirely composed of officers on the active list of the British navy, and they earnestly hoped that His Majesty's Government would consent to spare officers for that purpose. The Minister of Marine had sent him proposals on the subject, which he would have translated and sent to me officially. I understood it to be the wish of the Greek Government that the members of the present mission should continue to do their work until the date when the original contract would have expired.

It was not until the 10th instant that I received the official note of which I have the honour to enclose a copy, and which as regards the last point does not tally with my recollection of what M. Coromilas said, nor of subsequent conversations with M. Venizelos, inasmuch as it contemplates the members of the mission (with certain exceptions) taking six months' pay under articles 19 and 21 of the contract, and leaving Greece immediately, so that a new contract may be signed and come into operation without loss of time.

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I have the honour to enclose a copy of my reply to M. Coromilas's note, which explains the situation as regards the exceptions mentioned above.*

I have also the honour to enclose copies of a fresh draft contract prepared some time ago by the members of the mission in consultation, when they were under the impression that their engagements would be renewed* ; and of a letter addressed by Admiral Tufnell to the Minister of Marine on the same subject.* These are the communications alluded to in the third paragraph of the official note. The allusion in the second paragraph to two letters from Admiral Tufnell on the 15th and 28th October must refer, by a clerical error, to a single letter of the 15th (28th) October.

I have, &c.

F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 351.

M. Coromilas to Sir F. Elliot.

Athènes, le 27 avril, 1913.

M. le Ministre,

MON collègue le Ministre de la Marine me prie de faire part à votre Excellence de ce qui suit concernant la Mission navale britannique.

Le Contre-Amiral L. Tufnell, se conformant à l'article 21 de la convention du 30 juin, 1911, fit connaître au Ministre de la Marine par ses lettres en date du 15 et du 28 octobre, 1912, que, du fait de l'état de guerre existant entre la Grèce et la Turquie, la convention susdite cessait d'être en vigueur.

Le 28 novembre, 1912, et le 23 janvier, 1913, le Contre-Amiral L. Tufnell fit part à mon collègue des conditions auxquelles, à son avis, une nouvelle convention devait être conclue après la fin des hostilités.

Entre-temps, le Ministère de la Marine avait consenti au départ immédiat du Commissaire général G. Townshend et de l'Ingénieur des Constructions navales H. Gould, les autres membres de la mission continuant à remplir leurs fonctions sans qualité officielle.

Le Gouvernement Royal est, comme par le passé, d'avis que les lumières d'une Mission navale britannique sont indispensable pour parfaire l'organisation et l'instruction de la marine hellénique. C'est pourquoi, conformément à l'article 5 de la convention du 30 juin, 1911, le Ministre de la Marine vient par mon canal prier votre Excellence de faire part au Gouvernement Royal britannique de notre désir de conclure une nouvelle convention pour une période de deux ans à dater de sa signature.

Le Gouvernement Royal se plaît à croire que le Gouvernement Royal britannique fera bon accueil à sa demande ; c'est pourquoi j'ai l'honneur de soumettre dès maintenant à votre Excellence nos vues sur la façon dont devrait être composée la nouvelle mission.

Elle devrait comprendre :

1. Un contre-amiral chef de la mission. Vu que, d'après les dispositions de la loi, les officiers des missions étrangères sont en Grèce promus d'un grade et ont le pas sur les officiers grecs du même rang, il serait possible de désigner comme chef de la mission un capitaine de vaisseau. Le Ministère de la Marine est cependant d'avis qu'on ne devrait avoir recours à cette mesure que dans le cas où il serait impossible à un des contre-amiraux anglais les plus distingués de prendre service en Grèce. Au cas où l'on recourrait au choix d'un capitaine de vaisseau, celui-ci devrait avoir toutes les qualités requises pour exercer avec succès un commandement général.

2. Un capitaine de frégate pour organiser l'état-major et diriger les hautes études des officiers de la marine Royale.

3. Un capitaine de frégate commandant en chef des divisions légères (éclaireurs, contre-torpilleurs, torpilleurs et sous-marins).

4. Un lieutenant de vaisseau adjoint au commandant en chef des divisions légères.

5. Un lieutenant de vaisseau pour les défenses sous-marines, les torpilleurs et le matériel électrique. Cet officier sera en sous-ordre du commandant en chef des divisions légères.

6. Un capitaine de frégate, instructeur de l'artillerie.

7. Un capitaine de corvette adjoint au capitaine de frégate, instructeur d'artillerie.

* Not printed.

8. Un capitaine de frégate, directeur de l'École des Cadets et chargé de l'instruction générale des cadets et des équipages.

9. Un lieutenant de vaisseau, directeur de l'École des Mousses ou de toute autre école ayant pour but l'instruction générale des équipages.

10. Un ingénieur mécanicien en chef ou un ingénieur mécanicien pour diriger l'instruction du corps des ingénieurs mécaniciens.

11. Un ingénieur mécanicien ayant grade de lieutenant de vaisseau adjoint au précédent et en même temps directeur des chantiers de l'arsenal.

12. Un ingénieur des constructions navales pour diriger les constructions et réparations effectuées par l'arsenal. Cet officier sera conseiller attitré du Ministère de la Marine pour la construction des nouveaux navires de guerre. Il devra par conséquent, être très compétent et expérimenté.

Le Ministre de la Marine se réserve de demander, le cas échéant, l'adjonction à la Mission navale d'officiers supplémentaires.

Le Gouvernement Royal prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien être son interprète auprès du Gouvernement britannique et lui exprimer ses plus vifs remerciements pour le zèle et la capacité avec lesquels les membres de la mission anglaise ont rempli leurs fonctions en Grèce. Cependant, le Ministre de la Marine est d'avis qu'il nous faut tenir compte, après une guerre victorieuse, du désir de nos officiers de marine d'avoir pour chefs et pour instructeurs des officiers appartenant au cadre actif de la marine britannique, d'autant plus que, d'après la loi actuelle, les officiers des missions étrangères exercent un commandement effectif.

C'est pourquoi le Gouvernement Royal prie le Gouvernement britannique de vouloir bien remplacer par des officiers du cadre actif le Contre-Amiral Tufnell, le Capitaine de Vaisseau Éd. Boyle, conformément aux articles 19 et 21 de la convention. Quant au Secrétaire Mr. H. Campbell, il est naturel qu'il soit remplacé par celui que choisira le nouveau chef de la mission. Par contre, nous désirerions que les officiers ci-dessous fassent partie de la nouvelle mission :—

1. Le Capitaine de Frégate H. Cardale, comme directeur de l'instruction des divisions légères.

2. Le Lieutenant de Vaisseau J. Waring, pour diriger l'enseignement relatif aux torpilles, au matériel électrique et aux défenses sous-marines, à condition qu'il consente à servir en sous-ordre du Capitaine de Frégate Cardale.

3. L'Ingénieur mécanicien en chef J. Watson, pour diriger l'instruction du corps des ingénieurs mécaniciens.

4. Le Capitaine de Corvette K. G. Salmond, comme adjoint au capitaine de frégate instructeur de l'artillerie.

Le Ministère de la Marine est prêt à régler les traitements du Contre-Amiral L. Tufnell, du Capitaine de Vaisseau Éd. Boyle et du Secrétaire du chef de la mission H. Campbell, conformément aux dispositions des articles 19 et 21 de la convention. Pour ce qui regarde MM. H. Cardale, K. Gofton Salmond, J. Watson et J. Waring, s'ils acceptent de rester au service grec, il propose d'appliquer jusqu'à la conclusion de la nouvelle convention, le système appliqué jusqu'à ce jour depuis le commencement de la guerre.

Pour ce qui concerne les sous-officiers de la marine Royale britannique actuellement à notre service, le Ministère de la Marine est d'avis de maintenir le *statu quo* jusqu'à l'arrivée du nouveau chef de la mission et, après entente avec lui de faire au Gouvernement britannique de nouvelles propositions soit pour maintenir ces sous-officiers au service, soit pour les remplacer en tout ou en partie, soit pour en augmenter le nombre.

Je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien intervenir auprès du Gouvernement britannique afin qu'il agrée notre demande et qu'il désigne des officiers de son choix appartenant au cadre actif de la marine anglaise pour compléter la mission navale qui nous est nécessaire. Nous sommes convaincus que le choix que fera le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté répondra pleinement au vœu de la marine hellénique, qui sous la direction de ses nouveaux instructeurs verra ses connaissances tant théoriques que pratiques atteindre le degré de perfection auquel est parvenu la glorieuse marine britannique.

Veuillez, &c.

L. A. COROMILAS.

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[23054] No. 352.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 20.)

(No. 112.) *Athens, May* 13, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 111 of the 12th instant I have the honour to state that, after receiving notice from M. Coromilas, on the 1st instant, of the intention of the Greek Government to apply for the services of British naval officers on the active list, I asked M. Venizelos, at Admiral Tufnell's request, to find if possible a way of employing him until the 1st November which should avoid the necessity of his remaining at Athens more than necessary. His Excellency, entering into Admiral Tufnell's feelings, readily promised to do so. It was therefore with surprise that I received the note of which copy is enclosed in my previous despatch; and in writing a private note to M. Venizelos upon a personal matter relating to another member of the mission, I added: "Quant à la note que j'ai reçue hier relative à la mission, je regrette qu'on ne nous l'a pas expliquée dès le début avec plus de franchise. Si nous avions compris que l'on demandait le 'rapatriement' pur et simple conformément aux articles 19 et 21 du contrat, nous n'aurions pas eu recours à votre obligeance pour trouver un moyen de sauver les apparences. Aujourd'hui la situation est nette."

M. Venizelos, not understanding what I meant, sent for M. Coromilas, who also did not understand until he sent for the draft of the official note which he had addressed to me, when he found that the letter of the Minister of Marine had been misinterpreted by the Foreign Office clerk who drafted the note. He came at once to me to express his deepest regret (as did later M. Venizelos himself), and he afterwards sent me an official note of which a copy is herewith enclosed. I said, as afterwards proved to be the case, that I did not think that any of the officers concerned would reconsider their decision to leave Greece immediately. A special attempt was made through me by M. Venizelos to retain the services of Lieutenant Waring, but that officer thought that in view of the manner in which the question had been put with regard to him, it would be consistent neither with his own dignity nor with the interests of the Greek service that he should remain.

Admiral Tufnell and most of the members of the mission leave in a few days. After their departure I shall have the honour to submit to you a confidential report on the whole subject of the naval mission.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 352.

M. Coromilas to Sir F. Elliot.

Athènes, le 29 *avril* (12 *mai*), 1913.

M. le Ministre,

J'AI le vif regret de communiquer à votre Excellence qu'une erreur de traduction a été la cause d'une fâcheuse méprise dans la lettre du 27 avril (10 mai), par laquelle je vous transmettais la demande du Ministère de la Marine concernant la Mission navale anglaise.

Le Ministère de la Marine n'a pas voulu dire qu'il était disposé à appliquer les articles 19 et 21 de la convention, mais, au contraire, que ces articles n'étaient pas applicables, puisque nous avons toujours considéré que la convention restait tacitement en vigueur; l'on continuerait donc à considérer les membres de la Mission anglaise comme étant toujours en service, et ceux qui désireraient se retirer avant l'expiration de la convention recevraient leurs traitements et indemnités jusqu'au 1er novembre, 1913.

Ceci, d'ailleurs, est conforme aux déclarations antérieures que le président du Conseil et moi-même nous avons faites, à savoir, que la convention ayant été tenue par nous comme tacitement existante, nous n'entendions nullement que les articles 19 et 21 avaient lieu d'être appliqués.

Je tiens à vous faire toutes mes excuses pour cette très regrettable erreur, et prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien agréer, &c.

L. A. COROMILAS.

[23092] No. 353.

M. de Fleuriau to Sir A. Nicolson.—(*Received May* 20.)

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 17 *mai*, 1913.

Cher Sir Arthur,

JE vous ai communiqué, hier, une proposition de mon Gouvernement relative au rôle des délégués turcs et balkaniques dans la conférence ou Commission financière de Paris. M. Pichon a pris cette décision sur l'avis de la commission française, qu'il avait consultée à cet égard, et je crois devoir vous communiquer le procès-verbal résumant les observations des commissaires français.

Votre très sincèrement dévoué,
A. DE FLEURIAU.

Enclosure in No. 353.

Procès-verbal de la Commission interministérielle française chargée de préparer les Travaux de la Commission financière des Affaires balkaniques.

L'ARTICLE 6 du projet de traité de paix entre la Turquie et les États balkaniques remet à la Commission financière des Affaires balkaniques le soin de régler les questions d'ordre financier résultant de la guerre qui prend fin.

Le programme de cette commission se trouve, d'ailleurs, précisé dans une note en quatre articles qui a été communiquée aux Puissances le 19 avril dernier, et approuvée par elles sous le bénéfice d'observations de détail.

La question aujourd'hui soumise à l'appréciation de la Commission interministérielle française est de savoir à quel titre et avec quels pouvoirs les représentants des États belligérants seront invités à participer aux travaux de la commission.

Une observation préliminaire s'impose.

Il y a lieu, tout d'abord, de noter que les décisions finales n'appartiendront pas à la commission elle-même, mais aux Gouvernements des Grandes Puissances, qui seront appelés à transformer en décisions définitives les avis formulés par la commission.

La situation de principe est en effet la même pour les questions qui seront traitées à Paris et pour celles qui ressortissent à la réunion des Ambassadeurs à Londres. La commission de Paris aura à résoudre les problèmes financiers dans les mêmes conditions où la réunion de Londres s'applique à résoudre les problèmes politiques et territoriaux. La procédure doit donc être la même, c'est-à-dire qu'à Paris comme à Londres, les représentants des Grandes Puissances doivent avoir seuls voix délibérative et pouvoir de décision.

Le programme assigné à la commission est un argument de plus à l'appui de cette conclusion.

En ce qui concerne, par exemple, la détermination de la part qui doit incomber aux États alliés dans le service de la dette ottomane, on ne saurait admettre les États belligérants à intervenir dans la délibération. Ce serait vouer la commission à l'impuissance, puisque pour empêcher toute décision, il suffirait qu'un seul des États belligérants refusât de se rallier à l'opinion commune. Serait-ce logique enfin qu'il dependit du Monténégro (qui n'a, pour ainsi dire, aucun intérêt dans la répartition de la dette ottomane) de paralyser le concert de toutes les Puissances?

Qu'adviendrait-il, d'ailleurs, lorsqu'il s'agirait d'examiner les réclamations que les États belligérants se proposent de produire, à titre de compensation pécuniaire du fait des opérations de guerre? C'est là une question sur laquelle on peut prévoir, dès à présent, un antagonisme irréductible, entre les Turcs et les alliés balkaniques. Il serait contraire aux termes mêmes, et surtout à l'esprit qui a dicté l'insertion de cet article dans le programme de la Commission financière, de convier les belligérants à procéder à cet examen avec voix délibérative. Ce serait là encore s'exposer à un insuccès certain. Concilier les prétentions adverses des belligérants et sauvegarder simultanément les intérêts propres des Grandes Puissances, tel est l'objet de la Commission financière; elle ne saurait, de toute évidence, remplir ce rôle nécessaire de médiateur et d'arbitre que si son pouvoir n'est pas à chaque pas, et sur toute question, mis en échec par le vote de l'un quelconque des belligérants.

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L'exposé qui précède ne tend point à écarter des travaux de la commission les représentants des belligérants. Il ne vise qu'à faire prévaloir une méthode de travail qui permette à cette commission d'aboutir, dans un délai raisonnable, à l'élaboration de formules positives. Si, malgré toutes les garanties d'équité et d'impartialité qu'offre aux belligérants une réunion où seront représentées toutes les Grandes Puissances, telle ou telle solution leur semblait inacceptable, ils auraient toujours la ressource de faire directement appel aux Gouvernements des Grandes Puissances.

Il n'en est pas moins désirable que les belligérants soient admis, dans la plus large mesure, à défendre leurs intérêts au sein de la Commission financière. La Commission interministérielle française estime donc que les délégués des belligérants devraient être admis à tous les travaux préparatoires, tant dans les réunions plénières de la commission que dans les sous-commissions qui seront organisées pour étudier les problèmes spéciaux. Admis de plein droit à toutes ces réunions, ils auraient les mêmes facilités que les délégués des Grandes Puissances pour soutenir leurs réclamations, mais la décision ne saurait finalement leur appartenir : ils n'auraient que voix consultative.

Seule l'adoption d'une telle méthode peut assurer aux délibérations de la commission de Paris un résultat pratique.

Paris, le 15 mai, 1913.

[23100] No. 354.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 20.)

Admiralty, May 17, 1913.

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of the convention and agreement regarding the handing over of the town of Scutari, which have been received from the vice-admiral commanding third battle squadron.

I am, &c.

O. MURRAY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 354.

Agreement.

POUR éviter tout incident entre les troupes du Monténégro et les détachements internationaux, je soussigné, Pierre Plamenatz, représentant de Sa Majesté le Roi de Monténégro, prends les engagements suivants :—

1. Quand la ville de Scutari aura été évacuée par les troupes de Monténégro, ces troupes se retireront dans une zone éloignée de 10 kilom. au moins de la ville de Scutari.

Exception est faite pour les 1,000 hommes prévus au paragraphe 6 de la convention ; 800 d'entre eux pourront séjourner à mi-distance entre Zogaj et Siroka, les 200 autres dans les casernes de Tarabosch.

2. Lorsque le matériel de guerre, &c., aura été enlevé, ces 1,000 hommes se retireront également dans une zone éloignée de 10 kilom. au moins de la ville de Scutari.

Le Gouverneur civil de la ville de Scutari,
PIERRE PLAMENATZ.

Le 26 avril (9 *mai*), 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 354.

Convention.

SA Majesté le Roi de Monténégro après avoir pris, le 9 (22) avril, 1913, avec son armée victorieuse, la ville fortifiée de Scutari, défendue par une armée ottomane, a décidé, le 22 avril (5 mai), 1913, dans l'intérêt supérieur de la paix, de faire sortir

ses troupes de Scutari et de confier le sort de cette ville aux Grandes Puissances d'Europe.

Pour régler toutes les questions concernant l'abandon libre par l'armée monténégrine du fruit de sa victoire et l'entrée dans la ville de Scutari des marins de la flotte internationale, Sa Majesté le Roi de Monténégro a chargé son Gouverneur civil de la ville de Scutari, M. Pierre Plamenatz, de s'entendre avec M. le Vice-Amiral anglais Cecil Burney et les autres commandants des divisions internationales.

Après avoir débattu toutes les questions concernant leur mission, ces messieurs sont tombés d'accord que :

1. L'armée monténégrine abandonnera la ville et la forteresse de Scutari le mercredi prochain, 1er (14) mai, à 2 heures de l'après-midi.

2. Les troupes internationales prendront possession de la ville de Scutari laissée libre par le Monténégro le même jour à partir de 2 heures de l'après-midi.

3. La gendarmerie et la police monténégrines resteront à Scutari pour maintenir l'ordre seulement jusqu'à l'entrée des troupes internationales dans la ville.

4. Vu que le Monténégro a pris par les armes la ville de Scutari, qui faisait partie intégrante de l'Empire ottoman, tout ce qui appartenait, soit dans la ville, la forteresse et les retranchements (poteaux et fils de fer), au Gouvernement ottoman et à l'armée ottomane qui défendait la ville contre le Monténégro, est devenu par le fait même de la conquête la propriété de l'armée et du Gouvernement de Monténégro ; le Monténégro se réserve la faculté d'en disposer après la prise de possession de la ville de Scutari par les Grandes Puissances comme il veut et comme il aurait pu le faire avant l'entrée des troupes internationales dans la ville ; de transporter au Monténégro ce qu'il veut transporter, de vendre sur place ce qu'il ne veut ou bien ne peut pas transporter.

Le transport et la vente devront se faire au fur et à mesure des moyens dont le Gouvernement monténégrin dispose et dans le plus court délai possible.

5. Comme le Gouvernement monténégrin n'aura pas avant l'entrée des troupes internationales le temps nécessaire d'enlever ou de vendre tout ce qu'il a apporté à Scutari et ce qui lui est échu en vertu de la conquête, le vice-amiral commandant en chef des flottes réunies désignera des officiers qui, avec les officiers monténégrins, en dresseront un inventaire détaillé. Tout ce qui sera contenu dans cet inventaire sera gardé par les troupes internationales et leur conservation garantie par les Grandes Puissances.

6. Mille hommes de l'armée monténégrine camperont sur la rive droite de la Boïana et pourront entrer librement dans la ville de Scutari pour enlever et liquider tout ce qui appartient à l'armée et au Gouvernement de Monténégro et qui n'aura pas pu être enlevé et liquidé avant l'entrée dans la ville des troupes internationales.

7. Au moment de l'entrée des troupes internationales dans la ville de Scutari, le vice-amiral commandant en chef et les autres commandants des divisions navales s'engagent à lever immédiatement le blocus des côtes monténégrines depuis Spitza jusqu'à l'embouchure de Drin.

Fait en rade de San Giovanni di Medua, le 26 avril (9 mai), 1913, à bord de H.M.S. "King Edward VII."

P. PLAMENATZ,
Gouverneur civil de Scutari.
CECIL BURNEY,
Vice-Admiral.
PATRIS, G.,
Contre-Ammiraglio.
NJEGOVAN,
K. u. K. Kontreadmiral.
G. LAUGIER,
Capitaine de Vaisseau.
V. KLITZING,
Fregattenkapitän, Kommandant, S.M.S. "Breslau."

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[23181] No. 355.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 67.) *Paris, May 20, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 207 of 19th May.

French Ambassador in London instructed to bring before the *réunion* of Ambassadors ways and means of finding funds for Scutari purposes.

[23188] No. 356.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 236.) *Constantinople, May 20, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

YOUR telegram No. 216 of 13th May: Oil.

The Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs both categorically state that no promises whatever have been given to the representative of Messrs. Wagg, Russell [*sic*].

[23183] No. 357.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 75.) *Athens, May 20, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

THE Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs asks me to explain to you the attitude of the Greek Government with regard to preliminary draft treaty.

They ask that mention of the allied Sovereigns should be eliminated from articles 3 and 5, not because they contest the right of the Great Powers to take or their power to enforce their decisions, but because the mention of the Sovereigns would seem logically to exclude the submission of their views to the Powers.

In article 7 they want it stipulated that the special conventions shall be signed simultaneously with the definitive treaty, in order to avoid the long delays of which they had unfortunate experience after the war of 1897.

[23184] No. 358.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 76.) *Athens, May 20, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

MY telegram No. 70 of 9th May.

Greek Government are strongly urging Bulgarian Government to withdraw objection to repatriation of Turkish troops from Albania.

[23186] No. 359.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 77.) *Athens, May 20, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs thinks that the Italian threat of war, referred to in my telegram No. 72 of 15th May, was an intimation to the Greek Government that they had better negotiate directly with the Italian Government. They do not wish to do this without knowing what the French and English Governments think about it.

[23194] No. 360.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 101.) *Rome, May 20, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 181 of 19th May: Scutari finance.

Minister for Foreign Affairs will consult consul as to possible local resources. He is against the Powers imposing taxes on population in their present desperate condition, and considers that least possible outlay should be contemplated. He thought it worth considering whether temporary advance might not be obtainable from revenues collection of the Commissioners of Debt.

[23197] No. 361.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 20.)

(No. 82.) *Berlin, May 20, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 206 of 19th May.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to whom I communicated the above telegram, told me this evening that he had no suggestion to make except that all the Powers who took part in the blockade should subscribe and include amounts in general expenses of the expedition. Beyond this he had no ideas, as it was improbable that any money could be got from Turkey. He recognised urgency of matter, but said that he must reflect further before giving me definite views.

[22971] No. 362.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 208.) *Foreign Office, May 20, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 207 to Paris of 19th May: Funds for Scutari.

Vice-Admiral telegraphs he has been able to arrange with Ottoman Bank to advance immediate money requirements up to 1,000*l.*, and has authorised guarantees of sum advanced out of receipts from customs dues and by international commission. If this procedure is approved and bank directors agree he will raise further sums in this way to meet necessary expenditure. Vice-Admiral adds he is informed revenue of customs dues, which will now go to town, should produce 3,000*l.* to 4,000*l.* monthly when trade is thoroughly re-established.

[22727] No. 363.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 209.) *Foreign Office, May 20, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

MR. LAMB'S telegram No. 32 and Sir F. Elliot's telegram No. 74, both of 17th May: Ottoman Bank at Saloniea.

Inform French Government of action taken at Athens.

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* Also to Sir F. Cartwright (No. 175), Sir R. Rodd (No. 182), Sir E. Goschen (No. 207), and Mr. O'Beirne (No. 411).

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[22732] No. 364.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 413.) *Foreign Office, May 20, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 194 of 17th May: Persian Gulf Anglo-Turkish negotiations.

You should explain to Minister for Foreign Affairs that, so far as I am aware, there is no question of a British advance to Turkey under consideration, and certainly His Majesty's Government have not undertaken any obligation to make a separate advance to Turkey apart from the other Powers. I trust that all the Powers will, on the conclusion of peace, be prepared to use their good offices to facilitate Turkey's efforts to secure that financial assistance which will be essential for her welfare, but this has formed no part of our own negotiations with Turkey. You should add that our negotiations with Turkey respecting the Persian Gulf involve no attempt to press her in her present condition, since they have been in progress for over two years, and that from the outset the successful issue of those negotiations has been made an important condition of British assent to the Turkish customs increase.

I could not possibly defend our assent to that increase (which will principally affect British trade, which amounts to 60 per cent. of the total imports in Mesopotamia) unless I had concluded our negotiations first.

Apart from the Turco-Persian frontier, our political negotiations merely involve the recognition by Turkey of the *status quo* in the Gulf, as it has existed for a century, and the other negotiations are directed to safeguarding British commercial interests in view of the steady progress and undoubted ultimate completion of the Bagdad Railway.

But British assent to the customs increase will continue to be dependent on the assent of all the Powers concerned to that measure.

I have kept the Russian Ambassador informed of the progress of the Bagdad Railway negotiations, and as long ago as last summer I communicated to the Russian Government the draft of a convention respecting the Shatt-el-Arab—a convention which has since so far only been modified in unimportant details.

We are in no way endeavouring to turn the misfortunes of Turkey to our own advantage, but merely to safeguard our important existing interests in view of altering local conditions.

[22643] No. 365.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 70.) *Foreign Office, May 20, 1913.*
Sir,

THE Bulgarian Minister informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 13th May that he had received authority to sign the draft treaty, and was ready to do so as soon as the others were. He intimated that the Bulgarian Government would like to state in a protocol or in some way their desire for the Sarai-Muratli line. Sir A. Nicolson told him that this was a detail to settle with the others. Sir A. Nicolson was glad to hear that the Bulgarian Government had authorised him to sign, and trusted that the other allies would be equally reasonable.

M. Madjarof then spoke of the concentration of large Greek forces in Salonica and Serres vicinity, and of the conflicts which had already taken place between Bulgarian and Greek troops. His Government hoped that His Majesty's Government would state at Athens—

1. That conflicts should be avoided.
2. That an enquiry should be held as to who was to blame for the collisions which had occurred.
3. That the *status quo* should be maintained.

Sir A. Nicolson took note of the above.

The matter will be mentioned verbally to the Greek Minister here.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[22644] No. 366.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 45.) *Foreign Office, May 20, 1913.*
Sir,

M. SKOULOUDIS called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 13th May. Sir A. Nicolson expressed the hope that M. Skouloudis had received authority to sign the preliminary treaty of peace. M. Skouloudis said that he had not received any instructions as yet to that effect. Sir A. Nicolson said that Bulgaria and Turkey were ready to sign, and he presumed that neither Servia nor Montenegro would make difficulties. M. Skouloudis said that if the articles as to Albania and the islands were modified or omitted his Government would make no difficulties. Sir A. Nicolson went over again with M. Skouloudis all the old ground, pointing out that the preliminary treaty was between the allies and Turkey, and that surely it was a great gain to Greece to obtain a formal engagement from Turkey that she left the two questions which he had mentioned in the hands of the Powers. That was a great step in advance. Greece, by not signing, would not advance her cause an inch *vis-à-vis* to the Powers, and would allow a state of quasi-hostility with Turkey to continue, which entailed a heavy burden on the Greek treasury, besides blocking all Greek trade with the Black Sea and hampering it with other portions of the Turkish Empire. By signing the treaty Greece gained much and lost nothing. M. Skouloudis did not dispute this, but said that his position was delicate, and he could hardly place these considerations before his Government. He urged strongly that at least Greece might be permitted to lay her views before the Powers. Sir A. Nicolson said that she had already done so, and that the Powers were well aware of her wishes and aspirations. Sir A. Nicolson impressed on M. Skouloudis that it would be most unfortunate if Greece stood out.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21143] No. 367.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 109.) *Foreign Office, May 20, 1913.*
Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 85 of the 21st ultimo, regarding the seizure of Ottoman fiscal stamps by the Greek and Bulgarian authorities in the occupied territories, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris,* setting forth the views of the French Government, to whom an enquiry was addressed similar to that contained in my despatch above-mentioned on the same question, from which you will observe that they have based representations to the Greek and Bulgarian Governments, solely on the injury to the interests of the bondholders of the Ottoman Public Debt likely to result from the action complained of.

I have instructed His Majesty's Ministers at Athens and Sophia to make similar representations based on the same consideration, and your Excellency should inform the Austro-Hungarian Government of the action which I have taken and of its motive.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23705] No. 368.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.†

(No. 112.) *Foreign Office, May 20, 1913.*
Sir,

AT the reunion to-day I communicated what had passed between the Servian delegates and myself about the insertion that they desired to have made in the treaty of peace.

* Sir F. Bertie, No. 219, May 1, 1913.
† Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 324), Sir E. Goschen (No. 162), Sir R. Rodd (No. 141), and Mr. O'Beirne (No. 201).

It was the unanimous opinion of the reunion that to insert these words in the treaty of peace between Turkey and the allies would be out of place, and the following resolution was come to :—

" Le Gouvernement serbe, avant de signer le traité de paix entre les alliés et la Turquie, réclame des Puissances une assurance relative au débouché commercial qui lui a été reservé sur l'Adriatique avec un chemin de fer international sous le contrôle européen. La réunion pense qu'il n'y a aucun inconvénient à répéter la déclaration sur laquelle elle s'est mise d'accord le 20 décembre, 1912, et qui a été approuvée par les six Gouvernements. Cette déclaration ne peut être insérée dans le traité qui se conclut entre les alliés et la Sublime Porte, mais elle peut faire l'objet d'une mention spéciale dans un instrument diplomatique, et en attendant elle peut être réitérée par Sir Edward Grey, au nom des six Puissances, aux délégués serbes à la conférence de Londres."

We then discussed the question of alterations in the treaty of peace, as desired by Turkey, and especially the alteration desired by Greece.

The Italian Ambassador held very strongly the opinion that the alteration desired by Greece was not one that should be countersigned by the Powers, though it had not been communicated to his Government and he was without instructions.

The Austrian Ambassador was disposed to take the same line.

The German Chargé d'Affaires said that the German Government saw no objection to the alteration desired by Greece if none of the other Powers objected.

The French and Russian Ambassadors also saw no objection to it.

I stated that this was my view as well. It was clear, however, that we might expect strong objection from Italy and Austria, and that the assent of the Powers to this alteration could certainly not be obtained without considerable discussion and delay, and probably it would be impossible to come to an agreement about it.

The French Ambassador and I pointed out that Turkey and the allies were entitled to make what alterations they pleased in a treaty that was their own affair, though of course such alteration would be theirs, and would have no binding effect on the Powers.

Finally, the following resolution was come to :—

" M. de Kühlmann fait savoir à la réunion que le Ministre de Grèce à Berlin a dit que son Gouvernement réclamait dans les articles 3 et 5 la suppression des mots 'et leurs Majestés les Souverains alliés.' M. Skouloudis a parlé dans le même sens au Foreign Office.

" D'autre part, l'Ambassadeur de Turquie a demandé l'insertion dans l'article 7 d'une mention relative aux vakoufs et des indications plus précises sur la question de juridiction.

" Après un échange de vues sur ces diverses réclamations, Sir E. Grey a proposé à la réunion, qui l'a adopté, l'avis suivant :

" Les Puissances estiment qu'une discussion sur des modifications du traité entraînerait inévitablement des délais, et elles expriment l'espoir que la Turquie et les alliés arriveront le plus tôt possible à un accord pour la conclusion de la paix."

The Austrian Ambassador handed in the following reservation, which was received by the *réunion* for the purpose of record :—

" En donnant son assentiment au texte du traité de paix préliminaire, le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal tient à ce que les observations suivantes, auxquelles ce texte donne lieu, fussent insérées dans une résolution de la réunion :

" I.

" Le Gouvernement austro-hongrois, tout en maintenant la proposition présentée dans la note du 15 mars relativement aux droits découlant des Capitulations turques dans les territoires qui seront annexés par les alliés, est prêt à ne pas insister pour qu'une stipulation à ce sujet soit insérée parmi les articles de la paix préliminaire.

" Cette décision a été prise par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal pour les raisons [illegible].

" La paix préliminaire ne spécifie pas encore l'étendue des territoires qui seront annexés à chacun des États balkaniques, et le règlement des questions rattachées à la souveraineté territoriale dans ces portions, surtout des questions régies actuellement par les Capitulations, est donc réservé à une date ultérieure quand il y aura pleine clarté sur les parts de territoire attribuées à chaque État balkanique.

" L'Autriche-Hongrie fera alors dépendre sa reconnaissance de ces changements territoriaux d'une solution satisfaisante des questions susindiquées.

" II.

" Il nous semble qu'il ne pourrait être dans l'intérêt des Grandes Puissances d'accorder aux représentants des États balkaniques à la commission siégeant à Paris le même vote décisif qu'aux Grandes Puissances, vu que les États belligérants devront assumer dès la conclusion de la paix de nombreuses charges, résultant de la dette publique et des concessions accordées à des compagnies privées qui passeront dans leurs mains.

" Accepter un pareil principe serait dangereux et difficile à appliquer en pratique.

" D'ailleurs, on avait tout d'abord eu l'idée de notifier simplement aux belligérants comme volonté des Puissances les décisions qui auront été prises par la réunion des Ambassadeurs (d'après le projet d'article proposé par la France) sur toute question de principe touchant des matières de finance.

" De même, on avait proposé que la commission de Paris n'aurait à s'occuper que de l'élaboration des détails et qu'elle ne serait formée que par des représentants des Grandes Puissances.

" C'est seulement plus tard qu'on a décidé de confier à la commission de Paris le règlement de toutes les questions de principe et de permettre aux belligérants de se faire représenter à ladite commission.

" Par conséquent, il nous semble que les belligérants ne pourraient prétendre qu'à un vote consultatif."

The French Ambassador stated that, in the view of his Government, the representatives of the Balkan States and Turkey should be present at the Financial Commission with a consultative voice only.

I pointed out that, though the question of whether the representatives of the allies should be there in a deliberative or only a consultative capacity had never been directly discussed, yet the allies had been induced to put aside the acceptance of their demands for an indemnity, as one of the conditions of peace, by the promise that they would be represented on the commission in Paris, which was to discuss all questions of a financial nature. No limitation had then been placed on this representation, and I feared that, if they were now told that they were to be there with a consultative voice only, they would accuse the Powers of bad faith.

We discussed the question of the organisation of Albania, and the French Ambassador made the following proposal :—

" Sur le projet d'organisation de l'Albanie présenté par les Ambassadeurs d'Autriche-Hongrie et d'Italie, l'Ambassadeur de France a formulé les observations suivantes :

" En ce qui concerne la suzeraineté du Sultan, une décision peut être ajournée, car cette suzeraineté purement nominale ne peut avoir d'effet sur l'organisation intérieure de l'Albanie. Si elle est admise, l'action politique du Sultan sera nulle; si elle ne l'est pas, les populations musulmanes conserveront leurs rapports religieux avec le Calife, comme toutes celles qui appartiennent à des régions séparées politiquement de la Turquie.

" L'examen de cette question peut donc être ajourné quant à présent.

" Il n'en est pas de même de la suggestion relative à la désignation d'un prince ou chef d'État qui serait proposé par l'Autriche et l'Italie. Cette désignation, si l'on adopte cette mesure, devrait appartenir à toutes les Puissances, mais il serait préférable de renoncer à donner un prince au nouvel État autonome.

" L'Albanie ne possède encore ni Gouvernement, ni organisation, ni ressources; que fera-t-elle d'un prince venu du dehors, sans compétence, sans autorité, à qui il faudra constituer une liste civile? Son rang lui imposera une réserve pleine d'inconvénients lorsqu'il faudra se mettre en rapports avec les chefs de clan. Il sera probablement voué à une fin violente et les Puissances se trouveront alors entraînées dans des interventions pleines de péril.

" En réalité, le moment n'est pas venu de créer en Albanie une institution définitive. Les Puissances devraient s'attacher d'abord à organiser un Gouvernement

viable et ce Gouvernement aura d'autant plus de chances d'être accepté qu'il respectera davantage la vieille organisation féodale de régions qui en réalité n'ont jamais possédé de Gouvernement régulier. Nous avons assumé la charge de constituer ce Gouvernement, mais nous ne savons rien de l'Albanie, et si nous trouvons une organisation ottomane sur la côte et dans les parties accessibles du pays, nous ignorent absolument s'il y a un ordre établi dans l'intérieure. Chaque fois que la Sublime Porte a voulu soumettre les populations de la montagne à une règle quelconque et leur imposer une charge, elle a provoqué des insurrections. Comment élaborer dès maintenant un statut définitif?

"Il semblerait plus opportun de confier d'abord à un mandataire temporaire le soin de mettre sur pied une machine dont la mise en œuvre demandera du temps et de la patience. Ce mandataire, nommé pour deux ou trois ans, aurait le titre de Haut Commissaire des Puissances, et, à moins qu'on ne trouve en Europe un homme assez expérimenté et assez au courant des affaires albanaises pour renoncer à nos procédés administratifs ordinaires, le mieux serait de choisir un Albanais de bonne race.

"Le Haut Commissaire une fois trouvé, on constituerait aussitôt la commission internationale de contrôle administratif et financier.

"Le projet présenté par nos collègues d'Autriche-Hongrie et d'Italie propose d'abord une commission d'études qui, une fois ses projets d'organisation adoptés, procédera à l'installation d'une commission de contrôle.

"Cette commission d'études nous fera perdre du temps. Il vaut mieux instituer immédiatement la commission de contrôle, qui pourra constituer avec le Haut Commissaire un Gouvernement, dont l'action s'exercera utilement dans les parties accessibles de l'Albanie et qui se mettra en rapports avec les personnalités influentes de l'intérieur et établira avec elles un *modus vivendi* acceptable.

"Il peut paraître singulier de constituer un contrôle administratif et financier avant que l'Albanie possède une administration et des finances, mais il serait encore plus singulier de prétendre légiférer sur un pays dont nous ignorons tout.

"Ainsi le projet présenté par nos collègues d'Autriche et d'Italie mentionne une organisation judiciaire dans le genre de celle de l'Égypte, mais en Égypte l'organisation des tribunaux mixtes, avec leur législation et leur procédure calquées sur les institutions françaises, est destinée aux étrangers; en Albanie, il n'y a pas d'étrangers. Prétendrons-nous édifier de toutes pièces une législation à l'usage des Albanais?

"Le Gouvernement français pense qu'il convient d'éviter les mesures hâtives et les organisations à la mode européenne. D'après lui, la commission internationale de contrôle, d'accord avec le Haut Commissaire, aura la double mission de prendre des mesures immédiates et temporaires dans les régions déjà pourvues d'une organisation ottomane et de se renseigner, pour les autres parties de l'Albanie, sur les usages et les institutions traditionnelles du pays afin de s'y conformer dans ses propositions d'organisation définitive.

"Dans quelle mesure la population sera-t-elle appelée à se prononcer sur ces propositions? Sous quelle forme exprimera-t-elle ses désirs? Existe-t-il déjà des assemblées populaires? Comment s'exerce la justice dans l'intérieur? Existe-t-il des juridictions reconnues, ou n'y a-t-il simplement qu'un recours aux chefs de clan? Les populations sont-elles soumises à des taxes et sous quelle forme?

"Ces questions doivent être élucidées avant qu'il soit possible de songer à créer des institutions dont les agents provoqueraient, comme au temps de la domination turque, des insurrections contre les Puissances.

"En résumé, nomination d'un Haut Commissaire et d'une commission internationale de contrôle, qui seraient à la fois des agents du Gouvernement et des agents d'étude. Organisation temporaire progressive et aussi peu centralisée que possible. Telles sont les conclusions que le Gouvernement français soumet à l'examen des Puissances."

I said that it had become clear that the *réunion* had neither the time nor the knowledge to elaborate a programme of organisation for Albania, and I had been turning over in my own mind how this could be done. The suggestion that had occurred to me was that it should be referred to a committee of experts; but I thought that the proposal of the French Ambassador, of which I had heard only this morning, was more practical and useful.

The Ambassadors said that they would refer it to their Governments.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21143] No. 369.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.**

(No. 195.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 20, 1913.*

I HAVE received Sir G. Buchanan's despatch No. 146 of the 3rd instant, regarding the seizure of Ottoman fiscal stamps by the Greek and Bulgarian authorities in the occupied territories.

I transmit to you herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris,† setting forth the views of the French Government, to whom an enquiry was addressed similar to that contained in my despatch No. 163 of the 21st ultimo to Sir G. Buchanan on the same question, from which you will observe that they have based representations to the Greek and Bulgarian Governments, solely on the injury to the interests of the bondholders of the Ottoman Public Debt likely to result from the action complained of.

I have instructed His Majesty's Ministers at Athens and Sophia to make similar representations, based on the same consideration, and you should inform the Russian Government of the action which I have taken and of its motive.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23253] No. 370.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 199.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 20, 1913.*

M. DE ETTER informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 19th May that M. Sazonof was of opinion that the Powers should express to the belligerents a wish that they should come to an agreement among themselves as to demobilization, and that the latter measure should take place immediately on signature of peace.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23253] No. 371.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 200.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 20, 1913.*

M. DE ETTER informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 19th May that M. Sazonof considers that the Balkan delegates at the Paris Conference should be on exactly the same footing as all the other delegates, and possess a consultative and deliberative voice.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21143] No. 372.

Sir Edward Grey to Tewfik Pasha.

HIS Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the Turkish Ambassador, and has the honour to refer to his Highness's memorandum of the 7th ultimo, relative to the seizure of Ottoman fiscal stamps by the Greek and Bulgarian authorities at certain places in Macedonia.

Sir Edward Grey has the honour to inform Tewfik Pasha that he has instructed His Majesty's Ministers at Athens and Sophia to take steps to prevent the despatch of these stamps to Asiatic Turkey, where their sale would injure the interests of the bondholders of the Ottoman Public Debt.

Foreign Office, May 20, 1913.

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* Also to Sir R. Rodd, No. 136, *mutatis mutandis.* † Sir F. Bertie, No. 219, May 1, 1913.

[22306] No. 373.

Sir Edward Grey to French Chargé d'Affaires.

HIS Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the French Chargé d'Affaires, and in reply to his communication of the 14th instant, has the honour to inform him that Tuesday, May 27th, is agreeable to His Majesty's Government as the date on which the Financial Commission on Balkan affairs should assemble in Paris.

Foreign Office, May 20, 1913.

[23212] No. 374.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 432.) *Constantinople, May 16, 1913.*

Sir,

IN my telegram No. 235 of to-day's date I had the honour to report that Messrs. Whittall and Co. complain that one of their stores at Rodosto had been opened by the Bulgarian military authorities and a store of their canary seed sold by auction, and that, fearing further seizures, they requested that steps might be taken to prevent any such high handed action on the part of the Bulgarians.

I enclose herewith, for your information, copy of Messrs. Whittall's letter on the subject, from which it will be seen that they trust "that the Bulgarian Government will be held responsible to them for the value of the goods seized in capital and interest—not at the price obtained at auction at Rodosto, but on the basis of the prices ruling in Europe during the past month."

The matter would seem to be of considerable importance, not only on account of the individual act of injustice here complained of, but as a matter of principle, in view of the somewhat loose methods in vogue among the Bulgarian military authorities throughout Macedonia.

Copy of this despatch has been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Sophia.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER

Enclosure in No. 374.

Messrs. Whittall and Co. to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir,

WE recently heard indirectly from the brother of our agent at Rodosto, who, being an Italian, was replaced by Mr. J. W. Streater during the war, and from other sources, that one of the stores rented by us in our own name in the town had been opened by the local Bulgarian military authorities and the goods contained therein or part of them had been seized and sold at public auction.

A part of the merchandise in our store belonged in reality to our Italian agent, who was at liberty thus to make use of the store, especially as the goods represented security to us for the credit allowed him. He is claiming through his embassy, but all the same, the goods being in our store, the Bulgarian authorities had no right of seizure.

But it was also stated that some 600 bags of canary seed as well as linseed, &c., belonging to us had been seized.

As we had no direct news from our agent at Rodosto we have refrained from communicating the above to your Excellency hitherto, but news received by us now from other sources confirms the report.

Our agent's brother has received definite particulars of the seizure by the Bulgarians, and sale at public auction of 580 bags of canary seed and 90 bags of linseed, and the buyers at auction of our seed have informed us through their house here of the purchase of our goods. They add that our agent protested strongly against this illegal action, but without avail.

It is clear that our agents are not allowed to communicate with us, or we should have heard from them.

There is, however, no longer any room for doubt as to the facts, and, seeing that the letter received from our agent's brother states that the remaining about 1,700 bags of our canary seed in the same store were also on the point of being seized and sold, we are forced to apply to your Excellency for help, and to beg, if possible, that a telegraphic protest be entered through His Majesty's Minister at Sophia against the illegal action of the Bulgarian authorities at Rodosto, and that instructions should be at once sent from Sophia so as to prevent the possibility of any further seizures.

We trust also that the Bulgarian Government will be held responsible to us for the value of the goods seized in capital and interest, and this not at the price obtained at auction at Rodosto, but on the basis of the prices ruling in Europe. Trusting your Excellency will appreciate the urgency of the case.

We remain, &c.
J. W. WHITTALL AND CO.

[23213] No. 375.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 433.) *Constantinople, May 16, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 234 of yesterday's date, relative to the transport of the Ottoman troops from Durazzo and Valona to Beirout and Ismidt, I have the honour to enclose herewith copies of two *notes verbales* from the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs informing me of the proposed measure and further engaging that these contingents will not be utilised during the operations of war.

You will notice that this assurance was omitted in the first note from the Sublime Porte, and was only furnished in the subsequent note despatched on the following day, after further representations made by me.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 375.

Circular Note verbale communicated to Sir G. Lowther.

POUR faire suite à sa note verbale du 11 courant, le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Etrangères a l'honneur d'informer l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique que les soldats ottomans malades et infirmes qui seront embarqués à Valona et Durazzo seront transportés à Ismid pour recevoir les soins et traitements nécessaires dans les hôpitaux préparés à cet effet et le reste des troupes sera débarqué à Beyrouth.

Sublime Porte, le 14 mai, 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 375.

Circular Note verbale communicated to Sir G. Lowther.

POUR faire suite à sa note verbale du 14 courant, le Ministère Impérial des Affaires Etrangères a l'honneur d'informer l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique que le Gouvernement Impérial s'engage à ne pas se servir pour les opérations de guerre des contingents de l'armée Impériale de l'ouest qui seront transportés à Beyrouth et à Ismid, conformément à la note verbale susmentionnée.

Sublime Porte, le 15 mai, 1913.

[23220] No. 376.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 21.)

(No. 128. Confidential.)

Rome, May 16, 1913.

Sir,

SIR FRANCIS ELLIOT has been so good as to repeat to me his telegram No. 72 of the 15th instant, reporting to you that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed the Greek Chargé d'Affaires that Italy would go to extreme lengths to prevent Greece from holding both sides of the Corfu channel, and that the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs considered the attitude of Italy was rather directed against other Powers than against Greece in the first instance.

It is probable that the menace which Italy and Austria-Hungary profess to see to the gate of the Adriatic in the occupation by Greece of the two shores enclosing the sheltered waters of Corfu does, indeed, contemplate the utilisation of those waters as a naval base by some powerful maritime Power at war with Italy or Austria, and it is permissible to doubt whether this danger would be in any way minimised by the mainland shore being in the occupation of a neutralised Albania. But, however this may be, there is, I think, no doubt that the Italian Government are thoroughly in earnest as regards maintaining the attitude they have adopted.

On the 6th April Sir F. Elliot reported, in his telegram No. 47, that M. Venizelos had stated that he did not think that public opinion in Italy would sanction the ejection of Greece by force from territories which she had won. It would, in my opinion, be very unwise to count on such an attitude of public opinion.

The country has been carefully educated to believe that the question of the Corfu channel is a vital one, and the Opposition has been disarmed by the satisfaction universally felt here at the ingenious policy of the Minister for Foreign Affairs in his plan for parallel "co-operation" with Austria-Hungary by an expedition to Vallona if the latter had resorted to isolated action to compel the evacuation of Scutari. This move was regarded as a brilliant example of diplomatic resource. It was designed to achieve an alternative purpose—either it would tend to make Austria pause in her anti-Montenegrin campaign, or, if the worst anticipations were realised, it would give Italy an efficacious lever for negotiating a return to the *status quo ante*, and a hostage for good behaviour on the part of her ally. Austria thus suddenly found herself confronted with the possibility of seeing Italy, under circumstances which practically excluded any protest, in occupation of Vallona—a contingency which the policy of years had aimed at excluding; the Triple Alliance party here were satisfied with the blessed word "co-operation," and the opponents of the Alliance with the pleasant consciousness that the move would be supremely distasteful to Austria. The quick intelligence of this people appreciated the adroitness of the manœuvre, and the protests of the advocates of struggling nationalities were silenced—for the time, at any rate—in the general consensus of approval. At that moment secret preparations were hastily initiated for the rapid concentration of an expeditionary force of 45,000 men. Although the handing over of Scutari to the Powers rendered the expedition unnecessary, there is reason to believe that the condition of preparedness for eventualities is maintained. The troops then assembled at Brindisi—said to be 7,000, though the Austro-Hungarian military attaché puts the figure somewhat lower—remain there, and I am informed that there is considerable accumulation of military material ready for embarkation on the quays. This attitude of expectation will, I believe, continue until the question of the southern frontier of Albania has been settled.

Even if the interests of Austria-Hungary were not, as it is claimed here, involved quite as seriously as those of this country by the future of the Corfu channel, Italy can in any case count on the solidarity of her ally, as the latter would be no more disposed to see Italy acting alone in the neighbourhood of Vallona and Santi Quaranta than Italy has shown herself to see Austria act alone in the north of Albania, and a similar sense of mistrust would make "co-operation" inevitable.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

[23231] No. 377.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 21.)

(No. 165.)

St. Petersburgh, May 16, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that it is announced that M. Sazonof submitted to the Duma on the 14th instant a bill requesting the sanction of that body for the sum of 1,000,000 roubles (over 100,000*l.*) expended in the purchase of food and stores, principally flour and maize, for the starving Montenegrins.

In an explanatory statement appended to the bill it is pointed out that the two harvest failures in 1911 and 1912, together with the effects of the war which had withdrawn all able-bodied men from the land, had reduced the population of Montenegro to the point of starvation. The long-standing traditional friendship and racial kinship between Russia and Montenegro made it impossible for the former to stand idly by, and it had been accordingly decided to incur this expense in the purchase of foodstuffs for the people of Montenegro through the agency of the Russian Minister at Cettinjé, and in accordance with article 17 of the budget regulations. In view of the urgency of the need and the state of war in the Balkans, it had been necessary both to act at once and to keep the matter a secret, as, although such action did not constitute a violation of neutrality, publicity might have provoked "undesirable discussions." It was, however, no longer necessary to keep the matter a secret.

I have, &c.

HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[23215] No. 378.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May* 21.)

(No. 435.)

Constantinople, May 17, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that the Committee press has recently occupied itself with the subject of the reported Anglo-German rapprochement in matters concerning Turkey, and the remark of the "Temps" that England is reverting to the policy of 1878.

The "Tanin" remarks that "by this rapprochement Turkey invites England to carry out some duties she had forgotten. The revival of a thirty-five years' old convention (that of Cyprus) cannot disturb the equilibrium. It was disturbed by the occupation of Cyprus, but the interested parties obtained compensation, *e.g.*, Austria got Bosnia, while France obtained permission to invade Tunis. The matter is not a new one. Similarly, with regard to the Persian Gulf and the last section of the Bagdad Railway, all that was needed was to give the question a form that would prevent disputes.

"There is consequently no necessity to talk about the great success of the Anglo-German policy. Germany's only success lies in her having set aside certain questions that caused trouble with England."

The "Tanin" then goes on to rebut the "Temps'" statement as to the failure of M. Bompard to secure economic advantages for France in Turkey, a failure which should be set down to a "diplomat who spends his time at the Quai d'Orsay on better terms with Russia than is necessary." It would be more fitting if the "Temps," instead of talking about the French Ambassador at Constantinople, tried to influence a certain *milieu* in Paris in the direction of modifying its "tributary" attitude towards Russia. *À propos* of the alleged divergence between France and England over Syria, the "Tanin" asked whether England and France are reverting to the positions they occupied with regard to one another at the time of the Fashoda incident.

From this and other comments in the Ottoman press it would seem that the present Government in Turkey believes that its most advantageous line in foreign policy is to serve as an instrument to bring England nearer to Germany and to Turkey, and by the offer of economic advantages to France to draw her in the same direction, and thus work for the isolation of Russia.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[23332] No. 379.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 21.)

(Confidential.) *Admiralty, May 21, 1913.*

Sir,

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a cypher telegram relative to the situation in Scutari.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No 379.

Admiralty to Vice-Admiral, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) *Admiralty, May 20, 1913.*

WHEN your colleagues have received requisite instructions, confer with them as to institution of a provisional civil administration, to be controlled by commanders of international fleet, and to exercise municipal powers.

[23350] No. 380.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 69.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, May 21, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 15th May.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that decision of the Ambassadors at St. Petersburgh will be discussed in the Chamber in secret session on 26th May. He seems to have little doubt that the decision will be accepted by substantial majority.

[23320] No. 381.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, May 21, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 174 of 19th May.

The Austrian Government have received the same information from their admiral, and have replied with similar enquiry as to the minimum sum required for the present at Scutari.

The Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informs me that the matter is being considered, and he will let me know as soon as possible the views of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who, in the meantime, is inclined to think that funds will have to be provided somehow for the temporary needs of the administration of Scutari.

[23358] No. 382.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 21.)

(No. 173. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May 21, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 171 of 17th May.

Greek Minister tells me that his Government have now informed Bulgarian Government that the time has gone by for discussion of frontier question between the

two countries *à deux*, and that such questions can only be discussed between allies. (This means that Greek Government practically refuse to receive M. Sarafof, and that they have come to arrangement with Servia to protect their joint interests.)

Bulgarian Government have informed Greek Minister that they cannot accept such an arrangement, as, in their opinion, no frontier question exists between Bulgaria and Servia. Montenegro is a negligible quantity.

Greek Minister tells that military party here are working hard for the overthrow of present Cabinet and for the adoption of immediate military action against Greece after signature of preliminary treaty. He added that his Government are prepared for all eventualities.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

[23546] No. 382°.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 210.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 21, 1913.*

FINANCIAL Commission at Paris.

I discussed with French and Russian Ambassadors this morning position of representatives of belligerents at forthcoming conference, and pointed out that the allies desisted from insisting on an indemnity being made one of the peace conditions, on the understanding that this and other financial questions would be dealt with at an international conference, at which allies would be represented. No indication was ever given to the allies that their representation would be limited in any way, or that their representatives would not be on exactly the same footing as the representatives of the Powers. The Powers would therefore lay themselves open to the reproach of not keeping faith with the allies were they to decline to give them a deliberative voice, and, in any case, the Powers would always be in a majority over all the belligerents. There are certain questions in which latter are not directly interested, and such questions could well be treated by the Powers alone, but I am strongly of opinion that the representation of the belligerents should not be limited in character. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[23183] No. 383.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 77.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 21, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 75 of 20th May.

To raise discussion with the Powers about alterations in terms of treaty of peace between Turkey and the allies will cause most undesirable delay. It seems to me that Greece has nothing to gain by such delay, and that it will make a favourable settlement of Southern Albanian frontier and Ægean islands not less but more difficult.

There is no chance that all the Powers will agree to make settlement of these questions dependent upon consent of Greece or formal consultation with her.

On the other hand, it is certain that no decision securing the consent of all the Powers will be come to without fair account being taken of the claims and interests of Greece.

This is the real situation: it will not be changed by any alteration of the wording of a treaty between Turkey and the allies, and delay in conclusion of peace with Turkey will produce new and most unfortunate complications, especially if, as seems possible, Bulgaria takes a line of her own and concludes peace without waiting for all the allies.

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* Also to Mr. O'Beirne (No. 418).

[23551] No. 384.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 33.) *Foreign Office, May 21, 1913.*

Sir,

M. NOVAKOVITCH gave me to-day the following list of alterations in the treaty of peace, on which he said that the three allies, Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece, were agreed, and which he wished to have submitted to the Powers:—

1. "Dans le préambule, après les mots 'traité de paix,' ajouter le mot 'préliminaire.'

2. "Suppression dans les articles 3 et 5 des mots 'et leurs Majestés les Souverains alliés.'

3. "A la fin de l'article 3 ajouter 'ainsi que, en faveur de la Serbie, les garanties d'un port libre, du chemin de fer et de la liberté d'exportation et d'importation de toute marchandise et de tout matériel, exempts de droits de douane et de toute autre imposition.'

4. "L'article 6 est accepté, sous la condition expresse que les délégués des États alliés siègent avec voix délibérative.

5. "A la fin de l'article 7 ajouter les alinéas suivants:

"A partir de la reprise des relations diplomatiques et jusqu'à la conclusion desdites conventions, qui seront signées et ratifiées au plus tard avec le traité définitif de paix, les consuls et sujets, le commerce et la navigation de chacun des États alliés en Turquie, et ceux de la Turquie dans chacun de ces États, seront traités conformément au régime en vigueur avant la déclaration de la guerre et pour ce qui concerne spécialement les consuls et sujets, le commerce et la navigation hellènes en Turquie, il sera, en attendant, rétabli le régime en vigueur au moment de la déclaration de la guerre de 1897, sur la base de la clause de la nation la plus favorisée.

"Aussitôt après la ratification des présents préliminaires de paix, les détroits du Bosphore et des Dardanelles seront ouverts à la navigation de commerce des États alliés.

"Une amnistie pleine et entière est accordée de part et d'autre à toutes les personnes compromises dans les événements qui ont précédé ou suivi la déclaration de guerre. En conséquence, aucun individu ne pourra être poursuivi ni inquiété à raison d'actes ayant une relation quelconque avec la guerre, et toutes condamnations judiciaires ou mesures administratives motivées par des faits de cette nature seront *ipso facto* annulées."

I gave him a copy of the following words, as representing the opinion of the *réunion* yesterday:—

"Les Puissances estiment qu'une discussion sur des modifications du traité entraînerait inévitablement des délais, et elles expriment l'espoir que la Turquie et les alliés arriveront le plus tôt possible à un accord pour la conclusion de la paix."

He said that, if the Powers would not allow any alteration in the text of the treaty that they had submitted, the delegates might have to go away without signing anything.

I said that the treaty was to be one between the allies and Turkey; the draft had been given to them to facilitate their negotiations: to discuss alterations of it with th Great Powers would cause indefinite delay; but he must not suppose that the Powers would interfere to prevent any alterations upon which the delegates were all agreed; these would, of course, not be binding upon the Powers, for the treaty was between the allies and Turkey; but, if the allies wished to make an alteration such as No. 5 in his paper, they had better discuss it with Turkey.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23546] No. 385.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 323.) *Foreign Office, May 21, 1913.*

Sir,

SIR ARTHUR NICOLSON and I pointed out to the French and Russian Ambassadors to-day what M. Jonnart had said respecting the representation of the allies and Turkey on the Financial Commission in Paris, and that it would be inconsistent and appear as a breach of faith if they were now limited to a consultative voice.

The French Ambassador seem to be impressed by these arguments and by being shown what M. Jonnart had said, but he urged that there were some questions, such as financial reorganisation in Turkey, which did not concern the allies.

We said that this objection might be met by dividing the work of the commission, and referring questions that did not concern the allies to a committee on which the Great Powers and Turkey were alone represented.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23707] No. 386.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.†

(No. 325.) *Foreign Office, May 21, 1913.*

Sir,

I INFORMED the French and Russian Ambassadors to-day that, though the Italian Government were bound to the Turkish Government by their treaty of peace, and therefore could not honourably propose to give up to Greece the islands now occupied by Italy, yet I understood from the Italian Ambassador that, if a satisfactory settlement could be come to about the south of Albania, and Turkey referred the decision about the Ægean islands to the Powers, Italy would agree to a decision of the Powers that the islands in her occupation should go to Greece. I understood also, though I had this only indirectly and could not be certain of it, that Germany would make no difficulties, except about the islands of Tenedos and Imbros. It seemed to me, therefore, that we should consider whether we should aim at an arrangement under which all the islands, except Tenedos and Imbros, should go to Greece, those of strategic importance being neutralised, as the Russian Government had proposed. The southern frontier of Albania should start then from Cape Stilos, as Italy now desired.

The French Ambassador said that he was to see the Italian Ambassador this afternoon, and after that he would report to his Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23706] No. 387.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 74.) *Foreign Office, May 21, 1913.*

Sir,

THE Bulgarian Minister informed me confidentially to-day that his Government had information from an Austrian source that Greece and Servia were trying to get an alliance with Roumania against Bulgaria, and that Roumania had informed Bulgaria that she would prefer to work with Bulgaria, if the latter would make certain concessions. This showed the complications that were likely to arise from delay in signing the treaty of peace.

I showed him the paper that M. Novakovitch had given me this afternoon as representing the views of Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece.

The Bulgarian Minister said that they had no objection to these alterations, but they feared that to discuss them with Turkey would give rise to delay.

* Also to Mr. O'Beirne (No. 204). † Also to Mr. O'Beirne (No. 203).

I observed that, if that was so, the treaty had better be signed without any alteration.

The Bulgarian Minister asked me whether, if Bulgaria wanted to sign the treaty of peace alone with Turkey in the last resort and Turkey was willing, the Powers would help.

I said that I could say nothing about this. If and when such a situation arose, I would consult the Powers as to what should be done.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21034] No. 388.

Sir Edward Grey to Roumanian Minister.

Foreign Office, May 21, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 6th May, and to inform you in reply that the following resolution was adopted at the meeting of the Ambassadors on the 8th May :—

"La réunion pense qu'il convient de recommander aux alliés de proclamer aussitôt après la conclusion de la paix une amnistie générale pour tous les faits de guerre et la participation des minorités de race ou de religion aux opérations militaires."

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

[23462] No. 389.

Mr. Carnegie to Mr. Maxwell.—(Received May 22.)

Paris, May 20, 1913.

Dear Maxwell,

I MET a friend of mine to-day, an Englishman who occupies a very important financial position in Paris, and he began to talk about the Financial Commission and the work before it. He said that there appeared very little probability of anything being settled as long as the allies were able to obtain funds, and that the Powers should agree that no money should be lent them until all the financial questions were settled. I remarked that the Powers were well aware that the only way in which the allies could be compelled to pay up whatever might be necessary to Turkey would be by threatening them in regard to the loans that they undoubtedly would require. The difficulty was to prevent their getting money in spite of Governments, in London for instance; another difficulty was that, in order to gain political advantages, Governments might wink or connive at pecuniary assistance being provided, as had been done in China. My friend replied that possibly the allies might obtain some money in the way I had indicated, but the true source of supplies was Paris, and if the French Government would let French bankers know that they did not wish money to be found for the Balkans the latter would not get much elsewhere. He said that now was the moment for action if the work of the Commission was to have any practical result, for the allies were already obtaining lots of money in Paris by issuing short-term Treasury bonds. They would certainly not agree to any irksome financial proposals so long as money was forthcoming in Paris, and the work of the Commission would be thereby unduly protracted. The only hope was that His Majesty's Government might persuade the French Government to take the necessary action, which would of course be very distasteful to Russia.

In the course of our conversation I remarked that, if the European money market were closed, the allies might perhaps obtain some money from America, as Austria-Hungary had done last year. My friend said that it was true that the Americans had taken over the bonds, but only to resell them in Paris at a profit. Many Frenchmen who refused from patriotic motives to lend money to one of the Triple Alliance never hesitated for a moment to buy the Austrian bonds from the Americans.

There seems to be some doubt still as to whether we shall officially meet on the

27th, but some unofficial conversations are to be held about the end of the week, for which Harvey, I presume, will come over here.

Yours sincerely,
LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.

[23486] No. 390.

Mr. Duncan to the Earl of Onslow.—(Received May 22.)

Dear Lord Onslow,

26, *Throgmorton Street, London, May 21, 1913.*

ENCLOSED is the promised copy of Mr Fromageot's opinion on the recent Balkan seizures. I am sorry not to have been able to let you have it sooner.

Yours very truly,
H. H. DUNCAN.

Enclosure in No. 390.

Opinion of Mr Fromageot on recent Balkan Seizures.

NOTE POUR LA BANQUE IMPÉRIALE OTTOMANE.

Situation faite aux Agences par les Armées d'occupation dans les Balkans.

AU cours de la guerre des Balkans, les succursales de la Banque Impériale ottomane dans les territoires envahis, se sont vues soumises par les autorités des Puissances alliées soit à l'inspection de leurs livres et comptes, soit à la saisie-arrêt ou à la confiscation des sommes pouvant être dues aux administrations ottomanes.

Il en a été ainsi notamment à Uscub et à Monastir, villes occupées par les armées serbes, à Cavalla, Drama, Dédéagatch, Gumuldjina, Xanthie et Serrès, villes occupées par les armées bulgares, et à Salonique et Mytilène, villes occupées par les armées helléniques.

Partout, les autorités serbes, bulgares ou helléniques ont déclaré agir en vertu de leurs droits de belligérants occupant militairement un territoire de l'ennemi.

La Banque Impériale ottomane pose la question suivante : —

"Les autorités belligérantes balkaniques avaient-elles le droit de saisir-arrêter et de s'approprier les fonds se trouvant entre les mains des agences de la Banque Impériale ottomane établies dans les territoires occupés par lesdites autorités?"

Exposé des Faits.

D'après un dossier communiqué par la Banque Impériale ottomane, les faits auxquels celle-ci se réfère sont les suivants :

1. *Actes émanant des autorités serbes.*

A Uscub, les troupes serbes sont entrées le 13 (26) octobre, 1912. Le 15 (28) octobre, la succursale de la Banque ottomane recevait du defterdar ottoman une note datée du 13 (26) octobre, portant ordre de transfert au Ministère des Finances à Constantinople des soldes crédités des administrations ottomanes sauf un reliquat de £T.600. Comme de coutume, cet ordre fut exécuté par voie de virement.

Le même jour, 15 (28) octobre, la succursale reçut des autorités serbes l'avis suivant :—

(Traduction.)
(Officiel.)

"Banque ottomane, Uscub, "*Le 28 octobre*, 1912.

"La Banque ottomane est avisée de ne donner à qui que ce soit l'argent du Gouvernement ottoman sans l'ordre écrit du commandant de la place. En même temps, La Banque ottomane est avisée que toutes les autorités turques ont cessé de fonctionner et que les seules compétentes sont la municipalité d'Uscub et le commandant de la

place, auquel je vous prie de vous adresser dorénavant et de lui accuser réception de cet acte.

" Avec respect,
" Le Commandant de la Place, Major Juge militaire."

La banque ayant, en accusant réception, indiqué le solde de £T.600, resté au crédit des administrations ottomanes, les autorités serbes lui notifièrent, à la date du 29 octobre (11 novembre), la décision ci-après :—

" *Intendance générale du Quartier général, Uscub,*
" *le 29 octobre*, 1912.

(Traduction.)

" Décision : Vu que la succursale de la Banque ottomane ici accomplissait les fonctions du trésorerie pour le Gouvernement ture, en base des articles 227 et 230 du Règlement manipulait l'argent du Gouvernement, j'ordonne que M. Drag. K. Protitch, secrétaire de l'Intendance générale, fasse la revision du compte courant du Gouvernement ture auprès de la succursale de la Banque ottomane ici, prélève toutes les sommes qui peuvent s'y trouver et les porte à la Trésorerie de l'Intendance générale au quartier général. M. Alexandre Hitch, greffier de l'Intendance, générale, en qualité de personne compétente, est mise à la disposition de M. Protitch. M. Hitch fera la revision des comptes qu'il comparera avec les documents et arrêtera le bilan définitifs des comptes de la Trésorerie du Gouvernement tures auprès de la Banque ottomane. M. Protich me présentera le compte rendu concernant l'accomplissement de la revision.

" L'Intendant général,
" Colonel G. Bogianovitch."

La banque répondit qu'elle n'accomplissait nullement les fonctions de trésorerie pour le Gouvernement ottoman et qu'elle ne manipulait pas l'agent de celui-ci ; au surplus, se conformant à la demande qui lui avait été adressée ; elle fit connaître les diverses administrations ottomanes qui pourraient être considérées comme gouvernementales.

Immédiatement l'autorité militaire fit sommation :—

" *Intendance générale du Quartier général, Uscub,*
" *Le 30 octobre* (12 *novembre*), 1912.

(Traduction.)

" Banque ottomane, Uscub, 6.

" J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception. . . . Conformément à notre règlement concernant le service de la suite des troupes (articles 227 et 230), l'Intendance générale du quartier général est tenue et est autorisée de découvrir toutes les sommes appartenant au Gouvernement ture et, dans le cas où les biens de l'Etat ont été pillés, de procéder suivant les dispositions de la loi martiale. En vertu de ces dispositions, je vous invite de me présenter, tout au plus jusqu'à demain 11 heures avant midi, un extrait de tous les comptes qui sont énumérés dans votre lettre, dans lequel extrait sera signalé le mouvement de chacun de des comptes à partir de la date de la proclamation de la guerre, soit le 3 octobre courant jusqu'à ce jour. J'espère que vous irez au-devant de ma présente réclamation et que vous ne me mettrez pas dans la situation de devoir employer des moyens dont je dispose en vertu de notre règlement de guerre.

" Avec respect,
" L'Intendant général du Quartier Général,
" Colonel G. Bogianovitch."

La banque s'étant bornée à répondre que, sous toutes réserves, elle ne pouvait que laisser faire cette inspection de ses comptes, l'autorité serbe ordonna qu'il y soit procédé par le directeur de la succursale et deux représentants serbes.

Sur ces entrefaites, le defterdar ottoman, ayant été arrêté, avoua avoir donné, en l'antidatant, l'ordre de virement susrappelé et, contraint de l'annuler, adressa à la succursale un ordre d'annulation immédiatement exécuté.

Le 5 (18) novembre la banque recevait alors de l'autorité serbe une nouvelle notification :—

" *Intendance générale, Uscub,*
" *le 5 novembre*, 1912.

(Traduction.)

" Banque Impériale ottomane, Uscub,

" . . . . l'ordre donné par le defterdar constitue une affaire criminelle prévue par l'article 116 du Code penal militaire ; toutes sommes soustraites aux différents comptes doivent lui être restituées. . . . .

" Comme en base de l'article 227 du Règlement militaire, tout l'argent de l'Etat ture doit appartenir à l'Etat serbe, j'ai honneur de vous prier de vouloir bien informer

immédiatement l'Intendance générale, comme la plus haute instance d'autorité militaire administrative, du montant des soldes de chacun des comptes d'Etat qui sont énumérés dans votre lettre du 12 novembre (à l'exception du compte de la municipalité), étant donné que l'Etat serbe, à partir de la date d'entrée des troupes serbes à Uscub est le propriétaire de tous ces comptes.

" Avec respect,
" G. Bogianovitch."

La banque envoya l'indication des soldes présentés par les comptes courants de la caisse du vilayet, de la Banque agricole de la commission dite des caracols et du dépôt des orphelins.

L'autorité militaire exigea le versement de ces soldes, à l'exception toutefois des sommes dues à la Banque agricole et au dépôt des orphelins, mais en faisant défense d'en disposer sans son consentement. Cette note, en date du 7 (20) novembre, ajoutait :—

" Cet argent, je le prends de la banque, car, en vertu de l'article 227 du service suivant les troupes et du principe du droit international de la guerre, je le considère comme propriété de l'Etat serbe, propriété devant entrer dans la Caisse provinciale de guerre comme butin de guerre. Vous pouvez faire à l'occasion de la remise de cet argent, toutes les réserves que vous considérerez comme nécessaires pour votre sécurité."

Le 8 (21) novembre le versement fut effectué ; un procès-verbal mentionnant que la banque a agi, contrainte et forcée, avec toutes ses réserves que de droit, constata le versement et fut signé par les délégués de l'intendance serbe en même temps que par le directeur de la succursale.

A Monastir, l'entrée des troupes serbes eut lieu le 6 (19) novembre, 1912. Deux jours plus tard, le 8 (21) novembre, les autorités militaires firent sommation verbale à la succursale de la Banque ottomane de lui faire connaître si l'Etat ottoman ou ses administrations possédaient des dépôts. La banque déclara les soldes existant au crédit de la Caisse provinciale pour les services civils et militaires, de la Banque agricole, de l'Evkaf, de l'Administration de l'Instruction publique, de l'Ecole des Arts et Métiers, des Postes et Télégraphes. Elle déclara, en outre, qu'elle avait en dépôt libre, c'est-à-dire en garde, un certain nombre d'objets inaltés, sacs et paquets cachetés dont elle ignorait le contenu et qui lui avaient été confiés les uns par l'Administration des Postes, d'autres par la Comptabilité du vilayet ou par le Cadastre, d'autres encore par la Banque agricole, ou par le defterdar du vilayet.

Les autorités serbes, après avoir procédé à l'ouverture et à l'inventaire desdits sacs et paquets déposés, se firent, le 10 (23) novembre, verser les soldes déclarés exister au crédit des diverses administrations ottomanes et exigèrent en outre l'indication de tous les comptes de dépôt depuis quinze jours, soit depuis le 27 octobre (8 novembre), 1912, c'est-à-dire dès avant l'occupation.

Cette liste fut remise ; elle comportait l'indication d'une série de dépôts particuliers en comptes courants créditeurs, en comptes courants créditeurs provisoires, au nom de la Caisse de Famille, à titre de dépôts à échéance fixe, en bons de caisse payables à l'une quelconque des succursales de la banque, enfin des dépôts libres (sacs, valises, paquets, &c.). Parmi les bons de caisse ci-dessus, un certain nombre avaient été remis à la gendarmerie. Les autorités serbes en requérirent le versement immédiat : —

" J'ordonne que la banque me verse les sommes mentionnées ci-haut et qu'elle télégraphie immédiatement à ses succursales de Janina et de Salonique de ne pas payer les bons de caisse en question à qui que ce soit et d'en faire de même par lettre pour toutes ses autres succursales.

" Pour le Commandant de la Place de Monastir :
" Le Capitaine de Première Classe.

" Nous certifions que ces fonds appartiennent au Gouvernement.
" Costa Lozanitch.
" Yovan Prodanovitch.
" Maxime Milosevitch."

Les autorités serbes exigèrent du même la remise du solde signalé au crédit de diverses personnalités militaires ou officielles ottomanes déclarées avoir agi pour

compte de leur Gouvernement. Elles exigèrent également la remise du sac déposé par les Postes ottomanes.

Chacune de ces opérations fut constatée dans des procès-verbaux contradictoirement dressés et signés des autorités serbes, des représentants de la banque et des dragomans ou des délégués des consulats français et britanniques. On y lit la menace d'employer la force en cas d'opposition.

On doit remarquer, enfin, que d'après des déclarations écrites adressées à la succursale, les sommes déposées au nom de la Direction des Postes ne représentaient pas des recettes, mais constituaient des dépôts arrivés au nom de particuliers; que les sommes, portées au compte courant de la Banque agricole, représentaient des dépôts à intérêt effectués par le public; et que les sommes portées au compte courant de la Direction de l'Instruction publique représentaient les recettes des biens religieux dits vacouls, affectés aux écoles vacoufs. Chacune de ces administrations a protesté contre l'action des autorités serbes, mais, semble-t-il, sans aucun résultat.

2. *Actes émanés des autorités bulgares.*

A Cavalla, à Dédéagatch, à Xanthie les autorités bulgares ont signifié aux succursales de la Banque ottomane dans ces villes une sorte de saisie-arrêt conçue dans les mêmes termes :—

"M. le Directeur de la Banque Impériale ottomane, Cavalla.

"*Inspection des Finances de Bulgarie,*
"*Cavalla, le* 15 (28) *novembre*, 1912.

"M. le Directeur,

"J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que conformément aux ordres de M. le Ministre des Finances de Bulgarie, vous êtes prié de ne pas céder au Gouvernement turc toute somme déposée à la banque et provenant de divers revenus ainsi que les fonds déposés par la Commission pour la Flotte turque ou toute autre espèce de documents concernant le Gouvernement turc, parce que les susdits montants et objets sont séquestrés en faveur du Gouvernement bulgare. Vous êtes prié de même de ne pas rembourser à personne toute somme revenant de divers dépôts comme Caisse d'Épargne, Caisse agricole ou dépôts de communautés qui se trouvaient sous le contrôle du Gouvernement turc, tant que les personnes et communautés respectives ne seront pas autorisées avec les mêmes droits par le Gouvernement bulgare.

"Veuillez, &c.

"Le Délégué du Ministère des Finances,
"Inspecteur des Finances."

La banque, en accusant réception, fit observer :

"Qu'en ce qui concerne les disponibilités chez nous de la Caisse provinciale ottomane, ces fonds ne peuvent pas être séquestrés, car ils sont la propriété privée de notre établissement, en ce sens qu'ils ne figurent au crédit du compte du Gouvernement auprès de notre agence qu'à titre provisoire, notre établissement ayant avec le Gouvernement turc, à son siège central, à Constantinople, un compte courant général au crédit duquel sont portés les encaissements effectués en province pour le compte du Gouvernement. Or, ce compte étant toujours débiteur et l'encaissement des recettes locales étant pour notre établissement la garantie de ce compte, il est impossible de séquestrer l'avoir chez nous de la Caisse provinciale sans léser gravement les intérêts de notre banque et ceux de ses actionnaires; pour ce qui est des disponibilités chez nous des autres administrations, telles que : Caisse des Orphelins, Notariat, Tribunal de Commerce, &c. . . . . qui ne proviennent pas des revenus de l'État, mais appartiennent en réalité à des tiers, nous nous permettons de vous faire remarquer que la nature et le fonctionnement de ces comptes ne permettent pas leur assimilation à ceux du Trésor provincial.

"Veuillez, &c."

A Drama, les autorités bulgares, ont, par lettre du 26 novembre, 1912, demandé la remise de tous les registres et documents que les diverses administrations du Gouvernement ottoman avaient confiés à la banque avant la prise de Drama.

A Gumoudjina, lesdites autorités ont exigé la remise des soldes créditeurs de la Banque agricole, du Trésor provincial et des autorités militaires.

Il est à remarquer que d'après les explications fournies par la succursale, les autorités bulgares auraient eu recours aux employés mêmes de la Banque agricole et du

Trésor ottoman pour se faire indiquer les soldes et pour ordonner le remboursement des soldes de leurs départements.

Au surplus, reçus réguliers en la forme furent remis à la banque avec mention "que suivant les lois du Gouvernement bulgare, dont dépend actuellement Gumuldjina, ces montants appartiennent au Gouvernement bulgare."

Enfin, à Serrès, les autorités bulgares ont également exigé la remise des fonds se trouvant à la succursale de la banque en faveur des administrations turques.

3. *Actes émanés des autorités helléniques.*

A Salonique, les autorités helléniques demandèrent tout d'abord le 1er (14) novembre, 1912, au directeur de la succursale de la banque de lui faire remettre dans le plus bref délai possible "un relevé du compte de la Direction des Contributions indirectes et de la Banque agricole ottomane, ainsi qu'une liste détaillée des dépôts d'argent appartenant à d'autres administrations publiques ottomanes."

La banque fit connaître immédiatement les administrations gouvernementales ottomanes ayant des dépôts présentant un compte créditeur ou ayant mis en garde à titre de dépôts libres des sacs scellés déclarés contenir du numéraire.

En réponse et par lettre du 3 (16) novembre suivant, les autorités helléniques requirent la banque de tenir à la disposition de l'État hellène les sommes énoncées comme dues à des administrations publiques et dans tous les cas de s'abstenir de tout payement sur ces sommes et de tout dessaisissement sans une entente avec les représentants du Gouvernement hellénique.

Le 20 novembre (3 décembre), 1912, les autorités helléniques firent sommation à la banque de leur délivrer les sommes susdites parmi lesquelles figuraient les soldes au crédit de la caisse des orphelins, ainsi que les sacs déposés, parmi lesquels un sac de l'Administration des Postes déclaré contenir du numéraire en colis postaux. Un procès-verbal de remise fut dressé; il mentionne que la succursale n'a agi que contrainte et forcée et sous toutes réserves.

En outre des comptes déclarés par la banque comme étant ceux des administrations "gouvernementales" ottomanes, celle-ci avait également des comptes au nom de la Dette publique ottomane et de diverses administrations telles que les Phares, la Compagnie des Eaux, la Société du Chemin de Fer Jonction-Salonique-Constantinople.

Il n'apparaît pas que les autorités helléniques aient émis des prétentions sur ces divers comptes. Toutefois, le compte de la Dette publique ottomane a donné lieu à la notification suivante :—

"Le Commandant en chef de l'armée Royale d'occupation à M. Directeur de la Banque ottomane, à Salonique.

"*Salonique, le* 20 *novembre* (3 *décembre*), 1912.

"Faisant application des lois de guerre, qui lui donnent le droit d'administrer les services publics des pays occupés, le commandant en chef de l'armée Royale d'occupation a prescrit aux autorités placées sous ses ordres de percevoir les revenus, taxes et impôts antérieurement perçus par les autorités ottomanes. Toutefois, soucieux des droits des créanciers étrangers à la Turquie, malgré les précédents que pourrait fournir la pratique internationale, il n'étend pas toucher durant la guerre au fonctionnement des institutions établies pour leur sauvegarde. En conséquence, il a décidé que l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane qui, en vertu du règlement en vigueur à son égard, a été substituée à l'autorité ottomane dans la perception des revenus affectés à la Dette, continuera à effectuer le service dont elle a eu jusqu'ici la garde. Mais afin de garantir tous les droits que l'Etat hellénique tire de l'occupation de guerre et d'empêcher que l'ennemi ne profite d'aucune manière ni directement, ni indirectement; de l'excédent des revenus affectés au service de la Dette publique, la Banque Impériale ottomane ne pourra, sans l'autorisation des autorités helléniques compétentes, faire aucun emploi des fonds déposés dans ses caisses par l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane. Au rétablissement de la paix, il sera procédé à un règlement des comptes, afin de déterminer dans les sommes perçues par l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane durant l'occupation, la part qui sera prélevée pour le service de la Dette et celle dont aura à profiter le Trésor hellénique à titre de butin de guerre.

"CONSTANTIN, Duc de Sparte."

La même notification fut adressée dans les mêmes termes à la succursale de la banque à Lesbos (Mytilène) par le commandant en chef des forces navales d'occupation, Amiral Koundouriotis.

A la suite des faits ci-dessus énumérés, la Banque Impériale ottomane signale aux Gouvernements français et britannique la situation faite à ses agences par les armées d'occupation. Cette note, en date du 20 novembre, 1912, fut adressée à ce sujet par la voie diplomatique aux Cabinets de Sophia, Belgrade et Athènes.

Le Gouvernement hellénique y répondit le 21 décembre par les justifications suivantes :—

" . . . . Les autorités grecques en réclamant la remise entre leurs mains des fonds déposés dans les agences de la banque au crédit du Gouvernement ottoman et rien que de ces fonds, loin de méconnaître les prescriptions du droit des gens et du règlement annexé à la Convention de La Haye, n'ont fait que s'y conformer strictement. Il est de principe que l'occupant, entre les mains duquel l'autorité du pouvoir légal a passé **le droit, dans son intérêt et au point de vue de la guerre,** de veiller à affaiblir les ressources de l'adversaire en mettant la main sur ses revenus. En conséquence, les autorités grecques sont fondées à demander que les recettes dont **il s'agit leur soient livrées, soit qu'elles proviennent de revenus hypothéqués,** soit qu'elles constituent des revenus que la banque perçoit directement pour le compte du Gouvernement ottoman. En ce faisant les autorités grecques ont usé d'un droit consacré par l'article 53 du règlement de La Haye ; la banque, il est vrai, s'efforce de prouver que ces fonds doivent être traités comme la propriété privée de cette société en tirant argument de ce que le Fisc ottoman est son débiteur dans le compte courant général qui lui est ouverte et en alléguant que, dès lors, les encaissements faits par la banque dans ces agences sont la garantie de ses actionnaires. Mais le caractère de gage attribué à ces fonds ne résulte d'aucune stipulation ni convention. D'ailleurs, on pourrait facilement retourner l'argument de la banque et prétendre avec raison que ce serait justement grâce à ces revenus des pays occupés dont la banque opère le recouvrement, que le Gouvernement ottoman pourrait augmenter son crédit auprès d'elle et renforcer d'une façon efficace bien qu'indirecte ses ressources et partant sa situation."

De son côté, le Gouvernement bulgare prétend n'avoir confisqué aucune somme et s'être borné à mettre sous séquestre confié à la garde de la banque elle-même, les fonds revenant au Gouvernement turc.

Quant au Gouvernement serbe, aucune réponse de sa part n'apparaît dans le dossier communiqué.

Pour répondre à la question de savoir si les autorités belligérantes balkaniques sont ou non en droit d'avoir agi comme elles ont fait vis-à-vis de la Banque Impériale ottomane il convient tout d'abord de rappeler les principes du droit de la guerre relativement aux occupations militaires, puis de préciser la situation de la Banque ottomane et la nature des opérations au regard desquelles lesdites autorités balkaniques ont agi.

D'après les principes actuellement reconnus du droit de la guerre, quels sont les droits de belligérant sur les fonds ou valeurs se trouvant en pays occupé ?

Aux termes de l'article 53, alinéa 1er du règlement annexé à la Convention de la Haye, 1907, concernant les lois et coutumes de la guerre sur terre :—

" L'armée qui occupe un territoire ne pourra saisir que le numéraire, les fonds et les valeurs exigibles appartenant en propre à l'État, les dépôts d'armes, moyens de transport, magasins et approvisionnements, et, en général, toute propriété mobilière de l'État de nature à servir aux opérations de la guerre."

Cette disposition n'est qu'une application du principe consacré par le même règlement, article 46, alinéa 2, d'après lequel :

" La propriété privée ne peut pas être confisquée."

Comme on le sait, le texte de l'article 53 ci-dessus et la reproduction d'un texte identique qui figurait dans le règlement annexé à la convention antérieure de 1899, lequel n'a fait qu'adopter la même disposition du projet de déclaration internationale sur le droit de la guerre, élaboré à Bruxelles en 1874 (article 6). Le projet de Bruxelles avait, en effet servi de base aux délibérations de la première Conférence de la Paix sur ce point et ce n'est plus en 1899 qu'à la onzième conférence en 1907 le texte de Bruxelles a été l'objet d'une discussion comme d'amendements ou de modification quelconque (Première Conférence de la Paix, 1899, " Actes et Documents," deuxième édition, pp. 114, 115 ; seconde Conférence de la Paix, 1907 " Actes et Documents," tome i, pp. 87 et 102).

En revanche, en 1874, la disposition avait été assez longuement discutée et les " Actes et Documents " de la Conférence de Bruxelles fournissent à cet égard un commentaire utile.

Dès l'origine, ce qu'on a prévu comme pouvant être pris par l'occupant, ce sont les " capitaux du Gouvernement." (" Projet russe présenté comme base de discussion," section 1, chapitre I, § 6.) (" Actes de la Conférence de Bruxelles, 1874," deuxième édition, p. 11.)

En séance de la XXe Commission (séance du 13 août, 1874) (" Actes de la Conférence de Bruxelles, 1874," deuxième édition, p. 147), l'expression de " capitaux de Gouvernement " fut considérée comme un peu vague et l'on proposa de la remplacer par celle de " tous les fonds du Gouvernement qui se trouvent dans les caisses publiques." Finalement l'on tomba d'accord pour admettre la définition suivante :—

" On peut entendre par ' capitaux du Gouvernement ' les sommes disponibles et les valeurs exigibles appartenant en propre et exclusivement à l'Etat."

On décida que cette interprétation serait insérée au protocole et, sur une demande de la faire figurer dans le texte même de la disposition, on reconnut que c'était inutile parce que " le protocole est le commentaire vivant du texte et fait loi comme le texte lui-même."

En séance plénière (" Actes de la Conférence de Bruxelles, 1874, quatrième séance plénière, pp. 296 et suivantes), la Conférence revint encore sur cette définition à propos des " mots " appartenant en propre, afin de spécifier qu'ils excluaient les fond et valeurs appartenant à des institutions régies sous la surveillance de l'État en vertu de lois particulières, telles que les caisses d'épargne ou les caisses de dépôts et consignations.

Il est clair que ces explications doivent être appliquées au règlement de 1907 comme au texte de 1874, dont il est la reproduction textuelle.

Il ne paraît donc pas douteux que les fonds et valeurs dont le belligérant peut s'emparer en pays occupé sont uniquement et exclusivement les fonds disponibles et les valeurs exigibles appartenant en propre à l'État ennemi.

Ces principes ayant été rappelés, quelle est, en droit, la situation de la Banque Impériale ottomane ? Quelle est la nature des opérations et le caractère des encaisses ou valeurs, objet des prétentions des belligérants balkaniques ?

La Banque Impériale ottomane est, aux termes de ses statuts, une société anonyme par actions, ayant pour objet le commerce de banque et spécialement l'exploitation d'un privilège à elle consentie par le Gouvernement ottoman.

La siège social et le domicile de la banque sont, par ses statuts également, fixés à Constantinople et, conformément à l'opinion la plus généralement admise en pareille matière, la nationalité ottomane appartait comme celle de la banque, encore que le conseil d'administration soit entièrement composé d'étrangers.

Si la banque a la nationalité ottomane, en revanche, elle n'est pas une banque d'État. Son capital appartient, en effet, exclusivement à ses actionnaires et l'État ottoman n'y a aucune part. Son caractère commercial et privé se manifeste, d'ailleurs, non seulement par ce capital actions, mais encore par son conseil d'administration, composé de personnes privées, par des assemblées générales d'actionnaires, par le partage des bénéfices exclusivement effectés soit aux actionnaires, soit au fonds de reserve, par **la compétence judiciaire reconnue aux tribunaux de droit commun, enfin par la** réglementation en assemblée générale de sa liquidation, en cas de dissolution.

C'est, en un mot, une société commerciale qui joint au commerce de banque ordinaire l'exploitation de certains privilèges stipulés avec l'Etat ottoman, l'intervention de celui-ci ne se manifestant que par un contrôle, sans immixtion de participation dans la question des affaires sociales.

Dans les banques d'État, au contraire, on voit le capital et les bénéfices appartenir en tout ou en partie à l'État, la gestion est confiée à des fonctionnaires de l'État. Il est inutile d'insister sur ces différences qu'une simple comparaison avec des banques d'État comme la Banque Impériale de Russie, la Banque Royale de Suède, la Banque nationale bulgare, ferait surabondamment ressortir.

Par l'effet des conventions passées avec l'État ottoman, la banque apparaît comme le banquier de celui-ci, en même temps que son agent financier. Par là même, les opérations auxquelles la banque se livre, dans ses rapports avec l'État ott man, sont des opérations de banque. Elles se manifestent pratiquement par un compte courant principal à Constantinople, conformément à une convention en date du 1er 14 février, 1911, et par les comptes-courants locaux, ouverts dans les succursales établies en

province, conformément à une convention du 17 février (2 mars), 1911. Les retraits de fonds s'y font par voie de chèque.

Aucun des belligérants ne paraît avoir attribué à la Banque ottomane le caractère d'une banque d'État. Mais ils ont prétendu voir dans telles ou telles des encaisses des fonds appartenant à l'État ottoman, ou, pour parler plus exactement, ils ont prétendu voir, dans les soldes que les comptes des succursales présentaient au crédit des administrations ottomanes, des "fonds et valeurs exigibles appartenant en propre à l'État," selon les expressions du Règlement de la La Haye, article 53.

Rien ne paraît moins exact.

Les alliés balkaniques se sont trouvés, dans les pays qu'ils envahissaient, en présence non pas de numéraire constituant des fonds et valeurs exigibles appartenant à l'État, mais en présence de comptes courants ouverts en banque au nom des administrations ottomanes et présentant un crédit en leur faveur. C'est très différent.

La Banque ottomane reçoit bien, dans les provinces, pour être transmises à Constantinople, les sommes provenant d'encaissement de revenus; mais il est clairement spécifié dans son contrat précité du 1er (14) février avec l'État ottoman, article 5:

"Les sommes versées directement par le Trésor Impérial à la Banque Impériale ottomane à Constantinople et celles versées dans les provinces pour être transmises à Constantinople et provenant, comme il est dit à l'article 4, d'encaissement de revenus inscrits au budget ordinaire, seront portés par la Banque Impériale ottomane au crédit du compte courant du Trésor Impérial, valeur du jour de ces versements, la banque prenant ainsi à sa charge les pertes d'intérêts correspondant aux délais de route."

Et pour faciliter ces opérations, l'État ottoman s'est fait ouvrir, dans les succursales de la banque en province, ces comptes courants au nom des administrations, notamment au nom des caisses provinciales des vilayets; c'est ce qui est clairement expliqué dans la convention du 17 février (2 mars), 1911, précitée:—

"Dans toutes les localités où nous avons actuellement des agences, les caisses provinciales des vilayets, sandjaks ou cazas, suivant les cas, ouvriront des comptes courants en or et en gros medjidiés, qui seront alimentés, au crédit, par les versements provenant des revenus généraux ou autres et, au débit, par les prélèvements qui seront effectués, soit en espèces, soit pour être transmis au Ministère des Finances, ou à un vilayet ou sandjak, pourvu que, dans ces deux derniers cas, il y ait une agence de la banque dans les localités où ces transmissions seront faites."

Tandis que le compte courant principal à Constantinople peut être et est effectivement débiteur à concurrence de £T. 1,500,000, les comptes courants ouverts auprès des succursales doivent toujours être créditeurs (conventions précitées du 1er (14) février et du 17 février (2 mars), 1911), et les sommes ainsi créditées portent un intérêt variant suivant les localités.

C'est donc, et cela ressort d'ailleurs de l'exposé des faits en présence de comptes courants et de soldes créditeurs, que les alliés balkaniques se sont trouvés dans les agences de la Banque ottoman.

Dans ces conditions, étaient-ils justifiés à se faire verser soldes créditeurs, de seul fait que les comptes courants étaient ouverts au nom d'une administration de l'État ottoman? Il ne le semble pas.

Le compte courant, comme on le sait, est un contrat synallagmatique. Le titulaire peut en ressortir débiteur ou créancier, mais jamais, à aucun titre, il ne peut se dire et on ne peut le dire propriétaire de tout ou partie de l'encaisse du banquier, encore que cette encaisse provienne des remises de fonds qui lui sont faites. A toute remise correspond pour le remettant une créance; les fonds remis deviennent, la propriété du banquier encaisseur, celui-ci en a la libre disposition, et c'est pourquoi il en paye un intérêt. Il importe peut que le remettant soit créancier et le banquier débiteur, car le fait de devoir une certaine somme à quelqu'un n'empêche pas qu'on soit propriétaire des fonds que l'on a en caisse. Le compte courant n'a pas et ne saurait avoir pour effet de transformer le banquier en un caissier du titulaire.

A aucun titre, par conséquent, les soldes existant dans les succursales de la Banque ottomane en faveur des administrations ottomanes, quelles qu'elles soient ne peuvent être considérés comme étant leur propriété et, le cas échéant, comme des fonds appartenant en propre à l'État. Les espèces en caisse représentant ces soldes sont la propriété privée de la banque, et le solde créditeur n'est que l'expression d'une créance desdites administrations ou, le cas échéant, de l'État.

Il est clair que, pour la même raison, si les belligérants s'étaient trouvés en

présence d'une banque d'État, les encaisses de celle-ci étant alors propriété d'État, auraient pu être confisquées.

Les encaisses de la Banque ottomane étant sa propriété et les soldes créditeurs n'étant que l'expression de créances, on se trouve en présence de la question de savoir si les belligérants pouvaient se faire verser et s'approprier le montant de ces créances, dans le cas où elles auraient appartenu en propre à l'État ottoman. Mais ici encore, la question doit être résolue par la négative.

Depuis longtemps, en effet, on a reconnu que le rapport de créancier à débiteur est un rapport personnel, que la guerre, acte de force est impuissante à modifier. Le belligérant occupant n'est pas le successeur de l'État dont le territoire est occupé; il ne le représente pas juridiquement à l'égard des tiers comme son ayant cause. Cela n'a lieu qu'une fois l'occupation transformée en conquête par l'effet du traité de paix. Jusque-là, la conquête n'est pas réalisée; le belligérant occupant n'a sur le territoire occupé qu'une possession précaire et le débiteur qui avait été forcé de lui verser le montant d'une dette contractée vis-à-vis de l'autre État serait exposé à payer une seconde fois au véritable créancier (Heffter, "Droit international," § 134, p. 308; Westlake, "International Law," Part II, "War," p. 103).

Si le Règlement de La Haye, 1907, sur le droit de la guerre, articles 48 et 49, prévoit le prélèvement d'impôts par l'occupant, c'est parce que les impôts représentent les revenus de l'État sur le territoire occupé, c'est à dire les fruits de ce territoire.

On remarquera que c'est par application des principes ci-dessus rappelés qu'ont été réglées les diverses questions que, pendant la guerre franco-allemande de 1870 71, avaient soulevées les prétentions des autorités prussiennes au regard des succursales de la Banque de France dans les territoires envahis.

C'est ainsi, comme on le sait, que les autorités prussiennes s'étant fait livrer, le 4 septembre, 1870, l'encaisse de la succursale de Reims; le 6 septembre suivant la restitution en fut ordonnée, et un ordre du Prince Royal de Prusse Frédéric-Guillaume, daté du 7 septembre, 1870, déclara que "les fonds se trouvant dans cet établissement ne peuvent être exposés à aucune saisie ou à aucun arrêt, tant qu'ils ne sont pas destinés à soutenir l'armée française" ("Pommier, "La Banque de France et l'État," Paris, 1904, p. 447.)

C'est ainsi encore qu'à la succursale de Strasbourg les mêmes autorités s'étant emparé le 17 septembre, 1870, de sacs de numéraire portant la mention "à la disposition de la Trésorerie générale," ces fonds, plus de 6,000,000 de francs, furent après examen approfondi, restitués à la Banque de France, précisément parce que l'État français n'avait avec elle que les rapports d'un titulaire de compte courant, comme un particulier. (Pommier, *op. cit.*, p. 449; Valfrey, "Histoire du Traité de Francfort," tome ii, pp. 20–23; May; "Le Traité de Francfort," p. 284.)

Pendant la guerre russo-japonaise de 1904–5, la Banque russo-chinoise a donné lieu à une difficulté d'une nature une peu différente et qui ne saurait être invoquée comme précédent en opposition avec les principes ci-dessus rappelés. Les autorités japonaises, au moment de la prise de Port-Arthur, se saisirent des livres de la succursale de ladite banque. Mais il a été expliqué (Nagae Ariga, "La Guerre russo-japonaise," pp. 374, 375) que cette saisie des livres avait pour cause spéciale une enquête à faire sur la disparition d'une somme de plus de 200,000 roubles, mise en garde par la ville de Port-Arthur dans les caves de la banque.

Aux considérations générales qui précèdent, il importe d'ajouter diverses observations concernant certaines particularités des faits exposés:—

1. On a pu remarquer que, parmi les administrations ottomanes titulaires des comptes courants portés à la connaissance des autorités balkaniques, se trouvaient des institutions comme la Banque agricole, la Caisse des Orphelins, la Caisse des Familles. Or, ce sont là des institutions qui, quelle qu'y soit la gestion ou l'ingérence de l'État, paraissent présenter le caractère de caisses recevant les dépôts ou l'épargne des personnes privées, caractère expressément prévu à la Conférence de Bruxelles, 1874, comme devant, dans tous les cas, être protégées contre les exigences du belligérant.

2. En revanche, on a vu également qu'à côté des comptes courants, les succursales avaient reçu en garde sous le nom de dépôts libres des sacs de valeurs scellés et cachetés au nom de diverses administrations ottomanes. Ces sacs constituant des choses corporelles individualisées, on se trouve, à leur égard, en présence d'un véritable dépôt du droit civil, et, en pareil cas, l'objet déposé ne cesse pas d'appartenir en propre au déposant. On ne se trouve pas en présence d'un droit personnel de créance, mais en face d'un devoir réel de propriété. Dans ces conditions, à supposer que le contenu de ces sacs constituât des valeurs appartenant en propre à l'État, le belligérant est en droit de les confisquer.

3. Sans confisquer les soldes existant au crédit de telles ou telles administrations ottomanes, les autorités balkaniques avaient elles le droit de se faire livrer, sinon toute la comptabilité, du moins les comptes de dépôts et de procéder à leur vérification? Assurément! Le secret du compte courant est un devoir professionnel de toute banque. Néanmoins, les nécessités de la défense nationale peuvent être de nature à justifier, au profit du belligérant occupant, l'exercice d'un droit général de police et de contrôle, en même temps que la faculté de s'enquérir de la présence ou de l'absence de valeurs appartenant à l'État ennemi.

4. Enfin, sans aller jusqu'à se faire verser les fonds représentant les soldes créditeurs ces comptes courants, les autorités balkaniques avaient-elles le droit de former entre les mains des succursales, sinon une véritable saisie-arrêt, du moins une opposition ou défense de verser à qui que ce soit aucune somme sans leur autorisation?

Il semble qu'il faille faire une distinction entre les titulaires des comptes courants. S'agit-il de particuliers ou d'institutions d'épargne sur lesquelles l'occupant n'a aucun droit? On ne voit pas sur quoi pourrait se baser une opposition sans porter atteinte à des intérêts privés ou déclarés protégés. S'agit-il, au contraire, de l'État lui-même? De même alors que le belligérant occupant a éventuellement le droit de s'emparer des valeurs appartenant à l'État ennemi, de même il paraît justifié à empêcher ces valeurs de se réaliser au profit dudit État ennemi. En faisant défense à la banque de verser aucun fonds à ce dernier, l'occupant ne nuit qu'à celui-ci et ne porte pas atteinte à la banque elle-même.

Dans l'espèce la Banque ottomane a fait remarquer avec raison que les soldes créditeurs présentés par les succursales au profit du Gouvernement ottoman étaient pour elle-même la garantie du solde débiteur de £ T. 1,500,000 conventionnellement prévu, au compte courant général du Gouvernement ottoman à Constantinople. Il semble que non seulement une opposition à tout dessaisissement de ces soldes créditeurs ne supprime pas ladite garantie, mais encore qu'elle la fortifie en l'immobilisant aux mains de la banque. Certes cela aboutit à arrêter les opérations et à entraver la vie financière de l'État ennemi. Mais c'est à quoi tendent tous les actes de guerre, et puisque les intérêts privés ou protégés n'en sont pas lésés, il n'y a rien là que de régulier dans l'état actuel des choses.

Conclusions.

Si les considérations qui précèdent sont exactes, on peut répondre comme il suit à la question posée :—

1. La Banque Impériale ottomane n'étant pas une banque d'État et les encaisses d'une banque étant sa propriété particulière, les autorités balkaniques n'avaient pas le droit de s'approprier aucune encaisse existant dans les succursales de ladite banque en pays occupé.

2. Le titulaire quelconque d'un compte courant ouvert à son nom auprès d'une banque ne pouvant avoir, au regard des sommes qui y sont portées à son crédit, qu'un droit personnel de créance et le belligérant occupant ne pouvant exercer des prétentions que sur les valeurs objet d'un droit réel de propriété de l'État ennemi, les autorités balkaniques n'avaient pas le droit de se faire verser et de s'approprier aucune somme représentant les soldes créditeurs d'aucun compte courant ouvert auprès desdites succursales ou agences.

3. Le belligérant occupant pouvant se saisir des valeurs appartenant en propre à l'État ennemi et le dépôt d'une chose mobilière individualisée laissant entier le droit réel de propriété du déposant sur cette chose, les autorités balkaniques avaient le droit de se faire remettre les sacs scellés et cachetés au nom des administrations de l'État ottoman et de se saisir des valeurs s'y trouvant lorsque ces valeurs lui appartenaient en propre.

4. Le belligérant occupant ayant un droit général de police et de contrôle sur les territoires occupés et pouvant s'y saisir des valeurs appartenant en propre à l'État, les autorités balkaniques avaient le droit de s'enquérir de l'existence ou de l'absence de valeurs de cette sorte et, à cet effet, d'inspecter les comptes, livres et locaux des succursales de la Banque ottomane dans le pays occupés.

5. Enfin, le droit du belligérant de se saisir en pays occupé des valeurs appartenant à l'État ennemi, impliquant celui de s'opposer à la réalisation de ces valeurs, les autorités balkaniques avaient le droit de former aux mains des succursales de la Banque Impériale ottomane dans les territoires occupés, une opposition à tout dessaisissement d'aucun solde de compte courant existant au crédit de l'État ottoman auprès desdites succursales.

HENRI FROMAGEOT.

Le 20 février, 1913.

[23507] No. 391.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 174.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May 22, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 170 of 17th May.

The Bulgarian Government have concentrated about 70,000 troops along the Servian-Bulgarian frontier. Nearly half this number have been drawn from the fighting line; the remainder consist of Turks resident in Bulgaria and Macedonia, irregulars and recruits.

A slight incident has occurred between Servians and Bulgarians in Macedonia, in which a few villagers were killed.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[23503] No. 392.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 84.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, May 22, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 82 of 20th May: Scutari.

I have now received communication from German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stating that, in the opinion of the German Government, it is not possible to call upon Turkish Treasury to contribute towards cost of joint administration, since Turkey has already definitely renounced possession of Scutari. They think that it would be fairer if the six Powers defrayed such costs temporarily in equal shares. It might be considered later whether the amounts in question should be borne by the Powers as part of the general expenses of the expedition, or whether they should be regarded as an advance made in the interest of Albania, to be recovered from future Albanian State.

[23511] No. 393.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 22.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, May 22, 1913.*

BALKAN Financial Commission.

Your telegram No. 210 of yesterday.

Austrian Ambassador told French Minister for Foreign Affairs more than a week ago that there are certain questions respecting which the Austro-Hungarian Government cannot admit Balkan States should have any decisive vote in the commission. This naturally meant the German Government also. French Minister for Foreign Affairs gave directions that a memorandum should be drawn up to show in what way financial questions might be separated from political ones. It was found impossible. He thereupon instructed French Embassy in London (15th May) to propose to you that the representatives of Balkan States should have "voix consultatives" and not "voix délibératives." This proposal has been accepted by the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, German, and Italian Governments, and he does not feel that he can withdraw it.

To the Balkan representatives here French Minister for Foreign Affairs has pointed out that it will make little or no difference whether they have "voix délibératives" or "voix consultatives," for if the views which they may urge be not adopted by the commission they can always say that they will not accept them [*sic*], and if they had "voix délibératives" their votes could always be overruled by Powers. He is of opinion that to give Balkan States votes in the commission would complicate matters.

[23539] No. 394.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 18. Treaty.) *Salonica, May 16, 1913.*

Sir,

IN a telegram which I had the honour of addressing to you on the 24th December last I informed you that the Greek authorities here were inclined to claim the right of inspecting the accounts of all Government departments in the books of the Imperial Ottoman Bank.

Acting, I understand, on your instructions, His Majesty's Minister at Athens made certain representations to M. Coromilas, in consequence of which the matter was allowed to drop (see Sir F. Elliot's despatch No. 11 of the 13th January).

The question has now been raised again in a more acute and, I venture to think, an even less justifiable form. A day or two ago the director of the bank received a letter from M. Ractivan, stating that it had come to the knowledge of the authorities that a certain Mahmoud Effendi, a military official, had deposited with the bank a sum of £T. 2,000 against a "bon de caisse" and demanding the surrender of this sum as "butin de guerre." The director of the bank replied that, in the absence of instructions from his administration, he could not disclose private accounts, even if the depositor happened to have been an employé of the Ottoman Government. At 9 o'clock last night he received a further letter from M. Ractivan, reasserting his claim and intimating his intention of sending two officials to inspect the books of the bank with a view to controlling this and all similar accounts. At 10 o'clock this morning the officials in question presented themselves at the bank and endeavoured to frighten the director, by threats of employing force, into permitting them to carry out the proposed inspection. In view of his opposition they consented to postpone the use of force until this afternoon. The director at once laid the matter before my French colleague and myself, and we called together upon M. Ractivan to protest against the threatened action. His Excellency listened to our arguments, and said that he would take our objections into consideration, which I took to mean that he would for the present desist.

His emissaries, however, returned to the bank in the afternoon, and again endeavoured to persuade the director to permit the proposed inspection under formal protest. The latter declared that he would yield only to actual force, to which they evidently were not then authorised to resort. Fearing however that, having gone so far, M. Ractivan may be prepared to proceed to extremities, I have thought it advisable to report the matter to you telegraphically, at the same time informing Sir F. Elliot, to whom I am likewise forwarding a copy of this despatch. Annexed translation of letter just received by the bank.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure in No. 394.

M. Ractivan to Imperial Ottoman Bank.

(Traduction.) *Salonique, le 3 (16) mai, 1913.*

M. le Directeur,

A LA suite de notre lettre du 1er (14) mois courant, nous vous faisons savoir de nouveau que nous n'admettons nullement l'argument contenu dans votre lettre du 30 avril (13 mai), année courante, suivant lequel des dépôts existants, sous n'importe quelle forme, auprès de votre banque au nom de fonctionnaires civils ou militaires du Gouvernement ottoman, sont des dépôts personnels et nous persistons d'une façon absolue à caractériser les dits dépôts comme fonds de l'État ottoman et nous exigeons, disposés à n'accepter aucune autre objection, la restitution, au plus tôt, de ces montants à la caisse hellénique, à laquelle ils appartiennent comme prise de guerre.

D'une façon concrète, nous considérons comme appartenant à l'État ottoman, et par conséquent à nous-mêmes, tous dépôts existants au nom de tout fonctionnaire civil ou militaire du Gouvernement ottoman avec la mention précise de sa qualité, que nous ne considérons pas comme une simple indication établissant l'identité de la personne, mais qui démontre que les montants déposés appartiennent, par suite de cette qualité, au Gouvernement ottoman. En plus, nous considérons comme tels tous dépôts effectués par lesdites personnes même sans désignation de leur qualité.

Ceci étant, nous rendons d'une façon absolue responsable envers le Gouvernement hellénique, la Banque ottomane en général et surtout son agence en cette ville, de tout dessaisissement éventuel de sa part, à partir du 26 octobre dernier, de quelconque de ces montants, qui sera opéré de la suite de l'inspection [illegible] nous réservons de faire du mouvement des comptes de votre succursale avec le Gouvernement ottoman et ses administrations ottomanes, comme aussi de nos rapports avec les fonctionnaires civils et militaires ottomans.

En terminant nous rappelons aussi, personnellement, aux dirigeants de la Banque ottomane de notre ville la très lourde responsabilité qu'ils assument tant envers le Gouvernement hellénique qu'envers la Banque ottomane et les intérêts généraux de celle-ci, en se soustrayant à la déclaration et à la restitution des montants en question qui, par succession, appartiennent de droit et incontestablement à l'État hellénique, et en n'obtempérant pas à notre invitation de se prêter à l'examen de ses comptes par le Gouvernement hellénique. Ce refus de leur part peut entraîner contre eux des poursuites pénales en vertu de la loi martiale.

Le Ministre,
D. RACTIVAN

[23944] No. 395.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, May 23, 1913.

(Confidentielle.)

M. SAZONOF me télégraphie, en substance, que l'Ambassadeur de France lui a communiqué que le Gouvernement allemand insiste sur ce que les Grandes Puissances s'accordent tout d'abord entre elles sur les principes fondamentaux et dirigeants concernant les questions financières à débattre par la commission de Paris, à laquelle les délégués des belligérants ne seraient invités à prendre part qu'après.

M. Sazonof me charge d'attirer l'attention du Ministre des Affaires Etrangères sur le fait que cette façon de poser la question lui paraît en contradiction avec la décision des Puissances prise à Londres. Celle-ci portait que les questions financières n'étaient pas du nombre de celles dont les Grandes Puissances se réservent exclusivement l'examen, qu'au contraire elle admettait le droit des belligérants d'y prendre directement part.

Il me charge de m'expliquer en ce sens avec Sir E. Grey, en ajoutant que nous ne saurions adhérer à la proposition allemande.

(Répétée à Paris.)

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 24 mai, 1913.

[23519] No. 396.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 259.) *Paris, May 22, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my telegram No. 70 of to-day's date, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum which was communicated last week privately to Mr. Carnegie by the secretary of the Balkan Financial Commission in regard to the position of the Balkan delegates on the commission. M. Ponsot told Mr. Carnegie that the French Ambassadors to the five Powers had been instructed to speak in the sense of this memorandum to the Governments to which they were respectively accredited. These are no doubt the instructions sent to M. Cambon on the 15th May mentioned to me by M. Pichon, to which I refer in my telegram of to-night.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 396.

Memorandum communicated to Mr. Carnegie by Secretary of Balkan Financial Commission.

Commission financière.—Procès-verbal de la Commission interministérielle française chargée de préparer les travaux de la Commission financière des Affaires balkaniques. (Séance du 14 mai, 1913.)

Présents: MM. Gout, William Martin, Luquet, Sergent, Ponsot (*Secrétaire*).

Au sujet de l'admission à la Commission de Paris des Délégués des États belligérants.

L'ARTICLE 6 du projet de traité de paix entre la Turquie et les États balkaniques remet à la Commission financière des Affaires balkaniques le soin de régler les questions d'ordre financier résultant de la guerre qui prend fin.

Le procès-verbal de cette commission se trouve, d'ailleurs, précisé dans une note en quatre articles qui a été communiquée aux Puissances le 19 avril dernier, et approuvée par elles sous le bénéfice d'observations de détail.

La question aujourd'hui soumise à l'appréciation de la Commission interministérielle française est de savoir à quel titre et avec quels pouvoirs les représentants des États belligérants seront invités à participer aux travaux de la commission.

Une observation préliminaire s'impose.

Il y a lieu, tout abord, de noter que les décisions finales n'appartiendront pas à la commission elle-même, mais aux Gouvernements des Grandes Puissances, qui sont appelés à transformer en décisions définitives les avis formulés par la commission.

La situation de principe est, en effet, la même pour les questions qui seront traitées à Paris et celles qui ressortissent à la réunion des Ambassadeurs à Londres. La commission de Paris aura à résoudre les problèmes financiers dans les mêmes conditions où la réunion de Londres s'applique à résoudre les problèmes politiques et territoriaux. La procédure doit donc être la même, c'est à-dire qu'à Paris comme à Londres, les représentants des Grandes Puissances doivent avoir seuls voix délibérative et pouvoir de décision.

Le programme assigné à la commission est un argument de plus à l'appui de cette commission.

En ce qui concerne, par exemple, la détermination de la part qui doit incomber aux États alliés dans le service de la dette ottomane, on ne saurait admettre les États belligérants à intervenir dans la délibération. Ce serait vouer la commission à l'impuissance puisque pour empêcher toute décision, il suffirait qu'un seul des États belligérants refusât de se rallier à l'opinion commune. Serait-ce logique enfin qu'il dépendît du Monténégro (qui n'a, pour ainsi dire, aucun intérêt dans la répartition de la dette ottomane) de paralyser le concert de toutes les Puissances? Qu'arriverait-il, d'ailleurs, de l'État belligérant d'exiger des réductions que les États belligérants se proposent de faire, à titre de compensation financière, du fait des opérations de guerre? Or, la une question sur laquelle on peut prévoir, dès à présent, un désaccord irréductible entre les Turcs et les alliés balkaniques. Il serait contraire aux termes mêmes et surtout à l'esprit qui a dicté l'insertion de cet article dans le projet de traité que la Commission financière se convoque les belligérants à procéder à cet examen avec voix délibérative. Ce serait, là encore, s'exposer à un insuccès certain. Concilier les prétentions adverses des belligérants et sauvegarder simultanément les intérêts propres des Grandes Puissances, tel est l'objet de la Commission financière; elle ne saurait, de toute évidence, remplir ce rôle nécessaire de médiateur et d'arbitre que si son pouvoir n'est pas à chaque pas et sur toute question mis en échec par le veto de l'un quelconque des belligérants.

Les observations qui précèdent ne tendent point à exclure les délégués des belligérants. Il ne vise qu'à faire prévaloir une méthode de travail qui permette à cette commission d'aboutir, dans un délai raisonnable, à l'élaboration de l'accord qui lui est confié. Si, malgré toutes les garanties d'équité et d'impartialité qu'offre aux belligérants une réunion où seront représentées toutes les Grandes Puissances, telle ou telle solution leur semblait inacceptable, ils auraient toujours la ressource de faire directement appel aux Gouvernements des Grandes Puissances.

Il n'est pas moins désirable que les belligérants soient admis, dans la plus large mesure, à faire valoir leurs intérêts au sein de la Commission financière. La Commission

interministérielle française estime donc que les délégués des belligérants devraient être admis à tous les travaux préparatoires, tant dans les réunions plénières de la commission que dans les sous-commissions qui seront organisées pour étudier les problèmes spéciaux. Admis de plein droit à toutes ces réunions, ils auraient les mêmes facilités que les délégués des Grandes Puissances pour soutenir leurs réclamations, mais la décision ne saurait finalement leur appartenir: ils n'auraient que voix consultative.

Seule l'adoption d'une telle méthode peut assurer aux délibérations de la commission un résultat pratique.

[23622] No. 397.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May 23.*)

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, May 23, 1913.*

FIGHTING has been going on between Greeks and Bulgarians for two days. King of Greece left this morning for Tchaingzi. He will try and arrange with Bulgarian General Staff for a wide neutral zone.

Prime Minister is uneasy. He has confidence in Bulgarian Prime Minister, but he has information from different quarters that Bulgarian officers are determined to attack Greek army, whatever their own King or Government may say. If they do, they will probably find Servians take part with Greeks. He appeals to you to take initiative in proposing arbitration between the allies on the question of partition.

I said that the Powers wished the allies to settle partition between themselves; also that arbitration is only resorted to on the request of all the disputants. He replied that the Powers had already turned mediation into intervention upon more than one point, and that it was surely worth their while to impose settlement upon the allies in order to avoid war, fraught with most dangerous consequences. If Servia took part in it, temptation of Austria would be great. He begs you earnestly to intervene.

To-morrow being festival of the patron saint of Bulgaria, it is rumoured that general attack will be made on the Greek positions.

[23623] No. 398.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May 23.*)

(No. 79.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, May 23, 1913.*

I READ your telegram No. 77 of 21st May to the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday and to Prime Minister to-day. They say Bulgarian Government agree to support their proposed alterations in draft treaty, and they hope that the Powers may accept them. They point out that all the Powers are not equally favourable to Greece, and that Austria and Italy might hold them to their word if they surrendered their claims to the Powers unconditionally. Responsibility for an unfavourable decision would be then thrown upon them in this country.

[23619] No. 399.

Sir H. Rose-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May 23.*)

(No. 175.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, May 23, 1913.*

SERVIA and Bulgaria.

My immediately preceding telegram of 22nd May.

In view of strained relations, press has been ordered to moderate its language, especially in regard to Royal personages.

Postal censorship, which had been relaxed, has been now re-established.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[23620] No. 400.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 241.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, May 23, 1913.*

YOUR despatches Nos. 137 and 147.

Sir A. Block leaves for London 24th May, and will communicate his observtions direct to you.

[23515] No. 401.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 23.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, May 23, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 30 of 12th May.

Further fighting reported near Angista. No details procurable.

[22475] No. 402.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 222.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, May 23, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 233 of 15th May, point 3: Temettu.

Is the note sent in to Sublime Porte the same as that enclosed in your despatch No. 89, Commercial, of 9th May, 1912?

Hakki Pasha has asked for a copy.

[23432] No. 403.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. O'Beirne.

(No. 196.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 23, 1913.*

ON the 19th May M. de Etter informed Sir A. Nicolson that he had received a telegram to the effect that the Russian Government considered that the seizure of the island of Ada Kaleh by Austria-Hungary was not in accordance with the self-denying ordinance laid down by the Powers, and of which ordinance Austria-Hungary was one of the warmest supporters. Austria-Hungary, who had acquired Ada Kaleh without striking a blow, could not, therefore, object to Montenegro, after all the sacrifices which the latter has made, obtaining territorial compensation for the surrender of Scutari. If the Vienna Cabinet did not acquiesce in this view, then any other Power was quite at liberty to secure for herself any compensation which she might think desirable.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[22645] No. 404.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 140.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 23, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador read to Sir A. Nicolson on the 13th May a telegram from Marquis di San Giuliano to the effect that the Servian Minister had, on the part of his Government, expressed the desire that in the preliminary treaty of peace a clause should be inserted specifying and confirming the engagement of the Powers as to the Danube Adriatic Railway. The Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs wished to know our views on this request. Sir A. Nicolson told the Ambassador that such a clause in a treaty between the allies and Turkey would be meaningless and quite out of place.

Servia need not be under any apprehension that the Powers would go back on their word. Perhaps in the final and definitive treaty which would, Sir A. Nicolson presumed, eventually have to be signed by the Powers as well as by the others the Adriatic Railway might be mentioned.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[24320] No. 405.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 162.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 23, 1913.*

I ASKED Nizami Pasha to come to see me to-day, and I gave him a copy of the letter which I had written to M. Novakovitch on the 21st.

Nizami Pasha said that he feared that, if the Turkish delegates agreed to any alteration in the treaty of peace, Dr. Danef would at once raise the question of the Enos–Media line, and this would lead to endless discussion. The only way to deal with it was to let the treaty stand as it was, referring the details of the line to an international commission. Turkey could not, without the consent of the Powers, agree to omit the words "les Souverains alliés." To do so would be to imply that Turkey was bound by the decision of the Powers, but that the allies were not. There were certain changes in the treaty, such as making the peace come into effect on the signature of the treaty without waiting for ratification, which were desirable, and there were some other minor points; but he thought that it would be better that the treaty should be signed as it stood; that other points on which they were agreed should be put into a protocol that they could sign separately; and that the object that Greece had in view in proposing to omit the words "les Souverains alliés" should be dealt with by a reserve on the part of Greece.

I said that I entirely agreed that the method he proposed was a good one. The Powers would never give their consent to the omission of the words "les Souverains alliés," as it would in effect imply that the Powers admitted that their future decisions were to be dependent upon the consent of Greece. If Greece wished to make a reserve as to her right of liberty of action regarding future decisions of the Powers, she could do so for herself; but she must not ask the Powers to admit her right to dispute their decisions. The Powers must of course retain unimpaired the right to make their decisions and enforce them as they thought fit.

I told Nizami Pasha that if, when Monday came (the 26th instant), he and Dr. Danef were still ready to sign the treaty without alteration, and the others made difficulties, I thought that the Powers should bring some strong pressure to get them all into line.

Nizami Pasha thanked me, and said that he would keep me informed, and would be glad to have my advice.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[24321] No. 406.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 113.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 23, 1913.*

COUNT MENSDORFF informed me to-day that Count Berchtold agreed to the statement decided upon by the *réunion* of the 20th instant, beginning with the words, "Les Puissances estiment qu'une discussion," to the effect that the Powers urged the early conclusion of peace. Count Berchtold wished, however, to observe that he did not think he could share the view that the Powers had not the right and the power to prevent a modification of the text of the Treaty of Peace should the belligerents agree upon a modification. A preliminary peace concluded through the mediation of the Powers, would impose upon them in a certain sense the moral obligation not to object afterwards to anything that was explicitly laid down in that instrument. If the

belligerents agreed on a text that was not identical with the one proposed by the Powers, the preliminary Treaty of Peace could not be looked upon as the result of the mediation of the Powers, and the Austrian Government would have to reserve their right "de prendre position" to these agreements in the measure that they thought proper. It seemed doubtless that an eventual understanding between Turkey and the Balkan States on questions, the settlement of which had been reserved to the London reunion, would meet with the opposition of the Great Powers; and the Austrian Government presumed that the Powers would be in a position to carry through their will towards the Balkan States. Austria-Hungary would certainly "prendre position" against any decision of a Treaty of Peace concluded directly by the belligerents, by which any interest of the Monarchy could be injured.

I said, that Count Berchtold's views were practically met by my letter of the 21st to M. Novakovitch, which I would communicate to the *réunion* on Monday the 26th, and by what I had said to Nizami Pasha, the substance of which I told Count Mensdorff.

Count Mensdorff said that he thought this put the matter in a light that was consistent with Count Berchtold's views.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[24322] No. 407.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 114.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 23, 1913.

COUNT MENSDORFF told me to-day that Count Berchtold thought that it was not necessary to appoint a Civil Governor in Scutari, but that a provisional Civil Administration should be arranged by those on the spot. He thought that we should proceed with the appointment of a gendarmerie for Albania, and that Swedish officers might be suitable.

I said that I had thought that officers of the Great Powers might be used, as they had been in Macedonia.

Count Mensdorff expressed a preference for officers of a minor Power, and said that there were Swedes who had had experience in Macedonia.

With regard to the northern and north-eastern frontiers of Albania, which were already agreed to, Count Berchtold thought that the delimitation of them should be proceeded with at once.

I said that I did not see why there should be objection to this.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23943] No. 408.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 75.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 23, 1913.

M. DANEF explained to Sir A. Nicolson to-day that he was ready and anxious to sign the treaty of peace—and that he had intimated to the allies that he would wait a day or two, but not longer, before signing. He thought that this interval might very well be employed by the Powers authorising a protocol to be annexed to the treaty, defining in detail one or two points on the frontier line (practically the Bulgarian line). He did not desire to alter a word of the draft treaty, but a protocol specifying one or two points through which the line was to run was essential. He had ascertained from the Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Italian Ambassadors that they were already authorised to favour the Muratti line. He was going to see the German Embassy on the subject.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Danef that the International Frontier Commission could very well deal with the point which he had raised; that the Powers, he had always understood, had settled in article 1 of the draft treaty their part in the frontier question; that if they were to return to that question and discuss annexing a protocol to the

treaty further delays would occur; that Turkey might very possibly strongly demur if the Powers were to come to her afresh on the subject; that the other allies would instantly press the Powers to add their desired modifications to the treaty, and we should see no end of the matter. There was no harm in his talking to Osman Nizami Pasha as to the addition of a protocol, and if the Turks agreed we naturally should raise no objection. M. Danef urged that the matter should be examined at the next meeting of Ambassadors.

Sir A. Nicolson would give him no promise, but said that he would repeat to me what M. Danef had told him.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23942] No. 409.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 48.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 23, 1913.

M. STREIT, in the absence of M. Skouloudis, who was ill, called on Sir A. Nicolson to-day, to say that he had proposed to Osman Nizami Pasha that the words "les Souverains alliés" should be omitted from articles 3 and 5 of the treaty of peace, and that he thought that Osman Nizami Pasha was not opposed to the suppression of these words. M. Streit asked if the Powers would raise objections.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Streit that it would be better not to ask too many questions. As regards Albania and the islands the Powers naturally maintained the attitude which they had adopted from the commencement, and that what the allies chose to settle with Turkey was their own affair. Sir A. Nicolson read to him my letter to M. Novakovitch, copy of which I transmit to you herewith,* and said that the sooner the allies signed with Turkey the better it would be.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[21333] No. 410.

Foreign Office to Treasury.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 23, 1913.

WITH reference to Sir T. L. Heath's letter to Mr. Maxwell of the 14th May relative to the arrangements to be made as regards the Ottoman Public Debt at the conclusion of the present war, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum by the British delegate on the forthcoming International Commission at Paris,† asking for the views of His Majesty's Government on three points connected with this question.

With regard to the second point raised, I am to state that Sir E. Grey has approved the line of argument which Sir P. Harvey proposes to adopt in discussing the question of a war indemnity.

Sir E. Grey would, however, be glad to learn the views of the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury as regards the first and third points, and I am accordingly to enquire (1) whether the arguments advanced by the German delegates in favour of the formula advocated by the German Government are such as to cause their Lordships to modify the opinion which they have already expressed in support of the formula preferred by France; and (2) whether their Lordships concur in the arguments used by Sir P. Harvey against the inclusion of the 3 per cent. customs surtax in the sum on the basis of which the share of the Ottoman Public Debt to be assumed by the allies should be calculated, especially that under heading (6).

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* To M. Novakovitch, May 21, 1913.
† Memorandum by Sir P. Harvey, May 8, 1913.

[23711 No. 411.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Canea, Crete, May 12, 1913.*

I HAVE received a visit from Mr. E. Rosenbusch, of Candia, with reference to the claim against the Cretan Government of the late Dr. Ittar, of whose estate he is administrator.

This claim is founded on a judgment of the Turco-Cretan courts given in 1887, by which the then Government of the island was ordered to pay Dr. Ittar the sum of 47,057 fr. with interest to the date of payment. The validity of the judgment was not contested, the only question being whether the autonomous Cretan Government took over such liabilities of the Turkish Government in Crete along with its assets.

Consul-General Howard came to an arrangement with the last Cabinet of Prince George whereby this point was to be submitted to arbitration, an arrangement which you, Sir, finally approved in your despatch No. 126 of the 10th October, 1906. No subsequent steps were, however, taken either by Mr. Howard or by his successor, Mr. Peel, and the first I heard of the matter was this week from Mr. Rosenbusch. According to the latter's calculation, the claim for interest now amounts to 152,361 fr.

The Greek Government might, perhaps, be induced to undertake the settlement of the Ittar claim if, as I gather from the newspapers is probable, the cession of Crete to Greece forms one of the conditions of peace.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[23712. No. 412.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 12.)
Sir, *Canea, Crete, May 15, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 5 of the 27th March, suggesting that out of the proceeds of the 3 per cent. surtax deposited in the Bank of Canea in the name of the six Powers an indemnity might be paid to the family of Mustafa Hamza, or Hamzadaki, the Mussulman rural guard, whose murder by a Christian gendarme was reported in my despatch No. 27 of the 31st March, 1912, I have the honour to report that the acting French consul-general, acting under instructions from his Government, has consulted his colleagues of the protecting Powers regarding the amount which should be paid to the murdered man's family on this account.

In my despatch No. 34 of the 19th April, 1912, I forwarded the copy of a *procès-verbal* of a consular meeting, at which the sum of 5,000 fr. was named. Since then, however, M. Dragoumis was authorised by the Greek Government to pay 6,000 fr. as indemnity to the family of Bilal Tsikoudakis, who was murdered by a Christian rural guard, as reported in my despatches No. 82 of the 31st October and No. 84 of the 4th November, 1912; and we came to the conclusion that it would be convenient if the precedent thus set were followed, particularly as it would be to the advantage of the bereaved family.

My French colleague will therefore report to his Government that we are of opinion that the amount of the indemnity in the case of Mustafa Hamza should be fixed at 6,000 fr.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[23693] No. 413.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 100. Confidential.)
Sir, *Belgrade, May 16, 1913.*

WITH reference to Sir H. Bax-Ironside's despatch No. 32, Secret, of the 10th March last, I have the honour to enclose herewith a summary of the replies prepared by the Bulgarian Government to the arguments set forth in M. Pashitch's letter to M. Spalaikovitch which formed the enclosure to the above-mentioned despatch.

These replies have not yet been communicated to the Servian Government, but are held in readiness in case the latter should again assert that, for various reasons, they are justified in claiming territorial compensation in Macedonia at the expense of Bulgaria.

The Servian attitude is now, however, that the original treaty must be put entirely aside; that they claim compensation altogether irrespective of the stipulations it may have contained; that they do not even intend to submit the dispute to the arbitration of the Emperor of Russia, as provided for in the treaty; that Servia intends to remain in occupation of the disputed territory, and Bulgaria can come and take it if she is able.

Under the circumstances it seems unlikely the Bulgarian counter-arguments, which are based entirely on the treaty, will be accorded much attention in Servia.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 413.

Summary of Bulgarian Replies to the Contentions of the Servian Government as set forth in the Enclosure to Sir H. Bax-Ironside's Despatch No. 32, Secret, of March 10, 1913 (see Confidential Print No. 12216, Section 12, of March 17, 1913).

THE contention that Servia, by mobilising more men than stipulated under the treaty, relieved Bulgaria of the onerous obligation of supplying 100,000 men for the support of the Servian army on the Vardar, and that this fact enabled Bulgaria to employ all her troops to the eastward, which contributed largely to the Bulgarian successes, takes no account of the arrangements entered into in conventions concluded subsequently to the treaty, which conventions were all the outcome of the treaty and were interconnected. There were in all one Military Convention and four General Staff Conventions. The Military Convention was concluded on the 29th April, and by this were fixed the minimum of the troops to be put in the field respectively by the allies, viz., Bulgaria, 200,000 men; Servia, 150,000 men. It was further stated that in case of Servia being attacked by Turkey, Bulgaria engaged to send 100,000 men into the Vardar territory to her assistance, and this stipulation was also to hold good in the event of Servia being the attacking party, unless, however, it were previously modified by a special convention. This is, in effect, what occurred, since, when it was decided to assume the offensive against Turkey, a General Staff Convention, signed on the 23rd August, o.s., and another signed on the 15th September, o.s., the latter therefore two days only before the issue of the mobilisation decrees, determined that Bulgaria should only send one division to co-operate with the Servian army on the Vardar, and that with the exception of this division the whole of the Bulgarian army should operate on the Maritza. It was, moreover, agreed that, granting the Servian troops were successful, the Bulgarian division might be withdrawn after a time.

Under the circumstances, Bulgaria fulfilled all obligations incumbent upon her, inasmuch as 35,000 men were sent to co-operate with the Servians on the Egri Palanka road and were not withdrawn until after the Turks had fled southwards and Salonica had been occupied. Neither the treaty nor the conventions contain any mention whatever of a partition of territory based on the number of troops respectively employed on the Vardar by the allies.

2. According to article 2 of the secret annex to the treaty, the Servian contention that Macedonia constituted contested territory is erroneous. By that article it was

agreed that Macedonia should either be an autonomous province within frontiers clearly defined, viz., Shar dagh, the Rhodope Mountains, the Archipelago, and Lake Ochrida, so that it should be apportioned to the allies, in which case the same secret annex determined the one portion to be undisputably Bulgarian, whilst another, but far smaller area, only, might be contested and was, in case of disagreement, to form the subject of arbitration on the part of the Emperor of Russia. The following words appear: "La Serbie s'engage de ne rien chercher au delà de la ligne tracée sur la carte annexée." (The line referred to on the map runs approximately from Egri Palanka, south-west to the north end of Lake Ochrida, leaving Kuprulu, Prilop, Monastir, and Ochrida to Bulgaria.) Therefore the only disputable territory lies between the Shar dagh and this line.

With regard to the Servian contention that, the Powers having deprived Servia of the fruits of her victories on the Adriatic littoral, this loss should be shared between the allies and not fall entirely on Servia, no mention is contained in the treaty of how much territory to the west or how much territory to the east should fall respectively to Servia and Bulgaria; therefore the fact of Servia having renounced Durazzo has no bearing whatever on the territorial arrangements between the allies, and the Bulgarian Government can admit no responsibility for this decision, which was, moreover, taken without any reference to Bulgaria.

3. The argument that, because Bulgaria asked for Servian reinforcements and artillery for the reduction of Adrianople—both of which were at once supplied—therefore Servia has gone beyond her obligations and is entitled to expect compensation, is in contradiction to the stipulations of the treaty and conventions.

According to paragraph 3 of article 2 of the Military Convention, "la Serbie est obligée de secourir la Bulgarie avec toutes ses forces qui pourraient rester disponibles." Bulgaria undertook a similar obligation towards Servia. The General Staff conventions are even more explicit on this point. Article 7 of the General Staff Convention of the 19th June has words to the following effect: "Si la situation exige le renforcement de l'armée bulgare opérant sur le Maritza, et s'il n'est pas nécessaire qu'on maintienne toutes les forces sur le Vardar, les troupes nécessaires doivent être transportées du Vardar sur le Maritza et *vice versâ*." When, during the war, it was found indispensable to have a larger number of troops operating on the Maritza, two Servian divisions were transported thither in accordance with the above provision, whilst the 7th Division of the Bulgarian army remained on the Vardar until the end of the operations in that direction.

The Servian argument, with regard both to reinforcements of troops and of artillery, falls to the ground. The aim of treaties between allies is to secure benefit to all. Had the Turks been victorious on the Maritza the Servians would have felt the effect as well as the Bulgarians; likewise, if the Turks had been successful against the Servian army, Bulgaria must also have suffered. Therefore assistance had to be mutual. Can the Servian Government point to one single stipulation in the treaty or conventions which implies that either party can ask for an increase of territory? Servia has done no more than she was obliged.

4. The assertion made by Servia that before the war it was said that Adrianople and Constantinople would be outside the Bulgarian sphere of action is unsupported by any documentary evidence. In the same way it was currently stated before the war that the sanjak and the Adriatic littoral did not enter into the Servian programme, but Servia nevertheless occupied both. If there is to be a division of territory according to losses in the war, Bulgaria has to show by far the longest list of killed, wounded, and missing, viz., a total of about 84,000, as against a Servian total of about 25,000.

Servia complains of having been obliged to cede territory in the interest of the allies. Bulgaria has likewise had to cede a larger area of territory back to Turkey, and, furthermore, territory to Roumania, in the interests of the allies.

The Bulgarian Government hopes the Servian Government will not raise questions incompatible with the treaty, and they are compelled to state that the strict accomplishment of engagements undertaken will be the best guarantee for the future of the alliance.

[23698] No. 114.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 113.)

Sir, *Athens, May 17, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 57 of the 22nd March respecting the funds at the disposal of the Greek Government for meeting expenditure connected with the war, I have the honour to transmit herewith a further memorandum giving particulars of fresh charges on the budget of 1913.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 414.

Memorandum.

BY a law dated the 27th April (10th May), 1913, a grant of 2,280,000*l.* is made in favour of the National Defence Fund "from the extraordinary budgetary resources of the Treasury," and a further grant of 610,000*l.* from the same source to the National Fleet Fund, thus increasing the estimated deficit for 1913 by nearly 3,000,000*l.*, which will therefore amount approximately to 5,000,000*l.*

Adding the 1,600,000*l.* uncovered by revenue—funds available from the surplus of 1910 and 1911, and loans provided for in last year's budget included—in 1912 it would appear that 6,000,000*l.* must still be found to meet war expenditure already incurred or foreseen.

[23699] No. 115.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 114.)

Sir, *Athens, May 17, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 74 of this date, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the reply which I have received this evening from M. Coromilas to the private note which I addressed to him upon receipt of Mr. Lamb's telegram No. 32 of this morning on the subject of the expressed intention of the Greek authorities to proceed to the examination of the accounts of Ottoman officials with the Ottoman Bank at Salonica.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 415.

M. Coromilas to Sir F. Elliot.

Mon cher Ministre, *Athènes, le* 4 (17) *mai*, 1913.

NOUS avons été informés, de notre côté, de l'incident relatif à la Banque ottomane de Salonique. Il s'agit d'une somme de 2,000*l.* que Mahmoud Effendi, vice-président de l'armée du Vardar, avait déposée à la banque et que les autorités grecques réclament comme butin de guerre. En outre, les autorités ont demandé à la banque une liste des sommes déposées chez elle par les fonctionnaires ottomans ainsi que des bons de caisse délivrés en leur nom. C'est pour contrôler des dépôts—qui en tant qu'il sera établi qu'ils proviennent de leur gestion pourront être saisis par l'occupant—que les autorités désirent procéder à une vérification des comptes de ces fonctionnaires.

Bien que les arguments des autorités de Salonique soient fort plausibles, toutefois, pour éviter tout incident regrettable et afin de satisfaire au désir que vous avez bien voulu m'exprimer, je viens de télégraphier à M. Ractivan de donner ordre de surseoir à toute opération.

Très sincèrement à vous,
L. A. COROMILAS.

[23694] No. 416.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 101.)
Sir, *Belgrade, May 18, 1913.*

WHILST, as reported in my telegram No. 122 of yesterday's date, M. Pashitch gave me assurance that the intentions of Servia towards Bulgaria were pacific, the tone of the Servian inspired press is not reassuring.

The "Politica," which bears an almost semi-official character, has a leading article in its issue of the 15th instant which urges the Government to adopt a decisive attitude and energetic measures in order to safeguard the territories conquered by the Servian army during the war. Servia, the "Politica" continues, should strike now when the chances of delivering a severe blow are all in her favour. The longer the Government delay decisive action the greater will be the difficulties for Servia to contend with. Every day that passes is a day lost for Servia and a day gained for Bulgaria. The longer Servia puts off that which is becoming more and more inevitable the better can Bulgaria prepare herself by concentrating her troops on a frontier starting from the Danube down to Ghevgheli, and the more easily can she choose the most advantageous point at which to attack Servia. The policy of the Government has hitherto been good. Servia has raised her national prestige to the level she deserves. All this is, however, now threatened if action is longer delayed. The possibility of another Slivnitza should urge Servia to an immediate step.

The "Tribuna," which passes as the Crown Prince's organ, has an article much to the same effect.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[23673] No. 417.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 437.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 19, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith two despatches from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica reporting on the fighting in the Previtscha district between Greek and Bulgarian outposts, and on the general relations between the allies.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 417.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 42.)
Sir, *Salonica, May 10, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 39 of the 5th instant, I have the honour to enclose herewith translation of a paragraph in to-day's issue of the "Pravo" relating to the confiscation of that paper by the Servian authorities at Ghevgheli.

The Servian troops, whose return from Albania was alluded to in my despatch No. 38 of the 2nd instant, have been arriving somewhat more deliberately than was anticipated, but have, I believe, almost all been landed now, twenty-seven transports having put in an appearance since the 30th ultimo. The men and material have been entrained and despatched up the Uskub line with the least possible delay.

The levy of import duty at the rate of 100 per cent. on goods landed at Dedeagatch from places in the occupation of the allies, which was likewise alluded to in the above-mentioned despatch, seems to have been countermanded, and the port of Dedeagatch is now believed to be open. That of Cavalla, on the other hand, has again been closed,

and it is once more rumoured that it is being mined. This is probably due to fresh anticipations of a Greek assault.

Though it is extremely difficult to obtain any definite and trustworthy information, there seems to be no doubt whatever that fighting has been going on since the 5th instant between the Greek and Bulgarian outposts along a front of some 15 to 20 miles from Vultchista and Anghista to the sea near Lefteri. The wildest rumours are afloat, and between them and official denials it is impossible to fix on the exact truth, but there is no doubt that a considerable number of wounded (a conservative estimate is thirty-seven), together with a few bashi-bazouk prisoners, have been brought in from the front. The localities at which encounters have taken place are said to include Vultchista and Anghista for the northern, Paleokhori and Dranitch on the eastern, and Avli-Kuey Eledjikli on the southern slopes of the Pangheon Mountain, whilst disturbances between Bulgarian troops and Greek natives are also said to have occurred at Doxat on the Drama-Cavalla road.

According to one informant, Greek Evzones have penetrated as far as Kanali and Vasilaki, between Pravishta and Cavalla, whilst the Bulgars, on the other hand, have withdrawn their isolated posts from the vicinity of Lefteri. It would therefore appear as if it were the Greeks who had here assumed the offensive.

The latter assert that the Patriarchist villagers within the zones occupied by the Bulgarians are being systematically subjected to the most violent persecution conceivable, and that over 6,000 of them have already sought refuge behind the Greek lines. I am unable to control this statement, but there is little doubt that the feeling between the two elements is running as high as it ever did in 1903-8, and the Dimitritch incident, reported in my despatch No. 35 of the 23rd ultimo, is significant of the methods by which that feeling may be translated into action when occasion offers.

The Mixed Greco-Bulgarian Commission, of which his Excellency M. Sarafof was a member, has "terminated its labours," and his Excellency is, I understand, on the point of returning to Sophia. He appears to have maintained good personal relations with the Greeks, amongst whom he, himself, has left a favourable impression; but I gather that the work of the commission was limited to an exchange of ideas and the establishment of a considerable number of facts in regard to the occupation of various districts, not much having been accomplished in the way of mutual agreement.

The three days' quarantine vexatiously imposed by the Greeks on arrivals from the ports in Bulgarian occupation has been removed; but, on the other hand, as above mentioned, the Bulgarians have again notified that the port of Cavalla is closed to commerce.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 417.

Extract from the "Pravo" (Bulgarian) of May 10, 1913.

UN DERNIER GESTE.

(Translation.)

THANKS to the Greek Post Office there, Ghevgheli had hitherto remained the only one of all the towns in Servian occupation where our paper was granted hospitality. To-day we have lost even this town.

On the 20th–23rd instant the Servian district administrator at Ghevgheli addressed himself to the director of the Greek Post Office with the demand that he should hand over to him the packet of papers addressed to our agent in that place. Very much to the credit of the Greek post, the director refused to do so without first asking for instructions from Salonica, where the central direction of the Greek post approved his attitude. The Servian authorities, however, were not satisfied with this. They lay in wait for our agent as he came out of the Greek Post Office with the packet, and confiscated it in the street. In reply to his demand for an explanation of their grounds for proceeding in this manner, he was told that the "Pravo" "spoke ill about the Serbs," and he was referred to the article of Miliukof. The same happened again on the second and third day, after which the prohibition of our paper was officially proclaimed. The prohibition was notified to every commune in the Ghevgheli

district with orders to arrest and prosecute any one on whom the "Pravo" might be found.

With this "ally-like" action the Servian authorities have taken the last step in their proceedings against our paper. They had already closed against us the whole of the Monastir and Kossovo vilayets, and now they have similarly closed the only remaining place where, thanks to the local Greek Post Office, it was still favourably received. Now they can rest assured that the "Pravo" will no more trouble the waters for them.

Wretched people!

It is worth remarking that there are still in Ghevgheli Bulgarian administrative officials and a company of Bulgarian troops. It would be interesting if the Serbs were to begin to seize the "Pravo" on Bulgarian soldiers!

Enclosure 3 in No. 417.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 43.) *Salonica, May* 12, 1913.

Sir,

IN continuation of my immediately preceding despatch of the 10th instant, I have the honour to report that I am informed that the authorities have succeeded in putting an end, at least for the moment, to the series of outpost engagements which have been proceeding since the 5th instant in the Pravishta–Cavalla districts.

The Greeks admit a loss of fourteen killed and thirty-two or thirty-four wounded, twenty-seven of whom were brought in by the depôt vessel "Kanares" from Lefteri late last night. I am, however, inclined to believe that their casualty list is in reality considerably longer. They say that the losses inflicted on the Bulgarians were very much heavier than their own, but nothing really definite is yet known here on that subject.

A joint commission is being constituted for the purpose of examining into these incidents, and his Excellency M. Sarafof has received instructions to defer his departure presumably in connection with this enquiry.

The Bulgarian army appears to have incurred even more serious losses in an unfortunate railway accident which occurred yesterday, or the day before, on the line between Drama and Buk. As a military train was climbing the steep gradients between the stations of Buk and Nusretli a coupling broke and a number of cars slipped back down the line and dashed into another train. About 100 soldiers are said to have been killed and 150 or 200 injured, though it is possible that these figures may be found to have been exaggerated.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[23675] No. 418.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 140.) *Constantinople, May* 19, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose herein copy of a letter which has been addressed to me by Sir Adam Block, in his quality of president of the Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, reporting on the demand of the Greek authorities at present established in Samos for the payment of sums due by the Ottoman Public Debt to the Government of the principality.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 418.

Sir Adam Block to Sir G. Lowther.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Constantinople, le* 4 (17) *mai*, 1913.

J'AI l'honneur de rappeler à votre Excellence qu'en vertu de la convention conclue à la date du 12 (24) mars, 1895, entre l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane et la Principauté de Samos, pour l'affermage de la saline de cette île, et renouvelée depuis lors tous les cinq ans, ladite administration est tenue de verser, chaque exercice, au Gouvernement princier la somme de 150,000 piastres, payable par semestre.

Or, les autorités helléniques, qui ont pris possession de Samos au cours des récentes hostilités, ont bien laissé les services de la Dette publique fonctionner dans cette île, comme par le passé, mais, par lettre en date du 17 (30) mars dernier, ont réclamé à l'agent local de notre administration la somme de 75,000 piastres, représentant le terme semestriel dû par la Dette publique à la principauté, en vertu de la convention précitée.

Prévoyant la retourne de l'île au *statu quo ante* dès la conclusion de la paix prochaine, notre administration ne saurait, sans déroger à ses engagements antérieurs et sans s'exposer à mal payer, donner suite à la demande des autorités helléniques.

En présence de ces faits, le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique a décidé de porter la réclamation du Gouvernement hellénique à la connaissance des Ambassadeurs de trois Puissances protectrices et de s'en remettre dès maintenant à leur avis dans la question pendante.

Je vous serai, en conséquence, très obligé, M. l'Ambassadeur, de vouloir bien, si cet avis est, comme je l'espère, conforme au nôtre dans le litige que je viens d'avoir l'honneur de vous exposer, user de votre haute influence pour déterminer le Gouvernement hellénique à renoncer à ses prétentions.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Président du Conseil,
ADAM BLOCK.

[24056] No. 419.

Memorandum communicated on May 24, 1913, *by Hakki Pasha, suggesting form of Reply to Points* 4 *and* 5 *of his Highness's Memorandum of May* 1, 1913.

4. LE Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique admet, en principe, l'abolition des bureaux de poste anglais existants en Turquie. En fait, cette abolition ne peut avoir lieu que si les autres bureaux étrangers sont en même temps abolis et si les postes ottomanes offrent au commerce anglais les garanties de sûreté et de régularité désirables. Le Gouvernement anglais est prêt à entrer en négociations avec la Sublime Porte pour les améliorations à apporter au régime postal ottoman afin de rendre possible l'abolition des bureaux étrangers, pourvu que les autres États intéressés aussi y prennent part.

Toutefois, le Gouvernement anglais, appréciant que dans l'état des choses actuel, des revenus postaux devant revenir au Trésor ottoman, se trouvent être perçus par des bureaux étrangers, déclare n'avoir pas d'objection à prescrire à ses bureaux de poste en Turquie l'usage de timbres ottomans si tous les États intéressés se trouvent d'accord pour les conditions d'un tel usage.

5. En ce qui concerne les Capitulations, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique fait d'abord remarquer que les parties commerciales et financières de ces anciens traités ayant fait l'objet d'autres accords, il ne peut s'agir en l'espèce que de leurs parties jurisdictionnelles. Comme le Gouvernement ottoman lui-même ne demande qu'une étude de la question, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique se déclare prêt à nommer des délégués à une commission purement de juristes où tous les États ayant des Capitulations à eux propres devront être représentées et qui sera chargée d'étudier soit les mesures propres à assurer l'abolition des parties susénoncées, soit les améliorations successives qu'on peut apporter à la situation actuelle.

(*Note.*—Compare annexed Austro-Turkish Protocol of the 26th February, 1909, and Turco-Italian Treaty of Peace signed at Lausanne on the 18th October, 1912.)

Annex No. 1.

Austro-Turkish Protocol.

LE Gouvernement Impérial et Royal commun d'Autriche-Hongrie et le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, désirant donner, d'un commun accord, une solution à certaines questions pendantes entre eux, les soussignées:

Jean Marquis Pallavicini, Ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire d'Autriche-Hongrie; et

Hussein Hilmy Pacha, Grand-Vézir, et Gabriel Effendi Noradounghian, Ministre ad intérim Impérial ottoman des Affaires Étrangères;

dûment autorisés par leurs Gouvernements respectifs, sont convenus des stipulations suivantes:

Article 1er.

L'Autriche-Hongrie déclare renoncer d'une façon expresse à tous les droits qui lui ont été conférés par rapport à l'ancien sandjiak de Novi-Bazar par le Traité de Berlin et la Convention de Constantinople du 21 avril, 1879.

Article 2.

La Convention du 21 avril, 1879, ainsi que la protestation de la Sublime Porte contre la décision du Gouvernement commun d'Autriche-Hongrie, concernant la Bosnie et l'Herzégovine et toutes les autres dispositions ou stipulations existant entre les Hautes Parties contractantes, et contraires à cette décision, sont abrogées et remplacées par le présent Protocole, qui constate que toute divergence au sujet de ces deux provinces est aplanie entre elles et que le Gouvernement ottoman reconnaît d'une façon expresse le nouvel état de choses en Bosnie-Herzégovine créé par la dite décision.

Article 3.

Les originaires de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine qui se trouvent actuellement en Turquie—à l'exception des personnes indiquées dans les notes qui seront échangées entre les Parties Contractantes lors de la ratification du présent Protocole—ainsi que les sujets ottomans originaires des différentes parties de l'Empire ottoman de passage ou en résidence fixe en Bosnie-Herzégovine, continueront à conserver leur nationalité ottomane comme par le passé.

Les habitants de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine domiciliés dans ces provinces seront libres d'émigrer dans l'Empire ottoman en se conformant, comme auparavant, aux lois de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine, et ils seront admis en Turquie comme Ottomans. Ceux-ci de même que les originaires de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine qui se trouvent actuellement en Turquie auront toujours le droit de disposer pleinement de leurs immeubles sis en Bosnie et en Herzégovine, de les affermer ou de les administrer directement par eux-mêmes ou par des tiers.

Il est entendu que les originaires de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine qui, sans esprit d'émigration, se rendraient désormais en Turquie, y seront traités sur le même pied que les sujets autrichiens ou hongrois.

Article 4.

La liberté et la pratique extérieure du culte musulman seront assurées, comme par le passé, aux personnes habitant ou séjournant en Bosnie et en Herzégovine.

Les Musulmans continueront à jouir des mêmes droits civils et politiques que tous les habitants de la Bosnie et de l'Herzégovine appartenant à d'autres cultes.

Le nom de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan comme Khalife continuera à être prononcé dans les prières publiques des Musulmans.

Les droits des fondations pieuses ("vakoufs") seront respectés, comme par le passé, et aucune entrave ne sera apportée aux rapports des Musulmans avec leurs chefs spirituels, qui dépendront comme toujours du Cheik-ul-Islamat à Constantinople, lequel donnera l'investiture au Reis-ul-Ulema.

Article 5.

Une décision arbitrale ayant constaté de plus que, d'après le Code Foncier ottoman, l'État ottoman possédait en Bosnie-Herzégovine des biens immeubles de diverses natures, le Gouvernement commun d'Autriche-Hongrie s'engage à payer à Constantinople, dans un délai de quinze jours, qui suivront la ratification du présent protocole, au Gouvernement ottoman, une somme de £T. 2,500,000 en or comme contrevaleur de ces biens immeubles.

Article 6.

L'Autriche-Hongrie s'engage à conclure avec la Turquie, dans un délai de deux ans à compter de la date de la ratification du présent protocole, sur la base du droit public européen, un traité de commerce qui sera mis en vigueur en tant que les autres traités de commerce de la Sublime Porte seront conclus et mis en vigueur sur la même base.

En attendant, l'Autriche-Hongrie consent, après un délai de quinze jours à partir de la ratification du présent Acte, à l'élévation de 11 à 15 pour cent des droits de douane *ad valorem* en Turquie; ainsi qu'à l'établissement de nouveaux monopoles ou au prélèvent de surtaxes de consommation sur les cinq articles suivants: pétrole, papier à cigarettes, allumettes, alcools, cartes à jouer, tout cela à condition qu'un même traitement soit appliqué simultanément et sans distinction aux importations des autres pays.

En tant qu'il s'agit de l'importation d'articles faisant l'objet d'un monopole, l'administration de ces monopoles est tenue de se fournir d'articles de provenance autrichienne ou hongroise suivant le pourcentage établi sur la base de l'importation annuelle de ces mêmes articles, pourvu que les prix à offrir pour la livraison des articles de monopole se conforment à la situation du marché au moment de l'achat, tout en prenant en considération les qualités des marchandises à fournir et la moyenne des prix, qui ont été notés dans les trois dernières années pour lesdites qualités.

Il est, en outre, entendu que si la Turquie, au lieu d'établir de nouveaux monopoles, sur les cinq articles susmentionnés, se décidait à les frapper de surtaxes de consommation, ces surtaxes seraient imposées dans la même hauteur aux produits similaires de la Turquie et de toute autre nation.

Article 7.

Reconnaissant le droit régalien du Gouvernement ottoman sur le service des postes, le Gouvernement commun d'Autriche-Hongrie s'engage à supprimer, dès la ratification du présent Acte, les offices postaux Impériaux Royaux fonctionnant actuellement en Turquie dans des localités où il n'existe pas d'autres bureaux de poste étrangers. Il s'engage, en outre, à supprimer également les autres offices postaux Impériaux Royaux dans l'Empire ottoman au fur et à mesure que les Puissances ayant des bureaux de poste en Turquie auront supprimé les leurs.

Article 8.

La Sublime Porte se proposant d'ouvrir en Conférence européenne ou autrement avec les Grandes Puissances intéressées des négociations en vue de faire cesser le régime capitulaire en Turquie en le remplaçant par le régime du droit international, l'Autriche-Hongrie, en reconnaissant le bien-fondé de ces intentions de la Sublime Porte, déclare dès maintenant vouloir lui prêter à cet effet son plein et sincère appui.

Article 9.

Le présent Protocole sera ratifié et entrera en vigueur immédiatement après l'échange des ratifications. Les ratifications en seront échangées à Constantinople aussitôt que faire se pourra et au plus tard dans deux mois.

Fait en double expédition à Constantinople, le 26 février, 1909.

(L.S.) PALLAVICINI, *m. p.*
(L.S.) H. HILMY, *m. p.*
(L.S.) GABRIEL NORADOUNGHIAN *m. p.*

Annex No. 2.

Extract from the "Italie" of October 19, 1912.

AUJOURD'HUI, le 18 octobre, à Ouchy, les plénipotentiaires italiens et les plénipotentiaires turcs, le Sultan ainsi que le Roi d'Italie ayant émané les décrets et rempli les actes qui avaient été convenus, signent le traité de paix, qui prendra le nom de Traité de Lausanne.

La réunion entre les plénipotentiaires dans ce but a commencé à 3 heures de l'après-midi.

Voici le texte intégral du traité :—

"ARTICLE 1er.

"Les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à prendre, immédiatement après la signature du présent traité, les dispositions nécessaires pour la cessation immédiate et simultanée des hostilités. Des commissaires spéciaux seront envoyés sur les lieux pour assurer l'exécution des susdites dispositions.

"ARTICLE 2.

"Les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à donner immédiatement après la signature du présent traité, l'ordre de rappel de leurs officiers, de leurs troupes, ainsi que de leurs fonctionnaires civils, respectivement le Gouvernement ottoman de la Tripolitaine et de la Cyrénaïque, et le Gouvernement italien des îles qu'il a occupées dans la Mer Egée.

"L'effective évacuation des îles susdites par les officiers, les troupes et les fonctionnaires civils italiens aura lieu immédiatement après que la Tripolitaine et la Cyrénaïque auront été évacuées par les officiers, les troupes et les fonctionnaires civils ottomans.

"ARTICLE 3.

"Les prisonniers de guerre et les otages seront échangés dans le plus bref délai possible.

"ARTICLE 4.

"Les deux Gouvernements s'engagent à accorder pleine et entière amnistie, le Gouvernement Royal aux habitants de la Tripolitaine et de la Cyrénaïque, et le Gouvernement Impérial aux habitants des îles de la mer Egée sujettes à la souveraineté ottomane, lesquels aient pris part aux hostilités ou qui se seraient compromis en leur occasion, sauf les crimes de droit commun. En conséquence, aucun individu de quelque classe ou condition qu'il soit ne pourra être poursuivi ou troublé dans sa personne ou ses biens ni dans l'exercice de ses droits en raison de ses actes politiques ou militaires ou bien des opinions qu'il aurait exprimées pendant les hostilités. Les personnes détenues et déportées de ce fait seront immédiatement remises en liberté.

"ARTICLE 5.

"Tous les traités, conventions et engagements de tout genre, espèce et nature, conclus ou en vigueur entre les deux hautes parties contractantes antérieurement à la déclaration de la guerre, seront remises immédiatement en vigueur et les deux Gouvernements seront placés l'un vis-à-vis de l'autre, ainsi que les sujets respectifs, dans la situation identique dans laquelle ils se trouveraient avant les hostilités.

"ARTICLE 6.

"L'Italie s'engage à conclure avec la Turquie, en même temps qu'elle renouvellera ses traités de commerce avec les autres Puissances un traité de commerce sur la base du droit des gens européen, c'est-à-dire qu'elle consent à laisser à la Turquie toute son indépendance économique et le droit d'agir en matière commerciale et douanière à l'instar de toutes les Puissances européennes et telles qu'elles sont liées par les Capitulations et d'autres actes à ce jour. Il est bien entendu que ledit traité de commerce ne sera mis en vigueur qu'en tant que seront mis en vigueur les traités de commerce conclus par la Sublime Porte avec les autres Puissances sur la même base.

"En outre, l'Italie consent à l'élévation de 11 pour cent à 15 pour cent des droits de douane *ad valorem* en Turquie, ainsi qu'à l'établissement de nouveaux monopoles ou au prélèvement de surtaxes de consommation sur les cinq articles suivants : pétrole, papier à cigarettes, allumettes, alcool, cartes à jouer. Tout cela à la condition qu'un même traitement soit appliqué simultanément et sans distinction aux importations des autres pays.

"En tant qu'il s'agit de l'importation d'articles faisant l'objet d'un monopole, l'administration de ces monopoles est tenue de se fournir d'articles de provenance italienne suivant le pourcentage établi sur la base de l'importation annuelle de ces mêmes articles, pourvu que les prix à offrir pour la livraison des articles de monopole se conforment à la situation du marché au moment de l'achat tout en prenant en considération les qualités des marchandises à fournir et la moyenne des prix, qui ont été notés dans les trois années précédentes à celle de la déclaration de la guerre pour lesdites qualités.

"Il est en outre entendue que, si la Turquie, au lieu d'établir des nouveaux monopoles sur les cinq articles susmentionnés, se décidait à les frapper de surtaxes de consommation, ces surtaxes seraient imposées dans la même mesure aux produits similaires de la Turquie et de toute autre nation.

"ARTICLE 7.

Le Gouvernement italien s'engage à supprimer les bureaux de poste italiens fonctionnant dans l'Empire ottoman en même temps que les autres États ayant des bureaux de poste en Turquie supprimeront les leurs.

"ARTICLE 8.

La Sublime Porte se proposant d'ouvrir, en conférence européene ou autrement avec les Grandes Puissances intéressées, des négociations en vue de faire cesser le régime capitulaire en Turquie, en le remplaçant par le régime du droit international, l'Italie, en reconnaissant le bien-fondé de ces intentions de la Sublime Porte, déclare dès maintenant vouloir lui prêter à cet effet son plein et sincère appui.

"ARTICLE 9.

"Le Gouvernement ottoman, voulant témoigner de sa satisfaction pour les bons et loyaux services qui lui ont été rendus par les sujets italiens employés dans les administrations et qu'il s'était vu forcé de congédier lors des hostilités, se déclare prêt à les rétablir dans la situation qu'ils avaient quittée.

"Un traitement de disponibilité leur sera payé pour les mois passés hors d'emploi, et cette interruption de service ne portera aucun préjudice à ceux parmi ces employés qui auraient droit à une pension de retraite.

"En outre, le Gouvernement ottoman s'engage à user de ses bons offices auprès des institutions avec lesquelles il est en rapport (Dette publique, Sociétés de Chemins de fer, banques, &c.), pour qu'il en soit agi de même envers les sujets italiens qui étaient à leur service et qui se trouvent dans des conditions analogues.

"ARTICLE 10.

"Le Gouvernement italien s'engage à verser annuellement à la caisse de la Dette publique ottomane pour compte du Gouvernement Impérial une somme correspondant à la moyenne des sommes qui dans chacune des trois années précédentes à celle de la déclaration de la guerre ont été affectées au service de la Dette publique sur les recettes des deux provinces. Le montant de la susdite annuité sera déterminé d'accord par deux commissaires nommés l'un par le Gouvernement Royal, l'autre par le Gouvernement Impérial. En cas de désaccord, la décision sera remise à un collège arbitral composé des susdits commissaires et d'un surarbitre nommé d'accord entre les deux parties. Si l'accord ne s'établit pas à ce sujet, chaque partie désignera une Puissance différente et le choix du surarbitre sera fait de concert par les Puissances ainsi désignées.

"Le Gouvernement Royal ainsi que l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, par l'entremise du Gouvernement Impérial, auront la faculté de demander la substitution de l'annuité susdite par le payement de la somme correspondante capitalisée au taux du 4 pour cent.

"Pour ce qui se réfère au précédent alinéa le Gouvernement Royal déclare de reconnaître dès à présent que l'annuité ne peut être inférieure à la somme de 2,000,000 de lires italiennes et qu'il est disposé à verser à l'Administration de la Dette publique la somme capitalisée correspondante, aussitôt que demande en sera faite.

"ARTICLE 11.

"Le présent traité entrera en vigueur le jour même de sa signature.

"En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs cachets.

"PIETRO BERTOLINI.
"GUIDO FUSINATO.
"GIUSEPPE VOLPI.
"MEHEMMED NABY.
"ROUMBEYOGLOU FAHREDDIN.

"*Lausanne, le 18 octobre*, 1912."

[23812] No. 420.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 215.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, May 24, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from consul, Smyrna, to-day:—

"'Nevada,' American steamship, destroyed and sunk by mine this morning while leaving port; many lives lost. Please, if possible, obtain removal mines. I have warned all British agents that their vessels must not enter port."

I am consulting my American colleague.

[23797] No. 421.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 102.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, May 24, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 71 of 11th April.

Bulgarian Government informed the Italian Minister at Sophia that they will allow free despatch of silkworms' eggs.

[23776] No. 422.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 80.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, May 24, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from military attaché for Director of Military Operations:—

"Reports to-day show the situation east of Salonica still serious, and no cessation of hostilities. At least two Greek divisions actively engaged, and Bulgarian attacks not only by the Bunar Dagh, but also by Nigrita. The King left yesterday for the scene of operations."

[23777] No. 423.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 24.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, May 24, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 33 of 23rd May.

Heavy fighting continues since 21st May, Bulgarians having attacked Greek positions on Mount Pangheion in force. Casualties serious, especially in 19th regiment.

[23813] No. 121.

Vice-Admiral, "King Edward VII." to Admiralty.—(Communicated to Foreign Office, May 25.)

(No. —.)
(Telegraphic.) *May* 24, 1913.

THE distress in the districts in close vicinity of Scutari is very acute. In four villages, quite close to Scutari, nearly 100 houses have been burnt, and the 3,000 inhabitants, whose flocks had been removed by the army, are homeless and have no work, no crops have been sown, so that there will be no harvest. The destitute inhabitants are at present being supplied with food by the Italian and Austrian Governments through their agents at Scutari. Submit that the state of affairs may be represented as soon as possible to the charity organisation dealing with these matters in order that money may be immediately forthcoming to help them to get new flocks and rebuild their houses. Request the amount of money that can be immediately placed at my disposal may be telegraphed as soon as possible.

[23623] No. 124.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 78.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May* 24, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 79 of 23rd May.

To ask the Powers to sanction alteration proposed is equivalent to asking them to admit that their future decisions about Albania and the islands are to be dependent upon consent of Greece. This the Powers will not do. Greece can of course make a reserve for herself of her own liberty of action as regards the Powers, but she must not ask the Powers to give up their right to make what decisions they please, or to enforce those decisions as they please, as they would give it up if they countersigned or sanctioned Greek alterations or reserves. By delaying conclusion of peace with Turkey Greece will gain nothing, and will wear out the patience of her friends. You can inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[23793] No. 125.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, May* 25, 1913.

GREEK ironclad proceeding to Salonica was fired at 3 miles from Cavalla by Bulgarian heavy guns. She did not reply. Her appearance there seems to have been unnecessary, as it was out of her course.

Bulgarian Prime Minister agrees to establish wide neutral zone, and hopes to send General Savof to negotiate, together with M. Sarafof, with the Greek General Staff.

The Greek Government have agreed that Sarafof should come here to negotiate partition, but only on condition that the treaty between Servia and Bulgaria is non-existent for Greece, and that every step of the negotiation is communicated to the other allies.

[23794] No. 126.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 82. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, May* 25, 1913.

RUSSIAN Minister tells me that he has been instructed to suggest to the Greek Government that the question of partition should be decided by the arbitration of England, France, and Russia. Greek Prime Minister has verbally agreed, but my colleague expects an answer in writing.

[23795] No. 127.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, May* 25, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 78 of 23rd May.

Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs fully admits the right of the Powers to make and enforce their decisions, but he says that he cannot honestly sign treaty with a reservation. He says that Bulgarian Government now recognise correctness of the Greek view with regard to the modifications, and that the allies are unanimous on the point.

My belief is that the Greek Government feel that, if the Powers effected great reductions in the Greek claims under an authority signed blindly by Greece in advance, they themselves would be certainly placed in a precarious position. They would consequently prefer to have the decisions of Europe imposed upon them.

Crown Prince has just completed a tour of the most advanced places in Greek occupation. He is reported to have been received everywhere with the greatest enthusiasm, even the Mussulmans joining in the demonstrations in favour of remaining under the Greek flag.

[23789] No. 428.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 196.) *St. Petersburgh, May 25, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

SCUTARI.

Your telegrams No. 412 of 19th May and No. 414 of 20th May.

Russian Government state that they see no objection to urgent expenditure on public services being defrayed by means of advance from the Ottoman Bank provided that this expenditure does not exceed the yield of the customs revenue which would be affected as security for the advance.

[23790] No. 429.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 176. Confidential.) *Sophia, May 25, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

PRIME Minister thinks that it is most important that preliminary treaty should be signed at once, and he asks me to telegraph this to you.

His Excellency states that Bulgarian people now attribute the responsibility of delay to other allies, and excitement against them is increasing daily, specially in the army. He apprehends that if any more incidents occur in occupied territories it will be very difficult to restrain troops.

[23791] No. 430.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 177. Confidential.) *Sophia, May 25, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 173 of 21st May.

In view of practical refusal of Greek Government to receive M. Sarafof, Prime Minister is proposing to King of Bulgarians to send Chief of Staff first to Serres and then to Salonica in order to again try to come to a working agreement with the Greek Government.

His Excellency fears strong feeling against Greece, alluded to in my immediately preceding telegram of to-day, may easily lead to further trouble, and informs me confidentially that, in his opinion, arrival of King of Greece at Salonica will not tend to ease the situation.

[23792] No. 431.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 178. Very Confidential.) *Sophia, May 25, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

MY telegram No. 171 of 17th May.

Servian Minister has to-day handed in note fully recapitulating Servian case, and concluding with proposal that all difficulties between the allies should be settled among themselves.

I gather that the Bulgarian Government are unlikely to agree to this procedure, as they have already rejected a similar suggestion from Greek Government (see my telegram No. 173 of 21st May).

Action of Servian Government is result of long deliberation at Belgrade, and has been taken in entire accord with the Greek Government, who have promised full co-operation and are prepared, if necessary, themselves to maintain claim to Monastir as against Bulgaria.

Aim of both Servia and Greece is to confine Bulgaria to the east of the Vardar and clear of Salonica–Uskub Railway.

Prime Minister is now laying the question before the King of the Bulgarians.

(Repeated to Belgrade.)

[23866] No. 432.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 78.)
Sir, *Sophia, May 9, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that in the exercise of the discretion allowed to me by your telegram No. 103 of the 29th ultimo, I handed to M. Gueshof three days ago the extract, of which copy is enclosed,* embodying practically the whole of Mr. Consul-General Lamb's despatch to Sir Gerard Lowther, No. 32 of the 12th April, respecting the violence used to compel the Moslem inhabitants of the Osmanieh (Petchevo) district to embrace Christianity.

M. Gueshof promised that this should have the same careful attention as he had given to my former communications on the same subject.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[23867] No. 433.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 79. Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, May 9, 1913.*

ON receipt of your telegram No. 105 of the 7th May respecting the frontier question between Bulgaria and Roumania, I took a favourable opportunity to point out to M. Gueshof that the attitude of His Majesty's Government throughout the discussion of this matter had been absolutely impartial, and that they have been animated, from the beginning of the negotiations, solely by the desire to see the difficulty settled in as pacific and fair a manner as possible.

In my telegram No. 157 of the 8th instant I had the honour to inform you that the Prime Minister wished me to thank you for the above communication, and to state that he was well aware that the attitude of His Majesty's Government had been throughout such as you described. His Excellency added that M. Sazonof had informed the Bulgarian Minister at St. Petersburgh of all that had been going on, and he believed that the Austro-Hungarian Government were endeavouring to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds in a vain attempt to gain the confidence of both the Bulgarian and Roumanian Governments in this matter at the expense of the Triple *Entente*.

M. Gueshof further informed me that the Austro-Hungarian Government had given the Bulgarian Government to understand, from more than one source, that if they would cede willingly on the question of Silistria, all the influence of Austria-Hungary would be used in favour of the cession of Salonica to Bulgaria. This action showed him clearly on which side the sympathy of the Austro-Hungarian Government really lay.

At the present time the Austrian Minister here, Count Tarnowsky, is making especially strenuous efforts to be on good terms with the Bulgarian Government. These efforts are, however, so apparent that they have become a subject of merriment in some circles.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

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* Not printed.

[23868] No. 434.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 80.)
Sir,
Sophia, May 10, 1913.

ON receipt of your despatch No. 58 of the 30th ultimo I consulted with my French colleague respecting the best course to be pursued for the protection of the interests of British and French holders of the Treasury bills issued by the National Bank of Turkey and the Bank of Salonica on the 14th February, 1912.

M. de Panafieu informed me that he had already received instructions from Paris on this matter, and showed me copy of a note which he had addressed to the Bulgarian Government, drawing their attention to the position of the bondholders.

I then called upon the Prime Minister and explained the situation of the British bondholders. M. Gueshof agreed with me that it would be preferable to send him a note on the subject, and so I drew one up on identical lines with that of my French colleague.

Copy of this note I have the honour to enclose.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 434.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to M. Gueshof.

M. le Président du Conseil,
Sophia, May 9, 1913.

ON the 1st (14th) February, 1912, the Imperial Ottoman Government contracted with the Bank of Salonica and the National Bank of Turkey for a short loan, in the form of an issue of Treasury bonds for the sum of 1,300,000*l.*, to fall due on the 28th February (13th March), 1913.

By article 7 of the contract, the Ottoman Government expressly assigned and affected to the two banks, exclusively, irrevocably, and inalienably, from the 1st (14th) March, 1913, until the complete payment of the capital and interest of the above bonds, the customs revenues and indirect taxes of the districts of Salonica, Smyrna, Adrianople, Broussa, and Beirout, with the exception of the revenue produced by the additional 3 per cent. customs duties.

Of the 300,000*l.* stipulated as the minimum sum, there had been paid to the banks, on the 31st January (13th February), 1913, only 75,000*l.*, and the Ottoman Government is consequently under a liability to the banks of 223,000*l.*, in virtue of paragraph 2 of article 7 of the contract.

As a consequence of the occupation by Bulgaria and Greece of the districts of Salonica and Adrianople, the customs revenue and indirect taxes of those districts, which were assigned as the guarantee of the above-mentioned loan, have for several months past been levied, in whole or in part, by Bulgarian and Greek authorities.

In these circumstances I have the honour to bring to your Excellency's knowledge, by instruction of His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and on behalf of the British holders of Ottoman 5½ per cent. Treasury bonds, due on the 28th February (13th March), 1913, the assignment of revenue stipulated in the contract between the Ottoman Government and the above-mentioned banks.

I avail, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[23869] No. 435.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 81.)
Sir,
Sophia, May 17, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 164 of the 12th instant, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of the note handed by the Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs on that date to the representatives of the Great Powers at this capital, and containing the reply of the allied Governments to the collective communication of the 1st May, copy of which was enclosed in my despatch No. 76 of the 8th.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 435.

Note communicated to Representatives of Great Powers by Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

LES Gouvernements alliés ont eu l'honneur de recevoir la communication du 18 avril (1er mai), par laquelle les Grandes Puissances, prenant acte de l'acceptation par les quatre Etats balkaniques des bases de paix formulées dans la note collective du 1er (14) avril, les invitent à cesser les hostilités et à désigner leurs plénipotentiaires ainsi que le lieu de réunion pour les négociations de la paix.

Les Grandes Puissances répètent dans cette communication qu'elles n'admettent pas les réserves relatives à la délimitation de l'Albanie et aux îles. Les Gouvernements alliés ne peuvent cependant croire que dans la médiation proposée il s'agissait de leur refuser de débattre des questions touchant à leurs intérêts vitaux et résultant de la guerre victorieuse et libératrice qu'ils ont enterprise. La différence des deux points de vue ne doit pas toutefois arrêter les négociations en vue de conclure la paix, et les Gouvernements alliés, dans leur désir de déférer aux démarches des Grandes Puissances, déclarent qu'ils sont prêts à cesser les hostilités et designent Londres comme lieu de réunion pour la conférence de la paix, à laquelle ils désignent les mêmes plénipotentiaires comme par le passé.

Sophia, le 29 avril (12 mai), 1913.

[23870] No. 436.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 82. Confidential.)
Sir,
Sophia, May 17, 1913.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 169 of to-day, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of the note received from the Bulgarian Government communicating a list of twenty-four persons who have been already sentenced by the court-martial at Serres for crimes of violence committed in the occupied territories, and of sixty-three more who are awaiting trial for similar offences.

I have thanked M. Gueshof for this communication, and ventured to express my personal satisfaction at the action taken, but I said that I did not see in the list the name of Tchakof or Tchernopeief. His Excellency replied that Tchakof would also be brought to trial, and as soon as the military régime in the occupied territories came to an end every effort would be made to apprehend Tchernopeief, who was at present with the troops at Bulair.

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 169 of the 12th instant, I have approached my French colleague, who has consented to associate himself with the action taken by this and by the German Legation, less, he said, with reference to forcible conversions, than to excesses generally.

Although the co-operation of the three legations has not been simultaneous, I believe that much good may be hoped from it, as I hear on good authority that it opened the eyes of M. Gueshof's colleagues in the Ministry to the seriousness of the matter.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 436.

Note communicated to Sir H. Bax-Ironside by Bulgarian Government.

LE Ministère Royal des Affaires Etrangères a l'honneur de faire parvenir ci-près à la Légation de Sa Majesté britannique, à titre d'information, une liste des personnes jugées et condamnées par la cour martiale de Serrès, ainsi que des accusés dont les procès restent encore à juger par la même cour.

Enclosure 2 in No. 436.

List of Persons Judged and Condemned by Sofia Court-Martial.

Nom et prénom du condamné.	Nationalité.	Nature de l'infraction qui a entraîné la condamnation.	Articles du Code pénal en vertu desquels la condamnation a été prononcée.	Peine infligée.
Ibo Bey	Turc	Assassinat de deux Turcs	247 et 61 du Code pénal	15 ans de travaux forcés.
[illegible]	Grec	"	"	"
[illegible]	Bulgare	Assassinat de huit Bulgares	250 du Code pénal	2 ans de prison.
[illegible]	"	"	"	"
[illegible]	"	"	"	"
[illegible]	"	"	"	"

No.	Nationalité.	Nature de l'infraction ayant motivé la condamnation.	Articles du Code pénal ou autres desquels il résulte la peine à être prononcée.
55. Dimitri Yakof	.. ..	Vol d'argent comptant sur des Turcs	..
56. Athanase Tsiapkas	.. ..		
57. Athanase Tsiamis	.. ..		
58. Kosti Lazaroff	.. ..		
59. Kostaki Christof	.. ..		
60. Ephtim Ivanof	.. ..	Vol effets dans des maisons inhabitées	..
61. Dimitri Athanasof	.. ..		
62. Tsolo Petroff	.. ..		
63. Lazare Stavridi	.. ..	Maraudage	..

La cour martiale de Serrès, du 7 décembre, 1912, au 15 avril, année courante, a été saisie en tout de 142 procès, dont 107 sont jugés et 35 pendants, auront à être jugés jusqu'à la fin du mois de mai de l'année courante.

[23871] No. 437.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 83.)
Sophia, May 19, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith a despatch, accompanied by a map,* from the military attaché to His Majesty's Legation, describing the projects of railway construction which are now in contemplation by the Bulgarian Government.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 437.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 3. Confidential.)
Sophia, May 19, 1913.

Sir,

ALTHOUGH some doubt exists regarding the amount of territory that will be ceded to Bulgaria at the conclusion of the war, the Department of Railways has been turning its attention to the consideration of the best manner of developing the liberated territories, and the head of the survey branch has been good enough to indicate to me the probable direction that railway construction will take both in old and in new Bulgaria.

Roumania south-west from Sophia there is at present a railway to the frontier of Macedonia south of Kustendil. For some years past the project has been under consideration of constructing a branch line leaving the above railway at Radomir and running southwards to Kocarinovo, where the River Struma crosses the frontier. The object of this line would be to facilitate the transport of wood from the forest of Rilo, the exploiting of which is leased to an Austrian contractor.

The inducement to construct this line will now be much increased. The Turks can no longer oppose its extension southwards, and it can be continued down the Struma Valley to connect near Demir Hissar with the Dede Agatch Salonica line. It will then form the quickest communication between Sophia and the sea either at Salonica or Kavalla.

It is also considered desirable to continue the Kustendil line through Kratova, Ishtib, and Pirupe to Monastir.

A second line joining Bulgaria with the sea at Kavalla is also under consideration. Such a line would branch off from the main Sophia Adrianople line at Philippopoli, and would follow the Rhodope Mountains by the valley of the Krichna, after which it would join the Dede Agatch Salonica line either by the valley of the Mesta or at Drama. This line is also to be continued northwards through Karlovo over the Balkans by the Troyan Pass to Plevna.

* Not reproduced.

A line from Drama to Kavalla will certainly be undertaken, and, if the Greeks retain Salonica, Kavalla is likely to become the principal port for Bulgaria.

It is proposed that the line opened in August last year from Baba Eski to Kirk Kilissa shall be prolonged northwards to Yamboli. The need for such a prolongation does not, however, appear to be pressing, unless an arrangement is made with Turkey to prolong it southwards to Rodosto. That port might then be used by Eastern Bulgaria as an alternative to Dede Agatch, which is likely to remain an open roadstead.

For the country to the east of Kirk Kilissa there are at present no railway projects, the country being at present unproductive. Minerals are reported to abound in the Istrandja Balkans, but railway construction is not likely to be undertaken unless sufficient mineral wealth is discovered to make a line desirable.

The hope of being able to induce Roumania to permit a railway bridge to be built across the Danube appears to be still entertained, or has, perhaps, been revived by the prospect of ceding Silistria. One of the projects of the Railway Department is therefore for a line from Kaspitchan to Silistria and crossing the river there. It is unlikely that Roumania will consent to this being done, as nothing has recently occurred to make her former objections to such a railway less strong, and she will still fear the diversion of trade from Constanza to Varna.

Some attention has been turned to the possibility of making a port in the Tachyno Gol, south of Seres, but serious consideration of such a project is likely to be deferred for many years. The shores of the lagoon are marshy and would have to be drained, and numerous small rivers flow into it. These bring down much sand, and the constant dredging that would be necessary would cost more than Bulgaria could afford.

The total amount of money that will be required for railway purposes is estimated to be 250,000,000 fr., and the cost of constructing some of the railways mentioned above is estimated to be as follows:—

Kustendil–Ishtib–Monastir, 210 kilom., 42 millions;
Plevna–Troyan–Philippopoli–Kavalla, 380 kilom., 93 millions;
Radomir–Kocarinovo–Demir Hissar–Drama–Kavalla, 190 kilom., 19½ millions.
Yamboli–Kizil Agatch–Kirk Kilissa, 130 kilom., 15½ millions.

I have, &c.
F. LYON, *Military Attaché.*

[23872] No. 438.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 84.)
Sophia, May 21, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to your despatch No. 64 of the 9th instant, relative to the seizure by the Bulgarian authorities of the Ottoman fiscal stamps and papers deposited at the agencies of the Ottoman Bank at Drama and Dedeagatch, I have the honour to report that, after consultation with my French colleague, I have addressed to the Bulgarian Government a note identical with that handed by him to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 16th instant.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 438.

Note Communicated to Bulgarian Government by Sir H. O. Bax-Ironside.

FROM official reports received at Constantinople it appears that the fiscal stamps and other papers representing cash value ("papiers de valeur"), which were deposited at the agencies of the Ottoman Bank at Drama and Dedeagatch, have been seized by the Bulgarian authorities.

These stamps and papers were for use in the levy of Ottoman taxes and dues, and can therefore no longer be employed in the territories in the occupation of the Royal

Bulgarian authorities. The Ottoman Government has consequently requested the representatives of the Powers to approach the Royal Bulgarian Government with a view to obtaining their restitution.

His Britannic Majesty's Legation has the honour to bring the above request to the knowledge of the Royal Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

May 8 (21), 1913.

[23873] No. 439.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 85.)

Sir, *Sophia, May* 21, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have addressed to the Bulgarian Government protesting against the prevention of the sale of cigarette papers imported by the Mair de Botton Cigarette Paper Company (Limited) into the occupied territories, together with copy of a despatch from Mr. Consul-General Lamb, describing the attitude of the Bulgarian authorities in the same question.

Continual complaints have been received for some time past from the company's agents concerning the refusal of the local authorities to permit them to dispose of the company's cigarette papers, although the Bulgarian Government professed to have issued orders to allow their free sale in Macedonia. The recent restrictions which the latter now admit to have applied to their sale, however, clearly show that they mean to try and prevent the imported article from competing with their own monopoly.

Though in my note of the 30th April (13th May) I have clearly pointed out to the Bulgarian Government that they are, to judge by their present procedure, acting in defiance of the express desire of the Great Powers, as communicated by the identic note of the foreign representatives (*cf.* my despatch No. 52 of the 30th March), I consider it very possible that they may still continue their obstructive methods whilst outwardly professing a conciliatory attitude.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 439.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to M. Gueshof.

M. le Président du Conseil, *Sophia, April* 30 (*May* 13), 1913.

I HAVE the honour to call the attention of your Excellency to the hindrances which are being put in the way of the sale of cigarette papers imported by the Mair de Botton Cigarette Papers Company (Limited) into the territories now in Bulgarian occupation. On the 3rd (16th) April His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica was obliged to complain to General Hessaptchief of the confiscation of the company's cigarette papers in Gumuldjina, Dedeagatch, Strumnitza, Radovi-bta, Ishtip, Yenidjé, and Kotchana, to which the general replied on the 13th (26th) April that "les mesures prohibitives qui avaient été prises concernant la vente du papier à cigarettes dans les territoires occupés par l'armée bulgare ont été depuis longtemps rapportées par ordre du Ministre des Finances."

In spite of this assurance, complaints were received from the British vice-consul at Dedeagatch, dated the 18th April (3rd May), complaining of the attitude of the excise official in that port, who refused to permit the sale of four cases of cigarette papers imported by the above company. On bringing this matter to the notice of the Director-General of Customs, who referred it to the chief of the Excise Section of the Ministry of Finance, His Majesty's vice-consul was informed that instructions would be sent in the sense desired to the excise official at Dedeagatch. On the 24th April (7th May), however, the British vice-consul in that port again complained that the sale of cigarette papers was being forbidden, whilst a similar complaint was made to His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica that a consignment of cigarette papers and tobacco had been detained and placed under seal by the local authorities at Xanthi.

On an explanation being requested of the behaviour of the Bulgarian excise officials, apparently in contradiction with the orders received from the Ministry of

Finance, the chief of the Excise Section now informs His Majesty's Legation, through the Director-General of Customs, that instructions were sent to allow only a limited quantity of cigarette papers to be sold, the grounds given for this restriction being that their unlimited sale might afford opportunities for their being smuggled into Bulgaria. No specific limit was laid down as to the quantity which might be placed on the market, this point being apparently left to the discretion of the local excise officials.

I need not point out to your Excellency how unsatisfactory such an arrangement must prove to British importers of cigarette papers, and, whilst reserving the right to submit any claim which the Mair de Botton Company may present for losses incurred, to the Royal Government, I am constrained to protest against the present procedure of the Ministry of Finance, which, by thus modifying its own previous instructions, has acted in a manner inconsistent with the terms of the identic communication of the foreign representatives of the 17th (30th) March, which expressly stated that the Great Powers could not admit "la prohibition d'importer certains articles à raison qu'ils sont des articles de monopole dans les Etats balkaniques."

In view of the above considerations, I am confident that your Excellency will see the desirability of representing to the Ministry of Finance the necessity for issuing without delay the necessary instructions to the excise authorities in the occupied territories to permit the sale of imported cigarette papers without any restrictions whatever.

I avail, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 439.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

Sir, *Salonica, May* 15, 1913.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your despatch of the 10th instant informing me that instructions had been sent to the Bulgarian authorities at Dedeagatch to permit the importation and free sale of cigarette papers, and adding that you would consequently take no further action upon my letter of the 3rd instant unless you should hear that obstacles were still being placed in the way of the sale of these goods.

Yesterday morning one of the directors of the Mair de Botton Company called on me, and showed me letters which he had just received from his correspondents at Dedeagatch and Gumuldjina. The former stated that, although he had finally been permitted to clear the four cases of cigarette papers that had been so long detained in the custom-house, upon payment of duties which he estimated at about 175 per cent. of the real value of the goods, yet their sale in the town was still prevented. The latter informed him that on the 10th instant notice had been given by public crier in the town of Gumuldjina to the effect that the sale of cigarette papers and matches, unprovided with the Government banderolle, was rigorously prohibited, and that all contraventions would be visited with punishment in the shape of heavy fines. I had the honour of telegraphing to you yesterday afternoon to the above effect.

On calling, however, somewhat later on the Bulgarian representatives here, I was given communication of a note that was on the point of being addressed to me, and of which I now have the honour of enclosing a copy herewith for your information. In this note it is stated that instructions have been issued to the authorities in the occupied territories to take possession of all stocks of matches and cigarette papers of extraneous origin, and issue to retailers, against their receipts, such quantities as they may consider sufficient for the immediate requirements of each place.

I pointed out that this is not quite in agreement either with the information received from places in the interior, as set forth above, or with the assurances given to yourself at Sophia in regard to free sale, but they replied that, as these were the instructions issued from Sophia, it was preferable that I should submit the matter to yourself with a view to fresh representations there.

In my opinion, it is the merest trifling with words to pretend that there is freedom of sale, when the amount that may be put on the market is left to the discretion of the excise officials, as this restriction alone will suffice, almost as definitely as complete prohibition, to be a bar to all business on the part of the complainant company, for it is easy for anyone in the slightest degree familiar with the country to imagine how far their clients will be able to insist on being supplied with the "necessary" amount of

paper "not provided with the Government banderolle," when other paper, so provided, is in the hands of the officials to whom they have to apply.

Even if it can be shown that small quantities of non-monopolised paper have been introduced from the occupied territories (as they might previously have been introduced from Turkey) and sold in Bulgaria proper, that does not constitute the slightest justification for the restrictions still insisted upon in the former districts. The remedy for that, now as formerly, lies in the hands of the Bulgarian customs and excise officials, who are quite competent to put down contraband trade.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 3 in No. 439.

General Hessaptchief to Consul-General Lamb.

M. le Consul général, *Salonique, le* 2 (15) *mai*, 1913.

EN réponse à vos lettres en date des 3 et 7 courant, j'ai l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que, selon une dépêche que je viens de recevoir de son Excellence M. le Ministre Royal des Finances, des ordres ont été donnés à nos autorités respectives à Dédéagatch et à Gumuldjina de faire déposer chez elles les allumettes et le papier à cigarettes, en livrant peu à peu, sous quittance, aux négociants la quantité nécessaire pour les besoins locaux. De cette manière sera procédé avec les quatre caisses de la "Mair de Botton Cigarette Paper Company (Limited)" retenues à Dédéagatch.

Cette mesure a été prise afin d'empêcher l'envoi clandestin desdits articles dans la Bulgarie proprement dite, où ils constituent des objets de monopole. De pareils envois avaient été constatés dernièrement.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Représentant de l'Armée Royale bulgare,
GÉNÉRAL HESSAPTCHIEF.

[23874] No. 440.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 86.)
Sir, *Sophia, May 22, 1913.*

IN your note to the Bulgarian Chargé d'Affaires in London of the 22nd March, 1911, you stated that "His Majesty's Government have for a long time had cause for grave dissatisfaction at the manner in which British commercial interests have been treated in Bulgaria."

Since the above date nothing has happened to modify that judgment. There have, indeed, been demonstrations of a desire to conciliate and attract British capital and commerce, in the language held to you by Dr. Danef in January last, and related in your despatch No. 5 of the 3rd of that month, and in a proposal made to me by M. Arghelof, Bulgarian consul-general at Manchester, and now acting as secretary to Dr. Danef, that he should approach the various Departments of Government here with a view to obtaining the settlement of outstanding questions. But these demonstrations have been followed by little result, and I venture to think that, even were there to be a considerable improvement in the attitude of the Bulgarian Government, it would last no longer than the situation by which it was dictated.

The action of the Bulgarian authorities during the operations of war and in the occupation of the conquered territories has throughout been regardless of all rights and interests save their own. Five claims arising out of it have already come before this legation; I do not doubt that many more will be presented, and I see no reason to hope that the Bulgarian Government will meet them in a more equitable spirit than it has shown in other matters.

In these circumstances I venture to think that it would promote not only the British interests concerned, but also relations generally between Great Britain and this country, if the claims above mentioned could be submitted to some authority by which they should be smoothly and silently decided.

It is possible that at the present passing moment, if at no other, the Bulgarian Government might be induced to agree to the reference of claims arising out of the war and occupation to a commission composed in a manner satisfactory to His Majesty's Government, and I feel sure that endless correspondence and much friction would thereby be avoided.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX IRONSIDE

[23875] No. 441.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26

(No. 87.)
Sir, *Sophia, May 22, 1913.*

AFTER its adjournment since the 19th April the Bulgarian Sobranje met on the 4th instant and sat until the 13th, the close of the present session.

Several deputies announced their intention of interpellating the Prime Minister on questions of foreign affairs, but M. Gueshof declared that he would only make a statement on the situation if it were to be followed by no discussion, in view of the delicacy of the relations between Bulgaria and certain of her allies. As the leaders of the opposition parties would not undertake that there should be no debate, the promised statement was not made.

Authority was given for a credit for military purposes of 50,000,000 fr., which will be raised on Treasury bonds abroad. Three further twelfths were passed on account of the budget for the year, consideration of which was postponed.

In the absence of an extraordinary session, which will, however, probably be called, the Legislature now stands adjourned until the opening of the next session on the 15th October.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[23876] No. 442.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26)

(No. 88.)
Sir, *Sophia, May 22, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 76 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to report that the past fortnight at this capital has been a period of anxious expectation and suspense—expectation of the signature of the preliminaries of peace with Turkey, and suspense regarding the relations of Bulgaria with her principal allies.

There is no question of the resumption of hostilities between Bulgaria and Turkey, and some of the Bulgarian force before Chatalja has actually been withdrawn, and there is nothing but impatience to conclude a peace which will allow of the removal of the remainder. The Bulgarian delegates to the Peace Conference and financial commission have been in Paris and London respectively since the 16th instant, and Dr. Danef is reported to contemplate signing the preliminary treaty of peace separately from the Greek and Servian representatives, in case the concurrence of the latter should be too long withheld.

Meanwhile, the improvement of Bulgarian relations with Servia, which was observable here at the time of writing my despatch No. 75 of the 6th instant, has not substantiated itself. The Cabinet of Belgrade has taken no further action in regard to the disputed territory in Macedonia, but their attitude is understood to be uncompromising. This is confirmed and explained by the action of the Greek Government in declining to pursue further the discussion with Bulgaria alone of the question of their frontiers, so that it must be supposed that an understanding exists between Greece and Servia with regard to reciprocal support against Bulgaria. The Bulgarian contention continues to be that the matter in dispute with Servia is already settled by the treaty which preceded the war, and by the agreements appended to it, so that, in fact, no question remains to be discussed now. The Servian argument, on the other hand, is that the loss which Servia has suffered by the intervention of the Powers and her consequent abandonment of Albania should not fall on her alone, but should be shared with her allies, and she is consequently entitled to compensation from Bulgaria

—an argument which should lead logically to the settlement of the dispute by the same Powers whose intervention has given rise to it.

The serious collisions, attended by numerous casualties, which have taken place between Greek and Bulgarian forces in the neighbourhood of Cavalla have further contributed to embitter public feeling, and the Greek Minister here believes that the military party in this country are making every effort to bring about the overthrow of the present Cabinet in favour of one which would not hesitate to take military action against Greece so soon as the preliminaries of peace with Turkey were signed.

The Bulgarian troops withdrawn from Chatalja, to the number of 30,000 or 40,000, have been transferred to the Servian frontier, where they have been reinforced with about an equal number of irregulars, recruits, and others.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[23858] No. 443.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received May 26.*)

(No. 102.) *Belgrade, May 22, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to Sir R. Paget's despatch No. 88 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to enclose copy of a further despatch which I have received from Mr. Vice-Consul Peckham upon the action of the Servian customs authorities at Ghevgheli in claiming export duty on tobacco.

There seemed to me to be considerable force in the arguments adduced in Mr. Peckham's despatch, and I therefore called on the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this morning and left with him an *aide-mémoire*, copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith.

M. Stefanovitch appeared to recognise the force of the arguments adduced, and promised that he would at once communicate with the Ministry of Finance on the subject.

I also enclose copy of my reply to Mr. Peckham's despatch.

I have, &c.
DAYRELL CRACKANTHORPE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 443.

Vice-Consul Peckham to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 25.) *Uskub, May 14, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 23 of the 20th April on the subject of export duties on tobacco, I have the honour to report that the agent of the Commercial Company of Salonica now informs me that the Servian customs demand, instead of 1 per cent. *ad valorem*, the specific duty of 1·50 dinars per kilogramme on exported tobacco.

In spite of the contention of the Servian Government as set forth in your despatch No. 8 of the 28th April, I venture to submit that the demand of this or any other export duty on tobacco is indefensible.

The statement that the Ottoman Government levied 1 per cent. on tobacco exported to Servia is, I believe, incorrect. According to article 1 (*c*) of the Turco-Servian Commercial Convention of the 9th June, 1902, which remained in force till the rupture of diplomatic relations in 1912, Turkish tobacco exported to Servia paid a specific duty of 1 piastres per oke, or 312·5 piastres per 100 kilog. Taking the dinar at 3 piastres, the rates officially established by the Servian authorities, the customs at Ghevgheli are demanding more than double 750 piastres per 100 kilog. Their demand is therefore not justified by the old Turco-Servian régime.

Seeing that this régime was not on a most favoured-nation basis, it is idle to quote it in the case of goods exported from Turkey by a British house and destined for Italy, Austria, and Germany.

According to the "Corps de Droit ottoman" (G. Young), vol. iii, pp. 223 ff., commercial treaties were concluded in 1861 between Turkey on the one hand and France, Great Britain, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Russia, &c., on the other; by these

treaties tobacco and salt, in virtue of their being monopolised in Turkey, were exempted from export duty (Anglo-Turkish Treaty, 1861, article 14 [?], Austro-Turkish Treaty, 1862, article 12). The last of this group of treaties expired in 1890, "but their régime has been continued temporarily as a *modus vivendi* till a general agreement is reached as to new treaties" (Young, vol. iii, p. 226).

It will thus be seen that the demand of export duty is contrary to the *de facto* régime of the Capitulations.

The company's agent has handed me a memorandum drawn up by an advocate, according to which Ottoman municipal law is also express in stating that tobacco is exempt from export duty. This document quotes a law of 28 Zilhijja (A.H. 1298), which I have not been able to consult. By implication the "Cahier des Charges" of the Ottoman Régie (article 13) confirms this freedom of export.

Doubtless His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople could give a categorical answer to the question whether the free export of tobacco was provided for in any Ottoman law.

In support of the view that the export of tobacco is free, I would also quote two other facts: The company's agent informs me that his company and also an Austrian company which he represents have always exported their tobacco duty free, even on one occasion when cleared from Zibefché (and passing Servia in transit). He also informs me that the Bulgarian authorities at Cavalla at first claimed to levy 1 per cent. export duty, but subsequently abandoned the claim on its being demonstrated to them that no such duty had been levied by the Turks.

I have, &c.
W. D. PECKHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 443.

Aide-mémoire respecting Export Duty on Tobacco.

Il paraît que le droit d'exportation sur le tabac, fixé d'abord à 1 pour cent *ad valorem*, vient d'être augmenté, et que la douane de Ghevgheli demande à présent un droit spécifique de 1·50 dinars par kilogramme.

Le Gouvernement Royal serbe a cherché à justifier l'imposition d'un droit de 1 pour cent *ad valorem* par le fait qu'un pareil droit était imposé, sous le régime turc, sur le tabac exporté à la Serbie, mais il faudrait tenir compte du fait que le régime turco-serbe n'était pas établi sur la base de la nation la plus favorisée, et que, par conséquent, ce régime ne peut être invoqué dans le cas actuel, où il s'agit d'exportation par une compagnie anglaise ("The Commercial Company of Salonica") avec destination à l'Italie, à l'Autriche et à l'Allemagne.

A part cela, l'augmentation récente de ce droit à un droit spécifique de 1·50 dinars par kilogramme représente plus que le double de l'ancien droit établi par article 1er (*c*) de la Convention commerciale turco-serbe du 9 juin, 1902, et qui était de 312·5 piastres par 100 kilog., car le droit spécifique demandé à présent représente une taxe de 750 piastres par 100 kilog., en évaluant le dinar à 5 piastres.

La Légation d'Angleterre fait observer finalement que la compagnie anglaise dont il s'agit n'a jamais payé de droits d'exportation sous le régime turc, le tabac et le sel ayant joui d'une franchise de droits d'exportation en vertu des traités commerciaux de 1861 entre la Turquie et la France, l'Angleterre, l'Italie et l'Autriche-Hongrie, dont le régime a continué comme *modus vivendi* après l'expiration desdits traités. Le droit d'exportation demandé à présent est, par conséquent, contraire au régime des Capitulations.

La Légation d'Angleterre espère que, pour les raisons ci-dessus indiquées, le Gouvernement Royal serbe voudra bien modifier son intention quant à l'imposition de ce droit d'exportation sur le tabac, comme on a déjà fait le Gouvernement bulgare, qui a abandonné à Cavalla l'imposition d'un droit de 1 pour cent *ad valorem* sur le tabac exporté.

Légation d'Angleterre, Belgrade,
le 22 mai, 1913.

Enclosure 3 in No. 443.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Vice-Consul Peckham.

(No. 9.)
Sir, *Belgrade, May* 22, 1913.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 25 of the 14th instant, I spoke to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to-day, and left with him an *aide-mémoire* in which I pointed out that the Commercial Company of Salonica had always exported their tobacco duty free under the Turkish régime, free export of tobacco being secured to us under the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1861, the provisions of which had continued to remain in force as a *modus vivendi* subsequently to the expiration of the treaty.

I also pointed out to M. Stefanovitch that, apart from this, the increase of the duty from a 1 per cent. *ad valorem* to a specific duty of 1·50 dinars per kilogramme represents more than double the tax collected under the Turco-Servian Commercial Convention, and therefore could not be justified by the analogy of the latter tax.

M. Stefanovitch appeared to recognise the force of the arguments adduced. He stated that the customs authorities at Ghevgheli had been apparently misled by the Turkish officials whom they had replaced. He promised that he would at once communicate with the Ministry of Finance on the subject. He was apparently not aware of the provisions of the Anglo-Turkish Treaty of 1861, but I ascertained that his attention had been called by the Austrian Minister on the previous day to similar provisions in the Austro-Turkish Treaty of 1862.

I will communicate to you the reply of the Servian Government to my representations, which I have been promised in a day or two, and which, I trust, will be satisfactory.

I have, &c.
DAYRELL CRACKANTHORPE.

[23859] No. 444.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 103.)
Sir, *Belgrade, May* 22, 1913.

THE "Srpska Zastava," the organ of the Nationalist party, has published a very violently worded article (précis of which is enclosed herewith*) asserting that the obligations imposed upon Servia under her treaty with Bulgaria are such as to imperil her national existence, and that the only possible solution of the frontier difficulty is the abdication of the King, who concluded the treaty without the consent of the Skupshtina, and who is therefore responsible for it. His abdication, it is asserted, would relieve the country from the odium of not carrying out an international treaty, and would leave a free hand to his successor.

The semi-official "Samouprava" qualifies this article as an impertinence; the frontier question has not yet been settled, and it is therefore premature to attempt to fix any responsibility; the arguments relative to the carrying out of the terms of the treaty are based on what it terms the vapourings of certain irresponsible Bulgarian newspapers which contest Servia's right to particular territories; it is doubly insulting to suggest that the King should abdicate at a moment when Servian arms have achieved such success.

While the attitude of the Prime Minister, as reported in Sir R. Paget's telegram No. 122 of the 17th instant, is ostensibly pacific, the Servian army is concentrated and ready for immediate action along a frontier starting from Zajecar in the north to Gevgheli in the south. Defensive positions have been taken up and fortifications made around Zajecar, Knjazevac, and Pirot in the north, where is the 1st Timok Division, and from Veles, down the Vardar to Gevgheli in the south, with the 2nd Timok Division. It is in the centre district around Uskub, Kumanovo, Egri Palanka, and Ovtche Polje that the mass of the army, destined for eventual offensive operations, is stationed, with the 1st and 2nd Danube Divisions, the 2nd Morava Division, and the 1st Drina Division, headquarters being at Uskub. The remainder of the Servian army is guarding the occupied territory to the west, the 1st Morava Division being stationed

* Not printed.

around Monastir, Ochrida, and Prilep; the 1st Schumadia Division in the Prisrend-Djakova district; and 2nd Drina and 2nd Schumadia Divisions in the Pristina-Mitrovitza district.

It is generally accepted here that Servia is not seeking for war; she has, however, prepared for all eventualities, and is showing the mailed fist with a view to affording all possible support to her diplomacy. The situation appears to be that the Bulgarian Government have intimated their willingness to accept the mediation of Russia, but that the Servian Government, upon whom pressure has been brought to bear by M. de Hartwig, by direction of his Government, to find a pacific solution of the difficulty, have expressed a preference for direct negotiation with the Bulgarian Government with a view to the revision of the treaty. I understand from the Bulgarian Chargé d'Affaires that these negotiations have not yet begun, but the return of M. Spalaikovitch to Sophia to-day seems to indicate that some move will shortly be made by the Servian Government.

The recent arrival in Belgrade of M. Boshkovitch, Servian Minister to Greece, affords one among several indications that a close understanding exists between the Servian and Greek Governments as to the protection of their common frontiers. The Greek Minister has denied to me that any sort of separate treaty has been entered into, or that there was indeed any need to do so, or that any wish exists on the part of Greece to modify the existing Balkan alliance. A similar denial has been made to more than one of my colleagues at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The probability seems to be that, even if no separate treaty yet exists between Servia and Greece, a close accord has nevertheless been reached between the two Governments which circumstances might at any moment convert into a treaty.

(Copy to Sophia.)

I have, &c.
DAYRELL CRACKANTHORPE.

[23822] No. 445.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 448.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May* 22, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir respecting the withdrawal of Servian troops from Albania and the partition of the occupied areas.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 445.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 29. Confidential.)
Sir, *Monastir, May* 12, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Servian troops have now withdrawn from Elbassan and Kyuks. The most advanced point at present held by them on the Elbassan road is believed to be Cafa Shau, a locality 7 miles south by west of Struga. South of that the limit of Servian occupation on the Albanian border is the parting of the streams of Lake Ochrida on the one hand and of the headwaters of the Skoumbi River on the other. Its southern limit is the Devoli River.

My information as to the exact line of occupation north of Kafa Shau is at present less exact, but, according to a statement made to me by the chief of staff of the 1st Morava division, "the Servian troops are now everywhere within the bounds indicated by the Powers" (he added, "and we can no longer be held responsible for anything that may happen in Albania").

The Drin Kol region and Dibra remain in Servian occupation. The Plain of Dibra, of which Piskopeja was the administrative centre, has been evacuated.

Before retiring from Elbassan the Servian military authorities established a provisional government under Akif Bey, an influential local notable, on whose good offices in the future they are believed to count as a valuable asset of propaganda.

The following military movements are reported :—

1. The independent Morava brigade, except the 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment, withdrawn from Central Albania, is at Struga and Ochrida with detachments towards Dibra;

2. The 2nd battalion of the 2nd regiment of the independent Morava brigade arrived here on the 10th instant from Tirana by way of Durazzo and Salonica. It is about to leave for Ochrida;

3. A thousand supernumerarics belonging to various battalions in this district arrived here from Servia on the 9th instant.

Much has been heard during the past few days of an impending understanding between the Servian and Greek Governments regarding the partition of the occupied areas, but local official accounts have been too conflicting to provide any reliable clue to the details of the supposed arrangement.

There has been talk amongst officials, who should be well-informed, of the inclusion in the Servian sphere of Istib, Strumitza, and Doiran—to say nothing of Ghevgheli, and either Gumendjé or Vodena, and Florina.

But the tendency seems now to be towards more modest claims. The following information on this subject, which is, perhaps, the most likely to approach to the truth, has been given me by the staff of the 1st Morava division :—

Ghevgheli to go to Greece;

The Vardar Valley to be Servian as far as some point north of Ghevgheli, whence the boundary will run south of Kavadar and the Tikvesh region between the Morihovo and Moglena districts, following the Nidjé range as far as possible to Banitsa (12 miles east by south of Florina);

Florina, Zvezda (near the south-west extremity of Lake Presba), and Lakes Ochrida and Presba to be Servian;

Lake Ostrovo to be Greek.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

[23823] No. 446.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 149.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Monastir reporting on a deputation sent by the Monastir Municipality to Belgrade.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 446.

Vice-Consul Greig to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 28. Confidential.)
Sir, *Monastir, May 12, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Mayor and several members of the Municipal Council of Monastir have returned to this town after a five days' visit to Belgrade.

The purpose of the excursion, as given out before the departure of the party from Monastir, was to bring the members of the Municipal Council into touch with their colleagues in the Servian capital, and to enable them to study and discuss with them certain projected public works. From the first, however, it was suspected that the real meaning of the delegation was of a more political kind, and that its members would be called upon in Belgrade to express their desire for annexation to Servia.

That the group might be as representative as possible, municipal counsellors of all communities were invited to join it.

The Bulgarian members to a man declined the invitation, and the Greeks followed suit, with the single exception of a local lawyer named Michael Papazoghlou.

All efforts having failed to bring these, the chief communities, into line, the delegation left Monastir composed as follows:—

The Mayor: Peter Leshniarevitch, of local origin.
Servian members: Methodis Ochevitch, a bookseller, ex-propagandist of local origin; Christo Svietkovitch, an ex-schoolmaster of local origin.
Moslem member: Mehmed Effendi, the only Moslem counsellor who has not yet resigned. A time-serving local notable, who has invariably contrived to be on good terms with the party in power.
Vlach member: Kosmescou, a schoolmaster.
Jewish member: Youssullah Alevi, a chemist.
Greek member: Michael Papazoghlou.

At Salonica the representative character of the deputation was further reduced by the desertion of its only Greek member (who has not since ventured back to Monastir).

In Belgrade the counsellors were received by M. Pasitch, who is reported to have used language implying that the Servian annexation of Monastir is imminent. He expressed surprise at the absence of any Greek or Bulgarian representatives, especially the former. He seems to have given the deputation very definite assurances that the churches and schools of the Christian communities will not be interfered with,* and that Islamic institutions, particularly the "Vakouf," will be respected.†

The Mayor of Monastir tells me that, on another occasion, M. Pasitch observed in his presence, "Now we have enough soldiers on the Bulgarian frontier we can say openly that we mean to annex Monastir, and are prepared to fight for it."

Before leaving Belgrade the members of the delegation were informed that the Order of St. Sava had been bestowed on each of them.

On the evening of the 11th instant a torchlight procession was organised here, which was intended to be an expression of satisfaction on the part of the people of Monastir at the flattering reception given to the municipal counsellors in Servia. But the demonstrators were mainly Servian soldiers, with a fair number of Jews and a sprinkling of Moslems and Vlachs, including a few notables and hodjas. One Bulgarian member of the Municipal Council and a Greek municipal doctor were present. They halted some time in front of this vice-consulate, cheering and shouting "Long live the King of England!" Similar scenes took place outside the Russian consulate and French vice-consulate.

This manifestation cannot be regarded as in any way spontaneous. In my humble opinion its chief importance consists in the further evidence which it afforded of the unabated hostility to the Serbs of the Macedo-Greeks and Bulgars.

The events described have not only appreciably enhanced that hostility but have given the Greeks and Bulgars the very opportunity they desired for showing it in the most emphatic way possible. And, incidentally, the Serbs, already at daggers drawn with the Bulgars, are much irritated with the Greeks.

They appear to regard the coming visit of the Crown Prince of Greece to this district as an unjustifiable and almost unfriendly act.

I have, &c.
C. A. GREIG.

[23825] No. 447.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 151.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch No. 135 of the 7th instant relative to the collection of an export duty of 1 per cent. by the Servian customs authorities at Ghevgheli on tobacco exported by the Commercial Company of Salonica, and the assertion of the Servian Government to the effect that this tax had been formerly collected by the Turkish administration.

* Possibly this remark was intended exclusively for the Vlachs, who were the only non-Servian Christians represented.

† Questions connected with the "Vakouf" have already given rise to much discontent amongst the local Moslems. Only one such question has arisen with Moslem members of the Municipal Council, at Austrian instigation, resigned.

In virtue of the commercial treaties concluded by between the Great Powers and the Turkish Government in 1861–62, tobacco and salt ceased to be included among the articles which foreign subjects were permitted to import into Turkey; but, on the other hand, compensation for this prohibition was accorded, in that it was stipulated that no customs duties would be levied on tobacco and salt when exported from Turkey by foreign subjects. Although these treaties have long since been denounced, their stipulations—in the absence of any new treaties—still remain, as you are aware, more or less in force, and no customs duty has ever been, or is now, levied on tobacco exported from any part of the Turkish dominions to foreign countries, whilst the laws and regulations which govern the exportation of tobacco, as applied by the Tobacco Regie Company, are practically those which were in vogue before the establishment of that company. (See Young's "Corps de Droit ottoman," vol. v, pp. 236–243).

According to these regulations, tobacco exports are of two categories, viz., those to foreign countries, on which no duty is levied, and secondly, exports to dependencies of the Turkish empire, and to countries with which special arrangements concerning the export of tobacco have been made. The export of tobacco to such dependencies and countries is subjected to a "droit de sortie," which is payable in advance to the Régie Company at the port of shipment.

The following are the dependencies and countries with the different rates of duty levied:—

	Piastres.
Egypt (droit de sortie" per kilogramme)	3
Samos	7·80
Tunis	7·80
Crete (subject to a return of 40 per cent.)	4·68
Montenegro	7·80
Roumania	3·125
Servia	3·125
Bulgaria	3·90
Persia (tobaccos from Hekkiari and Billie), 12 per cent. *ad valorem* ..	—
Persia (other tobaccos)	7·80

The assertion of the Servian Government that customs duty was levied under Turkish rule on exports of tobacco is only correct in the sense that tobacco exported to Servia from Turkey was charged a duty of 3·125 piastres per kilogramme by the Ottoman Régie, but no duty whatever was, or is, levied on tobacco exported from Turkey to foreign countries

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[23827] No. 448.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 453.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, reporting on the arrival of Turkish troops from Albania.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 448.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 23.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that some 2,000 soldiers and 50 officers arrived here a couple of days ago in an Austrian Lloyd steamer, and are now lodged in the Selimiyeh Barracks at Scutari. The bulk of these men appear to have come from Fieri, where are now the remains of the Turkish army of the west, and to have been embarked at Cape Samana (on the Albanian coast somewhat to the north of Valona). From enquiries at the Ministry of War I learn that these men are invalids, but I could get no information as to the circumstances under which their transport had been effected, whether with the cognisance and permission of the Greeks or not. The men had no arms or ammunition, but the officers had their swords. Among the latter were

Colonel Shehab Bey, formerly "commandant de place" here, and Major Jaffer Tayyar Bey, the whilom Mutessarif of Ipek, both of whom are active adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress.

The arrival of a second batch of invalids from the same place is expected here shortly.

I have also seen an officer who arrived here a few days ago as a passenger in an Austrian steamer, and who had been with the Turkish army in Yanina. He told me that the Greeks had searched the steamer at the Pirœus and had taken from it two Turkish officers, fellow-passengers of his, whom they identified despite the fact of their travelling in plain clothes. One of these was Colonel Halil Bey, the chief of staff of the army of the Vardar, who is now, therefore, a prisoner in Athens.

I have, &c.
E. G. TYRRELL,
Military Attaché.

[23908] No. 449.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.

(No. 261.)
Sir, *Paris, May 24, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch from Mr. Carnegie, reporting a conversation which he had with the German delegate to the International Balkan Financial Commission.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 449.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Paris, May 24, 1913.*

THE principal German delegate to the Balkan Financial Commission has been showing lately the greatest anxiety to renew the unofficial conversations with the other delegates of the Powers which were interrupted at the end of April when the meeting of the commission was adjourned. The French delegates, Sir Paul Harvey, and I do not think that any good purpose would be served by resuming these conversations until the date of the meeting of the conference is fixed, and until certain tables respecting Turkish finances, which are being prepared by French and German delegates with the assistance of Sir Richard Crawford, are ready.

I saw Baron von Lancken this morning, and explained Sir Paul Harvey's and my views. He admitted that nothing much could be done until the tables were printed, which he hoped would be the case either to-day or Monday. He went on to say that his Government were tired of these perpetual adjournments, and were anxious that an agreement should be come to between the Powers before the commission met as to the broad lines on which the various financial, not political, questions were to be solved. He had spoken to M. Pichon yesterday, and had urged on him the desirability of resuming the unofficial conversations between the delegates of the Powers. His Excellency had replied with some embarrassment that, in view of the categorical refusal of the Russian Government to permit its delegates to take part in preliminary meetings at which the delegates of the allies were not present (see my despatch No. 3 of the 15th instant), it was impossible for the French delegates to continue the previous conversations; in fact, under the circumstances, nothing would be gained by their resumption. Baron von Lancken thereupon had remarked that it was most probable that his Government would decline to take part in the commission unless a preliminary agreement of the character he had described were come to between the Great Powers. M. Pichon was much upset by this declaration, which he said would of course mean the abandonment of the commission. After some further conversation, however, M. Pichon had agreed to authorise the French delegates to take part in conversations *à deux*, as he understood that the Russian Government had no objection to that.

Baron von Lancken said that, although this method of proceeding would be slow and cumbrous, he had great hopes of getting something settled, even with the Russians. It was most important that they should show themselves more amenable, for, although his instructions on the subject were not categorical, he felt sure that his Government would not come into the commission if no preliminary agreement were come to. In such an eventuality his Government would refer the whole financial question to the *réunion* of the Ambassadors in London.

Baron von Lancken further said that he noticed a great change in the attitude of the French Government towards this question. Formerly matters had been in the hands of M. Gout, who was a businesslike man, and who wished to solve these questions on sound practical lines. Now, however, M. Gout had been thrown overboard, and MM. Pichon, Paléologue, and Margerie had assumed control, with the result that political questions were mixed up with financial ones, which rendered a solution of the latter much more difficult.

I told Baron von Lancken that I was sure that Sir Paul Harvey would be ready to resume conversations here next week if it was necessary, and if in the meantime the financial tables had been printed.

I have, &c.
LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.

[23910] No. 450.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 266.)
Sir, *Paris, May 24, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a despatch from Mr. Carnegie, reporting a conversation which he had with the Russian delegate to the Balkan Financial Commission in regard to the payment of a war indemnity to the allies, and the attitude of the Russian Government in the matter.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 450.

Mr. Carnegie to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Paris, May 24, 1913.*

THE Councillor of the Russian Embassy came to see me this evening. He began by expressing his satisfaction at your having objected to the proposal that the Balkan delegates on the Finance Commission should have "voix consultatives" only, for his Government had agreed to it unwillingly in order to please the French Government. There would be no question, of course, he continued, of any voting taking place, as all decisions would have to be unanimous, an arrangement on which the German and Austro-Hungarian Governments had insisted. I observed that, under such conditions, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to settle anything. M. Sevastopoulo cheerfully assented. He then remarked that, unless an indemnity were accorded to the allies, Russia would not agree to the continuation of the 3 per cent. surtax on the Turkish customs after next year. I asked whether he meant a real substantial indemnity, or one of form only. He replied that the allies were entitled to handsome compensation for having been deprived by the Powers of the full fruits of their victory, especially Bulgaria, who had been stopped on her march on Constantinople, and had been prevented from keeping Rodosto. I replied that, as Bulgaria had been warned off Constantinople by Russia, it was the latter who ought to pay the indemnity. M. Sevastopoulo said that, although, as he saw, I was not speaking seriously, I had hit the nail on the head, for if the 3 per cent. surtax was continued, to say nothing of the proposed 4 per cent. increase, it would be Russia who would principally pay the indemnity. That, at any rate, was the opinion of M. Kokowstof, who had discussed the matter with him lately at St. Petersburgh. The President of the Council had pointed out that the products of England, France, and Germany imported into Turkey

were principally of a high-class and expensive character, and found a market in spite of customs surtaxes. Russian exports to Turkey were, on the contrary, mostly cheap, and were subjected to a severe competition with Turkish products of the same nature. Any surtax, therefore, seriously affected their sale, and Russian merchants suffered proportionately. Russia would not therefore agree to any surtax unless she obtained a satisfactory *quid pro quo*.

M. Sevastopoulo went on to say that it would not be a great calamity if the Commission did fail to effect anything, for financial matters in Turkey and the Balkans would right themselves gradually. He did not believe in the efficacy of the threat to starve the allies financially. They would always be able to get money somewhere, and it would of course cost them more if the European markets were supposed to be closed to them.

I have ventured to trouble you with a rather lengthy account of my conversation with M. Sevastopoulo because he has lately returned from St. Petersburgh, and it is possible that some of the views which he expresses with so much freedom are shared by his Government.

I have, &c.
LANCELOT D. CARNEGIE.

[24192] No. 451.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, May 26, 1913.

LE consul de Russie à Salonique télégraphie, le 23 mai, à Saint-Pétersbourg qu'à partir du 21 mai un combat se poursuit presque sans interruption entre les Grecs et Bulgares dans la région située à une distance d'environ 15 kilom. du lac Takhinos (au sud d'Élanchista entre Kotchani et Prévista).

Les Grecs soupçonnent les Bulgares de vouloir, en faisant le détour du lac, couper les communications entre la 7e division grecque, campée à Prévista, avec le gros de l'armée. D'après les renseignements du Prince Nicolas, les Grecs se retirent devant les forces supérieures des Bulgares, et les pertes subies par les deux adversaires sont considérables. Un bateau spécial a été envoyé à Orfano pour recueillir les blessés.

Les nouvelles de source bulgare manquent, mais il semble notoire que ce sont les Bulgares qui, cette fois, ont commencé l'attaque. 120,000 hommes de leurs troupes se trouveraient concentrés dans la région de Cérès; il est question que le Général Ivanof prenne le commandement de cette armée, dénommée "armée macédonienne."

Le Roi Constantin compte arriver pour deux jours à Salonique.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 24 mai, 1913.

[24190] No. 452.

Note communicated at Meeting of Ambassadors on May 26, 1913.

LES Ambassadeurs d'Italie et d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'ordre de leurs Gouvernements, ont l'honneur d'attirer l'attention de la réunion à ce qu'il est de toute urgence que la réunion prenne une prompte décision relativement à l'organisation de la gendarmerie en Albanie. L'article 1 des "Vues générales" présentées par l'Italie et l'Autriche-Hongrie contient une proposition pour cette organisation.

La décision que la réunion prendra devrait être mise en exécution sans retard; à cet effet des démarches devraient être faites auprès du Gouvernement d'un des Etats énumérés dans la proposition susdite (Belgique, Espagne, Hollande, Norvège, Suède, Suisse), pour qu'il consente de déléguer les officiers nécessaires pour l'organisation de la gendarmerie en Albanie.

Il appartiendra à l'officier qui sera à la tête de ces officiers étrangers d'élaborer le plan de l'œuvre organisation pour la gendarmerie de l'Albanie.

[24055 No. 453.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 26.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, May 26, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram relative to affairs at Scutari.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 453.

Vice-Admiral, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *May 26, 1913.*

EXPECT that by the 31st May all Montenegrin troops with their war material will have left Scutari and surrounding district, and by the 7th June large amount of war material which has been accumulated at the foot of Tarabosch will also have been removed. On the latter date the Montenegrin troops will withdraw outside radius of 10 kilom. from Scutari.

Movable property of sick Turkish soldiers to number of 1,500 will, I think, have been embarked for Turkey before the end of May. Departure of Montenegrins and Turks from Scutari would, I think, offer a good opportunity of substituting a military force for the present naval forces there.

[23796] No. 454.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

[By Post.]

(No. 71.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Paris, May 24, 1913.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 207 and 208 of the 19th and 20th instant.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs concurs in action taken by British vice-admiral, as reported in latter's telegram, for obtaining funds necessary for administration of Scutari.

[23924 No. 455.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 25.)

(No. 81.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, May 26, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 77 of 20th May.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs is continually speaking "unofficially" to the Greek Chargé d'Affaires about the Ægean islands. Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs sees no advantage in entering upon such conversations. Proper course for the Italian Government would be to submit their views to the meeting of Ambassadors. Even if private agreement were come to, ultimate decision would rest with France and England.

24100 No. 456.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, May 26, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 82 of 25th May.

Greek Government have expressed to Russian Minister in writing readiness to accept arbitration of Triple *Entente* if allies cannot agree amongst themselves about partition, but they stipulate that arbitration between Greece and Bulgaria and between Servia and Bulgaria shall be simultaneous.

[24106] No. 457.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, May 26, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 35 of 24th May.

Fighting appears to have been stopped on 24th May. Two hundred wounded were brought to Salonica yesterday afternoon.

[24107] No. 458.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, May 26, 1913.*

BULGARIAN batteries at Cavalla yesterday fired three volleys at Greek cruiser "Averoff," which was passing, but did not reply.

[24064] No. 459.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 85.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, May 26, 1913.*

SECRETARY of State informs me that Czar, before leaving Berlin, sent a very strong message to the King of the Bulgarians recommending greatest prudence in his dealings with the Greeks.

[24096] No. 460.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 125.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, May 26, 1913.*

FOLLOWING telegrams received from vice-consul at Monastir:—

"(No. 16.)

"Following troops left Monastir for Perlepe to-day:—

"1st regiment; all the cavalry of the 1st Morava Division except one squadron; four batteries field guns."

"(No. 17.)

"1st Morava Division and two battalions of the 3rd regiment left Monastir for Perlepe to-day."

Above movements appear to confirm statement in Sir H. Bax-Ironside's telegram No. 178 of yesterday that Greek Government have promised Servian Government full co-operation in regard to claim to Monastir, thus enabling Servians to strengthen their position to north-east.

I gather that a rather more pessimistic view of situation is now being taken at Russian Legation.

Russian Minister has been constantly closeted with Prime Minister during last few days. Former informed me yesterday that he had been endeavouring to prevail upon Servian Government to exercise moderation, but it is felt here that his position as a moderator has become difficult, owing to unfulfilled hopes he held out to Servian Government at the commencement of the war in respect of Albania and Adriatic.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[24097] No. 461.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 126.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, May 26, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Minister received this morning from Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs the most positive assurance that no separate treaty has been concluded between Servia and Greece. A similar statement has been made to me by Russian Minister, but everything points to a detailed arrangement having been come to by an exchange of notes or otherwise.

(Repeated to Sophia and Athens.)

[24098] No. 462.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 179.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May 26, 1913.*

THERE is great military activity throughout country and constant movement of troops towards Servian frontier. Sophia has apparently been safeguarded against attack. Part of troops from Chatalja and Gallipoli have been withdrawn viâ Media and Varna and probably only three divisions remain. Greek Minister infers Bulgarian understanding with the Turks.

Large supplies of ammunition and of forage have been ordered.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[24099] No. 463.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 180.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May 26, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 177 of 25th May.

Greek Minister informs me that skirmishes took place between Greek and Bulgarian troops on 23rd, 24th, and 25th May. Bulgarian artillery at Cavalla fired on Greek cruiser only about 2 miles from shore.

Bulgarian Government are sending General Savanof to Salonica to discuss situation with the Greeks and endeavour to agree on a neutral zone.

(Confidential.)

Present policy of Bulgarian Government is apparently to encircle Greek forces around Salonica in order to obtain freer hand against Servia.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[24094] No. 464.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 26.)

(No. 214.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, May 26, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 24th May.

Grand Vizier tells me that he has sent a commission of experts to Smyrna to enquire into the blowing up of the French and American steamers.

His Highness is at a loss to explain it, as he declares that the mines were all of modern type, which should be harmless half an hour after detachment.

[23212] No. 465.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 112.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 26, 1913.*

SIR G. LOWTHER'S despatch No. 432 of the 16th May: Seizures by Bulgarian troops at Rodosto.

You should request the Bulgarian Government to give orders to prevent the recurrence of such seizures without payment, and reserve full rights as to claiming compensation.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 225.)

[24518] No. 466.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 63.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 26, 1913.*

FOLLOWING sent to vice-admiral:—

"At meeting of Ambassadors to-day the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador called attention to the dilatory manner in which Montenegrins were removing the war material from Scutari and the forts. It would be advisable that the removal should be expedited as much as possible so as to procure the withdrawal of the Montenegrin detachments employed on this duty."

Above for your information only.

[23795] No. 467.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 79.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 26, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 83 of 25th May.

There is no chance of the Powers agreeing to sanction the alteration desired by Greece in the terms of the treaty. I think, therefore, that those delegates who are prepared to sign the treaty and conclude peace with Turkey should do so at once, and if all or any of the delegates are not prepared to sign the treaty there is no use in their remaining in London.

The first object of His Majesty's Government is to secure peace. The only object that I imagine Greece can have in view in delaying signature is to secure on the part of the Powers a decision favourable to Greece respecting questions reserved for the Powers. We are quite prepared to take into account the fair claims and interests of Greece in any decision to which we become a party, but if the other allies are prepared to conclude peace with Turkey we shall make it our object to secure that this peace is not disturbed by the action of Greece. Till peace between Turkey and the allies is concluded I can give no attention either to questions of South Albanian frontier and the islands or to those of divisions between the allies.

Greece can in signing the treaty with Turkey make her own reserve, if she desires it, regarding her attitude towards the Powers, though it will not of course bind the Powers, who must reserve their own rights intact.

[22196] No. 468.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 224.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 26, 1913.*

TEMETTU tax.

French Embassy have suggested that France, Russia, and England should stipulate that proceeds of tax on "revenus mobiliers, qui doit comprendre les patentes,"

must, in so far as French, Russian, and British residents are concerned, be devoted, not to special enterprises, such as the Bagdad Railway under its Conventions of June 1908 and March 1911, but to general improvement of the administration.

I think it would be invidious to single out the Bagdad Railway for special objection; but perhaps a suitable scheme of reforms for Asia Minor should be condition of our assent to temettu, the cost of such a scheme being defrayed as far as possible out of the increased taxation agreed to by the Powers.

I should like, in the first instance, to have your Excellency's observations as to whether such a condition could be added to those already made respecting the temettu.

[24516] No. 169.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 49.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 26, 1913.*

I SAW the Greek Minister this afternoon.

He dwelt upon the difficulty for Greece, and especially on the effect upon the position of M. Venizelos, of signing the treaty of peace without the alteration that Greece desired.

I said that it would be most regrettable if anything untoward happened to M. Venizelos. I had a great opinion of the value of his influence. But the Powers could not agree to sanction the alteration of the treaty which Greece desired. If they did agree, they would practically make their decision dependent upon the consent of Greece, and there were some of the Powers who would never agree to this. On the other hand, there were some of the Powers who would never become parties to any decision that did not take fair account of the claims and interests of Greece. The object of Greece was to secure from the Powers a decision favourable to herself respecting southern Albania and the Ægean Islands. To secure this, she had nominally two things on which she could rely. One of these was her right to dispute a decision arrived at by all the Powers. This was only nominal, for in effect she could not dispute such a decision. The other of the two things was the one on which she must really rely: it was the fact that some of the Powers would not become parties to any decision that did not take fair account of her claims and interests. Her prospect in this respect would not be prejudiced by her signing the treaty with Turkey. There were three important questions pending: one was the conclusion of peace between Turkey and the allies; the other two were the question of Southern Albania and the Ægean Islands, and the question of the division between the allies. I could not attend to either of these two latter questions till the first question was settled. I thought that those who were willing to sign the treaty with Turkey had better do so. If the treaty was signed by some of the Balkan States there would be a strong feeling amongst the Powers, which we at any rate should feel very strongly, that Greece alone ought not to continue the war with Turkey. As a matter of fact, I thought that she herself could not wish to continue the war with Turkey.

In the course of conversation, I observed to the Greek Minister that Greece could make what reserve she liked concerning her right to discuss questions with the Powers. The Powers would presumably either not make any objection to such a reserve, or at most simply say that it could not affect their right to make their own decisions and enforce them as they pleased.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[24515] No. 170.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 46.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 26, 1913.*

OSMAN NIZAMI PASHA came to see me this morning. He informed me that the Greeks still refused to sign the treaty of peace unless the words "les Souverains alliés" were omitted. This omission would free the hands of Greece with regard to

the decision of the Powers, while leaving Turkey bound. Turkey could not consent to such an alteration without the express authority of the Powers. He gave me the draft of a treaty with certain alterations, all verbal except the substitution of "signature" for "ratification," as the time for the commencement of peace.

I said that I was sure that the Powers would not object to any of these alterations. There was no chance of their consenting to an alteration such as Greece proposed. I understood from Nizami Pasha that the Turks were prepared to sign the treaty at once, and I said that I would let him know to-morrow morning what I had to say after the meeting of the reunion this afternoon.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[23433] No. 171.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 72.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 26, 1913.*

THE Bulgarian Minister paid a visit to Sir A. Nicolson on the 19th May to say that he had received precise and categorical instructions to convey to the conference of Ambassadors, through my channel, that Bulgaria could not continue in the present uncertain situation. The upkeep of the army in the field was costing her 100,000*l.* daily; she was most anxious to sign peace and demobilise, and she really could not wait indefinitely upon the other allies, who were delaying matters. He hinted pretty clearly that Bulgaria would be ready to sign independently of her allies, and apparently wished that the conference of Ambassadors should exercise strong pressure on Greece and Servia to sign without delay or allow Bulgaria to settle matters direct with Turkey. He hinted obscurely that if peace were not signed, Bulgaria might have to continue military operations at Chatalja.

To this veiled intimation it is probable that not much importance need be given, but undoubtedly if there is further delay Bulgaria will be greatly tempted to sign independently.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[24517] No. 172.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 76.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 26, 1913.*

DR. DANEF asked to see me this morning. He informed me that what he called the tergiversations of the Greeks in delaying the signature of the treaty of peace were causing great feeling in Bulgaria.

I understood from him that he was prepared to sign the treaty as it stood, or with the small alterations that Nizami Pasha had suggested.

I said that my own idea was to say that those delegates who were prepared to sign the treaty should sign it at once, and that those who were not should leave London. If Bulgaria signed the treaty with Turkey peace on land would be secured, for Servia and Montenegro could not carry on the war with Turkey when Bulgaria was at peace with her. If once peace was secured on land, I personally should like to see British power used to prevent the war being continued by sea; but this must of course depend entirely upon Bulgaria and Turkey being prepared to sign, and thereby to secure peace on land.

Dr. Danef talked about the outbreaks between Greeks and Bulgarians. He said that the idea of the Bulgarians was that Greece intended to seize the line that ran along the coast from Dedeagatch, in order to prevent Bulgaria from using it for the withdrawal of her troops from Chatalja.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[24518] No. 473.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 116.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 26, 1913.*

AT the *réunion* of Ambassadors this afternoon I explained what had passed in conversation to-day with the various delegates to the Peace Conference. I said that I saw no use in being patient any longer, and my disposition was to tell the delegates to-morrow that those who were prepared to conclude peace with Turkey had better do so, and that those who were not had better leave London.

I added that we could not by ourselves do anything to secure peace on land, but if this was secured by Bulgaria signing the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, it would at least be in our power to prevent the war against Turkey being continued by sea if Greece did not sign the treaty. I could not, however, in the absence of the Prime Minister, give any pledge as to our action, nor did I wish to propose any resolution to the *réunion*, except that it should confirm what it said last week about alterations in the treaty.

The French Ambassador said that he was sure that Greece would not sign the treaty without some assurance that the question of Albania and the Ægean Islands would be discussed with her.

Finally, the following resolution was passed :—

"Sur la proposition de Sir E. Grey, la réunion adopte la motion suivante :

"La réunion regrette le retard de la signature du traité de paix et maintient l'opinion qu'une discussion sur des modifications au traité entraînerait des délais indéfinis et qu'elle doit être évitée.

"L'Ambassadeur de France fait observer, en son nom personnel, qu'il a des raisons de penser que les délégués grecs refuseront leur signature si dans les articles 3 et 5 la mention des Souverains alliés n'est pas supprimée. Dans ce cas il redemande comment on déterminera les Grecs à signer le traité, et il pense qu'on pourrait, sous une forme ou sous une autre, les assurer que, le moment venu, ils seront mis à même de faire valoir leurs intérêts devant les Puissances.

"L'Ambassadeur d'Italie fait l'objection qu'il est difficile de conceder aux Grecs un droit qui n'a été reconnu ni aux Serbes ni aux Monténégrins.

"L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie, pas plus que celui d'Italie, n'est pas autorisé à donner son assentiment à une suggestion qui semble en contradiction avec les décisions précédentes de la réunion.

"Le Comte Mensdorff et le Marquis Imperiali se réservent au surplus de référer à leurs Gouvernements.

"M. de Kühlmann fait la même déclaration."

The Austrian and Italian Ambassadors then made the following communication about Albania :—

"Le Gouvernement d'Autriche-Hongrie est d'avis que la frontière de l'Albanie au nord et au nord-est telle qu'elle a été délimitée par les résolutions de la réunion et communiquée aux Etats balkaniques devrait être sans retard fixée sur les lieux par une commission technique internationale. La réunion pense qu'il y a lieu de procéder le plus tôt possible, afin qu'elle puisse fonctionner durant la belle saison, à la constitution de cette commission, qui pourrait être composée des officiers des Grandes Puissances."

The French Ambassador urged that the precedent of Macedonia for the employment of officers of the Great Powers for the gendarmerie was a good one.

I supported this view generally.

Eventually it was agreed to refer the communication of the Austrian and Italian Ambassadors to the respective Governments.

The Austrian Ambassador complained that Montenegrin and Servian detachments were dawdling in the neighbourhood of Scutari, under pretence of removing the war material.

It was agreed that the naval officers should be asked to get this work and the withdrawal of the detachments expedited.

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 332), Sir E. Goschen (No. 166), Sir R. Rodd (No. 143), and Mr. O'Beirne (No. 208).

I communicated to the *réunion* copies of the circular telegram from the Turkish Government about the Ægean Islands, but we did not discuss it.

The next meeting was fixed for Friday, the 30th instant, at 3·30.

During the *réunion* I pointed out to the Austrian Ambassador that his Government had not yet agreed to authorise me to confirm to the Servian delegates the assurance given by the Powers about railway access to the Adriatic. The Servian delegates might at any moment say that they could not sign till this assurance had been confirmed, and if they did so the responsibility for the delay in the conclusion of peace would not be with me. The Austrian Ambassador admitted this, and said he would press his Government for a reply. The German Chargé d'Affaires also had not been instructed on this point, but the Italian as well as the French and Russian Ambassadors said that their Governments gave their approval.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[24176] No. 474.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 115.)
Sir, *Athens, May 19, 1913.*

THE newspapers of the 17th published the following official communiqué :—

"According to official information the statement which has been published that M. Boshkovitch, the Servian Minister at Athens, has left for Belgrade with a draft treaty between Greece and Servia is absolutely inaccurate, and there is no foundation for it, no treaty being in existence or in course of negotiation between Greece and Servia."

It is at any rate a fact that M. Boshkovich left Athens a day or two ago ostensibly for Salonica, but it is known that he was going to Belgrade. Whether there is an understanding or not between the Governments it is certain that the two countries are being drawn together by their common interest in not seeing Bulgaria become overwhelmingly preponderant. For this reason the Greek Government wish, as M. Coromilas has told me, that the discussion of the partition of the conquered territories should take place between the four allies together, and not, as Bulgaria would prefer, between them in pairs. By the latter method two of the allies might dispose of a place without regard to the claims of a third to it. His Excellency instanced Ghevgeli, which is desired by Greeks, Servians and Bulgarians. The Greek line runs roughly from Ghevgeli to Lake Presba, and on the other side of it they wish to have the Servians, not the Bulgarians, as neighbours.

The recent fighting between Greeks and Bulgarians in the neighbourhood of Mount Pangaion (Bunar Dagh) appears to have been serious, although the *mot d'ordre* to the press has been to make as light of it as possible. According to the accounts published, there seems to have been a concerted attack by the Bulgarians on two sides, near Angista and Elevtherai. The Greeks hold that the Bulgarians have unwarrantably pushed their posts down the valley which debouches at Orfano; the attack, therefore, would have been in support of these posts.

The Bulgarian Minister maintains that all the frontier collisions have been the fault of the Greeks, who began pouring troops into the country as soon as their hands were freed by the fall of Yannina, and while the Bulgarians were still occupied before Adrianople and Chatalja, until they have got seven divisions to the Bulgarians three. (The Greeks, he says, reply that a Bulgarian division is of three times the strength of a Greek division). He also says that the reinforcement of the Greek troops is in direct contradiction to the arrangement made for the settlement of the question temporarily on the basis of the priority of occupation, it having been agreed that no increase in the numbers of the troops on either side should be made while the commission was sitting. The commission, it is true, arrived at no result, but the opinions of both parties were consigned in *procès-verbaux*, and he has been instructed to ask that these should be submitted to a third Power for arbitration. To this proposal he can obtain no answer.

The same has been the case with regard to the proposal that M. Sarafof (ex-Minister of Finance and Minister at Constantinople, as well as member of the above-mentioned commission) should come here and in conjunction with M. Hadji Mischef,

my colleague, should negotiate the future frontier with the Greek Government. That this proposal should have remained unanswered suggests to M. Hadji Mischef that an understanding has been, or is on the point of being, made between the Greek and Servian Governments. It is against the latter that he, and he believes every Bulgarian, feels the greatest bitterness, on account of their repudiation of the treaty of partition made before the war. But he is convinced that, if he knows the spirit of his countrymen, their backs will be only stiffened by a menacing attitude on the part of their allies.

M. Venizelos, whom I saw this morning, on his side betrays unusual exasperation against the Bulgarians, who, although they seem to be abandoning their claim to Salonica, propose to starve the city by leaving it no hinterland. They should remember that they are acquiring an extension of territory in Thrace upon which they never calculated, and in which not more than one-third of the population is of Bulgarian race. He also insisted that it is essential that no one of the allies should emerge from the war with a disproportionate accession of strength.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[24332] No. 475.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 181.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May 27, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 179 of 26th May.

Moslems throughout Bulgarian territories, numbering about 100,000, have been invited to enlist, and have consented on condition of no fighting against Moslems.

Vice-consul reports more troops arriving at Varna from Midia, and Moslems already enlisting.

Military activity is intense. Provisional depôts being established at Plevna, Vratsa, Sophia, Philippopôli, indicate movement towards attack on Servian frontier.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[24333] No. 476.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 182. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May 27, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 178 of 25th May.

My Russian colleague has endeavoured to persuade Bulgarian Government to cede part of territory claimed by Servia, but in vain. It is understood here that Russian Minister at Belgrade has been equally unsuccessful in reducing Servian claims.

At Ministerial council yesterday it was decided to delay, if possible, answering Servian note until after signature of peace preliminaries, but answer will be a refusal to discuss Servian claims in principle outside scope of treaty. Bulgarian Government are now prepared to face both Greece and Servia.

Situation is serious, and war may break out immediately after signature. My French colleague takes similar view.

Russian influence is at a low ebb here now, and there seems to be little chance of Russian Government being able to settle Servian and Bulgarian dispute, much less that between Bulgaria and Greece. Unless the Great Powers decide on a policy of non-intervention situation should be considered at once.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[24330] No. 477.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 27.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, May 27, 1913.*

FOLLOWING is repetition of my telegram No. 172 of 21st May:—

"Your telegram No. 111 of 16th May: Repatriation of Turkish troops.

"Bulgarian Government had already replied to my colleagues that they could not consent before signature of preliminary treaty, which they expected daily.

"I have given Prime Minister information contained in your telegram in case it might influence decision, especially as regards sick and wounded

"(Sent to Constantinople.)"

[24318] No. 478.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 27.)

(No. 246.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, May 27, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 224 of yesterday.

Note containing our assent to application of temettu with reserves was sent in on 14th March and a reply actually received to-day, which will require study.

Fresh stipulations to our acceptance could thus hardly now be added without having the appearance of breach of faith.

[24329] No. 479.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.**

(No. 226.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 27, 1913.*

IT has become abundantly clear that discussion of alterations in Treaty of Peace lead to nothing but indefinite delay. I have therefore stated that those delegates who are ready to sign the treaty as it stands had better do so at once, and those who are not prepared to sign had better leave, as it is of no use for them to remain here for negotiations that lead to nothing. Our own moral support will be given to those who sign.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[24519] No. 480.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.†

(No. 34.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 27, 1913.*

THIS morning, with Sir Arthur Nicolson, I spoke separately to M. Novakovitch, Dr. Danef, M. Gennadius, and Osman Nizami Pasha in the sense of my circular telegram, pointing out that the discussion of alterations in the Treaty of Peace led to indefinite delay, and that the only thing to be done was for those who were prepared to sign the treaty to do so as it stood, and for those who were not prepared to sign to leave London, as it was no use their remaining for negotiations that led to nothing. Our own moral support would be given to those who signed.

M. Novakovitch said that this created a new situation, and that he would ask his Government for instructions.

M. Gennadius seemed prepared for the intimation, and did not demur to it. He said that he would inform his Government.

* Also to Sir F. Elliot (No. 80), Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No. 113), Sir R. Paget (No. 90), and Count de Salis (No. 64).

† Also to Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No. 77), Sir F. Elliot (No. 50), and Sir G. Lowther (No. 164).

Dr. Danef expressed great satisfaction, and said that he was ready to sign at once.

Osman Nizami Pasha also expressed satisfaction, and said that he was ready to sign. He asked when this should be done.

Sir Arthur Nicolson said that copies of the treaty would be ready for all the delegates by to-morrow, and perhaps it would be well to let them have two clear days to get instructions.

I said that, in these circumstances, I should be ready to go to St. James's Palace next Friday morning, the 30th instant, to be present at the signature of the treaty. Of course, I must be sure that at least the Turkish and Bulgarian delegates were prepared to sign.

The resolution passed at the meeting of the Ambassadors with me on Monday last regretting the delay in signing the Treaty of Peace was read to each delegate, and I reminded each that, before they were sent this time to London, I had by a circular telegram pointed out to all their Governments my doubt of the expediency of a conference being reassembled unless they were prepared to sign the treaty without serious alteration.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[22570] No. 481.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 161.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 27, 1913.*

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith copies of correspondence relative to the action to be taken for the protection of the interests of the holders of certain Turkish Treasury bills,* and I have to request you to endeavour to obtain from the Turkish Government the information required by the National Bank of Turkey, as set forth in the last paragraph of their letter of the 16th instant, and to forward it to me in due course.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[22570] No. 482.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 331.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 27, 1913.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 203 of the 22nd ultimo, relative to the action to be taken for the protection of the interests of the holders of certain Turkish Treasury bills, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copies of further correspondence on the subject.†

Your Excellency should inform the French Minister for Foreign Affairs of what has passed since the receipt of his note of the 21st ultimo, and of the views of His Majesty's Government as set forth in the letter which I have caused to be addressed to the National Bank of Turkey, and you should express to M. Pichon my willingness to join in further representations later if he decides to make them and will allow his intention to be known.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Sir F. Bertie, No. 203, April 22; Sir F. Elliot, No. 108, May 10; National Bank of Turkey, May 16; to National Bank of Turkey, May 27; to Sir F. Bertie, No. 331, May 27, 1913.

† To Sir F. Elliot, No. 37, April 30; to Sir H. Bax-Ironside, No. 58, April 30; National Bank of Turkey, May 16; to National Bank of Turkey, May 27; to Sir G. Lowther, No. 161, May 27; Sir F. Elliot, No. 108, May 10, 1913.

[22702] No. 483.

Foreign Office to Sir H. Babington Smith.

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 27, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 16th instant relative to Turkish Treasury bills.

I am to inform you in reply that on the 4th ultimo Sir E. Grey instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris to enquire the views of the French Government (as the only one besides His Majesty's Government whose nationals are extensively interested in the question) as to what action should be taken to protect the interests of the holders of these bills.

On the 22nd ultimo Sir F. Bertie forwarded a copy of a note from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, sent in reply to his enquiry, from which I am to quote the following passage for your confidential information :—

"Tout en tenant compte du fait que l'avance représentée par ces bons est au nombre de celles qui très probablement seront admises à figurer proportionellement dans la part de la dette ottomane qui devra être mise à la charge des États alliés, concessionnaires de portions du territoire ottoman, le Gouvernement de la république a cru néanmoins qu'il serait utile de signaler aux États alliés, dont les forces occupent Salonique et Andrinople, l'affectation consentie par la Sublime Porte en faveur des créanciers étrangers sur les revenus douaniers perçus dans ces deux villes.

"En conséquence, le 8 avril, j'ai transmis aux Ministres de France à Sophia et à Athènes le mémoire que m'avaient remis les porteurs français de ces bons, et j'ai invité les représentants de la république à entretenir les Gouvernements bulgare et hellénique de cette question. Je ne verrais donc que des avantages à ce que le représentant du Gouvernement Royal, dont les nationaux détiennent la plus grande part de ces bons, soit également invité à appeler l'attention des Gouvernements à Sophia et à Athènes sur la situation des porteurs de ces titres ottomans."

Sir E. Grey accordingly, on the 30th ultimo, addressed to His Majesty's Ministers at Athens and Sophia instructions similar to those which the French representatives at those capitals had received.

Sir F. Elliot has now reported that he has consulted his French colleague, who has furnished him with copies of correspondence exchanged with the Greek Government on the subject, which M. Deville has submitted to his Government.

I am to transmit herewith for your confidential information copy of the note in which the Greek Government justify the attitude which they have adopted in the matter.*

Sir F. Elliot points out that any similar representation made by him to the Greek Government would doubtless be met with the same arguments, and he accordingly proposes to take no action of the kind pending further instructions, as it may appear preferable that he should take up the matter jointly with his French colleague at a later stage if the arguments of the Greek Government are found unconvincing.

Sir E. Grey has informed Sir F. Elliot that he concurs in his view, and has instructed Sir F. Bertie to let the French Government know what has passed and to express the willingness of His Majesty's Government to join them in further representations later if they decide to make them and will allow their intention to be known.

I am to observe in the meanwhile that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, the attempt of the Greek Government to distinguish between revenues assigned to the service of loans administered by the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt and other assigned revenues is one which should be resisted, and the argument that the Sublime Porte could have met their obligations out of other customs revenues is destructive of the system of specific guarantees for loans.

Sir E. Grey has so far received no reply from the Bulgarian Government to the similar representation addressed to them.

I am to add, with reference to the last paragraph of your letter, that Sir E. Grey has instructed His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to endeavour to obtain from the Turkish Government the information required by the National Bank of Turkey.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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* M. Coromilas to M. Deville, April 30, 1913.

[24367] No. 484.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 90)
Sir, *Cettinjé, May 13, 1913.*

IN my telegram No. 89 of the 9th instant, I had the honour to report to you that after the resignation of General Martinovitch on the King's decision to cede Scutari to the Powers a new Government had been formed by General Janko Vukotitch.

The new Prime Minister, who will also be Minister of War, is a cousin of the Queen of Montenegro and commanded the troops which operated during the last war in the Sanjak, in the Berane country, Ipek and Djakova. He was subsequently appointed chief of the staff before Scutari and directed the operations on the east side of the lake under the nominal command either of the King or of the Crown Prince. It is understood that for some years past he has been in favour of a military understanding with Servia and at the time of the crisis arising out of the annexation of Bosnia he was despatched by the King to ascertain the views of the Government of Belgrade. His arrest and detention for some hours on his journey through Hungarian territory by a senseless police official seems to have added a feeling of personal rancour to his political antipathies; as far as I know he has not entered the Austrian Legation for years nor had any personal communication with the Minister. A large and heavily-built man he contrasts somewhat unfavourably in appearance with his predecessor, General Martinovitch, but he is probably the superior in abilities.

M. Labud Gojnitch, the Minister of Interior, was formerly a member of M. Tomanovitch's cabinet. He presided over the special tribunal which condemned the ex-Prime Minister, M. Radovitch, to a long term of imprisonment. He is consequently hated by pro-Servian Liberals.

M. Risto Popovitch, the Minister of Finance, is a lawyer. I have had good opportunity of making his acquaintance in connection with the difficulties in which the Office of Works involved themselves over the proposed Legation House. The impression he gave me was that of being clear headed and energetic. His family enjoys a considerable degree of favour from the King; their opponents declare them to be of Moslem origin.

M. Mirko Mijushkovitch is Minister of Education and Ecclesiastical Affairs. He is a brother of the first Montenegrin Plenipotentiary to the Peace Conference. He was born under the Turkish flag, being a native of Niksitch.

M. Ljuda Bakitch is Minister of Justice. He was formerly a judge.

M. Pierre Plamenatz is Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was formerly Montenegrin Consul in Scutari and then for a short time Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople till the outbreak of the war. For a few days he was Civil Governor of Scutari and in that capacity arranged with Vice-Admiral Burney for the cession of the town to the International forces. He speaks French

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

[24369] No. 485.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 92.)
Sir, *Cettinjé, May 14, 1913.*

THE capitulation of Scutari in the early hours of the 23rd April was followed on the Sunday after, the 27th April, by a collective representation in the name of the Powers, calling on the Montenegrin Government to evacuate the town and hand it over to the commanders of the International Fleet. Efforts were made by the Montenegrin Government to gain time, and to postpone for as long as possible any decision in the matter. Though, as already reported to you, the acting Minister for Foreign Affairs was duly informed that the representatives of the Powers had a pressing communication to make to him, the Ministry was closed, and it was found necessary to send a messenger with a collective note to be placed at once in the Minister's hands. The Minister's reply that only business of extreme urgency could be transacted during the Easter festival seems to have provoked the special resentment of the Russian Government, and was met by an immediate warning from St. Petersburgh that any

further trifling might lead to complete disaster ("effondrement"). On the following day, the 30th April, a lengthy but unsatisfactory statement was communicated by the Montenegrin Government, the conclusion arrived at being that the Scutari question would be reserved for discussion during the negotiations for the signature of the definite treaty of peace. It may be added that the only two telegrams forwarding the complete text of this document, those sent respectively by the Russian and by His Majesty's Legation, were detained for many hours in the telegraph office, the explanation given being that the three telegraph lines were occupied by other traffic, principally for the Montenegrin Government.

It is difficult to offer any precise explanation of the persistency of King Nicolas and his advisers in having recourse to dilatory tactics of this nature. Elated at the unexpected fall of Scutari, the King, with the temperament of a true gambler, seems to have been buoyed up by the hope that some further stroke of good fortune was in store for him, and that every hour during which he could hold out against Europe might bring forth some reaction in his favour. Exaggerated reports were received from Russia that M. Sazonof would be overthrown by the Panslavist party, and that a change of policy was imminent. Equally misleading accounts were being spread with regard to disaffection in Austria-Hungary, and believed no doubt by members of the former Cabinet, composed of men with little or no knowledge of the Monarchy beyond the outlying Slav provinces on the Adriatic, which have never hitherto constituted its strength nor helped to direct its policy. Articles in the "Temps" and a letter or two in the English papers, such as those written by Mr. Harold Spender in the "Daily News," were readily seized upon and reprinted in the "Vjesnik" as proving that public opinion was opposed to Governmental policy both in France and England. Last of all, the action of the German Legation during the crisis may have inspired the idea that even Austria's closest ally was giving but a perfunctory support to the policy of the concert of Europe. For some time past the German Minister has warmly advocated the possession of Scutari by the Montenegrins, and even drew up and forwarded to Berlin a proposal for mediation with this object. Herr von Eckardt's efforts, which I am quite unable to explain, have been a source of great annoyance to the Austro-Hungarian Legation, and complaint has been made on the subject at Berlin, though with little apparent result.

On the 1st May the King addressed a last appeal to his allies for assistance. Their refusal to take action on his behalf must have been received here at the same time as the warning from you, which reached me in the course of the 2nd May, respecting the immediate danger to which Montenegro was exposed. According to report, it was decided in the first instance, at a council held at the palace, to send to M. Popovitch an authorisation to inform you that Montenegro would yield to the wishes of the Powers, but to instruct him not to make use of it until after the meeting of Ambassadors on Monday, the 5th May, should it then be apparent that no change in the situation in favour of Montenegro had occurred. But on second thoughts the King saw that this procedure was too dangerous, and on Sunday, the 4th May, he addressed to you the direct communication announcing that he placed the fate of Scutari in the hands of the Powers. The Prime Minister, General Martinovitch, who maintained his opposition to the last, then sent in his resignation in order not to be a party to the surrender, which has therefore been an act performed by the King without the participation of any constitutional adviser. An official statement (enclosed herewith)* explaining the King's action was published in the "Glas" of the 7th May. The Skupshtina, which had been convoked to discuss the whole question, met on the following day, but it was deemed desirable on all sides to avoid a public debate, especially as there were no Ministers to defend the policy adopted. It was arranged that the deputies should proceed to the palace, where the King delivered a speech in defence of the step which he had felt himself obliged to take. His words were listened to with marked attention and respect by the members of the Chamber, who subsequently dispersed without holding any formal meeting.

A translation of the speech is enclosed herewith.*

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

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* Not printed.

[24370] No. 486.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. [illegible])
Sir, *Cettinjé, May 17, 1913.*

A BRIEF statement was published in the official "Glas" to-day, announcing that Scutari had been handed over to the forces of the Powers. The commanders of the various detachments were received after landing by the Montenegrin General Betchir, who addressed Admiral Burney in a speech translation of which I have the honour to enclose. The admiral is described as having thanked General Betchir for his eloquent words, and assured him that the graves of the Montenegrin soldiers would be respected and honoured. A conference then took place at the Governor's house, at which an agreement was drawn up, the terms of which are thus reproduced in the "Glas," apparently in an abridged form:—

1. Montenegrin officers are to be allowed to move freely through the town, live where they wish, and carry their arms.
2. Montenegrin fatigue parties to be allowed to come into the town without arms as long as they have any work to do.
3. Officers on both sides to look after the police service.
4. The postal, telegraph, and customs services to be carried on by the Montenegrin employés.
5. The Montenegrin army service detachment to remain in Scutari, as well as the waggons in the artillery barracks, until the war material be removed.
6. The Montenegrin officers to keep their servants as long as they remain in Scutari.

The conduct of the Montenegrins appears to have given satisfaction to the officers of the international force, since in a letter copy of which I have the honour to enclose herewith Admiral Burney requested me to convey to the Montenegrin Government an expression of grateful thanks for the arrangements made. M. Plamenatz, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had already, before receiving this communication, spoken to me with warm appreciation of the tact and good-feeling displayed by Admiral Burney in the delicate circumstances in question.

I have, &c.
J. DE SALIS.

Enclosure 1 in No. 486.

Speech of General Betchir on handing over the Town of Scutari to Vice-Admiral Burney.

(Translation.)

I ENVY the good fortune of my predecessor, Essad Pasha, the heroic defender of Scutari, who was able to defend the town with arms until the last moment.

I should have followed his example, perhaps even against the order and the wish of my supreme superior, if any single army had attempted to take from us this beloved place to which we are united by the ties of a historic past and by the heroic capture on the part of our troops. But my fate is not the same as that of Essad Pasha, since I am yielding not to force, but to the pressure of the united Powers.

On handing over to you the town, I find in this sad moment my only consolation in the fact that I am handing it over to you, Sir, a son of the noble English race.

I am filled with the conviction and the hope that you will not allow that the graves of our heroes who have fallen here will ever be insulted by anyone.

[illegible], *May 13* (26), 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 486.

Vice-Admiral Burney to Count de Salis.

Sir, *Scutari, May 14, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to request that you will be kind enough to convey to the Montenegrin Government an expression of the grateful thanks of the Commission of officers of the international fleet representing the Great Powers of Europe for the arrangements made for the transfer of the control of the town of Scutari to-day.

The Commission would like to add that the kindness of the general officer in command of the troops in assisting to relieve the Montenegrin guards and his generous help in other matters connected with the taking over of the town was greatly appreciated.

I have, &c.
CECIL H. BURNEY.
Vice-Admiral and Senior Officer of the International Force.

[24382] No. 487.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 89.)
Sir, *Sophia, May 24, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from the British consular agent at Bourgas reporting on certain signs of military activity evidently connected with the present strained situation existing between the allied Balkan States.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 487.

M. Tacchella to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Bourgas, le 17 mai, 1913.*

DEPUIS la cessation des hostilités, nous avions dans le département de Bourgas le calme comme en temps de paix. Cependant, depuis trois à quatre jours ce n'est plus la même chose—on dirait qu'on est à la veille d'une nouvelle guerre. Les autorités réquisitionnent le peu de chevaux qui restent. Les dix-huit canons qui étaient placés à l'entrée du port de Bourgas, mis lors de l'apparition de la flotte turque, viennent d'être transportés en chemin de fer vers Dédéagatch. Auparavant, les farines qu'on transportait d'ici en bateaux à destination pour Dédéagatch, Porto-Lagos, Cavalla, pour les armées bulgares, on les transporte à présent par voie de terre (par les chemins de fer), de peur qu'elles ne soient pas réquisitionnées par la flotte grecque.

On a appelé sous les armes tous les réservistes turcs qui jusqu'à présent étaient exempts du service par suite de la guerre contre la Turquie, et on se sert d'eux pour garder l'ordre dans les villes et villages, et les recrues et une partie des territoriaux (les moins âgés) on les envoie dans les régions conquises.

J'ai, &c.
TACCHELLA.

[24379] No. 488.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 170. Confidential.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, May 24, 1913.*

THE Greek Chargé d'Affaires informs me that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs is constantly intimating to the Greek representative in Rome that Italy will make war on Greece if necessary in order to force her to evacuate the Albanian coast as far south as Cape Stilo. The present Italian pretensions, my Greek colleague says, represent a recent and complete change in the attitude of the Italian Government. All through the winter the Italian Chargé d'Affaires here was telling him that Italy's interests were confined to the coast from Durazzo to Valona; but he supposes that the Italian Government, seeing the results accomplished by Austria by threats of military

action decided on following the same tactics. The Greek Government, as I understand from M. Psycha, surmise that Austria has been induced to support the Italian demands chiefly by the fear that Italy would otherwise be led to occupy Valona.

M. Psycha tells me that he has received very little comfort or encouragement from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs. M. Sazonof has pointed out to him that the Greeks cannot expect the Powers of the Triple *Entente* to run the risk of war for the sake of obtaining satisfaction for Greece on the question of the Southern Albanian frontier. His Excellency's view, as I gather from some remarks which he has made to me, would seem to be that the Greek Government would make a mistake in treating the Albanian frontier question separately, but that they should seek to make a bargain of some kind, setting off the question of the islands against that of Epirus.

I have, &c.
HUGH O'BEIRNE.

[24357] No. 189.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 463.)
Sir, *Constantinople, May 24, 1913.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 222 of yesterday's date and to my telegram No. 242 of to-day, I have the honour to enclose herein copies of the notice attached to the *note identique* sent in to the Sublime Porte on the 14th March last regarding the temettu tax.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 189.

Notice attached to Identic Note regarding Temettu.

SE référant au dernier alinéa de sa note verbale identique, en date d'aujourd'hui, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique doit, conformément aux instructions formelles de son Gouvernement, se réserver le droit de s'adresser à la Sublime Porte toutes les fois que des réclamations spéciales de la part des ressortissants britanniques ayant trait à l'application de la loi paraîtraient justifier son intervention, vu que l'estimation de la taxe semblerait frapper d'une façon évidemment injuste certaines catégories de commerce. Sans vouloir trop anticiper la nature de ces réclamations, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique ne saurait ne pas faire part au Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères des vifs soucis qu'a inspirés aux compagnies d'assurance et de transport britanniques le contenu du tableau (C) annexé au projet de loi. Si chacune des nombreuses sous-agences de ces compagnies devait acquitter le droit fixe, outre les taxes à payer par leur personnel, ce constituerait une charge excessivement lourde pour les compagnies. L'Ambassade voudrait donc être éclairée sur la portée véritable de cette disposition du projet de loi, qui, d'après les représentants des compagnies en question, ne devrait frapper que l'agence principale dans l'Empire de chaque compagnie.

En ce qui concerne le droit de recourir en dernière instance à la commission centrale instituée au Ministère des Finances, l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique a l'honneur de faire remarquer au Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères que la composition de cette commission n'est pas précisée d'une manière tout à fait satisfaisante. Bien que la composition actuelle de cette commission soit de nature à rassurer les contribuables de nationalité étrangère l'Ambassade voudrait avoir des assurances à savoir que la commission gardera toujours un caractère apte à sauvegarder les intérêts légitimes des sujets britanniques.

L'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique est également chargée par son Gouvernement, avant de donner son adhésion définitive au projet de loi sur l'impôt sur les revenus mobiliers, d'attirer l'attention sérieuse du Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères sur la question de l'Oriental Carpet Company (Limited). Quoique cette question fasse l'objet d'une correspondance à part qui n'a pas encore pris fin, et que la question des sociétés commerciales en général soit traitée dans l'aliéna 7 de la note verbale d'aujourd'hui, la situation créée à cette importante société, qui sera une des

premières à être frappées par la nouvelle loi, par le refus des autorités de province à reconnaître sa nationalité, est tellement grave que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté s'est décidé à ne pas adhérer définitivement au projet de loi avant que le caractère britannique de cette compagnie ait été formellement reconnu par la Sublime Porte et que les ordres nécessaires dans ce sens aient été donnés aux autorités de Sivas et autres.

Constantinople, le 14 mars, 1913.

[24423] No. 190.

Note communicated by French Embassy, May 28, 1913.

LE Ministère français des Affaires Étrangères a fait étudier par ses [illegible] la question qui a fait l'objet des notes de l'Ambassade de France à Londres en date du 7 mars dernier et du Foreign Office en date du 20 du même mois, relatives à la juridiction du tribunal de commerce de Salonique sur des territoires destinés à être partagés entre les alliés.

Pour répondre aux préoccupations du commerce international de Salonique, il serait désirable d'obtenir des États balkaniques, lorsqu'ils procéderont au partage de leurs conquêtes et détermineront entre eux les conséquences de leurs annexions, qu'ils s'engagent à admettre à l'exequatur sans revision, chacun sur le territoire qui lui sera dévolu, les sentences rendues par le tribunal de commerce de Salonique, après la conclusion de la paix, à l'occasion des contrats antérieurs.

Le Gouvernement de la république est disposé à adopter cette proposition et à en saisir la réunion des Ambassadeurs à Londres ; mais il serait heureux de connaître auparavant l'opinion de son Excellence Sir Edward Grey.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 27 mai, 1913.

[24364] No. 191.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 86.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, May 27, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 79 of 26th May.

Instructions will be sent to Greek delegates not to make difficulties about signing draft treaty, with reserves indicated as regards articles 3 and 5, to which your telegram is understood to refer. As regards article 7, delegates will submit to you arguments of the Greek Government in favour of more precise definition.

[24455] No. 192.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 87. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, May 27, 1913.*

I TOOK your telegram No. 79 of 26th May to M. Venizelos, having doubt whether the Minister for Foreign Affairs keeps him informed, and found he had not communicated to him your telegram No. 78 of 24th May, which I also took. M. Venizelos was much distressed to find that your impression was that Greece was cause of delay in signing treaty, and repeatedly declared that Greece had no thought of contesting the rights of the Powers, and particularly desired to conform her policy to your wishes. He sent for Minister for Foreign Affairs, and it was arranged that instructions should be sent as reported in my telegram No. 86 of to-day. M. Venizelos would have been prepared to go further and to instruct delegates to accept article 7 without modification if, after submitting their arguments to you, you

still desired it, although the Greek Government attach greatest importance to a stipulation securing early conclusion of supplementary conventions and also to admission of their delegates to the Paris commission with a deliberative, not only consultative, voice. As, however, both Ministers believed there was unanimity amongst the allies on this point, and as they thought your telegrams referred only to articles 3 and 5, I was not authorised to make any statement beyond that contained in my telegram and conveyance of M. Venizelos's deep regret that any misunderstanding should have arisen with regard to the attitude of the Greek Government.

[24540] No. 493.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 74. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, May 28, 1913.*

GERMAN Minister has been most confidentially informed from Berlin that Italian Government have asked German Government to urge Greek Government to enter into direct negotiations with Italy with reference to Ægean islands, and that German Government, although favourable to the idea, decline to intervene on ground of their position as friends of Turkey, and advised Italian Government to ask you to take up the matter.

I told my German colleague that I had no information beyond what was said to me by Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, and reported in my telegram No. 84 of 26th May, substituting "conference of Ambassadors" for final words "France and England."

[24504] No. 494.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 183.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, May 28, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 226 of 27th May to Constantinople.

Prime Minister states that the Bulgarian delegates are prepared to sign preliminaries of treaty at once.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[24514] No. 495.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 184. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May 28, 1913.*

THE Greek Government have reconsidered their decision reported in my telegram No. 173 of 21st May, and have now expressed willingness to discuss outstanding questions with Bulgaria *à deux*. M. Saraïof will be instructed to negotiate at Salonica in the first instance, and if negotiations make progress he will afterwards proceed to Athens. In any case the neutral zone will be arranged on the Bulgarian side by General Ivanof (see my telegram No. 180 of 26th May).

(Very Confidential.)

Meeting has just been arranged between Bulgarian and Servian Prime Ministers to take place at the frontier station on 31st May. All differences will be fully discussed. I have the above direct from the Prime Minister. There is a *détente* since yesterday.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[24525] No. 496.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 185. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May 28, 1913.*

SERVIAN Minister, with consent of his Government, has suggested to my Russian colleague, as only means of preserving peace and Balkan alliance, a conference at St. Petersburgh between Prime Ministers of four allies to settle all differences with the help of Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and of British and French Ambassadors.

In order to compel Bulgaria to consent to conference, Servian Minister proposed that Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs should inform Bulgarian Government that whole responsibility of war will rest with them if they refuse, and that Roumania will be given a free hand; also that France should threaten refusal to Bulgaria of financial support.

Russian Minister has telegraphed in this sense to his Government.

(Repeated to Belgrade.)

[24526] No. 497.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 186.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May 28, 1913.*

MILITARY attaché informs me approximate distribution of Bulgarian army is as follows: —

12th division at Belogradchik; 6th division between Belogradchik and Vratsa; 1st division between Sophia and Tsaribrod; 9th division at Kustendil; 13th division east of Istib; 2nd division east of Strumnitza; 4th division at Demir Hissar; 8th division at Serres, Drama, and Cavalla; 11th division along the coast between the mouth of River Mesta and Bulair; 7th division at Bulair; 3rd, 5th and 10th divisions at Chatalja.

13th division is newly formed and composed of Macedonians.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[24531] No. 498.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 82.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, May 28, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that he entirely approved of the energetic language that had just been used to representatives of the allies, and he hopes that preliminaries of peace will be now signed without delay.

With regard to Bulgaria and Servia, his Excellency is of opinion that they mean to fight, and he does not think that any arbitration proposal is likely to be successful. His information leads him to believe that the recent skirmishing between Bulgarians and Greeks was intended by the former to draw mass of the Greek forces away from Servia. In his opinion it is probable that should war break out Bulgaria will beat Servia, as he said to me that one Bulgarian division was worth two Servian.

I enquired of Minister for Foreign Affairs what would happen if Servia collapsed before Bulgaria. He gave me to understand that Austria-Hungary would not repeat the action she took in the last Servian-Bulgarian war, when she arrested Bulgarian forces from advancing on Belgrade.

As to Roumania's attitude in such a war, Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that she will remain quiet, but he feels sure that she will drive a hard bargain with Bulgaria for her neutrality.

[24532 No. 499.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 83.) *Vienna, May 28, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs expressed to me to-day his disapprobation of M. Cambon's proposal regarding Albania. He said that a Governor-General would have no prestige or authority amongst Albanians, being unknown to the people. In his Excellency's opinion the Powers should take views of Albanian chiefs with regard to government of their country. As to the capacity of Essad Pasha for governing he could express no definite opinion, but he thought that there were one or two men in the Provisional Government who could be employed as temporary heads of administration. Ismail Kemal he thought little of. Minister for Foreign Affairs is of opinion that Albanian chiefs would prefer to have in the end a foreign Prince to rule over them rather than High Commissioner appointed by Powers.

As regards financing of new State, his Excellency seemed to think that Powers would have to resign themselves to the idea of raising an international loan guaranteed by them. He expressed his great regret that so little progress was being made in London in arriving at practical decisions as to administration of Albania.

[24527. No. 500.

Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 193.) *St. Petersburgh, May 28, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.)

SERVIA-BULGARIA conflict.

Minister for Foreign Affairs considers situation very peculiar. He tells me that, in view of reluctance of Servia to go to arbitration, he has proposed to Bulgaria to agree to frontier line which would run from Ochrida to the east of Kuprulu, leaving latter to Servia. He is awaiting Bulgarian reply, and he believes that, if she accepts his advice, Servia would come to terms.

[24513] No. 501.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 28.)

(No. 248.) *Constantinople, May 28, 1913.*
(Telegraphic.) R.

YOUR telegram No. 226 of 27th May.

Committee press of yesterday and to-day, while ascribing delay in signature of peace preliminaries to desire of Servia and Greece to utilise Turkish pressure on Bulgaria to compel latter to accept their point of view, contends that, if a conflict between allies, which they regard as all but inevitable, occurs before signature of peace preliminaries, Turkey would be free and in duty bound to take advantage of the situation by resuming hostilities, and perhaps forcing Bulgarians or allies to accept Iniada–Baba Eski line with no war indemnity and their share of Turkish Debt.

"Tanin" observes that, in profiting by such Balkan complications, Turkey will meet with no opposition from England in view of Turkey's recent friendly attitude to her, while active Russian interference is not to be expected.

(Sent to Athens, Sophia, and Belgrade.)

[24840 No. 502.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 336.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 28, 1913.*

M. CAMBON told me to-day that he had advised M. Stroit, one of the Greek peace delegates, that there was nothing for Greece to do but to sign the treaty as it stood. He had advised the delegates not to make reserves that would require an answer

from the Powers, but to draw up some formula which they could give to me, saying that they were ready to sign, but expressing the hope that the Powers would discuss with them the questions in which they were interested. The formula must be drawn up in such a way as not to require an answer. The Greek delegates had now shown M. Cambon such a formula, for which they were asking approval of their Government.

I said that I had told them to make any reserves they desired so long as they affected only the attitude of Greece towards the Great Powers, and did not impede the conclusion of peace with Turkey; but, like M. Cambon, I did not contemplate reserves that would require an answer.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[24841] No. 503.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 337.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 28, 1913.*

I SPOKE to M. Cambon to-day about the *réunions* of Ambassadors. I said that they could not go on for ever. It would be essential that the Ambassadors should get away in July for some holiday. I myself should like to get some holiday. We must, therefore, contemplate either bringing the *réunions* altogether to an end or at least interrupting them for some weeks or months in the summer. If we were to begin taking up new questions as they arose, we should never be able to do this. I should like to suggest that we should confine ourselves to the question of the south of Albania and the Ægean islands, that we should endeavour to settle this question, and that it should be understood that when we had settled it our meetings must be interrupted or brought to a close. I thought that it was possible, though I could not be sure, that, if a part of the Corfu Canal was reserved for Albania, we might get for Greece all the Ægean islands, except perhaps Tenedos and Imbros, subject to the Russian conditions of neutralisation. I thought that, if Greece obtained Yanina, a considerable part of the Corfu Canal, other territory in the hinterland, and most of the the Ægean islands, public opinion here would think that the settlement was a reasonable one. But I was certain that no settlement could be arrived at that would give the whole of the Corfu Canal to Greece. We ought, therefore, to consider whether we should not make it our object to get for Greece some such settlement as I had outlined.

M. Cambon said that he had already suggested to one of the Greek delegates that, if they could get some concessions in the hinterland and all the Ægean islands with the exception of perhaps Tenedos and Imbros, Greece might be satisfied.

I said that, if M. Cambon and Count Benckendorff were prepared to work for this objective, I would bring on the discussion in the *réunion* early next week.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[24842] No. 504.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 28, 1913.*

TO-DAY I saw the Montenegrin delegate to the Peace Conference. I said that Montenegro was the only country of which no delegate had come to see me to propose changes in the treaty of peace, and for this I was grateful. I explained to him how all the others had suggested changes, and how Bulgaria and Turkey had put aside their proposed changes in order to avoid delay. I then said to him about the situation what I had said to the other delegates yesterday, explaining the necessity of signing at once or of not remaining here to continue negotiations that would lead to nothing.

The delegate said that Montenegro was in despair. The settlement of the frontier was very unfavourable to her. She was exhausted. Her Government did not like to

ask for a loan from the Powers, because it would look as if they had ceded Scutari in return for a money compensation; and he appealed for certain changes in the frontier.

I said that it was impossible for the Powers to reopen the question of the frontier.

He urged that, in demarcating the frontier by a commission, some changes might be made.

I replied that a demarcation would no doubt take place, but it would have to be on the lines on which the Powers had come to an agreement. I could not promise what I knew the Powers would not agree to.

On his informing me that Messrs. Boulton had refused to lend money to Montenegro because the Foreign Office was not favourable, I told him that Messrs. Boulton had already been told, after the Scutari settlement, that there was no political objection to their making a loan. I would have this repeated to them.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[24574] No. 505.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, May 29, 1913.

M. PICHON pense, comme Sir Edward Grey, que les États balkaniques pourraient être représentés dans la commission financière de Paris à des titres différents suivant que les questions traitées par cette commission intéresseraient tous les États participant à la réunion ou ne concerneraient que les Grandes Puissances. Il lui semble que l'on pourrait dès à présent laisser à la commission le soin de fixer elle-même cette procédure et s'en remettre à elle de la faculté de décider, au fur et à mesure que les questions se présenteraient, quelles seraient celles qui appelleraient la délibération de tous les États et celles qui seraient réservées à la décision exclusive des Grandes Puissances.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 27 mai, 1913.

[24651] No. 506.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 29.)

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, May 29, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, decypher of a telegram relative to affairs in Scutari.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 506.

Vice-Admiral, Mediterranean, to Admiralty.

(Telegraphic.) *May 28, 1913.*

YOUR telegram of the 26th May submitted this morning to Commission. Resolution passed as follows, which they desire to be transmitted to conference of Ambassadors in London:—

"The work of removing war material from town and forts has been so expeditiously carried out that it will be completed in almost a week less than the minimum time which was originally believed to be necessary.

"It is the unanimous opinion of the commission that the work of the Montenegrin troops in this respect has been excellent."

[24543] No. 507.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 127.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, May 28, 1913.*

PEACE negotiations.

In the absence of the Prime Minister, I saw the Under-Secretary of State this morning and spoke to him in the sense of your telegram No. 90 of 27th May, leaving with him a paraphrase.

He took note, and said that he would at once inform the Prime Minister.

[24601] No. 508.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 128.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, May 28, 1913.*

SERVIA and Bulgaria.

I enquired of the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs this morning as to the situation. He assured me that the attitude and intentions of the Servian Government were still pacific, but that the military party in Bulgaria, under General Savof, were forcing the situation. He read me a portion of the exposition which the Prime Minister will to-day deliver to the Skupshtina, in which, after reviewing the arguments in favour of revision of the treaty, his Excellency will state that the Servian Government desire that the frontier disputes should be settled between all the allies. I asked him what would happen if Bulgarian reply to the Servian note were in the negative. He said that even then the door would not be entirely closed, and it would always be possible for the Powers to avert a conflict at the last moment. He gave me assurance that Servia would not take the initiative in an attack on Bulgaria, but could not answer for what Bulgaria might do.

There is no doubt that the Servian Government desire peace, but public opinion and army are warlike, and the Prime Minister would probably allow his hand to be forced rather than face resignation as a consequence of a too pacific policy.

The Bulgarian Minister returns at the end of this week and will probably bring Bulgarian reply. Critical stage will then be reached.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[24544] No. 509.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 129.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, May 28, 1913.*

ITALIAN military attaché informs me that he has heard from a reliable source that the Greek and Servian military authorities have come to an accord as to joint action.

(Repeated to Sophia.)

[24545] No. 510.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 130.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, May 28, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 125 of 26th May: Movement of troops.

Vice-consul at Monastir informs me that the rest of the 3rd regiment has left for the same destination.

(Repeated to Sophia.)

[24657] No. 511.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 131.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, May 29, 1913.*

SERVIA and Bulgaria.

The Russian Minister is to-day more optimistic, and hopes that a solution may be found within the next few days. He says that he has been unremitting in his efforts to bring the Servian and Bulgarian Prime Ministers together.

(Confidential.)

The Austrian Minister volunteered to me that he considered the loss of Russian influence in Bulgaria to be greatly due to the weak personality of the Russian Minister at Sophia.

(Repeated to Sophia.)

[24671] No. 512.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 187. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May 29, 1913.*

IN giving consent reported in my telegram No. 184 of 28th May the Greek Government reserved the liberty to keep the Servian Government informed respecting the negotiations. For the firing at Greek cruiser, reported in my telegram No. 180 of 26th May, they have demanded apology and the punishment of those responsible.

Bulgarian Government have so far only apologised.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[24635] No. 513.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 250.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, May 29, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 244 of 26th May.

His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna telegraphs that accidents occurred 2 miles inside the danger zone. I am awaiting reports.

[24669] No. 514.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 251.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, May 29, 1913.*

KIAMIL PASHA, being unable to land at Smyrna owing to stoppage of navigation there, arrived here yesterday, and was immediately informed by Military Governor that he must leave the country, and his house was surrounded by police agents and communication with him was prohibited.

After negotiations with Military Governor and the Grand Vizier he has been allowed to wait till Sunday next, when there is direct boat to Smyrna.

There is no charge against him.

[24664] No. 515.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 29.)

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, May 29, 1913.*

SENATE yesterday voted practically unanimously authorising Minister for Foreign Affairs to give effect to St. Petersburgh protocol. Debate on preceding vote was technically secret, but reports and apparently authorised versions of speeches have appeared in the press. From these it is clear that neither would the Government nor the Opposition regard the present solution as necessarily final.

Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out that protocol left Roumania with a free hand for the future. Leader of Liberal party, though voting with the Government for the protocol, severely criticised the Cabinet's inaction last October, and said that, by the present phase of Balkan affairs, Providence had offered Roumania an opportunity to repair past errors, and he did not think that she could come out of present [illegible] situation with merely acquisition of Silistria.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[23940] No. 516.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 166.
Sir, *Foreign Office, May 29, 1913.*

TEWFIK PASHA gave Sir A. Nicolson on the 22nd May, [illegible] allowed him to have a copy made—the annexed circular telegram from the Sublime Porte in regard to the islands. Your Excellency will observe that the arguments as regards the islands occupied by Greece are faulty, and the Turkish Government lay down a premiss which is untenable. The serious matter is the statement regarding the islands occupied by Italy. Sir A. Nicolson showed the telegram to M. Cambon, who called on the same day.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 516.

Circular Telegram from Sublime Porte respecting the Ægean Islands.

Constantinople, le 22 mai, 1913.

LA Sublime Porte croit savoir que, devant l'insistance de la Grèce, les Grandes Puissances seraient portées à adhérer à la cession des îles au Gouvernement hellénique. Or, le Gouvernement Impérial avait expliqué en détail dans sa note responsive du 30 janvier dernier (voir télégramme No. 44) les raisons multiples aux points de vue stratégique et politique qui lui rendaient impossible la cession des îles occupées par les alliés. D'autre part, les Grandes Puissances en nous proposant par leur note collective du 31 mars dernier (voir télégramme No. 134) de nous désintéresser complètement de la Crète et de laisser à leur décision le règlement de la question des autres îles, nous avaient clairement laissé entendre qu'elles reconnaissaient l'importance vitale pour l'Empire ottoman de la plupart de ces îles, et nous avaient ainsi inspiré la conviction que nos légitimes demandes seront prises en sérieuse considération lors de la solution de la question. C'est avec cette conviction que dans sa note responsive du 1er avril écoulé la Sublime Porte avait déclaré accepter dans leur ensemble les bases préliminaires proposées par les Grandes Puissances. Par conséquent, la tendance des Puissances de céder les îles à la Grèce est tout à fait contraire à leur promesse antérieure. La Sublime Porte ne saurait donc être obligée d'accepter une telle solution. Ainsi qu'il a été répété à différentes reprises, il nous est indispensable de garder une partie de ces îles pour la défense des Dardanelles et une autre pour la sécurité de l'Anatolie. D'autre part, nous ne saurions nullement admettre que les îles occupées actuellement par les troupes italiennes soient comprises parmi celles qui sont soumises à la décision des Grandes Puissances, le Gouvernement Royal italien s'étant engagé par un acte solennel à nous les restituer. En cas d'annexion de ces îles à la Grèce, il nous sera impossible de maintenir l'ordre et la tranquillité en Anatolie, et les garanties des Puissances nous

seraient suffisantes, ainsi que cela a été démontré par les multiples précédents pour assurer ce but. Dans ces conditions, le Gouvernement Impérial préférerait continuer à rester en état de guerre avec la Grèce, au lieu de souscrire au rétablissement d'une paix instable.

Je prie votre Excellence de vouloir bien soumettre ce qui précède à la sérieuse attention du Gouvernement près duquel vous êtes accrédité et de déployer tous vos efforts pour l'amener à donner à son Ambassadeur à Londres des instructions dans un sens conforme aux dispositions des pourparlers antérieures. J'attends réponse.

[23712] No. 517.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 333.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, May 29, 1913.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 225 of the 2nd instant relative to the employment of the sum which has accumulated in the Bank of Crete through payments made on account of the Cretan surtax, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Canea,† reporting a suggestion of the representatives of the protecting Powers that the indemnity for the family of the murdered Mussulman rural guard which it proposed to derive from this source should be fixed at 6,000 fr., and stating that his French colleague is making to his Government a recommendation to this effect.

Your Excellency should inform the Government to which you are accredited that His Majesty's Government agree to the sum proposed and that I have instructed Mr Wratislaw to take the necessary action in the matter as soon as his colleagues receive similar instructions.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[24715] No. 518.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 104.)

Sir, *Belgrade, May 27, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 102 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to report that I have received a note from the Servian Government in reply to my representations on the subject of the imposition of an export duty on tobacco by the Customs authorities at Ghevgheli.

It is stated that, in view of the facts (1) that no export duty on tobacco exported to England was paid under the Turkish régime, and (2) that under the Turco-Servian Commercial Convention a duty of 312·5 piastres per 100 kilog. was imposed as a consequence of the exclusion of the export of tobacco to Servia from the most-favoured-nation clause under article 3 of that convention, the Servian Government have given the necessary orders to allow the tobacco in question to be exported free of the above duty.

I have, &c.
DAYRELL CRACKANTHORPE.

[24684] No. 519.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 277. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, May 29, 1913.*

M. PICHON acquainted me yesterday with the warning which you had, after a *réunion* of the Ambassadors, given on the 27th May to the representatives of the

* See to Mr. Bertie (No. 500 all.) and R. B. 4 (No. 144), *retro materiels.*
† Enclosed in Wratislaw (No. 12) May 15, 1913.

Balkan States of the absolute necessity for them to sign the preliminaries of peace without further delays. His Excellency told me that he had used language to the same effect to those of the representatives of the Balkan States who had attended his reception yesterday afternoon.

I informed M. Pichon of the purport of the observations made by the councillor of the Russian Embassy to Mr. Carnegie (as reported by him in his despatch No. 5 of the 24th instant) on the subject of the position of the Balkan delegates in the Paris Financial Commission, and of indemnities to the Balkan States for being deprived of part of the fruits of their victories, and the questions of the continuation of the 3 per cent. additional Turkish Customs duties and of a further increase to them of 4 per cent.

I asked M. Pichon whether he thought that the observations made by M. Sevastopoulo and the language generally held by M. Isvolsky really reproduced the opinions of the Russian Government or were enlargements of the views of their Government, and what would be the attitude of the French Government in these questions.

His Excellency believed that MM. Isvolsky and Sevastopoulo had exaggerated the views of the Russian Government, and M. Sevastopoulo's remarks concerning Bulgaria having been prevented from entering Constantinople entitling her to compensation by Turkey were absurd. The French Government would energetically defend the interests of the French bondholders of the Ottoman Debt. The French Ambassador would make to you a proposal in the nature of a compromise in regard to the position to be assigned to the Balkan delegates in the Paris Financial Commission.

I suggested to M. Pichon that the freedom of action of the French Government in these financial questions was rather fettered by their political obligations to Russia, whose policy, as expounded by M. Isvolsky and M. Sevastopoulo, seemed to be inconsistent with the interests of France and England in regard to what would remain of the Ottoman Empire after the conclusion of peace with the Balkan States. That policy was to deprive Turkey of the financial means of reorganisation, and so keep her weak for future contingencies. That was, M. Pichon observed, not at all a policy which the French Government would support. They wished Turkey to have the means of living well and independently of her neighbours' possible desires.

His Excellency further stated that he intended to take advantage of the meeting of the Financial Commission to endeavour to come to arrangements with the Porte and the German Government in regard to railways and the extension of railways in Asia Minor in which France is interested. He mentioned in this connection your negotiations with Turkey on the subjects of the Persian Gulf and the Bagdad Railway, and your communications with the German Government on the railway question. His Excellency said that he would keep you informed of his negotiations in the same way that you had acquainted the French Government with your negotiations with Turkey and communications with the German Government.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

[24824] No. 520.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received May 30.)

Sir, *Admiralty, May 29, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, a copy of letter, dated the 17th instant, which has been received from the Vice-Admiral commanding the 3rd Battle Squadron, respecting the proceedings of the international force at Scutari.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY

Enclosure in No. 520.

Vice-Admiral Burney to Admiralty.

Scutari, May 17, 1913.

Sir,

BE pleased to lay before their Lordships the following report on the proceedings of the international force landed for taking over the town of Scutari from the Montenegrin Government.

2. The main body of the force, 500 officers and men, left the mouth of the River Bojana at 6 A.M. on the 14th instant in the steamer "Scutari"; in addition 250 officers and men left about 4 A.M. in a very much slower steamer, the "Yolanda," which arrived after the main body. The commission of officers, with their staffs, embarked in the "Mataruga" at 9 A.M., and left at once for Scutari. The "Scutari" "Yolanda," and "Mafalda" are river steamers, the first Austrian and the other two Italian. All steamers carried a white flag as well as their national ensign. The Montenegrin frontier runs along the right bank of the River Bojana for some distance from the mouth. On this side the people along the bank were quite silent. On the left bank, however, the Albanian side, the passage of the commission was greeted with manifestations of joy. These manifestations consisted mostly of a discharge of rifles with ball cartridges in the air. A curious fact about this country is the large quantity of ammunition in it. Every countryman has his rifle, and often young boys are seen carrying rifles, with plenty of ammunition.

The "Mafalda" with the commission arrived off Scutari at 2.30 P.M. The "Scutari" had arrived previously and landed a guard of honour, which consisted of one officer and ten men from each nation, with their respective flags. The Montenegrin guard was drawn up in a position as near as possible to and facing the international guard. The commission landed at the custom-house and was met by a principal officer on the staff of the Montenegrin General, also by all the consuls. The inhabitants had gathered in large numbers to witness the landing of the commission, and children carrying flowers lined the route in front of the custom-house. The behaviour of the Albanian population was most orderly. I had emphatically forbidden a demonstration, and my orders on this point were strictly carried out.

The commission, with their staffs and the consuls, was conducted to the headquarter offices, outside which the Montenegrin military governor (General Begir) met us. On our arrival he made the following speech to me in French, in the presence of the commission. At the time he appeared to be labouring under considerable emotion:—

"I envy the fate of Essad Pasha, who has been able to defend this town arms in hand to the last, and I would have followed his example had I to deal with one Power only, but I, representing my King, must submit to the decision of the Powers, and therefore I am glad that I have to surrender the town to a noble son of England, with confidence and hope that he will take care of the tombs of our heroes who have fallen in the surroundings of the town during the war."

We then went into the headquarter offices with the General, and I explained to him the wishes of the commission as regards the relieving of the Montenegrin guards by the men of the international force. Considerable tension was created by the Austrian Admiral, who did not appear to realise that his presence was regarded with considerable disfavour by all the Montenegrins. He insisted on taking up the attitude of a victorious general dealing with a conquered enemy, and is tactless in his methods, as he has a habit of joining in conversation and adding emphatic remarks such as "immediately" and "at once" when only suggestion is necessary. When he left the General unbent a little from his previously stiff attitude and I was able to get into quite friendly conversation with him. This very much lightened a difficult task, and the General was grateful for several small concessions which I was able to make.

The officers of the international force were then taken round to the numerous posts and the Montenegrin guards were relieved by the force.

The plan prepared for the division of the town into districts for the different nations worked extremely well, and enabled a definite plan to be adopted at once.

The very large number of guards which the Montenegrins have placed all over the town on their various stores of ammunition, arms, &c., has protracted the work of relieving them to a greater extent than was at first anticipated. This was, however, completed by the afternoon of the 16th, and the General left on the morning of the 17th.

The Montenegrin flag was struck on the morning of the 15th, and the flags of the five Powers hoisted horizontally on a yard above the citadel.

After the departure of the General from the headquarter offices we interviewed the various consuls, and it was arranged that a meeting should be held there at 10 A.M. the next day, when the men who formerly exercised the function of a Municipal Council were to be called before the commission.

When the force landed a certain number were at once told off for the various guards, &c., and the remainder were employed in landing provisions and gear and transporting it to the central barracks.

The Austrians and Italians were very well looked after by the priests, who arranged for tents to house them temporarily in the grounds of a monastery, and for transport for their gear. It was most difficult to obtain any transport, as in the first place there are very few carriages or horses in Scutari, and secondly the few that exist were bought up by the Austrians. The Italians had some excellent light carts which they landed in pieces and made up on shore. These were most useful to them, as the roads, especially through the bazaars—a large portion of which is burnt down and debris scattered about—are extremely bad, large holes and big stones everywhere. Our consul, an Albanian, was very little use in the matter of transport, as, although he had had several days' warning to provide it, nothing had apparently been done. The Germans were a smaller body of men, and they managed to secure two tents in the grounds of the same monastery as that in which the Austrians and Italians were accommodated.

The Germans requested the next day to move their camp from the monastery grounds, as they did not like being so close to the Austrians. This was, of course, arranged. The Italians also moved their camp on the 16th, giving the same reason for doing so.

The French and British took over the central barracks (about 1½ miles from the custom house), which had not then entirely been vacated by the Montenegrins. The whole barracks were in a state of indescribable filth, after occupation both by Turks and Montenegrins, and the men had an exceedingly poor time the first night. The French did not trouble about getting all their gear to the barracks and bivouacked in the barrack square for the night. Our men, on the contrary, stuck to the business of getting all their gear up and making the barracks as far as possible habitable. They eventually settled down about 1 A.M.

Great improvement has of course been made by now in the barracks, which were entirely without furniture, and necessity has developed the resourcefulness of the men. Without doubt the experience is an excellent lesson for them.

3. I have now held three meetings of the commission, at which the consuls have assisted. A collector of customs and staff have been installed in place of the Montenegrin officials. A sanitary commission has been formed of local doctors and doctors of different Red Cross missions who are still in the town. The Municipal Council has been directed to commence at once the work of cleaning the streets and providing lighting. I have approved of 160*l.* being obtained on loan from the Ottoman Bank, and have also arranged with the bank to draw up to 1,000*l.* for payment of officials, &c., and advances to the Municipal Council for local work. This sum is guaranteed out of the customs dues, which should reach between 3,000*l.* and 4,000*l.* monthly when trade is fully re-established. A small local police force of twenty men to uphold the authority of the Municipal Council will be sworn in. I have placed Lieutenant Richards, R.M.A., in charge of this force. He will be assisted by two Italian seamen as interpreters.

A telegram was sent to the Admiralty to say that it is impossible to do anything in this town at present without a considerable sum of money. There is no money available from municipal resources. For seven months trade has been at a standstill, and consequently an experienced civil administrator with financial powers is wanted immediately to take charge of the town. There is no such administrator in Scutari, and an Albanian would not be acceptable on account of the religious question. The Mussulman, Orthodox, and Catholic Albanians all hate each other. I therefore wired to the Admiralty suggesting that a civil governor be appointed as soon as possible, pointing out that no one is available locally, and I do not consider it is desirable that an officer of the international fleet should be appointed.

Bread is served out daily in large quantities, under the superintendence of the Austrian and Italian consuls, to the destitute population, and so long as the food continues to come the Albanian will not trouble to work. At present there is very little work to do, but the conditions will rapidly improve as time goes on. The shops in the bazaar and the town have reopened and trade is beginning again. The blockade has of course up to date prevented any trade in the town since the siege.

4. The Archbishop of Scutari and several bishops from places in the vicinity

called on me. They anticipate that the international occupation will bring money into the town and country, and they profess their satisfaction at the presence of the international force. They have undoubtedly great influence amongst the half-civilised population, and can stir them up to do apparently anything. They are, in my opinion, the worst type of religious political intriguers. I have information that all the priests are in receipt of regular pay from Austria, and I have also received intelligence that Austria is spending a large amount of money annually in Albania on schools and religious work. This information is commonly known, but the French consul was my chief informant. He is very well versed in the affairs of Scutari, and I am satisfied that his views are unbiassed.

As previously stated, the priests housed the Austrian detachment in the grounds of a monastery, and although the portion of the town allotted to this nation for guard duties is a long way from the monastery, the Austrian Admiral is disinclined to move more than a small portion of his men away from this place. Consequently the detachment lives practically with the priests. The Admiral is in close communication with the Archbishop.

The Austrian Admiral, with the assent of the Italian Admiral, has endeavoured to induce me to allow the Albanians in the town to carry arms, and also to permit several thousand Albanian tribesmen (Melissors) to enter the town, with their arms, and demonstrate. The demonstration takes the form of firing ball cartridge in the air, as they have no blank, and they are quite indifferent where the bullets fall. The reason given why the arms should be allowed is that it is a national custom and part of the ordinary dress. I will not allow arms to be carried or the demonstration to take place in the town, especially in view of the fact that, by arrangement, Montenegrin unarmed soldiers are still working in Scutari, taking away war material, &c. There is still a large quantity to be removed, and the Montenegrin working parties come in daily to do this. They are quite satisfactory in their behaviour, and very respectful to the English.

I have reported by telegraph (No. 81) the opinion I have gathered of the political situation at Scutari, and I am quite sure it is correct that the Austrians will do all in their power to prevent the international occupation being a success, with the idea of making Austrian influence in the town paramount. How they propose to achieve their object I do not know.

It appears to me that in order to ensure the success of autonomous Albania it will be necessary to install able civil and military governors, backed up by international military forces and a good gendarmerie, in the principal towns of Albania. These small Governments must gradually extend their influence to the surrounding country as time goes on. Lastly, every endeavour must be made to check Austrian intrigue, and if this is done it is anticipated that in a comparatively short time the international forces could be withdrawn and Albania left to the care of the gendarmerie.

I have, &c.
CECIL BURNEY.

[24856] No. 521.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 84. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, May 30, 1913.*

I HAVE received information from a trustworthy source to the effect that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs are very much annoyed at the speech made in the Skupshtina by M. Pashitch. This morning's "Fremdenblatt" publishes a leading article, inspired by the Ballplatz, denying categorically all the charges brought against Austria-Hungary by M. Pashitch in his statement, which is held to be an unjustifiable attack on the Dual Monarchy.

Military circles here are betraying considerable anxiety on account of his intimation that a final settlement of the Albanian question has not yet been reached, and I have reason to believe that the military authorities will in any case oppose the disbandment of any reservists in Bosnia until the quarrel between Servia and Bulgaria is settled one way or the other.

I learn that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs are at present of opinion that Austria-Hungary should not bind herself to a policy of non-intervention should war break out between Bulgaria and Servia, and that she must be free to interfere if there is any danger of her interests suffering by such a war. The opinion prevails here that Servian Chauvinists would be so elated if the war against Bulgaria were to go in their favour that Servia might be tempted to look towards Bosnia-Herzegovina as a field for further conquests.

[24954] No. 522.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 188.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May 30, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 66 of 13th May.

According to note received from the Bulgarian Government they are only taking care of refugees' property.

Despatch follows.

[24855] No. 523.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 189.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May 30, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 185 of 28th May.

Statement of Servian Prime Minister in the Skupshtina has made an unfavourable impression here. Government paper states that interview arranged between the two Prime Ministers will not now take place, but Prime Minister informed me that programme has not been altered.

Passenger traffic has been suspended throughout Bulgaria with the exception of one international train.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[24678] No. 524.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 30.)

(No. 40.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Salonica, May 29, 1913.*

M. VENIZELOS remains here at least until Saturday.

I am informed that little hope of an amicable settlement is now entertained.

[25082] No. 525.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 209.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May 30, 1913.*

ASIA Minor.

An impression that a partition of Asia Minor was contemplated by Great Britain, France, and Russia exists in Berlin, the German Ambassador remarked to-day, and mentioned that it was thought there might be some secret arrangement of this kind between the three Powers. You may assure the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the report is without foundation, and I have so informed Prince Lichnowsky.

[21441] No. 526.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 231.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, May 30, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 224 of 9th May.

As treaty of peace has been signed to-day, Admiralty enquire whether "Zealandia" can be withdrawn from Constantinople. She could be replaced by another ship if necessary.

[25083] No. 527.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 232.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, May* 30, 1913.

THE Bulgarian delegate proposed the signature of an additional protocol to-day to the peace delegates as soon as the preliminary treaty had been signed. By this protocol peace was to begin from the signature of the peace treaty and was not to be dependent on ratification. The Servian and Greek delegates raised objections, which I believe were frivolous, but the Ottoman delegate was prepared to sign such a protocol, and asked privately for my opinion as to whether it would be justifiable for him to sign it with Dr. Danef, without the delegates of the other Balkan States.

In case you are questioned on this matter by the Ottoman Government, it is desirable that you should know that I have informed Nizam Pasha that, in my opinion, he would be justified in signing with the Bulgarians only, if he wished to do so, and that I would be ready to say that I had told him so, in the event of his action being criticised.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[25532] No. 528.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 118.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, May* 30, 1913.

AT the *réunion* to-day the following resolution was adopted :—

"Sir E. Grey informe la réunion de la signature de la paix par les délégués du Gouvernement ottoman et des Etats alliés.

"Il ajoute que la réunion reste maintenant en présence des questions précises à la solution desquelles il est d'autant plus nécessaire de limiter ses travaux que des questions nouvelles qui ne sont pas de sa compétence pourraient se poser et qu'elle serait ainsi amenée à sortir du programme tracé par les différents Gouvernements.

"Ces questions sont :

"1. L'organisation de l'Albanie. Il ne peut s'agir d'une organisation de détail, mais il importe que l'accord se fasse entre les Puissances sur les lignes générales de l'institution de l'Etat autonome.

"2. La délimitation de la frontière albanaise au sud-est et au sud.

"3. La question des îles de la mer Egée.

"Une fois ces questions épuisées, il conviendrait d'ajourner la réunion."

I then observed that the questions of the Ægean islands and of the south of Albania were so closely connected that the two must practically be settled together.

The Italian Ambassador agreed, but said that, as Italy was under an obligation to restore the Ægean islands that she occupied to Turkey, she could not do anything inconsistent with that obligation. It was apparent, however, from what he said that if, as part of the settlement, the Powers decided that the islands occupied by Italy were to go to Greece, Italy would be prepared to agree. Indeed, the Ambassador agreed that, should the islands go to Greece, conditions of neutralisation and the arrangement of details to soothe the *amour-propre* of Turkey should be taken into consideration.

The German Ambassador said that, in view of all the difficulties, he thought that all the islands might go to Greece, except Tenedos and Imbros. It was understood, of course, that Thasos was to go to Bulgaria, as had been agreed some time ago.

With regard to the south of Albania, the Italian Ambassador said that the two cardinal points were that Thalia and Stilos on the coast and Koritza in the hinterland should be included in Albania.

I summed up the discussion by saying that a sketch of settlement had emerged under which, if Thalia and Stilos and Koritza were kept for Albania, all the Ægean islands except Tenedos and Imbros, which would be left to Turkey, and Thasos, which was to go to Bulgaria, should go to Greece under conditions of neutralisation, and with what might be arranged to satisfy the *amour-propre* of Turkey. I doubted whether

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 345), Sir E. Goschen (No. 171), Sir R. Rodd (No. 148), and Mr. O'Beirne (No. 212).

the *réunion* would wish to go so far to-day as to treat this as a definite proposition, and I suggested that each Ambassador should make his own report to his Government with a view to considering whether a discussion of Southern Albania and the Ægean islands should be entered upon with the object of attaining some such settlement.

The French Ambassador agreed, and said that it was necessary to "tâter le terrain."

The following resolution, unanimously passed by the naval commission in Scutari, was communicated to the *réunion* :—

"The commission are unanimously of opinion the Montenegrin troops have worked, and are still working, very well indeed in the removal of war material from the town and forts. The work has been so expeditiously carried out that it will be complete in nearly a week less than the minimum time that was originally anticipated."

The Austrian Ambassador observed that there were places, beyond the immediate zone supervised by the Naval Commission, which Montenegro must evacuate.

M. Cambon reported that M. le Comte de Voinovitch, one of the Montenegrin delegates to the Peace Conference, had stated that Montenegro had security that she could offer eventually in the form of tobacco or other monopolies, but that it was an immediate necessity for her to get some money at once, and that he hoped that the financiers to whom the Montenegrin Government applied would be encouraged by the Powers to give them a small loan for immediate necessities.

No one raised any objection to this, it being understood that the further question of a loan guaranteed by the Powers could not arise until after complete evacuation of Albanian territory.

Early in the discussion the Italian Ambassador said that his Government wished to reply to the proposal that M. Cambon had made about the organisation of a provisional administration for Albania. He was not yet ready to give their answer, but he wished to give it later. We did not, therefore, proceed further to-day with the discussion of the French Ambassador's proposal.

The Austrian Ambassador, while making no objection to this procedure, observed that it would not be very courteous to *passer outre* altogether with regard to the proposal for the reorganisation of Albania which had been drawn up by the Italian and Austrian Governments at the request of the *réunion*, and which had been submitted to it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[24318] No. 529.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon.

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the French Ambassador, and has the honour to state that he has been in telegraphic communication with His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople respecting the French note of the 13th May on the subject of the temettu tax. Sir E. Grey had enquired from Sir G. Lowther whether it would be practicable to make fresh conditions as to the expenditure of the revenue anticipated from this tax, without making specific exceptions in regard to expenditure on particular enterprises, as for instance, the Bagdad Railway.

Sir G. Lowther has now replied to the effect that the note assenting, with certain reservations, to the application of the temettu to foreigners was sent in as long ago as the 14th March, and that fresh stipulations could hardly now be added without having the appearance of a breach of faith.

Sir E. Grey is disposed to concur in this view.

Foreign Office, May 30, 1913

[22967] No. 530.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Cambon

HIS Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs p[illegible] compliments to the French Ambassador, and has the honour to acl[illegible] receipt of his Excellency's communication of the 16th instant relative to t[illegible] the Greek Government to goods of Greek origin of the right of free [illegible]

Sir E. Grey has the honour to inform M. Cambon that the account given in his [illegible] question raised by His Majesty's Minister at Athens to the [illegible] to make is correct.

[illegible] to telegraph that the Greek Government, in reply to a [illegible] the object of the preferential treatment accorded by them to [illegible] and territories which constitutes a somewhat analagous case, [illegible] Government in admitting [illegible] relates occupied by them free of duty. Sir F. Elliot [illegible] that a similar reply would doubtless be given to a protest regarding the case of Crete.

Sir E. Grey accordingly telegraphed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome, instructing his Excellency to ascertain whether the statement that Italian goods enter the occupied Aegean Islands duty free was correct, and Sir R. Rodd replied on the [illegible] that it was so, and that all Italian goods entering those islands pay 25th ultimo [illegible] material destined for the use of the military forces.

Sir E. Grey accordingly instructed Sir F. Elliot on the 28th ultimo to make the proposed [illegible] French, German, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Italian colleagues [illegible] have received similar instructions.

[illegible] 1913.

26930 [illegible]

No. 331.

[illegible] Saint-James.

PROTOCOLE No. 11

Séance du 17 (30) mai 1913.

[illegible]

Pour la Bulgarie :
[illegible] Majorow.

Pour la Grèce :
MM. Skouloudis, Gennadius et Streit ;

Pour le Monténégro :
MM. Popovitch et le Comte de Volnovitch ;

Pour la Serbie :
MM. Novakovitch, Nikolitch, Vesnitch et Pavlovitch ;

Pour la Turquie :
Osman Nizamy Pacha, Batzaria Effendi et Ahmed Réchid Bey.

La séance est ouverte à midi ½, sous la présidence de Sir E. Grey, président d'honneur.

Le Président, après avoir exprimé la satisfaction de Sa Majesté le Roi et de Son Gouvernement de voir la conférence réunie et d'accord pour signer le traité de paix, invite les délégués à procéder de suite à la signature.

Après communication des pleins pouvoirs, les délégués procèdent à la signature du traité en [illegible] exemplaire.*

Le Président prononce ensuite le discours suivant :

"D'ordre du Roi, mon Auguste Souverain, je m'empresse de vous exprimer la vive satisfaction avec laquelle Sa Majesté apprendra la nouvelle de la signature du traité de paix que vous venez de conclure à son Palais de Saint-James.

"Au nom du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, je me permets de vous [illegible] félicitations [illegible] au sujet de l'issue heureuse de la conclusion de la paix entre la Turquie et les États alliés.

* Voir l'annexe au présent protocole.

"Je me plais à espérer que vous envisagerez tous la décision à laquelle vous venez d'arriver avec [illegible] sentiment [illegible] prendront part [illegible] autres, ne [illegible] pas out [illegible] constante [illegible] de l'Europe. [illegible] de paix [illegible] et active [illegible] Balkans [illegible] le désir [illegible] pour suivre [illegible] entretenir avec [illegible] rapports fréquents et amicaux [illegible] les gages [illegible] la connaissance [illegible] pour succéder.

"Puissent [illegible] ressources, fortement éprouvées, développer ses territoires et assurer le bien-[illegible] le bonheur de son peuple [illegible]."

M. [illegible], hellénique, prononce les paroles suivantes :

"As the [illegible] Excellency Sir E. Grey [illegible] the Bulgarian [illegible] voiced the sentiments [illegible] that we [illegible] the part we have taken in [illegible] will [illegible] [illegible] in history [illegible] Balkan [illegible] Europe [illegible] established [illegible] our great Work [illegible] Peace [illegible] Majesty [illegible] the King [illegible] the [illegible] which [illegible] affixed [illegible] signatures to the treaty in this historic palace."

Nizamy Pacha, au nom de la délégation ottomane, s'exprime en ces termes :

"Mon premier devoir est de prier son Excellence Sir E. Grey de vouloir bien se faire l'interprète auprès de Sa Majesté le Roi [illegible] respectueux remerciements pour la [illegible] qu'Elle [illegible] de nous accorder en mettant à la disposition de la Conférence de la Paix Son Palais de Saint-James.

"Je pense également exprimer le sentiment unanime de mes collègues en disant que, si la conférence est arrivée aujourd'hui à un résultat positif, c'est grâce aux efforts déployés par notre éminent président d'honneur et à la sage et éclairée direction qu'il a su donner à nos travaux.

"Aussi prierai-je son Excellence Sir E. Grey d'agréer l'expression de notre reconnaissance pour avoir bien voulu accepter la présidence d'honneur de notre réunion."

M. Danef dit qu'avant d'exprimer ses remerciements, il croit devoir faire les déclarations suivantes :

1° au nom de la délégation bulgare [illegible] plénipotentiaires de la Bulgarie, en se basant sur les communications des Grandes Puissances, en date des 9 (22) mars et 31 mars (13 avril) 1913, entendent, au sujet de l'article 2 du traité de paix, que la frontière en Thrace partira d'un point sur la mer Noire à l'est de Midia, suivra le cours de l'Ergène jusqu'à Mourath, passera entre Kechan et Malgara et longera la ligne de partage des eaux jusqu'à la mer Egée en doutssant au cap Eridjé à l'est d'Enos.

2° de la part des alliés : "Sur l'article 6 du traité de paix les alliés font la réserve que leurs représentants à la commission financière internationale de Paris participeront aux délibérations et aux décisions de la commission au même titre que les autres représentants dans toutes les questions affectant leurs intérêts."

Il prononce ensuite ces paroles :

"M. le Ministre,

"Messieurs,

"Au prix d'efforts inlassables, nous voilà parvenus à la dernière étape de notre longue passion. La [illegible] d'oeuvre européenne pour les peuples des Balkans une date historique. En mettant fin à l'état de guerre, nous allons rétablir des conditions permettant à nos pays de renouer leurs anciens rapports de bon voisinage. Les dures

épreuves de bataille vont céder place à toute une foule de problèmes intéressant notre avenir. Sur ce champ d'endeavor pacifique, les combattants d'avant-hier trouveront des liens de solidarité qui les feront chacun se souvenir de leurs souvenirs de guerre. C'est de la manière dont nous accomplirons cette tâche que le monde nous jugera en dernier ressort.

"La cause de la paix a, dès la première heure, trouvé en vous, M. le Ministre, un ouvrier convaincu et infatigable. Nul n'a tant fait pour aplanir son chemin et assurer son succès final. L'heureux résultat que nous enregistrons aujourd'hui est dû avant tout à la persévérance de votre Excellence, et en lui exprimant ici les sentiments de notre gratitude nous ne faisons que nous acquitter d'un impérieux devoir.

"De même, nous n'oublierons jamais l'accueil si cordial qui nous a été fait par ce pays proverbialement hospitalier. Je saisis cette occasion solennelle pour vous prier, M. le Ministre, de vouloir bien vous faire, auprès de Sa Majesté votre Auguste Souverain, l'interprète de notre profonde reconnaissance. J'ai en outre l'honneur de vouloir bien nous permettre d'attacher le nom de ce palais historique à la paix que nous venons de signer."

M. Novakovitch s'exprime ainsi :

"Mes collègues ont déjà exprimé leurs remerciements à Sa Majesté le Roi, à Son Gouvernement et à son Excellence Sir E. Grey, et je n'ai qu'à m'associer à ces remerciements en exprimant, au nom de la délégation serbe, notre gratitude."

M. Panitch déclare, au nom de la délégation roumaine, s'associer aux remerciements et de gratitude exprimés par les chefs des autres délégations, et ajoute : "Mon pays, se souvenant du passé, tourne encore ses yeux vers la noble nation anglaise et vers son gouvernement pour obtenir ses bons vœux et son appui dans les circonstances présentes."

Osman Nizamy Pacha relève la première déclaration de M. Danev, et dit que, si elle n'admet que très rares décisions des Puissances ne peuvent en admettre d'autres, en son opinion, il faut s'en tenir aux termes de l'article 2 du traité qui vient d'être signé, en vertu duquel la frontière sera délimitée par une commission internationale conformément aux communications des Puissances.

Il dit qu'il faut de même s'en tenir au traité en ce qui concerne la seconde déclaration de M. Danev.

M. Skouloudis donne lecture de la déclaration suivante :

"La délégation hellénique constate, conformément aux déclarations échangées avec les plénipotentiaires ottomans, qu'il est bien entendu que les traités, conventions et actes en vigueur entre les deux gouvernements au moment de la déclaration de la guerre et suspendus par l'effet de la guerre, rentrent intégralement en vigueur après la reprise des relations diplomatiques."

Osman Nizamy Pacha répond qu'il ne peut y avoir de déclarations avant la réunion ici. Que certes la délégation hellénique a eu des conversations privées avec la délégation ottomane, et que, sur la demande des délégués hellènes d'avoir une déclaration officielle dans ce sens dans la séance actuelle, il a déclaré s'en référer à Constantinople pour demander l'autorisation de le faire. Jusqu'à présent il n'a pas reçu de réponse, mais il pense qu'il n'y aura pas de difficultés.

M. Streit fait la déclaration suivante :

"Après la réponse de son Excellence M. le Plénipotentiaire ottoman, je dois déclarer, au nom de la délégation hellénique, et je prie la haute assemblée de vouloir bien en prendre acte, que nous nous sommes déclarés en temps utile être prêts à procéder à la signature du traité sur promesse expresse de la délégation ottomane de faire encore à la séance d'aujourd'hui une déclaration dans le sens de ses assurances antérieures, d'après lesquelles il est bien entendu que les traités, conventions et actes en vigueur entre les deux pays au moment de la déclaration de la guerre et qui ne sont que suspendus par l'effet de la guerre, rentrent intégralement en force après la reprise des relations diplomatiques.

"Je dois ajouter que les assurances en question ont été faites à leurs Excellences MM. Skouloudis et Gennadius ainsi qu'à moi-même par son Excellence Osman Nizamy Pacha, et que le seul point qui reste à régler, principe généralement admis et indiscutable de droit sanctionné par la pratique internationale."

Osman Nizamy Pacha répète que, ainsi qu'il a téléphoné à M. Streit la veille de la séance, il ne peut y avoir ni d'assurances, promesses ou engagements lors des

conversations privées avant que les délibérations de la conférence soient ouvertes, mais qu'il a télégraphié à son gouvernement et qu'il ne peut faire aucune déclaration formelle avant d'avoir reçu une réponse.

M. Danev attire l'attention de la haute assemblée sur le protocole annexe concernant l'entrée en vigueur du traité de paix à partir du jour de la signature, que, d'accord avec plusieurs délégués, il a cru de son devoir de rédiger et dont le texte a été distribué avant l'ouverture de la séance. Il prie le Président d'honneur de vouloir bien inviter ceux des délégués qui sont prêts à signer ce protocole à procéder de suite à sa signature.

M. Veznitch déclare :

"En ce qui concerne les déclarations des délégués hellènes, déclare-t-il, contre-signées en vigueur des traités, conventions et actes suspendus par l'effet de la guerre, le principe invoqué étant un principe de droit international, il serait également applicable à la Serbie.

"Quant au protocole annexe, la délégation serbe ne peut pas le signer pour deux raisons : elle n'a pas de pleins pouvoirs à cet effet et n'a pas été prévenue à temps pour en demander."

M. Skouloudis déclare qu'il n'est pas autorisé à signer un protocole qui a été présenté il y a seulement quelques moments.

M. Popovitch déclare ne pouvoir signer le protocole pour le même raison.

Osman Nizamy Pacha se déclare prêt à signer le protocole annexe.

Sur une question posée par M. Veznitch, *M. Danev* propose que l'échange des ratifications ait lieu à Londres.

Cette proposition est adoptée à l'unanimité.

La prochaine séance est fixée au lundi 20 mai (2 juin), à 4 heures ½.

La séance est levée à 1 heure ½.

Le Président d'honneur
E. GREY.

Les Secrétaires :
H. NORMAN.
S. G. TCHAPRACHIKOV.
A. RIZO-RANGABÉ.
S. Y. GROUITCH.
D. NORADOUNGHIAN.

Annexe au Protocole No. 11.

SA Majesté le Roi des Bulgares, Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes, Sa Majesté le Roi de Monténégro et Sa Majesté le Roi de Serbie (ci-après désignés par les mots "les Souverains alliés") d'une part, et Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans d'autre part, animés du désir de mettre fin au présent état de guerre et de rétablir des relations de paix et d'amitié entre Leurs Gouvernements et Leurs sujets respectifs, ont résolu de conclure un Traité de Paix et ont choisi à cet effet pour Leurs Plénipotentiaires :

Sa Majesté le Roi des Bulgares :

Son Excellence M. le Dr. Stoyan Danev, Président du Sobranié ;
Son Excellence M. Michel Madjarov, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à Londres.

Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes :

Son Excellence M. Étienne Skouloudis, ancien Ministre des Affaires Étrangères ;
Son Excellence M. Jean Gennadius, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à Londres ;
Son Excellence M. Georges Streit, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à Vienne.

Sa Majesté le Roi de Monténégro :

Son Excellence M. Jean Popovitch, ancien Chargé d'Affaires à Constantinople ;
Son Excellence M. le Comte Louis de Vonovitch, ancien Ministre de la Justice.

Sa Majesté le Roi de Serbie :

Son Excellence M. Stoyan Novakovitch, ancien Président du Conseil des Ministres ;
Son Excellence M. André Nikolitch, Président de la Skoupchtina ;
Son Excellence M. Milenko Vesnitch, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire à Paris ;
Son Excellence M. Jean Pavlovitch, ancien Ministre à Sofia.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans :

Son Excellence Osman Nizamy Pacha, Général de Division, ancien Ambassadeur à Berlin ;
Son Excellence Batzaria Effendi, Sénateur, Ministre des Travaux publics ;
Son Excellence Ahmed Réchid Bey, Conseiller-légiste de la Sublime Porte ;

qui, après s'être communiqué leurs pleins pouvoirs et les avoir trouvés en bonne et due forme, sont convenus de ce qui suit :

ARTICLE 1er.

Il y aura, à dater de l'échange des ratifications du présent traité, paix et amitié entre Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans d'une part, et Leurs Majestés les Souverains alliés d'autre part, ainsi qu'entre Leurs héritiers et successeurs, Leurs États et sujets respectifs, à perpétuité.

ARTICLE 2.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans cède à Leurs Majestés les Souverains alliés tous les territoires de Son Empire sur le continent européen à l'ouest d'une ligne tirée d'Enos sur la mer Égée à Midia sur la mer Noire, à l'exception de l'Albanie.

Le tracé exact de la frontière d'Enos à Midia sera déterminé par une commission internationale.

ARTICLE 3.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans et Leurs Majestés les Souverains alliés déclarent remettre à Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, à Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Bohême, &c., et Roi Apostolique de Hongrie, à M. le Président de la République Française, à Sa Majesté le Roi de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande et des Territoires britanniques au delà des Mers, Empereur des Indes, à Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie et à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies le soin de régler la délimitation des frontières de l'Albanie et toutes autres questions concernant l'Albanie.

ARTICLE 4.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans déclare céder à Leurs Majestés les Souverains alliés l'île de Crète et renoncer en Leur faveur à tous les droits de souveraineté et autres qu'il possédait sur cette île.

ARTICLE 5.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans et Leurs Majestés les Souverains alliés déclarent confier à Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, à Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Autriche, Roi de Bohême, &c., et Roi Apostolique de Hongrie, à M. le Président de la République Française, à Sa Majesté le Roi de Grande-Bretagne et d'Irlande et des Territoires britanniques au delà des Mers, Empereur des Indes, à Sa Majesté le Roi d'Italie et à Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Toutes les Russies le soin de statuer sur le sort de toutes les îles ottomanes de la mer Égée, l'île de Crète exceptée, et de la péninsule du Mont-Athos.

ARTICLE 6.

Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Ottomans et Leurs Majestés les Souverains alliés déclarent remettre le soin de régler les questions d'ordre financier résultant de l'état de guerre qui prend fin et des cessions territoriales ci-dessus mentionnées à la commission internationale convoquée à Paris, à laquelle Ils ont délégué Leurs représentants.

ARTICLE 7.

Les questions concernant les prisonniers de guerre, juridiction, nationalité et commerce seront réglées par des conventions spéciales.

ARTICLE FINAL.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications seront échangées à Londres dans le plus bref délai possible.

En foi de quoi les Plénipotentiaires des Hautes Parties contractantes ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait à Londres, le 17 (30) mai 1913, à midi 35 (heure de Greenwich).

DR. ST. DANEFF.
M. IV. MADJAROFF.

ÉTIENNE SKOULOUDIS.
J. GENNADIUS.
G. STREIT.

J. POPOVITCH.
L. DE VOINOVICH.

STOJAN NOVAKOVITCH.
AND. NIKOLITCH.
MIL. R. VESNITCH.
IVAN PAVLOVITCH.

OSMAN NIZAMY.
N. BATZARIA.
AHMED RÉCHID.

NOTA.—Le texte ci-dessus, quant à l'ordre des Hautes Parties contractantes au préambule et des signatures, est celui de l'exemplaire en possession du Gouvernement bulgare.

[24970] No. 532.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 13.) *Canea, May 16, 1913.*

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 3 of the 15th February on the subject of the naval establishments of the protecting Powers in Suda, I have the honour to report that the French cruiser "Bruix" called at Suda Bay this week and removed the greater part of the property of the French Government, as well as the three bluejackets left in charge of it. There still remain a number of odds and ends, which I understand will be sold, and a portable hospital for which the "Bruix" had no accommodation, and which another ship will be sent later on to fetch.

The French flag will still be hoisted on Sundays and other holidays, and a caretaker is left on the premises until the Powers give orders for them to be evacuated. It seems desirable that evacuation of all the sites, if and when decided upon, should take place simultaneously.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[24893] No. 533.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 117.)
Sir, *Athens, May 23, 1913.*

I HAD the honour to receive on the 21st instant your despatch No. 42 of the 9th May on the subject of the restitution of Ottoman fiscal stamps seized by the Greek authorities at Salonica. I consulted my French colleague who, I found, had addressed to M. Coromilas a note on the subject on the 18th April, which he was so good as to show me. As this note said nothing of the representations being made at the request of the Turkish Government, or of the interest of the Ottoman Public Debt in the matter, I have thought it best to follow the same lines, and I am consequently sending M. Coromilas the note of which a copy is enclosed herewith.

The Greek Minister has not replied to M. Deville's note, nor to a similar communication addressed to him by the German Minister of the 13th March, a communication identical with the Porte's circular *note verbale* enclosed in Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 248 of the 28th March having been received at Berlin so long before as the 4th February.

I do not know whether any other of my colleagues have taken steps in the matter.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 533.

Sir F. Elliot to M. Coromilas.

M. le Ministre, *Athens, May 23 (10), 1913.*

HIS Britannic Majesty's Government have learnt, through His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, that the Greek authorities have seized stamps and other fiscal papers used in the collection of taxes, which the Turkish authorities had deposited at the Salonica branch of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. As these stamps and papers cannot be made use of by Greece, I am instructed to enquire whether the Royal Hellenic Government would have any objection to restore them to the branch of the bank from which they were taken.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[24895] No. 534.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 119.)
Sir, *Athens, May 24, 1913.*

AT M. Coromilas's reception on the 22nd instant he explained to me on the map the fighting between the Greeks and Bulgarians to which I referred in my despatch No. 115 of the 19th instant. The Bulgarians had attacked on two sides, from Angista and Eleytherni; at the latter place it was reported that they had had 300 casualties, a figure which he could hardly believe. In all cases except one the Bulgarians had been the aggressors; in that one case, where a Greek officer had advanced from the north-east extremity of Mount Pangaion (Bunar Dagh) and had surrounded a Bulgarian detachment, he had been punished. Notwithstanding the treacherous nature of the attack, the Greeks were behaving with great forbearance, especially in not cutting the railway between Drama and Serres, and so hindering the Bulgarian communications.

He believed M. Gueshof was kept in ignorance of what was going on, and that the orders which he repeatedly promised to send were disregarded. In future M. Coromilas proposed to make all representations to the Bulgarian Government in writing, so as to have a record of their replies. Notwithstanding M. Gueshof's efforts, which he believed were sincere, fighting had begun again on the day before (21st), when the Bulgarians had crossed the Angista River by two bridges, at Augista and Vutsista, and had attacked the Greek positions on the slopes of the Pangaion, which, however, were strong. The Bulgarian claim to occupy this district was untenable; the Greeks had been in possession even before the fall of Salonica.

The next day (23rd) M. Venizelos came to see me, and said that, fighting having been going on without interruption for two days, His Majesty the King had left that morning for Tsagesi (Chai-agzi), the headquarters of the Greek troops in that district, with the object of trying to arrange with the Bulgarian headquarters' staff for the establisment of a neutral zone 5 or 10 kilom. wide, to avoid the danger arising out of the too close proximity of troops, between whom the feeling is the reverse of friendly.

The Prime Minister was very uneasy at the turn things were taking. He said he had information from various quarters that the whole Bulgarian army was burning to attack the Greeks, and was only being restrained until peace was made with Turkey. The officers openly said they would overturn M. Gueshof, and snapped their fingers at King Ferdinand. M. Venizelos had never been under any illusion as to the permanency of the Balkan Confederation; he knew that racial antipathies were too strong; if he had allowed it to be supposed that he believed it would last it was because it was necessary at the moment, and because if he were wrong and it could have been prolonged no one would have been better pleased than himself; but that it should break up in bloodshed before the war with Turkey was over would be an intolerable misfortune and disgrace.

The object of his visit was to ask me to transmit to you his earnest appeal that you would take the initiative in proposing arbitration between the allies—not between Bulgaria and Greece only, but between them all—upon the question of the division of the spoils. I said that the Powers had always wished the allies to settle the question of partition among themselves, and that arbitration presupposed a request for it on the part of all the parties to the dispute. M. Venizelos rejoined that the Powers had already turned mediation into intervention upon several points, and were imposing their will upon the belligerents; could they not do so now, in order to prevent a war which might lead to the most dangerous consequences? If war took place between Greece and Bulgaria the probability was that Bulgaria would find Servia standing by the side of Greece—this was the first suggestion of the existence of an understanding between the two countries that I have heard from a Greek Minister—and the temptation to Austria to fall upon the rear of Servia would be great. He earnestly prayed you to take his appeal into consideration.

The news of to-day shows that fighting was continued yesterday, and that the Bulgarians were attacking Nigrita as well as at the points already mentioned. This indicates Chai-agzi as their objective.

According to a telegram received to-day from Mr. Lamb King Constantine arrived last night at Salonica. His Majesty therefore did not go direct to Chai-agzi. He left Athens yesterday before noon by train to Chalcis, whence he proceeded in a destroyer. He took the whole of his military staff with him, as well as his second son, Prince Alexander.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[24971] No. 535.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Canea, Crete, May 24, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of the Foreign Office despatch No. 2 of the 16th instant, forwarding correspondence relating to financial questions affecting Crete.

I beg leave to point out that, as reported in my despatch No. 65 of the 15th August, 1912, the proceeds of the 3 per cent. surtax are at present paid into the account of the Six Great Powers at the Bank of Crete, and are not, as stated in the third paragraph of your despatch No. 290 of the 27th April, at the disposal of the four protecting Powers alone.

It will therefore be necessary to obtain the consent of Austria-Hungary and Germany before disposing of this fund.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[24901] No. 536.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 133. Confidential.)

Sir, *Rome, May 25, 1913.*

THE recent visit of Prince Carol of Roumania was made the occasion for very marked demonstrations of sympathy, and official Italy, in the phase of self congratulation on the results of the renewal of the Triple Alliance, is now full of attention for the State, which may almost be regarded as an unofficial member of that association. I was therefore not altogether surprised to hear from the Greek Chargé d'Affaires that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had told him that, in view of the very cordial relations which had been established between Italy and Roumania, it was impossible for the former to ignore the strong desire entertained by the latter that the Koutzo-Vlachs of the Pindus should be incorporated in Albania rather than in Greece, a proposal which the Greek Chargé d'Affaires here has described as involving an Albanian enclave in the heart of Hellas.

In discussing the question of the Koutzo-Vlachs with myself the Marquess di San Giuliano has always rather contended that it is Austria-Hungary that feels bound to champion the interests of Roumania. He returned to the subject this morning, and gave me a historical sketch of the gradual development in the past thirty or forty years of a national feeling among these sporadic groups of Vlachs, which, before the active propaganda carried on by a committee established in Monastir, had admittedly not shown themselves recalcitrant to Hellenisation. They had now become so, and it was a fact to be reckoned with. I suggested that there were not a few in Hungary, and enquired whether Austria was equally anxious to guard against their Magyarisation.

As I have already reported some previous conversations on this subject it is unnecessary to record much that was said on similar lines on the present occasion. The new point which his Excellency raised was that in the proposed agreement between Bulgaria and Roumania the former had already accepted the principle of non-interference with the Koutzo-Vlachs of Macedonia, and the guarantee which Bulgaria was prepared to give constituted a precedent for their recognition as a distinct national element. He thought if Greece was prepared to give similar guarantees it was possible that Austria, that is to say Roumania, objections to the inclusion of the Koutzo-Vlachs of the Pindus in the territories accruing to Greece might be withdrawn, and that there would be something in the nature of compensation to set against the strip of coast between Vallona and the Corfu Channel, with regard to which both Austria-Hungary and Italy must remain uncompromising. From these observations the opinion was confirmed which I have from the first entertained—that the question of the Koutzo-Vlachs of the Pindus has been invented as one that might serve to provide material for bargaining with the Hellenic kingdom.

The Greek Chargé d'Affaires has also told me that he has heard, though not directly from the Marquess di San Giuliano, of a new question which is likely to be raised. It was, he learns, been discovered that Argyrocastro, and perhaps some other places in the neighbourhood which Greece has occupied in the interior, will command the road to Vallona, and that therefore their possession by Greece will constitute a menace to the Albanian State. It is possible that the researches which have led to this discovery were inspired by a similar motive.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[24930] No. 537.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 280.)

Sir, *Paris, May 30, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith Sir Paul Harvey's despatch, reporting a conversation with the secretary of the forthcoming Commission on Balkan Financial Affairs on the subject of the composition of the sub-commissions which it is proposed to appoint.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 537.

Sir P. Harvey to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 6.)

Sir, *Paris, May 30, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the secretary of the forthcoming Commission on Balkan Financial Affairs spoke to me this morning on the subject of the composition of the sub-commissions which it is proposed to appoint.

It is assumed that three sub-commissions will be necessary—one to deal with the apportionment of the Ottoman Debt, a second to deal with the question of the Balkan claim to a war indemnity, and the third to deal with the question of railway and other concessions in the ceded territories. A president and a "rapporteur" would be appointed to each.

It is suggested that M. Helfferich, the German delegate, should be the president of the first, M. Raffalovich of the second, and myself of the third. I was asked my opinion as to this arrangement.

I pointed out that M. Helfferich, the representative of the Deutsche Bank, had identified himself in the preliminary discussions with an extreme view as to the charges which should be thrown upon the Balkan States avowedly in the interests of the Baghdad Railway, and that his appointment to the presidency of the sub-commission, notwithstanding his great knowledge and competence, might not commend itself to the Balkan States as an indication of impartiality.

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith M. Pichon's reply, which is to the effect that the French Government hold similar views to those of His Majesty's Government, and that observations have already been made to the Greek Minister in Paris taking exception to the claim of the Greek authorities to control the accounts of the bank—a claim which, according to M. Pichon's information, has now been abandoned.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 537.

Memorandum communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Pichon.

EN faisant connaître au département les prétentions émises par les autorités grecques résidant à Salonique de procéder au contrôle des opérations de la Banque Impériale ottomane, l'Ambassade d'Angleterre a bien voulu s'enquérir, d'ordre de son Gouvernement, de l'attitude que le Gouvernement de la république comptait adopter à cette occasion vis-à-vis du Gouvernement hellénique.

M. Pichon s'empresse de faire savoir à son Excellence Sir Francis Bertie que le Gouvernement de la république était disposé à protester de son côté contre l'exercice de ce contrôle; des observations dans ce sens avaient même été faites au Ministre de Grèce à Paris, et, d'après des renseignements fournis par M. Romanos à la date du 24 de ce mois, les autorités helléniques à Salonique ont décidé de surseoir à l'application des mesures incriminées.

M. Pichon saisit, &c.

Paris, le 29 mai, 1913.

[24931] No. 538.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 281.)

Sir, *Paris, May 30, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith Sir Paul Harvey's despatch, reporting a conversation with the secretary of the forthcoming Commission on Balkan Financial Affairs on the subject of the composition of the sub-commissions which it is proposed to appoint.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 538.

Sir P. Harvey to Sir Edward Grey.

(No. 6.)

Sir, *Paris, May 30, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the secretary of the forthcoming Commission on Balkan Financial Affairs spoke to me this morning on the subject of the composition of the sub-commissions which it is proposed to appoint.

It is assumed that three sub-commissions will be necessary—one to deal with the apportionment of the Ottoman Debt, a second to deal with the question of the Balkan claim to a war indemnity, and the third to deal with the question of railway and other concessions in the ceded territories. A president and a "rapporteur" would be appointed to each.

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I pointed out that M. Helfferich, the representative of the Deutsche Bank, had identified himself in the preliminary discussions with an extreme view as to the charges which should be thrown upon the Balkan States avowedly in the interests of the Baghdad Railway, and that his appointment to the presidency of the sub-commission, notwithstanding his great knowledge and competence, might not commend itself to the Balkan States as an indication of impartiality.

Similarly, the Turkish Government might be unfavourably impressed with the appointment of so ardent an advocate of a war indemnity as M. Raffalovich to the presidency of the sub-commission dealing with the matter.

I suggested that the presidency of these two sub-commissions might with advantage be taken from the representatives of countries, such as Italy or Austria, less closely interested in the matters submitted to their consideration.

M. Ponsot, the secretary, replied that in view of M. Raffalovich's position it was desired to give him the presidency of one of the sub-commissions. I replied that he might perhaps be thought suitable for the presidency of the third sub-commission, that dealing with the question of concessions.

As for myself, I felt sure you would desire that I should accommodate myself to any arrangement that might be thought of general advantage, and that I had no desire to be considered for the presidency of any of the sub-commissions if it was found convenient to select other delegates for those posts.

I have, &c.
H. P. HARVEY.

[24875] No. 539.

Mr. Crackanthorpe to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 132.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, May 30, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from Monastir to-day, No. 20:—

"The intendance of the first Morava division has left Monastir for Perlepe. Second regiment has left Dibra, and is reported to have arrived at Perlepe. Second regiment of the independent Morava brigade has been sent to Dibra from Ochrida."

[25077] No. 540.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 190.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, May 31, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 30th May.

Both the King of the Bulgarians and the Prime Minister are working hard for a peaceful solution. If war can be averted for ten days or so I think that moderating counsels may prevail, but the situation is critical. Much will depend on interview between the Prime Ministers to-night. M. Gueshof is prepared to make some territorial concessions in the neighbourhood of Kuprulu and Ishtib, but not to cede Monastir or Ochrida. He is himself not sanguine of result since the Servian Prime Minister's statement in the Skupshtina.

(Sent to Belgrade.)

[25087] No. 541.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 191.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May 31, 1913.*

M. NATCHOVITCH, formerly Minister at Constantinople, has been sent there in order to arrange rapprochement.

Bulgarian Government hope to obtain assurance that attitude of Ottoman Government will be pacific in the event of war between the allies.

Signature of treaty in London yesterday aroused no public interest here in view of threatening outlook.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[25088] No. 542.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received May 31.)

(No. 192. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, May 31, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 190 of to-day.

Meeting of Prime Ministers has been postponed to to-morrow night.

If no immediate arrangement can be come to, Servian Government will formally propose a conference at St. Petersburgh on the lines given in my telegram No. 185 of 28th May. This proposal will be made with the knowledge and consent of the Russian Government.

(Sent to Belgrade.)